ANGELA KU vs PLAYQ INC., A DELAWARE CORP...

Community Property Management's Demurrer is sustained. Defendants Watergate Property Owners Association, Inc. and S.H. Chavin, Inc., D/B/A Community Property Management's Motion to Strike is granted. Leave to amend is denied. Date: 08/26/2026 _______________________________ William E. Weinberger Judge, Los Angeles Superior Court

HEARING DATE: 08/26/2026 CASE NUMBER: 25STCV29790 CASE NAME: ANGELA KU vs PLAYQ INC., A DELAWARE CORP... MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant Angela Ku OPPOSING PARTY: Defendants/Cross-Complainants PlayQ Inc. and Charles Tien PROCEEDING: Anti-slapp motion to strike

SUMMARY: Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant Angela Ku's Special Motion to Strike (Anti-SLAPP) is denied. Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant Angela Ku is to file an Answer to Defendant/Cross-Complainants PlayQ Inc. and Charles Tien's Cross-Complaint within ten days of this Ruling. The Court sets an Order to Show Cause Re: Filing of Answer to Cross-complaint for ________, 2026 at 8:30AM.

Background

On October 10, 2025, plaintiff Angela Ku ("Ku") filed a Complaint against defendants PlayQ Inc. ("PlayQ") and Chrles Tien ("Tien" and, with PlayQ, "PlayQ Parties") alleging causes of action for (1) Retaliation in Violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA") against PlayQ; (2) Whistleblower Retaliation in Violation of Lab. Code Sec. 1102.5 against PlayQ; (3) Violation of Lab. Code Sec. 98.7 against PlayQ; (4) Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy against PlayQ; and (5) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress ("IIED") against Tien.

Ku alleges as follows: She was hired by PlayQ in December 2024 and, starting in or about mid-January 2025, she began reporting concerns regarding improprieties and potential legal concerns with how PlayQ was structured and PlayQ's reporting patterns. Ku also made a formal complaint of harassment and discrimination based on gender against her supervisor, Tien, as she observed Tien was placing stricter deadlines for performance of her job duties than PlayQ Parties had placed on Ku's male predecessor.

Following these events, PlayQ parties engaged in a pattern of providing her with performance meetings and feedback. Ultimately, PlayQ terminated her employment on April 4, 2025 due

to her voicing her concerns, as a result of which she suffered damages. On December 30, 2026, PlayQ Parties filed their Answer to the Complaint and a Cross-Complaint against Ku. In the Cross-Complaint, they allege causes of action for (1) Unauthorized Access to Computer Systems (Pen. Code Sec. 502(c)(2), (e)(1)) pleaded by PlayQ only; (2) Breach of Contract, pleaded by PlayQ only; (3) Breach of Fiduciary Duty, pleaded by PlayQ only; (4) Conversion, pleaded by PlayQ only; (5) Defamation, pleaded by PlayQ Parties; and (6) IIED, pleaded by Tien only.

On February 3, 2026, Ku filed her Answer to the Cross-Complaint, and on March 3, 2026, Ku filed this Special Motion to Strike (Anti-SLAPP). PlayQ Parties filed their Opposition on August 65, 20206, and on August 12, 2026, Ku filed her Reply. LEGAL STANDARD Under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, a cause of action asserted against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of his/her right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution, in connection with a public issue, is subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim. (Code Civ.

Proc. Sec. 425.16(b)(1); Wilbanks v. Wolk (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 883, 892.)¿ In determining whether to grant a special motion to strike, the Court engages in a two-step process.¿ (E.g.,¿ Shekhter¿v. Fin.¿Indemn. Co. ¿(2001), 89 Cal.App.4th 141, 150.)¿ This process is essentially a "summary-judgment-like procedure at an early stage of the litigation." (Varian Med. Sys., Inc. v.¿Delfino ¿(2005), 35 Cal.4th 180, 192.)¿ "First, the court must determine whether defendant has made a threshold showing that the challenged cause of action 'arises from' a protected activity.¿ Second, if the defendant makes this showing, the trial court must determine whether the plaintiff has established a probability of prevailing on the claim."¿ (Optional Capital, Inc. v.

Das Corp. ¿(2014), 222 Cal.App.4th 1388, 1398.)¿¿¿¿ ¿ The motion requires the moving party to bear the initial burden of establishing a prima facie showing that the plaintiff's cause of action arises from the defendant's free speech or petition activity. (Wilbanks, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at 894.) The defendant may meet this burden by showing that the act that forms the basis of the plaintiff's cause of action was a written or oral statement made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding; or such a statement in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body; or such a statement was made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest.¿ (Wilcox v.

