Faramarz Assef v. The Hertz Corporation
Motion for an order setting a reasonable fee for the appearance at deposition of Petitioner's treating chiropractor
Motion type
Causes of action
Monetary amounts referenced
Parties
Ruling
(Van Nuys Courthouse East: Dept. U) August 25, 2026 DEPARTMENT U LAW AND MOTION RULINGS
OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - NORTHWEST DISTRICT FARAMARZ ASSEF, Petitioner, vs. THE HERTZ CORPORATION, Respondent. |)))))))))))))) | CASE NO: 24VECP00399 [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR AN ORDER SETTING A REASONABLE FEE FOR THE APPEARANCE AT DEPOSITION OF PETITIONER'S TREATING CHIROPRACTOR, DR. ALIREZA MIRSHJOAE, DC Dept. U 8:30 a.m. August 25, 2026 | A. BACKGROUND This personal injury action arises from a motor-vehicle accident in which Petitioner Faramarz Assef alleges he sustained injuries requiring chiropractic treatment from Dr. Alireza Mirshojae, D.C.
Respondent brings this motion because Dr. Mirshojae demands $2,500 per hour for deposition testimony and requires a $5,000 prepayment before agreeing to schedule deposition. A motion to compel arbitration hearing is scheduled for October 2, 2026.
B. RULING Respondent's motion for order setting reasonable fee is Granted in part.
C. LEGAL STANDARD If a deposing party deems an expert's deposition fee to be unreasonable, the deposing party may move for an order setting the compensation of that expert. (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 2034.470 (a); Gov Code, Sec. 68092.5.)
When evaluating such a motion, the trial court shall consider: (a) the ordinary and customary fee actually charged and received by that expert for similar services provided outside the subject litigation; (b) the number of times the expert has ever charged and received the presently demanded fee; and (c) the frequency and regularity with which the presently demanded fee has been charged and received by that expert within the two-year period preceding the hearing on the motion. (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 2034.470 (b).)
D. DISCUSSION 1. The ordinary and customary fee actually charged and received by that expert for similar services provided outside the subject litigation. Hertz Corporation argues that Dr. Mirshojae has not provided sufficient evidence showing that $2,500 is his ordinary and customary fee actually charged and received.
In response, Dr. Mirshojae provides multiple checks, including payments dated as recently as June 17, 2026, reflecting that he received $2,500 for deposition attendance. (Dr. Mirshojae Decl, Exhibit B) Although the checks do not include memos identifying the purpose of each payment, nor do they explicitly reflect the period of time for which each payment was made, Dr. Mirshojae explains in his declaration that these checks are examples of payments he has been paid for deposition fees in other matters at a rate of $2500 per hour. (Dr. Mirshojae Dec., P. 7.) His submission demonstrates that $2,500 is, in fact, the ordinary and customary fee he charges and receives outside this case.
2. The number of times the expert has ever charged and received the presently demanded fee. Dr. Mirshojae has established that seven times he has charged different insurance companies $2500/hour in order to appear at deposition. (Dr. Mirshojae Decl, Exhibit B)
3. The frequency and regularity with which the presently demanded fee has been charged and received by that expert within the two-year period preceding the hearing on the motion. Although Dr. Mirshojae submitted multiple checks, most payments were made in 2026 and one in 2025, all reflecting a $2,500 rate (Dr. Mirshojae Decl, Exhibit B.)
Based on this evidence, the Court finds that Dr. Mirshojae has sufficiently shown that his charged and received rate within the relevant two-year period is $2,500 per hour. The Court finds that although Dr. Mirshojae has demonstrated that he has received $2,500 for deposition appearances in the past, he has not shown with competent evidence that this rate was regularly charged and received within the two-year statutory period. Because the most probative factor, frequency and regularity of payment, remains unsubstantiated, the Court sets a rate that reflects the portions of the evidence that are reliable while discounting those that are not. Accordingly, the Court determines that $2,000 represents a reasonable hourly fee under the circumstances.
CONCLUSION Respondent's motion for order setting reasonable fee is GRANTED at a rate of $2000 per hour. The Court further orders that the witness is to receive prepayment of $2000.. DATED: August 25, 2026 _____________________ Lee S. Arian Judge of the Superior Court
Case Number: 25VECV03005 Hearing Date: August 25, 2026 Dept: U SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - NORTHWEST DISTRICT GLASS RESIDENTIAL GROUP, INC., a California Corporation, Plaintiffs, vs. JOSEPH KEYSHAWN JOHNSON also known as KEYSHAWN JOHNSON, an Individual; KJMKLV DEVELOPMENT, LLC and DOES 1-25, Defendants.)))))))))))))) CASE NO: 25VECV03005 [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL DEFENDANT KJMKLV DEVELOPMENT, LLC TO PROVIDE VERFIED RESPONSES TO FORM INTERROGATORIES, SET 1 Dept. U 8:30 a.m. August 25, 2026
A. BACKGROUND On May 29, 2025, Plaintiff Glass Residential Group, Inc. ("Plaintiff"), filed the present action against defendants Joseph Keyshawn Johnson also known as Keyshawn Johnson and KJMKLV Development, LLC ("Defendants"). Plaintiff Glass Residential now moves to compel initial verified responses from Defendant KJMKL Development to Form Interrogatories, General, Set One.
On October 1, 2025, Plaintiff served Defendant KJMKLV with Plaintiff's Form Interrogatories, Set One by email. (Davidson Decl., P.3; Exhibit 1) On January 30, 2026, Plaintiff counsel sent a meet-and-confer email requesting full and complete responses to Plaintiff's outstanding discovery request by February 2, 2026. (Davidson Decl., P.10; Exhibit 2) On February 2, 2026, defense counsel emailed Plaintiff's counsel requesting a 14-day extension to provide response because Defendant Johnson, the sole officer of Defendant KJMKL, had been ill. (Davidson Decl., P.11; Exhibit 3)
Plaintiff's counsel rejected the excuse, noting that Defendant Johnson had been visible during the alleged period of incapacity appeared on podcast, hired new contractor for the property, was observed meeting with an architect, and had been disparaging Plaintiff to third parties. (Davidson Decl., P.12; Exhibit 3) Plaintiff further advised defense counsel that all objections had been waived due to untimeliness of Defendant KJMKLV's response. (Davidson Decl., P.14) Defendant has continued to fail to produce any discovery responses (Davidson Decl., P.15.)
B. RULING Plaintiff's motion to compel responses to form interrogatories--General, Set One is GRANTED.
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