Tommie Wright v. Transportation Connection, Inc.

compel deadline due to scheduling difficulties. (Id. P.P. 9-16.)

The parties agreed that Defendant's amended responses would be provided by May 26, but they did not arrive on that date. (Id. P.P. 16-17.)

Eventually, unverified amended responses were received on June 10. (Id. P.P. 18-20.)

Further meet and confer efforts failed, and Plaintiff filed the present motions on July 1, 2026. (Id. P.P. 21-24.)

On August 4, Defendant served further verified responses. (Lowry Decl. P. 17.)

Defendant sought to have the present motions taken off calendar through discussions with Plaintiff's counsel on August 5 and 6. (Id. P.P. 18-20.)

The Court finds that Plaintiff's motions are partially moot. Defendant has provided further verified responses to Plaintiff's discovery requests since the filing of the present motion, and Plaintiff does not point to any specific deficiencies remaining in those responses. But through the provision of further responses, Defendant tacitly admits to the merit of Plaintiff's present motions. Thus, the Court does not find it appropriate to order further responses, but sanctions may still be warranted.

Plaintiff requests sanctions in the total amount of $28,412. Sanctions may be awarded where a party unsuccessfully opposes a motion to compel further responses to RFAs, RFPs, SPROGs, or FROGs, provided that the party does so without substantial justification. (Code Civ. Proc., Sec.Sec. 2030.300, 2031.310, 2033.290.) Here, Defendant opposed Plaintiff's motions without substantial justification, as it provided further responses demonstrating the necessity of Plaintiff's motion. Thus, sanctions are warranted pursuant to sections 2030.300, 2031.310, and 2033.290.

Counsel testifies to an hourly rate of $495, which the Court credits. (Ibarra Decl. P. 25.)

Counsel alleges the following time spent working on the present matter: (1) 0.6 hours drafting the declaration in support of the interrogatory motion; (2) 2.4 hours drafting the declaration in support of the RFPs motion; (3) 2.4 hours drafting the declaration in support of the RFAs motion; (4) 8.7 hours drafting the interrogatory separate statement and motion; (5) 7.5 hours drafting the RFPs separate statement and motion; (6) 8.8 hours drafting the RFAs separate statement and motion; (7) 24 hours drafting the three replies; and (3) hours attending the hearing on this matter. (Ibid.)

Because of the similarity between the three declarations drafted, the Court credits counsel with 2 hours total for drafting them all. Similarly, the relevant motions are also somewhat duplicative: the Court credits only 1.5 hours for each and 0.5 hours for each separate statement. Plaintiff's three replies are nearly identical; thus, the Court credits only 3 hours for the drafting of all of them. Finally, the Court credits counsel with 1 hour for attending the hearing on this matter.

Accordingly, the Court awards Plaintiff sanctions in the amount of $5,940 ([$495 per hour] x [12 hours] = $5,940).

C.

Conclusion

The Court grants Plaintiff's motions in part. Plaintiff is awarded $5,940 in sanctions, payable by Defendant's counsel to Plaintiff's counsel within 30 days.

Case Number: 26STCV00470 Hearing Date: August 26, 2026 Dept: 400 MOTION TO STRIKE WITHOUT DEMURRER

The Court tenders the following tentative decision in the matter Tommie Wright v. Transportation Connection, Inc., Los Angeles County Superior Court case number 26STCV00470, set for hearing on August 26, 2026. Transportation Connection, Inc. (Defendant) moves to strike Tommie Wright's (Plaintiff) requests for punitive damages contained in her second amended complaint (SAC). The Court denies Defendant's motion to strike.

A.

Legal Standard

The Court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 436, subd. (a).) The Court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the Court. (Id., Sec. 436, subd. (b).) The grounds for a motion to strike are that the pleading has irrelevant, false or improper matter, or has not been drawn or filed in conformity with laws. (Id., Sec. 436.) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Id., Sec. 437.)

