WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. vs CHAND

24CV011961: WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. vs CHAND 08/20/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment Pursuant to CCP 437C in Department 16D

Tentative Ruling

NOTICE:

Consistent with Local Rule 1.06(B), any party requesting oral argument on any matter on this calendar must comply with the following procedure:

To request limited oral argument, on any matter on this calendar, you must call the Department 16D Oral Argument Request Line at (916) 874-3056 by 4:00 p.m. the court day before the hearing and advise opposing counsel. At the time of requesting oral argument, the requesting party shall leave a voice mail message (a) identifying themselves as the party requesting oral argument; (b) indicating the specific matter/motion for which they are requesting oral argument; and (c) confirming that it has notified the opposing party of its intention to appear and that opposing party may appear via Zoom using the Zoom link and Meeting ID indicated below. If no request for oral argument is made, the tentative ruling becomes the final order of the Court.

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The Department 16D Zoom Link is https://saccourt-cagov.zoomgov.com/j/16146506749 and the Zoom Meeting ID is 161 4650 6749. To appear on Zoom telephonically, call (833) 568-8864 and enter the Zoom Meeting ID referenced above. NO COURTCALL APPEARANCES WILL BE ACCEPTED.

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A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

24CV011961: WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. vs CHAND 08/20/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment Pursuant to CCP 437C in Department 16D

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

*** EFFECTIVE APRIL 13, 2026, THIS DEPARTMENT HAS MOVED TO THE TANI G. CANTIL-SAKAUYE COURTHOUSE LOCATED AT 500 G STREET IN SACRAMENTO, CA 95814. ALL HEARINGS NOTICED FOR DEPARTMENT 53 WILL BE HEARD IN DEPARTMENT 16D OF THE NEW COURTHOUSE. ***

TENTATIVE RULING: Plaintiff Wells Fargo Bank’s (third) motion for summary judgment against defendant Chand is ruled on as follows.

Factual Background

According to the complaint filed on 6/18/2024, this litigation arises out of plaintiff’s issuance of a credit card to defendant Chand. It is alleged that defendant received and used the card but has subsequently defaulted and refused to bring the account current, owing roughly $14,300 to plaintiff. Plaintiff’s complaint asserts six separate causes of action against defendant Chand for (1) breach of written contract, (2) breach of contract (implied in fact), (3) money lent, (4) money paid, (5) open book account, and (6) account stated.

On 7/26//2024, defendant Chand’s attorney filed an answer to the complaint which included a general denial and a number of affirmative defenses.

Notably, on 11/12/2024, plaintiff Bank brought an initial motion for summary judgment against defendant Chand and this prior motion for summary judgment was “denied in its entirety” on 3/26/2025. The Court did not grant Plaintiff leave to refile any future motion for summary judgment against the Defendant. Shortly thereafter, nonetheless, plaintiff Bank filed its second motion for summary judgment on 7/14/2025 and noticed it for hearing on 12/23/2025. By Minute Order dated 11/6/2025, the hearing on this second motion for summary judgment was on the Court’s own motion continued to 1/29/2026.

On 1/29/2026, this Court denied Plaintiff’s second motion for summary judgment. As explained in such ruling, Plaintiff’s second motion was denied because it violated Code of Civil Procedure Code section 437c(a)(4)’s prohibition against bringing repeated

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV011961: WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. vs CHAND 08/20/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment Pursuant to CCP 437C in Department 16D

motions for summary judgment against an adverse party. Additionally, the Court explained that Plaintiff failed to satisfy its burden in any event.

Moving Papers. Despite the Court’s prior orders, Plaintiff now moves a third time for summary judgment against defendant Chand on the grounds that “there is no triable issue of material fact, or issue of liability, and therefore the moving party is entitled to summary judgment.” (2/19/2026 Not. of Mot., p. 1:28-2:2.) However, plaintiff Bank actually seeks summary judgment on just two of the six causes of actions alleged in the complaint: The first and second causes of action for “breach of written contract” and “breach of contract (implied in fact),” respectively. (Id., at p.1:25-28.)

