Dennis J. Stankie v. Pro Tow & Transport Inc., et al.

objections in deposition, to refrain from supplying testimony, and to allow the witness to answer. Moving party to give notice, unless waived. Dated: August 26, 2026 ¿ | ¿ Brock T. Hammond¿¿ ¿ Judge of the Superior Court¿ |

Judge Brock T. Hammond, Department 407 HEARING DATE: August 26, 2026 TRIAL DATE: April 26, 2027 CASE: Dennis J. Stankie v. Pro Tow & Transport Inc., et al. CASE NO.: 24STCV30969 MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER MOTION TO DECLARE PLAINTIFF DENNIS J. STANKIE A VEXATIOUS LITIGANT; REQUEST FOR SECURITY, STAY, PREFILING ORDER, AND DISMISSAL IF SECURITY IS NOT FURNISHED I. INTRODUCTION Plaintiff Dennis J. Stankie ("Stankie"), a self-represented litigant, brings this action against Defendants, Pro Tow & Transport, Inc. ("Pro Tow"), Mohammad Reza Choroumi ("Choroumi"), and Brian Morgan ("Morgan"), arising from Stankie allegedly being threatened with assault by Pro Tow's tow truck driver, Morgan, and being charged $60 to have his vehicle towed when it broke down.

Before the court are four motions: (1) Pro Tow and Choroumi's motion to declare Plaintiff a vexatious litigant; (2) Stankie's motion for leave to amend the complaint; (3) Morgan's motion for judgment on the pleadings; (4) Stankie's motion for protective order. The court addresses these motions in turn. II. DISCUSSION RE VEXATIOUS LITIGANT DECLARATION A.

Background

On July 7, 2026, Pro Tow and Choroumi (hereafter, "Defendants") filed a motion to declare Stankie a vexatious litigant. On July 14, 2026, Morgan filed a joinder to Pro Tow's motion. On August 17, 2026, Stankie filed an opposition. On August 19, 2026, Defendants filed a reply. B. Judicial Notice Defendants' request for judicial notice is GRANTED. Stankie appears to request judicial notice of the entire case files of twelve civil actions Stankie has previously filed. The request is improper and facially defective. Stankie's request for judicial notice is DENIED. C.

Legal Standard

The vexatious litigant statute "provides a procedure in pending litigation for declaring a person a vexatious litigant, and establishes procedure strictures that can be imposed on vexatious litigants." (In re Bittaker (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1008.) A court may "issue a prefiling order that prohibits the vexatious litigant from filing any new litigation without first obtaining permission of the presiding judge of the court where the litigation is proposed to be filed." (Ibid.) "The vexatious litigant statute . . . was enacted . . . to curb misuse of the court system by those acting in propria persona who repeatedly litigate the same issues." (Ibid.) "Their abuse of the system not only wastes court time and resources but also prejudices other parties waiting their turn before the courts." (Ibid.) "The prefiling order component of the vexatious litigant statute is a necessary method of curbing those for whom litigation has become a game." (In re Natural Gas Antitrust Cases (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 387, 394.) "It does not deny the vexatious litigant access to the courts, but operates to preclude meritless litigation and the attendant expenditure of resources." (Ibid.)¿¿¿ "A court may declare a person to be a vexatious litigant who, in the immediately preceding seven-year period has commenced, prosecuted, or maintained in propria persona at least five litigations other than in a small claims court that have been . . . finally determined adversely to the person . . . ." (Garcia v.

Lacey (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 402, 406, quoting CCP Sec. 391(b)(1).) "The term [l]itigation is defined broadly as any civil action or proceeding, commenced, maintained or pending in any state or federal court." (Ibid., internal quotations omitted.) "A litigation includes an appeal or civil writ proceeding filed in an appellate court." (Ibid.) "A litigation is finally determined adversely to a plaintiff if he does not win the action or proceeding he began, including cases that are voluntarily dismissed by a plaintiff." (Ibid.)¿¿ D.