When a motion to strike is granted, the Court determines whether there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment. (Blank, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 318.) When a plaintiff "has pleaded the general set of facts upon which his cause of action is based," the court should give the plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint, since plaintiff should not "be deprived of his right to maintain his action on the ground that his pleadings were defective for lack of particulars." (Reed v. Norman (1957) 152 Cal.App.2d 892, 900.)

B.

Discussion

Defendant moves to strike Plaintiff's request for punitive damages as an irrelevant matter without sufficient factual support in the complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 436, subd. (a).) The Court previously granted a motion to strike by Defendant on this same ground.

A plaintiff may recover punitive damages where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. (Civ. Code, Sec. 3294, subd. (a).) Malice is defined as conduct intended to injure the plaintiff or despicable conduct by a defendant acting with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights and safety of others. (Id., Sec. 3294, subd. (c)(1).) Oppression means despicable conduct subjecting a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of their rights. (Id., Sec. 3294, subd. (c)(2).) And fraud refers to intentional misrepresentations or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant. (Id., Sec. 3294, subd. (c)(3).)

In Plaintiff's first amended complaint (FAC), she did not allege any oppressive, fraudulent, or malicious conduct by Defendant. Rather, she alleged facts supporting Defendant's violation of Labor Code provisions. Importantly, "punitive damages are not recoverable when liability is premised solely on the employer's violation of the Labor Code statutes that regulate meal and rest breaks, pay stubs, and minimum wage laws." (Brewer v. Premier Golf Properties, LP (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1243, 1252.)

Here, Plaintiff's SAC includes additional allegations sufficient to support a claim for punitive damages under Brewer. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant engaged in affirmative conduct constituting malice, oppression, and fraud separate from its statutory violations. (SAC P. 57.) To that end, she alleges that Defendant engaged in fraudulent conduct by deliberately and falsely characterizing her termination as a "voluntary resignation." (Id. P. 58.) Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant acted with malice in limiting her and other employees' access to certain necessary systems because of their exercise of Labor Code rights. (Id. P. 59.) Plaintiff alleges that this conduct was undertaken and authorized by Defendant's officers and directors. (Id. P. 60.) Plaintiff thus requests punitive damages. (Id. P. 162, Prayer P. (p).)

These allegations include fraudulent and malicious conduct under Civil Code section 3294 separate and apart from Defendant's statutory violations. Indeed, Plaintiff alleges intentional retaliatory behavior by Defendant and fraudulent conduct meant to evade accountability. Thus, Plaintiff has pled sufficient facts to support her requests for punitive damages. Accordingly, Defendant's motion to strike is denied.

Conclusion: Defendant's motion to strike is denied.

Case Number: 26STCV12594 Hearing Date: August 26, 2026 Dept: 400 DEMURRER WITH MOTION TO STRIKE

The Court tenders the following tentative decision in the matter Blake Rogers v. William Parapiella, Los Angeles County Superior Court case number 26STCV12594, set for hearing on August 26, 2026. William Papariella (Defendant) demurs to Blake Rogers's (Plaintiff) complaint and the causes of action contained therein individually. Additionally, Defendant moves to strike Plaintiff's request for attorney's fees. Defendant's demurrer is sustained. Defendant's motion to strike is granted. Plaintiff is granted 20 days' leave to amend his complaint.

A.

Legal Standard

A demurrer is sustained where "[t]he pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action." (Code Civ. Proc., 430.10, subd. (e).) "A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the factual allegations in a complaint." (Yalung v. State (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 71, 80.)

In reviewing a complaint's legal sufficiency, a court will treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of law. (Esparza v. Kaweah Delta Dist. Hospital (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 547, 552.) It is well settled that a "demurrer lies only for defects appearing on the face of the complaint[.]" (Stevens v. Superior Court (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 594, 601.)

"We not only treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but also give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context." (Guclimane Co. v. Stewart Tit. Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 38.) For purposes of ruling on a demurrer, the complaint must be construed liberally by drawing reasonable inferences from the facts pleaded. (Wilner v. Sunset Life Ins. Co. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 952, 958.)