Curiously, in support of this motion for summary judgment, plaintiff Bank has filed a separate statement which sets forth two “issues,” “The First Cause of Action for Breach of Written Contract,” under which is cited Undisputed Material Fact (“UMF”) Nos. 1-14 and The Second Cause of Action for Breach of Implied Contract,” under which is cited Undisputed Material Fact (“UMF”) Nos. 15-28 Importantly for the disposition of this motion, the 2/19/2026 Notice of Motion does not indicate summary adjudication is in the alternative sought as to any individual cause of action and the moving separate statement by its own terms purports to address only the first cause of action for breach of written contract, and the second cause of action for “breach of contract (implied in fact)” with no mention of the four other causes of action alleged in the complaint against defendant Chand for money lent, money paid, open book account, and/or account stated.

Opposition. No opposition from defendant currently appears in the Court’s records.

Standards for Summary Judgment/Adjudication

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment/adjudication, the Court engages in a threestep process. First, the issues framed by the pleadings must be identified since the pleadings themselves define the scope of what may be addressed via a motion for summary judgment/adjudication (FPI Development Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381-382) and the evidence submitted in support of or in opposition to the motion must be addressed to the claims and defenses raised in the pleadings. The Court cannot consider an unpleaded issue in ruling on a motion for summary judgment/adjudication. (Roth v. Rhodes (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 530, 541.) The papers filed in response to such a motion may not create triable issues beyond the scope of the pleadings, nor are they a substitute for filing amended pleadings. (Tsemetzin v. Coast Federal Savings & Loan Assn. (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1342.)

Next, the Court must determine whether the moving party has met its initial burden of production. Code of Civil Procedure §437c(p)(1) explains that a plaintiff moving

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV011961: WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. vs CHAND 08/20/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment Pursuant to CCP 437C in Department 16D

for summary judgment/adjudication “[meets] his or her burden of showing that there is no defense to a cause of action if that party has proved each element of the cause of action entitling the party to judgment on the cause of action” and only when “the plaintiff or cross-complainant has met that burden” does the burden shift to the defendant or cross-defendant “to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” A party opposing summary judgment/adjudication has no evidentiary burden unless the moving party has first met his/her initial burden. (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 840; see also Rubenstein v. Rubenstein (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1131, 1151-1152; Thatcher v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1081, 1085-1086.)

Only where the moving party makes the requisite initial showing does a court need to examine the opposition papers to determine if the latter demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of material fact which precludes summary judgment/adjudication. (Salazar v. Southern Cal. Gas Co. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1370, 1376; Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 840.) The opposing party must present admissible evidence and may not rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleading. (Id.)

In ruling on the motion, a court must construe the evidence of the opposing party liberally and that of the moving party strictly, resolving any doubts in the opposing party’s favor. (Miller v. Bechtel Corp. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 868, 874; Cortez v. Vogt (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 917, 925-926; see also, Salazar v. Southern Cal. Gas Co. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1370, 1376; Brown v. FSR Brokerage, Inc. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 766, 773.)

Finally, before turning to the specific issues raised by this motion, the Court reminds the parties of the “Golden Rule” of summary judgment/adjudication: “If it is not set forth in the separate statement, it does not exist.” (See, Zimmerman, Rosenfeld v. Larson (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1466, 1477 (italics in original).) Moreover, according to Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, a moving party’s inclusion of facts in its separate statement effectively concedes each fact’s “materiality,” whether intended or not, and if there is a triable dispute relating to any one of these facts, the motion must be denied. (Nazir, at 252 (citing Weil & Brown, Civil Procedure Before Trial, Ch.10:95.1); see also, Insalaco v. Hope Lutheran Church of West Contra Costa County (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 506.)

Discussion

Plaintiff’s Third Motion for Summary Judgment is Procedurally Improper. Code of Civil Procedure §437c(a)(4) provides in pertinent part:

A party shall not bring more than one motion for summary judgment against an adverse party to the action or proceeding.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV011961: WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. vs CHAND 08/20/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment Pursuant to CCP 437C in Department 16D

(Underline added for emphasis.)