Application

1. Procedural Violations Here, Stankie filed and served his opposition less than nine court days before the hearing. CCP Sec. 1005(b) requires that all opposition papers be filed and served at least nine court days prior to the hearing. Stankie's opposition is untimely. Also, none of the documents attached to the opposition have been properly authenticated nor has a foundation been laid for such exhibits through a declaration. The Court acknowledges that Stankie is representing himself in pro per. However, pro per "litigants are held to the same standards as attorneys." (Kobayashi v. Superior Court (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 536, 543.)

2. Stankie Should be Declared a Vexatious Litigant Defendants present evidence, through the declaration of their counsel, Jeffrey Lewis, that Stankie has initiated 7 civil actions since February 13, 2020. (Frazier-Krane Decl., P.P. 31-49; Exhs. 56-73.) Those actions were determined adversely to Plaintiff. Specifically: On February 13, 2020, Stankie filed a civil action in Dennis Stankie v. CF United LLC, et al., LASC Case No. 20STCV05594, which was voluntarily dismissed with prejudice on June 8, 2022. (See RJN No. 10; Lewis Decl., P. 43, Ex. 67.)

A voluntary dismissal, with or without prejudice, counts as a final adverse determination for section 391(b)(1). (Tokerud v. Capitolbank Sacramento (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 775, 779.) On December 28, 2020, Stankie filed a civil action in Dennis J. Stankie v. Dennis Gorman, LASC Case No. 20STCV48887, which was disposed by jury verdict in the defendant's favor on May 2, 2022. Judgment was entered on the same day. (See RJN No. 6, Lewis Decl., P. 33, Ex. 58.) On September 9, 2021, Stankie filed an Emergency Writ of Mandamus in federal court in Dennis Stankie v.

Superior Court of California, Case No. LACV21-7233-DSF-AS regarding the superior court's rulings in Dennis J. Stankie v. Dennis Gorman, LASC Case No. 20STCV48887, which was dismissed on September 13, 2021 for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (RJN No. 7; Lewis Decl., P.P. 36-37, Exs. 61-62.) On November 3, 2021, Stankie filed a Notice of Appeal in Dennis J. Stankie v. Dennis Gorman, LASC Case No. 20STCV48887, which was dismissed by the appellate division on December 1, 2021 due to Stankie's failure to procure the record on appeal and to cure the default. (See RJN No. 6; Lewis Decl., P. 35, Ex. 60.)

On July 18, 2023, Stankie filed a civil action in Dennis Stankie v. Santa Monica Bay Woman's Club, LASC Case No. 23STCV16690, which was dismissed by the court due to Stankie's violations of various court orders on October 29, 2025. (See RJN No. 9; Lewis Decl., P. 42, Ex. 66.) On November 16, 2023, Stankie filed a civil action in Dennis Stankie v. Douglas Emmett LLC, et al., LASC Case No. 23SMCV05394, which Stankie dismissed without prejudice on January 8, 2024. (See RJN No. 10; Lewis Decl., P.P. 30, 39 and Ex. 64.)

On October 30, 2025, Plaintiff pursued an appeal in the

civil action in Dennis Stankie v. Santa Monica Bay Woman's Club, LASC Case No. 23STCV16690, which was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on June 2, 2026. (See RJN No. 9, Lewis Decl., P. 48, Ex. 72.) Based on the evidence presented by Defendants, as well as Stankie's numerous unmeritorious filings in this case, the court finds it appropriate that Stankie be declared a vexatious litigant. Defendants establish that, within the past seven years, Stankie has commenced and prosecuted seven civil actions which were determined adversely to him, either through dismissal or after consideration of the merits.

The court finds that Stankie is a vexatious litigant within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 391(b)(1). Accordingly, Defendants' request to deem Stankie a vexatious litigant is GRANTED. B. A Prefiling Order is Appropriate "[T]he court may, on its own motion or the motion of any party, enter a prefiling order which prohibits a vexatious litigant from filing any new litigation in the courts of this state in propria person without first obtaining leave of the presiding justice or presiding judge of the court where the litigation is proposed to be filed.

