Oscar Chun-Fong Chan v. Harris Chun-Hoi Chan, et al.

Transamerica Ins. Co. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1287.) Further, "[t]here must be evidence that defendant acted with knowledge of the probable dangerous consequences to plaintiff's interests and deliberately failed to avoid these consequences." (Flyer's Body Shop Profit Sharing Plan v. Ticor Title Ins. Co. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 1149, 1155; see also Angie M. v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1228 ["Conscious disregard for the safety of another may be sufficient where the defendant is aware of the probably dangerous consequences of his or her conduct and he or she willfully fails to avoid such consequences"].)

A motion to strike punitive damages is properly granted where a plaintiff does not state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, including allegations that defendant is guilty of oppression, fraud or malice. (Turman v. Turning Point of Cent. California, Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63.) "Mere negligence, even gross negligence, is not sufficient to justify such an award" for punitive damages. (Kendall Yacht Corp. v. United California Bank (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 949, 958.) The allegations supporting a request for punitive damages must be alleged with specificity; conclusory allegations without sufficient facts are not enough. (Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1041-1042.)

After reviewing the allegations in the Complaint, the court finds punitive damages are sufficiently pleaded. As outlined above, Plaintiff alleges that she made several complaints about the vermin infestation in her unit yet Defendants failed to identify, remedy, or abate the infestation. The vermin infestation rendered Plaintiff's kitchen unusable and resulted in her constructive eviction. These allegations, taken together, sufficiently describe despicable conduct which was carried on with a willful and conscious disregard of Plaintiff's rights and safety.

C.

Conclusion

The motions to strike are DENIED.

IV. DISPOSITIONS

The demurrers are Overruled. The motions to strike are Denied. Defendants are ordered to serve and file their Answer to the Complaint within 5 days of this order. Plaintiff to give notice, unless waived. Dated: August 18, 2026 | | | Brock T. Hammond Judge of the Superior Court |

Judge Brock T. Hammond, Department 407 HEARING DATE: August 18, 2026 TRIAL DATE: Not set CASE: Oscar Chun-Fong Chan v. Harris Chun-Hoi Chan, et al. CASE NO.: 26STCV07811 DEFENDANT WINNIE LI-MEI CHAN'S SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO CCP Sec.425.16 MOVING PARTY: Defendant Winnie Li-Mei Chan RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Oscar Chun-Fong Chan

Defendant Winnie Le-Mei Chan ("Winnie") and Yiu-Kai Chan ("Yiu-Kai") were married for nearly three decades and had two children, plaintiff Oscar Chun-Fong Chan ("Plaintiff" or "Oscar") and defendant Harris Chun-Hoi Chan ("Harris"). In 2022, Winnie and Yiu-Kai legally separated. The separation caused a schism in the family, with Oscar siding with Yiu-Kai and Harris siding with Winnie. Yiu-Kai, who has resided in China since the separation, entrusted Oscar with the management of his assets in the United States. Due to disagreements about family assets, the relationship between Oscar, on one hand, and Winnie and Harris on the other, deteriorated. Various physical altercations occurred between Oscar and Harris. Winnie alleges she has lost access to much of the family home because Oscar changed the locks.

In response to Oscar's conduct, Winnie filed various legal actions, including but not limited to, unlawful detainer action (Case No. 24PDUD03549), complaint to recovery community property (Case No. 24NNCV04824), probate petition to determine claim to property (Case No. 24STPB11153), domestic violence action (Case No. 24PDR001975), and appeal of the domestic violence action (Case No. B346270). These cases were either dismissed or decided in favor of Oscar. In 2026, Oscar filed this action against Winnie and Harris. As relevant here, Oscar brings claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, abuse of process, and malicious prosecution arising, in part, from the filing of the above-mentioned legal actions.

I. INTRODUCTION

On March 10, 2026, Plaintiff commenced this action against Harris and Winnie. On June 22, 2026, Winnie (hereafter, "Defendant") filed this special motion to strike the third cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, fifth cause of action for abuse of process, and seventh cause of action for malicious prosecution from the Complaint. On July 6, 2026, Plaintiff filed an opposition. On August 11, 2026, Defendant filed a reply.

II. DISCUSSION

Defendant's moti on is untimely. " A special motion to strike must be filed within 60 days after service of the complaint on the defendant, unless the trial court exercises its discretion to consider a later-filed motion." (Chitsazzadeh v. Kramer & Kaslow (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 676, 682; Code Civ. Proc. (CCP), Sec. 425.16, subd. (f).) "The purpose of the time limitation is to permit the defendant to test the foundation of the plaintiff's action before having to devote its time, energy and resources to combating a meritless lawsuit." (San Diegans for Open Government v. Har Construction, Inc. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 611, 624 (cleaned up).)

"[T]he Legislature's act in allowing an interlocutory appeal of the denial of an anti-SLAPP motion is clearly tied to the fact that the statute contemplates that most such motions will be filed within 60 days of the filing of the complaint." (Platypus Wear, Inc. v. Goldberg (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 772, 787.) Thus, a "trial court must be wary about freely granting a party the right to file an anti-SLAPP motion past the 60-day deadline." (Ibid.) "Discretion to permit or deny an untimely motion cannot turn on the final determination of the merits of the motion." (Olsen v. Harbison (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 278, 286.)

Here, Defendant was served with the Complaint on April 10, 2026. (See Proof of Service by Substituted Service, filed 4/14/26.) This anti-SLAPP motion was filed more than 60 days later on June 22, 2026. The motion is untimely.

To the extent Defendant contends her May 28, 2026 filing--Declaration of Demurring or Moving Party in Support of Automatic Extension (Form CIV-141)--extended the time to file her anti-SLAPP motion, Defendant is mistaken. As indicated on the face of Form CIV-141, that document concerns only the filing of a demurrer (CCP Sec. 430.41), motion to strike (CCP Sec. 435.5), or motion for judgment on the pleadings (CCP Sec. 439).

III. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the special motion to strike is DENIED. Plaintiff is ordered to give notice, unless waived. Dated: August 18, 2026 | | | |