Michael Verdugo v. Richard Meng, et al.

PARTY: Non-Party Express Deposition Services Motion for Order Setting Reasonable Fee for Copy of Deposition Transcripts The court considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers filed in connection with this motion.

DISCUSSION Plaintiffs J Cellars Investments, LLC and Joseph Bartholomew ("Plaintiffs") move the court for an order setting the reasonable cost of a copy of a deposition transcript from non-party Express Deposition Services ("EDS") for a non-noticing party at 20 cents per 100 words or 40 cents per page.

Ordinarily, the party noticing a deposition bears the cost for transcription of that deposition. (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 2025.510, subd. (b).) Any other party may obtain a copy of the transcript at that party's own expense. (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 2025.510, subd. (c).) A non-noticing party has the right to obtain a copy of a transcript at a "reasonable rate." (Serrano v. Stefan Merli Plastering Co., Inc. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1014, 1036.) Where there is a dispute over the reasonableness of the rate charged to a non-noticing party, the court may determine the amount of a reasonable fee. (Id. at 1038-39.)

The court finds that 40 cents per page is a reasonable fee for deposition transcripts to a non-moving party. That fee is in line with the statutory fee schedule for transcripts of court proceedings, which range between 20 and 26 cents per 100 words--which is approximately one half of a page. (Gov. Code, Sec.Sec. 69950, 69954.) While the transcripts at issue here are deposition transcripts, not court transcripts, the statutory fee schedule is instructive.

ORDER The court GRANTS plaintiffs J Cellars Investments LLC and Joseph Bartholomew's motion for order setting reasonable fee for deposition transcripts. The court orders that Express Deposition Services shall charge plaintiffs J Cellars Investments LLC and Joseph Bartholomew no more than $0.40 per page for deposition transcripts where plaintiffs J Cellars Investments LLC and Joseph Bartholomew were not the noticing parties. The court orders J Cellars Investments LLC and Joseph Bartholomew to give notice of this ruling. IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED: August 25, 2026 _____________________________ Robert B. Broadbelt III Judge of the Superior Court

Court of California

County of Los Angeles - Central District Department 513 Michael Verdugo; Plaintiff, vs. Richard meng, et al., Defendants. | Case No.: |

| | | Hearing Date: | August 25, 2026 | | | Time: | 10:00 a.m. | | | [Tentative] Order RE: Defendants' Special Motion to Strike Complaint | MOVING PARTY: Defendants Richard Meng and Vivian Meng RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Michael Verdugo Special Motion to Strike Complaint The court considered the moving and reply papers filed in connection with this motion. The court also exercises its discretion to consider the late-filed opposition papers filed August 13, 2026.

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE The court grants defendants Richard and Vivian Meng's requests for judicial notice pursuant to section 452, subdivision (d) of the Evidence Code. The court grants plaintiff Michael Verdugo's requests for judicial pursuant to section 452, subdivision (d) of the Evidence Code.

LEGAL STANDARD "The anti-SLAPP procedures are designed to shield a defendant's constitutionally protected conduct from the undue burden of frivolous litigation." ¿ (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 393.) ¿ " The anti-SLAPP statute does not insulate defendants from any liability for claims arising from the protected rights of petition or speech. ¿ It only provides a procedure for weeding out, at an early stage, meritless claims arising from protected activity. " ¿ (Id. at p. 384.) "Resolution of an anti-SLAPP motion involves two steps. ¿ First, the defendant must establish that the challenged claim arises from activity protected by section 425.16. ¿ If the defendant makes the required showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the merit of the claim by establishing a probability of success. " ¿ (Ibid. [citation omitted].) ¿ The California Supreme Court has " described this second step as a ' summary-judgment-like procedure. ' ¿ The court does not weigh evidence or resolve conflicting factual claims. ¿ Its inquiry is limited to whether the plaintiff has stated a legally sufficient claim and made a prima facie factual showing sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment. ¿ It accepts the plaintiff ' s evidence as true, and evaluates the defendant ' s showing only to determine if it defeats the plaintiff ' s claim as a matter of law. ¿ ' [C]laims with the requisite minimal merit may proceed. '" ¿ (Id. at pp. 384-385 [citations omitted].) ¿¿¿¿¿¿¿

DISCUSSION Defendants Richard and Vivian Meng ("Defendants") move the court for an order striking the Complaint for malicious prosecution in this action filed by plaintiff Michael Verdugo ("Plaintiff") pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, also known as the anti-SLAPP "("strategic lawsuit against public participation") statute. ¿