Disobedience of the order by a vexatious litigant may be punished as a contempt of court." (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 391.7, subd. (a).) "The clerk of the court shall provide the Judicial Council a copy of any prefiling orders issued pursuant to subdivision (a)." (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 391.7, subd. (f).) Defendants request that, along with being declared a vexatious litigant, a prefiling order be entered to prohibit Stankie from filing frivolous lawsuits. Given that Stankie has commenced a total of seven actions since February of 2020, and each have been adversely determined against Stankie, the court finds it appropriate to enter a prefiling order.

Accordingly, Defendants' request to enter a prefiling order is GRANTED. C. Defendants Show that Plaintiff Should be Required to Furnish Security "In any litigation pending in any court of this state, at any time until final judgment is entered, a defendant may move the court, upon notice and hearing, for an order requiring the plaintiff to furnish security or for an order dismissing the litigation pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 391.3." (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 391.1, subd. (a).) "The motion for an order requiring the plaintiff to furnish security shall be based upon the ground, and supported by a showing, that the plaintiff is a vexatious litigant and that there is not a reasonable probability that they will prevail in the litigation against the moving defendant." (Code Civ.

Proc., Sec. 391.1, subd. (a).) Here, the court finds that Defendants have made a showing that there is not a reasonable probability that Stankie will prevail in the litigation. The lone cause of action remaining against Defendants is negligent hiring. Choroumi states in his declaration that

before Morgan performed AAA-related towing services, he was subject to the background check process used for AAA-related work, and Pro Tow was notified that Morgan met AAA's standards. (Choroumi Decl., P.P. 9-11, 24-25.) Choroumi states that he was not aware of any prior act, threat, complaint, or other information indicating that Morgan had a propensity to assault, threaten, or physically harm customers or members of the public. (Id., P. 12.) Rather, during Morgan's time with Pro Tow, Morgan was a decent employee with no issues with co-workers or customers. (Id., P.14.)

Choroumi did not personally instruct Morgan to engage in any physical altercation with Plaintiff, or to threaten or harm Plaintiff in any way. (Id., P.P. 15-17.) Defendants meet their burden to show there is no reasonable probability that Stankie will prevail in this litigation against Defendants. Stankie, having filed an untimely opposition without any properly authenticated evidence by way of declaration, fails to show otherwise. [1] Accordingly, Defendants' request for Stankie to furnish security is GRANTED.

Within 60 days of this order, Stankie is ordered to furnish security in the sum of $10,000. E.

Conclusion

The Motion to Declare Plaintiff a Vexatious Litigant is Granted. The court finds that Dennis Stankie is a vexatious litigant under Code of Civil Procedure section 391(b)(1), in that during the preceding seven-year period, 7 cases in Los Angeles Superior Court and federal court have been commenced in propria persona by the litigant and all 7 were determined adversely. Further, it is ordered that a prefiling order is hereby entered pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 391.7(a), prohibiting Plaintiff from filing any new litigation in the courts of this state without first obtaining leave from the presiding/supervising judge of the court where the litigation is proposed to be filed.

Plaintiff is ordered to furnish security in this matter in the sum of $10,000 within 60 days. The action is ordered stayed as to Defendants Pro Tow and Choroumi until security has been furnished pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 391.6. Disobedience of these orders may be punished as a contempt of court. (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 391(a).) III. DISCUSSION RE LEAVE TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT A.

Background

On November 25, 2024, Stankie filed a Complaint against Pro Tow, Choroumi, and Morgan, alleging causes of action for (1) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, (2) negligent hiring, supervision and retention of employee, (3) elder financial abuse, (4) negligence, and (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress. The fifth cause of action is asserted against Morgan only. On February 13, 2025, Pro Tow filed a demurrer to the Complaint. On June 3, 2025, the court sustained the demurrers to the first, third and fourth causes of action

and overruled the demurrer to the second cause of action. Stankie was granted leave to amend within 20 days of the court's order. On July 3, 2025, Pro Tow and Choroumi (hereafter, "Defendants") filed an answer to the Complaint. Stankie did not file an amended pleading. On July 16, 2025, Stankie filed a motion for leave to amend the Complaint (the "First Motion"). On November 12, 2025, the court denied the First Motion. On June 1, 2026, Stankie filed another motion for leave to amend the Complaint (the "Second Motion"). On June 8, 2026, Morgan filed an opposition. On August 13, 2026, Defendants filed an opposition. At the time of this writing, no reply had been filed. B.

