WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. vs HAYES, AN INDIVIDUAL

25CV139849: WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. vs HAYES, AN INDIVIDUAL 08/26/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment filed by WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. (Plaintiff) CRS# 963404525870 in Department 5

Tentative Ruling - 08/25/2026 Mark Fickes

The Motion for Summary Judgment filed by WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. on 01/16/2026 is Denied.

Plaintiff Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.’s motion for summary judgment against defendant Erica A. Hayes is DENIED. Triable issues of material fact remain on Wells Fargo’s own proof of the debt, and Wells Fargo has not carried its burden as the moving plaintiff.

BACKGROUND

Wells Fargo alleges that Hayes opened a credit card account on or about March 28, 2017, used the card, and stopped paying, leaving a balance of $6,733.54. (Hogan Dec. ¶¶ 13, 15, 22-23.) The account sued upon is identified as the card ending in 7487. (Lopez Dec., Ex. 1 [Requests for Admission Nos. 1-9].) The cardmember agreement attached to the complaint and to the moving papers is an unsigned form agreement providing that the holder accepts its terms “by using or confirming your Account.” (Complaint, Ex. A; Hogan Dec., Ex. 1.)

The account statements offered to prove the balance are not all for the account sued upon. The statements attached as Exhibit 2 to the Hogan declaration are for a card ending in 6955 (2018 through 2021) and a card ending in 1602 (2023). (Hogan Dec., Ex. 2.) The number 7487 appears only on the final 2025 statement. (Reply, Ex. 1.) The moving papers do not explain the differing account numbers.

Wells Fargo served requests for admission. Hayes admitted that she or persons she authorized were the only users of the card (RFA No. 3) and that she never disputed the accuracy of the statements (RFA No. 5). (Lopez Dec., Ex. 2.) She denied that she owes $6,733.54 (RFA No. 6), denied that she has no defenses (RFA No. 9), and responded that she lacked sufficient information to admit or deny that the 7487 card was issued to her (RFA No. 1) or that she agreed to repay principal and finance charges (RFA No. 2). (Lopez Dec., Ex. 2.)

The complaint pleads two causes of action, both for breach of contract, one written and one implied in fact.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper only if the papers show no triable issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) A plaintiff who moves for summary judgment carries a distinct burden. It has met its burden only when it has proved each element of the cause of action, at which point the burden shifts to the defendant to show a triable issue. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(1); Aguilar v. Atlantic 25CV139849: WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. vs HAYES, AN INDIVIDUAL 08/26/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment filed by WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. (Plaintiff) CRS# 963404525870 in Department 5 Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 849-851.)

A plaintiff who would bear the burden of proof at trial must present evidence that would require a reasonable trier of fact to find each material fact more likely than not. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 850-851; Consumer Cause, Inc. v. SmileCare (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 454, 468.) The court’s function is to find issues, not to decide them. The moving party’s papers are strictly construed, the opponent’s liberally, all doubts and reasonable inferences are resolved against the movant, and the evidence is not weighed. (Y.K.A.

Industries, Inc. v. Redevelopment Agency of City of San Jose (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 339, 352.)

DISCUSSION

A. There Is a Triable Issue of Fact Concerning Damages

Both causes of action require the same core proof: a contract, Wells Fargo’s performance, Hayes’s breach, and resulting damages. (Professional Collection Consultants v. Lauron (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 958, 968.) As the moving plaintiff, Wells Fargo must prove each element affirmatively. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 849.) The damages element turns on the account statements, because they are the only evidence of the sum claimed. But the statements document accounts ending in 6955 and 1602, while the account sued upon ends in 7487. (Hogan Dec., Ex. 2; Reply, Ex. 1.)

Nothing in the moving papers ties those card numbers to a single continuing account or explains the discrepancy. Construing that silence against the movant, as the court must (Y.K.A. Industries, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 352), a reasonable trier of fact could find that Wells Fargo has not proved the $6,733.54 balance on the 7487 account. That is a triable issue of material fact, and it is equally a failure of Wells Fargo’s own prima facie showing. Where the movant’s evidence does not establish its case, the motion fails without regard to the opposition. (Id. at pp. 352-354.)

A qualified witness need not be the custodian or the record’s author. A person who understands the recordkeeping system and can explain the resulting data suffices. (People v. Lugashi (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 632, 640-642.) Bank and credit card statements prepared in the regular course of business occupy a category of heightened trustworthiness, and the absence of detail about the mode of preparation goes to weight, not admissibility. (People v. Dorsey (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 953, 960-961.) Brendan Hogan attests that he is familiar with Wells Fargo’s recordkeeping systems and reviewed Hayes’s account. (Hogan Dec. ¶¶ 4, 8.)

Under the more lenient standard, that foundation is adequate, and Hayes’s reliance on the eleven-factor federal test cited in her opposition, is unavailing because California courts have not adopted it for bank records. (See Dorsey, supra, 43 Cal.App.3d at pp. 960-961.) The foundational objection is overruled. The remaining evidentiary objections are not material to the disposition of this motion, and the court does not rule on them. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (q).)

