Thomas Huang et al. v. Fidelity National Title Company et al.

SUPERIOR COURT, STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA Department 10 Honorable Jeffrey B. El-Hajj Blanca Than, Courtroom Clerk 191 North First Street, San Jose, CA 95113

DATE: August 25, 2026 TIME: 9:00 A.M. / 9:01 A.M. To contest the ruling, call (408) 808-6856 before 4:00 P.M. Make sure to let the other side know before 4:00 P.M. that you plan to contest the ruling. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1308(a)(1); Local Rule 8.D.)

**Please specify the issue to be contested when calling the Court and counsel**

Line 8 25CV460436 Fang Xia v. Park See LINE 7. Townsend Homeowners Association Line 9 25CV467887 Lloyd Baylis et al. v. Ted Defendant TLR Masonry’s motion to set aside court default. Ricks et al. (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (b).) The court continued this motion from its original date because defendant had not included a proposed responsive pleading. Defendant has not lodged a proposed pleading (the clerk’s office rejected a filing by defendant). The court will continue this motion one more time to allow defendant to file and serve an updated declaration with the proposed responsive pleading attached.

The court will deny the motion if defendant does not follow those instructions by the next hearing. The motion is continued to October 1, 2026, at 9:00 a.m. in Department 10. Defendant is ordered to file and serve an updated declaration with a proposed responsive pleading attached no later than September 14, 2026. Defendant is ordered to provide notice of the continued motion hearing. The court will prepare the order. Line 10 26CV488025 Thomas Huang et al. v. Click LINE 10 or scroll down for ruling.

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Calendar Line 10 Case Name: Thomas Huang et al. v. Fidelity National Title Company et al. Case No.: 26CV488025

This is an action for fraud and conspiracy to steal title to residential property. Selfrepresented plaintiffs Thomas Huang and Xin Huang (Plaintiffs) sued several defendants, including Fidelity National Title Company (Fidelity) and Natasha Warner (Warner), a Fidelity employee.

The original and still operative complaint, filed in March 2026, alleges six causes of action: (1) fraudulent misrepresentation; (2) conspiracy to commit fraud; (3) gross negligence; (4) professional negligence; (5) quiet title/cancellation of instruments; and (6) declaratory and injunctive relief. The complaint is not verified and there are no exhibits attached.

At issue is a demurrer to the complaint by Fidelity and Natasha Warner (hereafter, Defendants). Plaintiffs oppose.

LEGAL STANDARDS FOR DEMURRER

In ruling on a demurrer, the court accepts as true all properly pleaded material factual allegations but does not accept as true contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. (Valero v. Spread Your Wings, LLC (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 243, 253.) Code of Civil Procedure section 430.60 states that “[a] demurrer shall distinctly specify the grounds upon which any of the objections to the complaint, cross-complaint, or answer are taken. Unless it does so, it may be disregarded.” The California Rules of Court also require that the demurrer itself (distinct from a supporting memorandum) specify the target of any objection and the grounds. (See Cal.

Rules of Court, rules 3.1103(c), 3.1112(a), 3.1320(a) [“Each ground of demurrer must be in a separate paragraph and must state whether it applies to the entire complaint, cross-complaint, or answer, or to specified causes of action or defenses.”].)

The court cannot consider extrinsic evidence when ruling on a demurrer. That includes declarations. The court has considered the declaration from defense counsel only to the extent it describes the require meet and confer efforts. The court has not considered any portion of the “Index of Exhibits” filed by Plaintiffs with the opposition, or any arguments based on that extrinsic evidence. Self-represented litigants are entitled to the same, but no greater, consideration than other litigants and attorneys. (County of Orange v. Smith (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1434, 1444.) Finally, “points raised in the reply brief for the first time will not be considered, unless good reason is shown for failure to present them before.” (Proctor v. Vishay Intertechnology, Inc. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1258, 1273.)

DISCUSSION

Defendants demur to the complaint’s second, third, fifth and sixth causes of action, the only ones alleged against them, on the ground that they fail to state sufficient facts and also on the ground that plaintiff Thomas Huang lacks standing. (See Notice of Demurrer and Demurrer at pp. 1:25-2:20.)

Plaintiffs’ opposition exceeded the page limit for an opposition. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1113.) Plaintiffs are admonished to comply with page limits in all future filings. 15

Plaintiffs also acknowledge that because of developments in a related criminal case, they “have no need” to pursue the fifth and sixth causes of action against Defendants. (See opposition at p. 2 (“ii”), lines 7-18.) And because the complaint is not verified, the fifth cause of action for quiet title currently fails as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 761.020.) Accordingly, the demurrer to the fifth and sixth cause of action on the ground that they both fail to state sufficient facts as alleged against the demurring Defendants is sustained without leave to amend.

