Liu vs. Tran

“Liability may [] be imposed on one who aids and abets the commission of an intentional tort if the person (a) knows the other’s conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other to so act or (b) gives substantial assistance to the other in accomplishing a tortious result and the person’s own conduct, separately considered, constitutes a breach of duty to the third person.” (Saunders v. Superior Court (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 832, 846.)

“California courts have long held that liability for aiding and abetting depends on proof the defendant had actual knowledge of the specific primary wrong the defendant substantially assisted.” (Casey v. U.S. Bank Nat. Assn. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1138, 1145.)

Eichin argues that Plaintiff’s allegation that Eichin falsely certified that Plaintiff personally appeared before her despite knowing that Plaintiff did not appear is shown to be false by the two deeds attached to the SAC, which demonstrate that Plaintiff signed the document and appeared before Eichin. This argument lacks merit. While the Court will accept as true the contents of exhibits attached to the pleading that conflict with the factual allegations and disregard those contradictory allegations, that rule does not apply here. Plaintiff is alleging that Eichin falsely certified under penalty of perjury that Plaintiff appeared before her when the documents were notarized. Eichin cannot point to those same documents and argue that Plaintiff did appear and sign them simply because that is what the documents say, to defeat those allegations.

Eichin further argues that Plaintiff does not have standing as a real party in interest to allege that Tran forged Jiao’s signature on the May 23, 2024 Grant Deed and only Jiao can properly assert such a claim as the individual whose signature was allegedly forged. Except as otherwise provided by statute, “every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. . . .” (Code Civ. Proc., § 367.) “A person who invokes the judicial process lacks standing if he, or those whom he properly represents, ‘does not have a real interest in the ultimate adjudication because [he] has neither suffered nor is about to suffer any injury of sufficient magnitude reasonably to assure that all of the relevant facts and issues will be adequately presented.’ [Citation.]” (Schmier v. Supreme Court (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 703, 707.)

Here, Plaintiff is alleging that title to her property was disrupted by the forging of Defendant Jiao’s signature on the Grant Deed and Eichin’s notarization of the Grant Deed despite knowing that the signature was not Defendant Jiao’s. Because Plaintiff is claiming significant injury caused by the alleged forgery, Plaintiff has standing.

Lastly, Eichin argues that Plaintiff has failed to plead that Eichin knew that a tort was being committed or that Eichin intended to give assistance to committing the tort. In Casey, the court considered the issue of whether the knowledge element of an aiding and abetting claim had been sufficiently alleged. The plaintiffs asserted a claim for aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty against banks used in a scheme to divert investor funds and alleged that the banks knew of the breaches of fiduciary duty and assisted by allowing the misconduct.

The court held that the allegations were insufficient because they failed to establish that the banks had actual knowledge of the primary violation in which they purportedly participated. (127 Cal.App.4th at p. 1148.) The court explained that while the banks may have been suspicious about certain account activities, mere suspicion alone does not give rise to tort liability. (Id. at p. 1151.) The court further noted that, on the other hand, had the plaintiffs alleged that the banks knew that corporate funds were being stolen and knowingly assisted in its laundering, those allegations would suffice to state a claim for aiding and abetting. (Ibid.)

In Neilson v. Union Bank of California, N.A. (C.D. Cal. 2003) 290 F.Supp.3d 1101, analyzed by the Casey court, the court held that the complaint adequately alleged that the defendant banks had actual knowledge of the primary violation, a Ponzi scheme that defrauded investors out of millions of dollars. (Id. at p. 1120.) The Neilson court noted that the complaint alleged that the banks actively participated in the conduct by their utilization of atypical banking procedures to service the accounts, and noted that the necessary knowledge for aiding and abetting could be inferred based on those allegations. (Id. at pp. 1120-1121.)

Here, Plaintiff does not only allege that Eichin knew of the forgeries but also that Eichin furthered the misconduct accomplished through the forgeries by engaging in atypical practices, i.e., by certifying under penalty of perjury that Plaintiff and Defendant Jiao had personally appeared before her despite the fact that they had not. These allegations are sufficient to support an inference of the necessary knowledge against Eichin at the pleading stage.

Eichin requests judicial notice of a police report she filed with the Orange County Sheriff’s Department in which she purportedly showed the officer her notary journal entries for August 31, 2023 and the journal entries do not match the names on the grant deeds provided in the SAC. “While [courts] may take judicial notice of court records and official acts of state agencies [citation], the truth of matters asserted in such documents is not subject to judicial notice.” (Arce v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 471, 482.) Therefore, Eichin’s request for judicial notice is DENIED.

In light of all the above, Eichin’s demurrer to the SAC is OVERRULED. Eichin is ORDERED to file an answer to the SAC within 20 days. Moving party to give notice.

103 Abinante vs. Collins

25-01457824 1. Demurrer to Second Amended Complaint 2. Motion to Strike Portions Of Second Amended Complaint 3. Case Management Conference Defendants Matthew Collins, Smarttecc, Inc. (“Smarttecc”), Validus DX, LLC (“Validus”), MedLab2020, Inc. (“MedLab2020”) and MVML, Inc. (“MVML” and collectively, “Defendants”) demur to the SAC of plaintiffs Matthew Abinante; Rume Health, LLC; and Rume Medical Group, Inc. (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) and move to strike certain allegations.

Defendants Collins, Smarttecc, Validus, and MedLab2020’s Demurrer These defendants’ previous Demurrer to the causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty, declaratory relief, conversion, unjust enrichment, fraudulent concealment, negligence, unfair business practices, accounting, and implied and equitable indemnity was overruled on December 4, 2025. The Court finds these causes of action remain sufficiently pled. Further, to the extent Defendants’ Demurrer raises any new arguments against these causes of action that could have, but were not, raised in their prior Demurrer, the Court disregards