Analysis

The court will deny the Second Motion. Having previously sought leave to file an amended pleading, Stankie effectively seeks reconsideration of the court's November 12, 2025 order. When an application for an order has been made to a judge, or to a court, and refused in whole or in part, or granted, or granted conditionally, or on terms, any party affected by the order may, within 10 days after service upon the party of written notice of entry of the order and based upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law, make application to the same judge or court that made the order, to reconsider the matter and modify, amend, or revoke the prior order." (Code Civ.

Proc. Sec. 1008, subd. (a).)¿ "A party seeking reconsideration also must provide a satisfactory explanation for the failure to produce the evidence at an earlier time. [Citation.]" (New York Times Co. v. Superior Court (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 206, 212.)¿¿A motion for reconsideration is properly denied where it is based on evidence that could have been presented in connection with the original motion.¿ (Morris v. AGFA Corp. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1452, 1460.)¿¿ Here, Stankie does not provide any adequate explanation for the failure to attach the amended pleading to the First Motion or his failure to file the amended pleading within the time limit provided in the court's June 3, 2025 order.

Stankie does not identify any new or different facts, circumstances, or law that require reconsideration of the court's November 12, 2025 order. D.

Conclusion

The motion for leave to amend is DENIED. IV. DISCUSSION RE JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS A.

Background

On March 12, 2026, Morgan filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. On June 11, 2026, Stankie filed an opposition. On June 17, 2026, Morgan filed a reply. B. Legal Standard "A motion for judgment on the pleadings performs the same function as a general demurrer, and hence attacks only defects disclosed on the face of the pleadings or by matters that can be judicially noticed.¿ [Citations.]"¿ (Burnett v. Chimney Sweep (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1057 1064.)¿ The court must assume the truth of all properly pleaded material facts and allegations, but not contentions or conclusions of fact or law.¿ (Blank v.

Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Wise v. Pacific Gas and Elec. Co. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 725, 738.)¿ "A judgment on the pleadings in favor of the defendant is appropriate when the complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action.¿ (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 438, subd. (c)(3)(B)(ii).)"¿ (Kapsimallis v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 667, 672.)¿ "Presentation of extrinsic evidence is therefore not proper on a motion for judgment on the pleadings.¿[Citation.]"¿ (Cloud v.

Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 999.)¿ "The common law ground for a motion for judgment on the pleadings is identical to the statutory ground[.]"¿ (Korchemny v. Piterman (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 1032, 1055.)¿ Allegations are to be liberally construed.¿ (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 452.)¿¿¿¿ ¿ If the motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted, it may be granted with or without leave to amend.¿ (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 438, subd. (h)(1).)¿ "Where a demurrer is sustained or a motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted as to the original complaint, denial of leave to amend constitutes an abuse of discretion if the pleading does not show on its face that it is incapable of amendment."¿ (Virginia G. v.

ABC Unified School Dist. ¿(1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1848, 1852 (emphasis added).)¿¿ C. Application 1. Meet and Confer Stankie first argues the motion should be denied because Morgan did not meet and confer prior to the filing of the motion. Before filing a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the moving party must meet and confer in person, by telephone, or by vieo conference with the party who file the pleading that is subject to the motion. (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 439, subd. (a).) After reviewing Morgan's meet and confer declaration, the court finds Morgan did not satisfy the meet and confer obligation.

However, because a determination by the court that the meet and confer process was insufficient cannot serve as grounds to grant or deny the motion for judgment on the pleadings (see Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 439, subd. (a)(4)), the court proceeds to consider the merits of the motion.

2.