Superior Court (1994) 27 Cal. App. 4th 809, 820 [overruled in part as to showing of intent of party that filed the complaint].)¿ Once a defendant meets their

burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim, i.e., to make a prima facie showing of facts that would, if proved at trial, support a judgment in plaintiff's favor. (Feldman v. 1100 Park Lane Associates (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1467, 1497-78.) Specifically, the plaintiff carries their shifting burden by making an evidentiary showing like that required under Code of Civil. Procedure section 437c. (Id.; Ludwig v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 8, 15.)¿ If the special motion to strike is granted, the court must enter judgment for the defendant.¿ (DuPont Merck Pharmaceutical Co. v.

Superior Court ¿(2000), 78 Cal.App.4th 562, 564.)¿ No leave to amend may be granted.¿ (Schaffer v. City and County of San Francisco ¿(2008), 168 Cal.App.4th 992, 1005.)¿ DISCUSSION Ku brings this Special Motion to Strike (Anti-SLAPP) as to the Cross-Complaint as a whole. A. Data-Exfiltration/Misappropriation of Data Claims (the First Through Fourth Causes of Action in the Cross-complaint) The basis for the First Cause of Action is that Ku "knowingly accessed PlayQ's 'computer systems,' 'computer devices,' and/or 'computer network' containing 'data' wrongfully and without authorization, and knowingly accessed and without permission took, copied, or made use of the 'data' from the 'computer systems,' 'computer devices,' and/or 'computer network,' and copied or took supporting documentation existing or residing internal or external to 'computer systems,' 'computer devices,' and/or 'computer network.' " (Cross-Compl.

P. 27.) The same allegations underlie the Second Cause of Action (Breach of Contract): Ku's above actions breached the Confidential Information and Invention Assignment Agreement (Cross-Compl. P. 34); the Third Cause of Action (Breach of Fiduciary Duty): Ku's above actions breached her duty as Controller at PlayQ (id. P. 42); and the Fourth Cause of Action (Conversion): Ku's actions converted PlayQ's property (id. at 49). Ku asserts that her alleged actions are protected under section 425.16(e) of the Code of Civil Procedure as preparatory conduct in furtherance of one's right to petition and to communicate about matters of public interest as, to the extent Ku purposefully took possession of PlayQ documents and information, it was only to preserve evidence relating to PlayQ's alleged illegal conduct and Ku's protected right to petition for redress of her grievances.

Ku supports her arguments with the following cases: · MMM Holdings, Inc. v. Reich (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 167: An attorney for a company, Valdez, used various documents he received from Valdez for a qui tam action. The appellate court held that that the distribution of documents for either purpose was done "in furtherance of

the exercise of the constitutional right of petition" with respect to the Perez documents and "in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right ... of free speech" as each distribution and use of the documents was done to further litigation efforts, ether on behalf of Valdez or others. The qui tam action and all issues related to it were necessarily issues of public interest as a qui tam action allows a private person to sue as a private attorney general to recover damages or penalties, all or part of which will be paid to the government.

In addition, Plaintiffs in the action failed to establish the probability of prevailing on their claims. · Greka Integrated, Inc. v. Lowrey (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1572: After leaving his employment, a safety manager testified against the employer in a personal injury suit filed by a worker and cooperated in criminal investigations of the employer regarding other worker safety and environmental contamination incidents. As part of these events, the safety manager took documents belonging to the company without permission and breached a nondisclosure agreement by disclosing those documents to third parties.

The safety manager declared that he disclosed information related solely to the employer's non-compliance with law and the identity of those who were informed of this non-compliance of law to officials at various public agencies - the district attorney, and also to his own attorney, in response to a deposition subpoena in the Lopez matter, and to family and friends to explain why he could no longer work for his employer. The appellate court held that disclosure to counsel, to authorities and in deposition and trial testimony in response to subpoenas were protected activities and statements to family and friends were not sufficient to refute the safety manager's prima facie case. · Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc. v.

Paladino (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 294: An in-house counsel believed she was terminated on the basis of her sex and pregnancy and consulted a law firm for legal advice as to her rights, including disclosing confidential and privileged information about her employer to the law firm. The appellate court held that in-house counsel may disclose ostensible employer-client confidences to her own attorneys to the extent they may be relevant to the preparation and prosecution of her wrongful termination action against her former client-employer.

Because, as explained below, Ku's acts underlying PlayQ Parties' causes of action were not in furtherance of Ku's right of petition or free speech, the Court concludes that has not met her burden, with regard to these causes of action, on the first prong of the two-part test. The applicability of section 425.16 to those causes of action depends upon the "principal thrust or gravamen" of PlayQ Parties' claims. (Martinez v. Metabolife Internat., Inc. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 181, 188 [italics omitted]; see City of Cotati v.

Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4th 69, 76-78 [discussing initial step as whether defendant has made threshold showing that challenged cause of action is one "arising from" protected activity].) As the Court explained in Olive Properties, L.P., v. Coolwaters Enterprises, Inc. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1169, 1175: The "'meaning of "gravamen" is clear; "gravamen" means the

"material part of a grievance, charge, etc." [Citation.]' [Citation.] [P.] In the context of the anti-SLAPP statute, the 'gravamen is defined by the acts on which liability is based.' [Citation.] The 'focus is on the principal thrust or gravamen of the causes of action, i.e., the allegedly wrongful and injury-producing conduct that provides the foundation for the claims. [Citations.]' [Citation.]" (Renewable Resources Coalition, Inc. v. Pebble Mines Corp. (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 384, 396 [159 Cal.

Rptr. 3d 901], original italics.) And the Court in Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82. 89, explained: "In deciding whether the initial 'arising from' requirement is met, a court considers 'the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based.' (Sec. 425.16, subd. (b).)" PlayQ Parties' Cross-Complaint is not based on Ku's protected petitioning activity or his preparation for protected activity. (Ibid.) The basis for the First through Fourth Causes of Action in the Cross-Complaint is Ku's alleged misappropriation of confidential and proprietary information of PlayQ from shortly after the commencement of Ku's employment as a Finance Controller, a position with a fiduciary duty to PlayQ, in December 2024 through April 2025.

They allege that Ku began copying PlayQ data and Confidential Information on or around December 4, 2024, onto her personal computer and/or other personal electronic devices in direct violation of PlayQ's Confidential Information and Invention Assignment Agreement. (Cross-Compl. P. 13.) In her declaration, Ku testifies that she discovered PlayQ's unusual structure "in or around mid-January" and "began downloading documents in "late January and February 2025." (Ku Decl. P.P. 6-7.) Tien's declaration focuses on the forensic analysis of Ku's computer which shows: · Ku began copying PlayQ data to personal devices as early as December 4, 2024--just two days into her employment (Decl.

Tien P. 7); · Ku was emailing PlayQ documents to her personal Gmail account by December 11, 2024 (id. P. 8); · There are at least 1,400 documented instances of Ku capturing or copying company information, which include: (a) quarterly financial forecasts; (b) investor and lender contact information; (c) employee W-2s containing Social Security numbers; (d) salary and compensation data; (e) tax filings; (f) insurance applications; (g) privileged legal invoices from PlayQ's outside counsel, Cooley LLP; and (h) PPP loan applications containing CEO Joseph Aigboboh's Social Security number (id.

P. 9); and · Ku permanently deleted and moved PlayQ files to "Trash" during her employment (id. P. 10). The gravamen of the

Cross-Complaint is unauthorized data usage, not Ku's protected petitioning activity. By Ku's own admission, she began downloading documents purportedly to prepare for protected activity in late January and February 2025. Moreover, based upon the evidence the PlayQ Parties presented, the alleged misappropriation and unauthorized access to computer files went far beyond what could be considered any alleged preparation for protected activity. Based upon the legal standard explained above, Ku has failed to meet her initial burden of establishing a prima facie showing that the PlayQ Parties' First through Fourth Causes of Action arise from her free speech or petition activity.

Therefore, the Court does not consider whether the PlayQ Parties have met any burden under the second-prong of the Anti-SLAPP motion analysis. B. Ku's Email Claims (the Fifth and Sixth Causes of Action in the Cross-Complaint) The Fifth and Sixth Causes of Action for Defamation and IIED, respectfully, are based on the following alleged conduct: Ku has represented and stated to third parties in writing, including current investors of PlayQ, that PlayQ and/or Tien was participating in fraudulent activity and unlawful business practices, among other things.

Ku made such statements with no good faith belief in any legally viable claim. (Cross-Compl. P. 58; see also P. 67 [stating that the Sixth Cause of Action is based on Ku "sending an unnecessary email"].) Ku argues that the email at issue unquestionably concerns her anticipated litigation and was sent in an attempt to avoid the instant lawsuit and that she directed the email to PlayQ stakeholders, including outside investors, to inform them of PlayQ's legal exposure on both her claims, and the fraudulent activity and unlawful business practices she uncovered and complained about during her employment.

Ku cited Neville v. Chudacoff (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1255, 1268 (" Neville ") to support her contention that such communications constituted protected activity. In Neville, the Court stated: "Although one could read the language of section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2) to allude to pending litigation by referring to 'an issue under consideration or review by a ... judicial body,' our Supreme Court has said, ' "[j]ust as communications preparatory to or in anticipation of the bringing of an action or other official proceeding are within the protection of the litigation privilege of Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b) [citation], ... such statements are equally entitled to the benefits of section 425.16." ' " (Id. at 1268 (citing Briggs v.

Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106).) The Court reviewed the letter sent by the attorney representing the corporation in its dispute with Neville, a former employee and cross-complainant, to employees under the "reasonably

relevant" to pending or contemplated litigation standard and determined that the letter was protected because it was directed to the corporation's current and former clients who "[the corporation] reasonably could believe had an interest in the dispute as potential witnesses to, or unwitting participants in, Neville's alleged misconduct" and "contained no statements of fact concerning [cross-complainant] Neville that were not based on or related to the allegations that formed the basis of [the corporation's] claims. (Id. at 1267-68.)