Plaintiff Thomas Huang’s Lack of Standing

In California courts, the term standing is broadly defined as the right to relief in court. (The Rossdale Group, LLC v. Walton (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 936, 944-945.) “In general terms, in order to have standing, the plaintiff must be able to allege injury — that is, some ‘invasion of the plaintiff’s legally protected interests.’” (Angelucci v. Century Supper Club (2007) 41 Cal.4th 160, 175.)

The complaint alleges that plaintiff Xin Huang “is and at all relevant times was the sole and lawful owner of the residential real property located at 991 Wainwright Drive, San Jose, California 95128 (the ‘Property’). Plaintiff Thomas Huang is Plaintiff Xin Huang’s brother and acted to protect the Property and investigate the fraudulent transfer once it was discovered.” (Complaint at ¶¶ 25-26, emphasis added.) Because every cause of action in the complaint depends on ownership interest in the subject property, these allegations admit that Thomas Huang has no standing to bring the second or third causes of action against Defendants. “It is well established that in the context of a demurrer, specific allegations control over more general ones.” (Chen v. PayPal, Inc. (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 559, 571-572 (Chen).)

Plaintiffs argue that the admission that only Xin Huang owns the subject property is inaccurate. But Plaintiffs are bound by the allegations in the complaint. And Plaintiffs’ argument depends upon extrinsic evidence, which the court cannot consider on demurrer

A plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that an amendment would cure the defect identified on demurrer. (Schifando v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1074, 1081.) The opposition does not meet that burden. Though the court has some concern that any attempt to amend the complaint will contradict the initial complaint’s factual allegations, the court will grant leave to amend because this is the first pleading challenge in the case. (See Berg & Berg Enterprises, LLC v. Boyle (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1020, 1034 [when considering a demurrer to an amended complaint, “we may consider the factual allegations of prior complaints, which a plaintiff may not discard or avoid by making ‘ “ ‘contradictory averments, in a superseding, amended pleading.’ ” ’ ”].)

Plaintiffs are admonished that, “[f]ollowing an order sustaining a demurrer or a motion for judgment on the pleadings with leave to amend, the plaintiff may amend his or her complaint only as authorized by the court's order. The plaintiff may not amend the complaint to add a new cause of action without having obtained permission to do so, unless the new cause of action is within the scope of the order granting leave to amend.” (Zakk v. Diesel (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 431, 456.) The court does not grant leave to add any new causes of action or parties.

Plaintiffs are cautioned that if new causes of action or parties are added without prior leave of court, as the opposition suggests, they may be struck by the court on its own motion. Adding new causes of action will require a noticed motion for leave to amend. 16

Second Cause of Action

“Conspiracy is not an independent tort; it cannot create a duty or abrogate an immunity. It allows tort recovery only against a party who already owes the duty and is not immune from liability based on applicable substantive tort law principles.” (Applied Equipment Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia, Ltd. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 503, 514 (Applied Equipment).) A “civil conspiracy to commit tortious acts can, as a matter of law, only be formed by parties who are already under a duty to the plaintiff, the breach of which will support a cause of action against them— individually and not as conspirators—in tort.

Restated, in cases where the plaintiff alleges the existence of a civil conspiracy among the defendants to commit tortious acts, the source of substantive liability cannot arise out of participation in the conspiracy alone.” (Chavers v. Gatke Corp. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 606, 614 (Chavers), internal citations omitted.)

Liability for civil conspiracy requires three elements: (1) formation of the conspiracy (an agreement to commit wrongful acts); (2) operation of the conspiracy (commission of the wrongful acts); and (3) damage resulting from operation of the conspiracy. (Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 47.) In addition, “[Plaintiffs] must show that each member of the conspiracy acted in concert and came to a mutual understanding to accomplish a common and unlawful plan, and that one or more of them committed an overt act to further it.

It is not enough that the conspiring officers knew of an intended wrongful act, they had to agree—expressly or tacitly—to achieve it. Unless there is such a meeting of the minds, ‘the independent acts of two or more wrongdoers do not amount to a conspiracy.’” (Choate v. County of Orange (2000) 86 Cal.App.4th 312, 333, citation omitted.) “Where fraud is alleged to be the object of the conspiracy, the claim must be pleaded with particularity.” (Prakashpalan v. Engstrom, Lipscomb & Lack (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1105, 1136.)

The complaint alleges that various individual defendants (not including Warner) carried out a scheme to impersonate “the true homeowner, Plaintiff Xin Huang, using a fraudulent California ID bearing [defendant Tuan] Luong’s facial photograph but Plaintiff’s name and identifying information, in order to falsely convey title to Defendant [Kim Thuy] Ho.” Fidelity, through Warner, acted as the escrow holder for the transaction and allegedly failed to detect various red flags. (See complaint at ¶¶ 3-5.)