1. First Prong: Protected Activity The court finds that Defendants have met their burden to show that the allegations in the Complaint arise from protected activity. (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)

"Initially, the moving defendant bears the burden of establishing that the challenged allegations or claims 'aris[e] from' protected activity in which the defendant has engaged." ¿ (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1061.) ¿ " [T]he statutory phrase ' cause of action ... arising from ' means simply that the defendant ' s act underlying the plaintiff ' s cause of action must itself have been an act in furtherance of the right of petition or free speech. ¿ [Citation.] ¿ In the anti-SLAPP context, the critical point is whether the plaintiff's cause of action itself was based on an act in furtherance of the defendant's right of petition or free speech." ¿ (City of Cotati v.

Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4th 69, 78.) The sole cause of action alleged in the Complaint is for malicious prosecution in bringing the action entitled Meng, et al v. Mays, et al. Case No. 19STCV21850 in the Superior Court for the County of Los Angeles. (Complaint P.P. 4-10.) These allegations pertain on their face to writings made before a judicial proceeding and to writings made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a judicial body. (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 425.16, subd. (e)(1)-(2).)

For that reason, the court finds that Defendants have met their burden to demonstrate that the sole cause of action arises from acts in furtherance of Defendants' right of petition.

2. Second Prong: Probability of Success The second prong places the burden on the plaintiff to establish that there is a probability of prevailing on the challenged claim. ¿ (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) ¿ To satisfy this burden, the plaintiff must show that the challenged claim is both legally sufficient and supported by a prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment. ¿ (Oliveras v. Pineda (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 343, 353.) ¿ " This is a ' " summary-judgment-like procedure. " ' ¿ [Citation.] ¿ The pleadings and evidentiary submissions of both parties are considered [citation], and the evidence favorable to plaintiffs is accepted as true. ¿ [Citation.] ¿ Plaintiffs need only establish that their claim has ' " minimal merit " ' to avoid being stricken as a SLAPP. " ¿ (Ibid. [internal citations omitted].) ¿¿¿¿¿¿¿

To prevail on a claim for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must prove that the underlying action was (1) terminated in the plaintiff's favor; (2) prosecuted without probable cause; and (3) initiated with malice. (Franklin Mint Co. v. Manatt, Phelps Phillips, LLP (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 313, 333.) The court finds that Plaintiff has not met his burden to establish there is a probability that Plaintiff will prevail on his claim for malicious prosecution because he has not shown that Defendants prosecuted their action against him (1) without probable cause and (2) with malice against him. (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)

"[T]he probable cause element calls on the trial court to make an objective determination of the 'reasonableness' of the defendant's conduct, i.e., to determine whether, on the basis of the facts known to the defendant, the institution of the prior action was legally tenable. The resolution of that question of law calls for the application of an objective standard to the facts on which the defendant acted." (Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert & Oliker (1989) 47 Cal.3d 863, 878.) Plaintiff presents no evidence tending to establish that Defendants lacked probable cause in pursuing the underlying action against Plaintiff.

A contention that the testimony elicited at trial undercut the Defendants' claims and resulted in a complete victory for the defense is not itself evidence of lack of probable cause, because it does not bear upon the objective reasonableness of Defendants' actions. The court's Statement of Decision also does not prove that Defendants were objectively unreasonable in prosecuting or maintaining the action against Plaintiff. More importantly, Plaintiff's opposition entirely fails to address the third element of malicious prosecution: malice.

Plaintiff therefore fails to present a prima facie showing of facts sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment, and thus has not met his burden to establish a probability that Plaintiff will prevail on his claim for malicious prosecution. For the reasons set forth above, the court grants Defendants' special motion to strike.

ORDER The court GRANTS defendants Richard Meng and Vivian Meng's special motion to strike the Complaint. The court orders that the Complaint filed by plaintiff Michael Verdugo is stricken as to defendants Richard Meng and Vivian Meng without leave to amend pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. The court orders that defendants Richard Meng and Vivian Meng are dismissed from this action. The court orders that defendants Richard and Vivian Meng are entitled to recover reasonable attorney's fees and costs in connection with this motion pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (c)(1).

Reasonable fees and costs shall be determined by a procedurally proper and regularly-noticed motion. The court orders defendants Richard Meng and Vivian Meng to give notice of this ruling. IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED: August 25, 2026 _____________________________ Robert B. Broadbelt III