The appellate court noted that the letter was written on corporate letterhead and informed employees that cross-complainant breached his duty to corporation and discussed cross-complainant's breach; the Court of Appeal also stated that the writer was acting to represent the corporation in its efforts to enforce the employment agreement and contained no statements of fact concerning cross-complainant that were not based on or related to the allegations that formed the basis of the corporation's claims. (Id. at 1269.)

The Court held that the letter at issue had statements made "in connection with" pending or anticipated litigation and that such statements directed to non-parties or potential parties to litigation are protected. (Id. at 1270.) Here, the email in question is attached to Ku's declaration at Exhibit 1. Unlike in Neville, Ku was not directed by PlayQ to draft such an email nor is she an attorney who represented PlayQ. (See id. at 1260.) The email came from Ku's personal email discussing what Ku's attorney told her ("My attorney advised me that PlayQ would conduct a fraudulent investigation of the behavior of PlayQ's CFO, refuse to share the investigation report with me, and fire me after my work on the audit and tax filing deliverables was approaching completion.

Everything played out 100% as the lawyer predicted."). (Ku Decl., Exh. 1.) The email also stated that (1) Ku made a mistake trusting PlayQ to do right by their employees to hold the lawyer off from filing a lawsuit; (2) PlayQ's actions constituted retaliation; and (3) Ku was giving PlayQ three business days to give a fair evaluation of the abuses that concern the problems she raised with PlayQ, including gender issues and potentially fraudulent loans, and to converse with her. (Ibid.) The letter was sent after Ku's termination and to external stakeholders. (Ku Decl.

P.P. 11-12.) The Neville Court provided the following rule: "Accordingly, although litigation may not have commenced, if a statement 'concern[s] the subject of the dispute' and is made 'in anticipation of litigation "contemplated in good faith and under serious consideration" ' (Rohde, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at p. 37, quoting Action Apartment, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1251) then the statement may be petitioning activity protected by section 425.16." (Neville, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at 1268.) Ku's complaint in the action concerns retaliation and IIED.

Ku's email partially addresses a subject of the dispute made in anticipation of litigation. However, Ku fails to address the full standard set out in Neville. Ku does not address whether the email, directed at PlayQ Defendants and their external stakeholders, was contemplated in good faith and under serious consideration. Further, Chudacoff's letter was sent to former customers of the corporation informing them that his attempt at solicitation of customers was in violation of an employment and confidentiality

agreement unlike in this action where the stakeholders were carbon copied onto Ku's email. Ku's situation vastly differs from that of Cudacoff, the attorney who represented the corporation against cross-complainant in Neville and, as such, is distinguished. The factual differences in this action remain unaddressed by Ku. In Action Apartment Assn., Inc. v. City of Santa Monica (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1232, 1251, the Supreme Court explained: "A prelitigation communication is privileged only when it relates to litigation that is contemplated in good faith and under serious consideration. . .

To be protected by the litigation privilege, a communication must be 'in furtherance of the objects of the litigation.' " Ku has failed to meet her initial burden of establishing a prima facie showing that the PlayQ Parties' Fifth and Sixth Causes of action arise from her free speech or petition activity. (See Legal Standard above.) As such, the burden does not shift and the Court need not move to the second-prong of the two-step process of determining whether to grant or deny a special motion to strike.

Accordingly, Ku's Special Motion to Strike (anti-SLAPP) is denied. C. Attorney's Fees Section 425.16(c)(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure provides: Except as provided in paragraph (2), in any action subject to subdivision (b), a prevailing defendant on a special motion to strike shall be entitled to recover that defendant's attorney's fees and costs. If the court finds that a special motion to strike is frivolous or is solely intended to cause unnecessary delay, the court shall award costs and reasonable attorney's fees to a plaintiff prevailing on the motion, pursuant to Section 128.5.

A motion is "frivolous" if "any reasonable attorney would agree that [it] is totally and completely without merit." (Decker v. U.D. Registry, Inc. (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1382, 1392.) Based on the papers submitted in support of and in opposition to the anti-SLAPP motion, the Court does not find that Ku's motion was frivolous. For this reason, the PlayQ Parties request for attorneys' fees and costs is denied.

Conclusion

Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant Angela Ku's Special Motion to Strike (Anti-SLAPP) is denied. Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant Angela Ku is to file an Answer to Defendant/Cross-Complainants PlayQ Inc. and Charles Tien's Cross-Complaint within ten days. The Court sets an Order to Show Cause Re: Answer to Cross-Complaint for ______________,2026, at 8:30AM. Date: _______________________________