Overruling the objection, however, does not carry the motion. Admitting the statements establishes only that they are what they purport to be. It does not supply the missing link between the documented accounts (6955 and 1602) and the pleaded account (7487). (See ante, pt. I.) Admissibility and sufficiency are different questions, and the triable issue identified in Part I

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

25CV139849: WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. vs HAYES, AN INDIVIDUAL 08/26/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment filed by WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. (Plaintiff) CRS# 963404525870 in Department 5 remains.

To the extent Wells Fargo contends that any dispute about which account the records concern goes to the weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility (see Jazayeri v. Mao (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 301, 321 [conflicting inferences about a document go to weight]), the contention misses the point. The question is not whether the statements are genuine Wells Fargo records. It is whether records for accounts 6955 and 1602 prove a debt on account 7487. On a plaintiff’s motion, an unexplained gap in the chain from the documented accounts to the pleaded account and sum is a defect in the movant’s affirmative proof, and all reasonable doubt is resolved in favor of trial. (Y.K.A. Industries, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at pp. 352-353.) The contention that the discrepancy is immaterial is not persuasive.

B. The Discovery Responses Do Not Establish Liability As a Matter of Law

A party’s clear and unequivocal discovery admission is entitled to deference, and can defeat a contrary declaration. (D’Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 21-22.) But that rule reaches only what was actually admitted. Hayes admitted that she or persons she authorized were the only users of the card and that she never disputed the statements’ accuracy. (Lopez Dec., Ex. 2 [RFA Nos. 3, 5].) She did not admit the debt. She denied owing $6,733.54, denied that she lacks defenses, and declined to admit issuance of the 7487 card or the repayment obligation. (Lopez Dec., Ex. 2 [RFA Nos. 1, 2, 6, 9].)

The admissions that exist do not establish the amount owed, and D’Amico gives Wells Fargo nothing on the facts Hayes denied. Wells Fargo’s characterization of the responses as admissions of the debt overstates the record. Wells Fargo’s separate-statement argument does not fill the gap. Even if Hayes’s opposing separate statement is deficient, a plaintiff-movant must still prove each element, and it cannot obtain judgment on the strength of the opponent’s procedural misstep. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 849; Consumer Cause, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 468.)

C. A Signature is Not Required for the Credit Card Agreement

A credit card agreement is accepted by use of the card, and no signature is required. Use of the card manifests acceptance of the written terms. (Cavalry SPV I, LLC v. Watkins (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 1070, 1081-1082; Civ. Code, § 1620.) Hayes’s admission that she or persons she authorized were the only users of the card supports formation. (Lopez Dec., Ex. 2 [RFA No. 3].) Her argument that only a signed agreement will do is not compelling. This point favors Wells Fargo, but it addresses formation, not the amount owed, and so does not cure the triable issue on damages.

D. Defendant’s Other Arguments Are Unpersuasive

Account stated. Hayes argues that Wells Fargo failed to prove the statements were mailed and received, defeating an account stated. (See Zinn v. Fred R. Bright Co. (1969) 271 Cal.App.2d

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

25CV139849: WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. vs HAYES, AN INDIVIDUAL 08/26/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment filed by WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. (Plaintiff) CRS# 963404525870 in Department 5 597, 600; Maggio, Inc. v. Neal (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 745, 752.) Wells Fargo did not plead an account stated. The pleaded claims sound in breach of the cardmember agreement. (Lauron, supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at pp. 968-971.) The argument is directed at a theory not before the court and does not affect the disposition.

Truth in Lending. Hayes argues that a Regulation Z violation bars recovery. A Truth in Lending violation does not void a credit obligation or bar collection, and the remedy is a separate statutory damages action. (15 U.S.C. § 1610(d).) This contention lacks merit and, in any event, is immaterial given the denial on other grounds.

Arbitration. Hayes “invokes” arbitration in her opposition. Arbitration is compelled by a noticed petition, not by a line in an opposition brief. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2.) No such petition is before the court, so the request is not presented for decision.

CONCLUSION

The motion for summary judgment is DENIED.

PLEASE NOTE: The tentative ruling will become the final order of the Court unless contested by 4:00 p.m. on the court day immediately preceding the scheduled hearing date.

To contest the tentative ruling, a party must directly notify both opposing counsel and the Court via the eCourt portal located on the Court’s website at www.alameda.courts.ca.gov.

If no party has contested the tentative ruling, then no appearance is necessary.

Reserved for Clerk’s File Stamp SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA COURTHOUSE ADDRESS: Rene C. Davidson Courthouse 1225 Fallon Street, Oakland, CA 94612 PLAINTIFF/PETITIONER: WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT: ERICA A HAYES, an individual CASE NUMBER: CERTIFICATE OF ELECTRONIC SERVICE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 1010.6 25CV139849

I, the below named Executive Officer/Clerk of Court of the above-entitled court, do hereby certify that I am not a party to the cause herein, and that on this date I served one copy of the Tentative Ruling (Motion for Summary Judgment filed by WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. (Plaintiff) CRS# 963404525870) entered herein upon each party or counsel of record in the above entitled action, by electronically serving the document(s) from my place of business, in accordance with standard court practices.

David Bartley Lynda E. Jacobs Collection at Law, Inc. Hemming and Associates assistant@collectionatlaw.com lyndaj@hemmingassociates.com

Chad Finke, Executive Officer / Clerk of the Court Dated: 08/25/2026 By:

CERTIFICATE OF ELECTRONIC SERVICE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 1010.6