Importantly, the prohibition set forth in §437c(a)(4) does not make any exception based upon the reasons why a party’s prior motion for summary judgment was denied. It prohibits the “bring[ing]” of “more than one motion for summary judgment” by a party against an adverse party. As applied here and discussed earlier, plaintiff Bank filed on 11/12/2024 its first motion for summary judgment against defendant Chand and this prior motion for summary judgment was “denied in its entirety” on 3/26/2025. Plaintiff’s second motion for summary judgment was denied on 1/29/26. Under the plain language of §437c(a)(4) cited above, plaintiff Bank is statutorily barred from bringing a third motion for summary judgment against defendant Chand as the Bank has attempted to do here.

Notably, §437c(a)(5) provides an exception to the “single summary judgment motion” rule. That is, §437c(a)(5) provides in relevant part: “Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, on motion or application of any party and a showing of good cause, the court may grant leave for the moving party to bring an additional motion for summary judgment.” However, plaintiff Bank did not seek, much less obtain, leave of court to file a third motion for summary judgment against defendant Chand. Plaintiff Bank was required to bring a motion or application seeking permission to file a third motion for summary judgment and if the Court were to determine that such motion/application demonstrated “good cause,” only then might the Court have granted leave to file a third motion of summary judgment.

Plaintiff Bank failed to comply with such requirement and the Court has made no such finding. While nothing in §437c(a)(5) allows such motion seeking leave to be made itself within a third motion for summary judgment, the Court notes that even if it did so, the moving papers filed on 2/19/2026 do not in any event establish the requisite “good cause” to pursue a third motion for summary judgment against defendant Chand. At most, Plaintiff’s third motion appears to be nothing more than another attempt following its previous failures to move for summary judgment, but curiously make the same mistakes which caused its prior denials.

Accordingly, plaintiff Bank’s present motion for summary judgment against defendant Chand shall be denied in its entirety as procedurally improper under Code of Civil Procedure §437c(a)(4). As such, the Court need not proceed further but it nevertheless does so in order to address additional reasons why plaintiff Bank’s third motion for summary judgment against defendant Chand must be denied even if this motion had been procedurally proper.

Plaintiff Failed to Carry Its Initial Burden of Production. While plaintiff Bank’s 6/18/2024 complaint by its own terms alleges a total of six separate causes of action

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV011961: WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. vs CHAND 08/20/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment Pursuant to CCP 437C in Department 16D

against defendant Chand for (1) breach of written contract, (2) breach of contract (implied in fact), (3) money lent, (4) money paid, (5) open book account, and (6) account stated, the 2/19/2026 Notice of Motion explicitly indicates that plaintiff Bank is here seeking summary judgment on the first two causes of action for “breach of written contract” and “breach of contract (implied in fact),” respectively. Because the 2/19/2026 Notice of Motion does not purport to seek summary judgment on the entirety of the complaint (i.e., all six causes of action alleged in the complaint), the present motion for summary judgment must be denied regardless of whether defendant Chand has produced evidence sufficient to create any triable issue of material fact.

Finally, as referenced earlier, plaintiff Bank is not entitled to summary adjudication of the first cause of action for breach of written contract or second cause of action for breach of implied contract because neither the Notice of Motion nor the moving points & authorities anywhere indicate that summary adjudication is sought in the alternative to summary judgment. Therefore, neither summary judgment nor summary adjudication can be granted in favor of plaintiff Bank based upon the moving papers filed on 2/19/2026.

Disposition

For the reasons explained above, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment against defendant Chand must be and hereby is DENIED in its entirety.

The Court hereby STRIKES the Memorandum of Costs filed by plaintiff on 2/19/2026 because no judgment in plaintiff’s favor has to date been entered.

Moving party to provide notice of this ruling and file proof of service of same within five (5) court days.

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code Civ. Proc. §1019.5; CRC Rule 3.1312.)