The first cause of action for fraud is not alleged against Warner or Fidelity. The second cause of action for conspiracy to commit fraud is alleged in a conclusory fashion. (See complaint at ¶¶ 62-73.) The only alleged overt acts by Warner are “processing and closing the fraudulent escrow despite obvious red flags.” The only alleged overt acts by Fidelity are “ratifying and recording the transaction and issuing a false closing statement.” (Id., ¶ 67d and e.)

The source of liability cannot arise out of participation in the conspiracy alone. (Chavers, supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at 614.) The first cause of action does not provide any support for the second because it is not alleged against Warner and Fidelity. The conspiracy claim is not alleged with the specificity of a fraud claim. It also does not sufficiently allege that Warner or Fidelity acted in concert with the other individual defendants or had a mutual understanding to accomplish an unlawful plan.

The second cause of action also fails to state sufficient facts because of the lack of any preexisting duty of care owed by Warner or Fidelity to Plaintiffs. The existence and scope of a duty of care are questions of law for the court, even at the pleading stage. (Melton v. Boustred (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 521, 531 (Melton).) Warner and Fidelity’s only alleged role in the scheme to change title to the Property was to act as the escrow holder. In that role, their only preexisting duty of care was to carry out the instructions of the parties to the escrow.

They owed no duty to police the affairs of depositors. (Summit Financial Holdings, Ltd. v. Continental Lawyers Title Co. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 705, 711-714 (Summit); Branscomb v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 801, 809-810 (Branscomb).) Plaintiffs were not parties to the escrow, meaning Defendants did not owe them any duty of care.

Defendants’ demurrer to the second cause of action on the ground that it fails to state sufficient facts as alleged against them is sustained. Plaintiffs’ opposition fails to meet their burden to show how the defects in the second cause of action could be cured through amendment. The court has some concern that this cause of action cannot be amended to allege a duty of care owed to defendants without contradicting existing factual allegations. But because this is the first pleading challenge, the court will grant Plaintiffs leave to amend. The court does not grant leave to add new causes of action or parties.

Third Cause of Action

“California does not recognize a distinct common law cause of action for gross negligence apart from negligence.” (Jimenez v. 24 Hour Fitness USA, Inc. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 546, 552, fn.3.) Gross negligence is different from ordinary negligence in degree, not in kind. (Anderson v. Fitness Internat., LLC (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 867, 881.) Because gross negligence is simply a degree of negligence, the elements of a claim for gross negligence are the same as one for ordinary negligence. (Rosencrans v. Dover Images, Ltd. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1072, 1082.)

The elements of a negligence cause of action are: “‘(a) a legal duty to use due care; (b) a breach of such legal duty; [and] (c) the breach as the proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury.’” (Ladd v. County of San Mateo (1996) 12 Cal.4th 913, 917-918, quoting Evan F. v. Hughson United Methodist Church (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 828, 834.) The existence and scope of a duty of care are questions of law for the court even on demurrer. (See Melton, supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at 531.)

Because the complaint admits that Defendants’ only role in the alleged scheme was to act as the escrow holder (see complaint at ¶¶ 75-76), they did not owe Plaintiffs a duty of care. Defendants’ only preexisting duty of care was to carry out the instructions of the parties to the escrow. The owed no duty to police the affairs of depositors. (Summit, supra, 27 Cal.4th at 711-714; Branscomb, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at 809-810.) Plaintiffs were not parties to the escrow, meaning Defendants did not owe them any duty of care.

The opposition’s argument that a duty of care owed to Plaintiffs should be found to exist by applying the Biakanja test is unpersuasive. (Citing Biakanja v. Irving (1958) 49 Cal. 2d 647.) As the reply points out, the Supreme Court has already concluded that even if that test is applied, there is “no reason to depart from ‘the general rule that an escrow holder incurs no liability for failing to do something not required by the terms of the escrow or for a loss caused by following the escrow instructions.’” (Summit, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 715.)

Because Defendants did not owe Plaintiffs a duty of care, the demurrer to the third cause of action on the ground that it fails to state facts is sustained. The court does not reach Defendants’ argument that the third cause of action is also time-barred.

The opposition does not meet Plaintiffs’ burden to show how the third cause of action could be cured by amendment. Because this is the first pleading challenge, the court will grant Plaintiffs leave to amend. The court does not grant leave to add new causes of action or parties.

CONCLUSION

Defendants’ demurrer to the complaint’s fifth and sixth causes of action on the ground that they fail to state sufficient facts is sustained without leave to amend.

Defendants’ demurrer to the second and third causes of action as brought by plaintiff Thomas Huang on the ground that he lacks standing is sustained with leave to amend.

Defendants’ demurrer to the second and third causes of action on the ground that they fail to state sufficient facts is sustained with leave to amend.

Any amended pleading must be filed and served no later than September 25, 2026.

The court will prepare the order.

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