Analysis

On January 13, 2025, Stankie filed a doe amendment to the Complaint naming Choroumi as Doe 1. On August 22, 2025, Stankie filed a doe amendment to the Complaint naming Morgan as Doe-1 "Defendant 2". Morgan now argues he is entitled to judgment on the pleadings because, having previously named Choroumi as Doe 1, Stankie's reuse of Doe 1 is legally invalid. The argument lacks merit, but not for the reasons discussed in the parties' briefing. Choroumi is a named defendant in the Complaint. Stankie was not ignorant of Choroumi's identity, which is a prerequisite to file a doe amendment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section4 74.

Accordingly, Stankie's January 13 amendment naming Choroumi as Doe 1 is defective. Moreover, the August 22 doe amendment precisely identifies Morgan as Doe-1 ("Defendant 2") consistent with the allegations in the Complaint. (Compare Amendment to Complaint, filed on 8/13/25, with Complaint, P. 3.) D.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the motion for judgment on the pleadings is DENIED. Stankie's request for costs is DENIED. V. DISCUSSION RE PROTECTIVE ORDER A.

Background

On June 9, 2026, Stankie filed this motion for protective order. Stankie requests sanctions against Defendants and their counsel. On August 13, 2026, Defendants filed an opposition. At the time of this writing, no reply had been filed. B.

Analysis

Stankie seeks a protective order regarding the disclosure of his residential address, Stankie's testimony regarding his observations of opposing counsel's deposition behavior and past settlements with unrelated parties, and a demand for production of Stankie's communications with AAA. Yet, Stankie does not identify the specific discovery requests or deposition questions at issue and merely relies on generalized assertions of privacy, privilege, annoyance, and oppression regarding the production demand. The court denies the motion for the following reasons. First, the disclosure of Stankie's residential address is not privileged information. "The disclosure of the names and addresses of potential witnesses is a routine and essential part of pretrial discovery.'" (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531,

543-544.) This is confirmed by looking no further than the Form Interrogatories which have been approved for use by the Judicial Council. Second, Stankie fails to show Defendants asked him inappropriate questions during his deposition regarding past settlements or that Defendants intend to continue questioning him regarding the same. Defendants confirm in their opposition that they do not plan on asking Stankie further questions about his previous lawsuits. Third, Stankie fails to show his communications with AAA are privileged. The granting of a protective order requires a factual showing that the documents are confidential or privileged; a mere conclusory statement that a document or set of documents may have confidential or privilege materials is insufficient. (Nativi v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 261, 318.) C.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the motion for protective order is DENIED. VI. DISPOSITIONS 1. The Motion to Declare Plaintiff a Vexatious Litigant is Granted. The court finds that Dennis Stankie is a vexatious litigant under Code of Civil Procedure section 391(b)(1), in that during the preceding seven-year period, 7 cases in Los Angeles Superior Court and federal court have been commenced in propria persona by the litigant and all 7 were determined adversely. Further, it is ordered that a prefiling order is hereby entered pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 391.7(a), prohibiting Plaintiff from filing any new litigation in the courts of this state without first obtaining leave from the presiding/supervising judge of the court where the litigation is proposed to be filed.

Stankie is ordered to furnish security in this matter in the sum of $10,000 within 60 days. The action is ordered stayed as to Defendants Pro Tow and Choroumi until security has been furnished pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 391.6. Disobedience of these orders may be punished as a contempt of court. (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 391(a).)

2. The motion for leave to amend the complaint is Denied.

3. The motion for judgment on the pleadings is Denied.

4. The motion for protective order is Denied. Dated: August 26, 2026 ¿ | ¿¿ ¿ | ¿

| ¿ Brock T. Hammond ¿ Judge of the Superior Court¿ | [1] The court is aware that Stankie submitted Morgan's discovery responses wherein Morgan indicates he was convicted of armed robbery in 1997. Even if Stankie had properly introduced this evidence, Morgan's discovery response does not change the result. Morgan's conviction precedes the underlying events by 25 years and is not admissible. | Home -->)" -->