QUIROZ vs THE ESTATE OF JOSE M. QUIROZ, et al.

26CV170244: QUIROZ vs THE ESTATE OF JOSE M. QUIROZ, et al. 08/25/2026 Hearing on Motion - Other Special Motion to Strike (anti-SLAPP); filed by The Estate of Jose M. Quiroz (Defendant) + CRS# 994946167050 in Department 517

Tentative Ruling - 08/19/2026 Keith Fong

The Motion for Order re Special Motion to Strike (anti-SLAPP) filed by Yolanda Vives Quiroz, The Estate of Jose M. Quiroz on 05/29/2026 is Granted.

Defendants’ Anti-SLAPP Motion to Strike is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Victor Quiroz (“Plaintiff”) initiated this action on February 11, 2026 against Defendants the Estate of Jose M. Quiroz (“Estate”) and Yolanda Vives Quiroz (collectively, “Defendants”). The Complaint alleges (1) Breach of Contract; (2) Breach of the Implied Warranty of Habitability; (3) Breach of the Implied Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment; (4) Wrongful Constructive Eviction; (5) Nuisance; (6) Constructive Fraud; (7) Deceit – False Promise; (8) Deceit – Intentional Misrepresentation; (9) Deceit – Negligent Misrepresentation; (10) Unfair Competition; (11) Failure to Pay Relocation; and (12) Bad Faith Withholding.

Plaintiff alleges that he was a tenant at property located at 36584 Leone Street in Newark, California (“the Property”) pursuant to an oral rental agreement between Plaintiff and the owner of the Property, his father, Jose Quiroz, beginning in 2004. (Compl. p. 2.) Jose Quiroz passed away in 2021. (Id.) The Estate became the owner of the Property. (Id.) Defendant Yolanda Vives Quiroz (“Defendant Vives”) is the personal administrator of the Estate. (Id.) Plaintiff generally alleges that he suffered habitability issues during his tenancy and eventually moved out of the Property, without legally required information and acts regarding his move out, under the Tenant Protection Act, which Plaintiff contends was a wrongful eviction. (Id. pp. 2-3.)

The Complaint alleges that Defendant Vives acted in both her individual capacity as well as her role as administrator of the Estate in communicating to Plaintiff that he needed to move out; in the negotiation and execution of a February 2024 settlement agreement; and as to Plaintiff’s eviction. (Compl. ¶ 10.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Vives retained and directed attorney Trevor Zink (“Zink”) and his firm, the Omni Law Group (“Omni”), regarding Plaintiff’s eviction and general mismanagement of the Estate. (Id. ¶¶ 10, 13, 15.) Plaintiff alleges that counsel advised Defendants to not carry landlord insurance to limit Defendants’ liability and assisted in structuring the 2024 settlement in a manner damaging to Plaintiff. (Id. ¶¶ 16, 18.)

Defendants move to strike the entirety of Paragraphs 10, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 20, 22, 29, 42, and 43 of the Complaint. Defendants further move to strike Paragraphs 109, 126, 142, 157, 172, 186, 216, and 241 to the extent they incorporate by reference allegations of malice, oppression, and fraud, as well as Defendant Vives’ individual liability. Defendants further move to strike Paragraphs 5-7 to the extent they incorporate allegations against Zink and Omni APC as part of 26CV170244: QUIROZ vs THE ESTATE OF JOSE M. QUIROZ, et al. 08/25/2026 Hearing on Motion - Other Special Motion to Strike (anti-SLAPP); filed by The Estate of Jose M. Quiroz (Defendant) + CRS# 994946167050 in Department 517 an agency, joint venture, and conspiracy framework, and any reservation of right to name them as Doe Defendants.

Defendants’ motion is brought pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. Defendants contend that the allegations sought to be stricken arise from protected activity, that is, communications and conduct of counsel, between counsel, regarding pending judicial proceedings and negotiation and implementation of a settlement of a judicial proceeding. Defendants further contend that Plaintiff cannot show a probability of prevailing on the merits of his claims due to, inter alia, the litigation privilege under Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b); attorney-client privilege; and the February 2024 settlement agreement. Plaintiff opposes the motion.

The motion was originally set for hearing on July 30, 2026. The Court continued the hearing for additional time to review the papers.

LEGAL STANDARD

“A cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” (C.C.P. § 425.16(b)(1).)

An “act in furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue” includes: (1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law; (2) any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law; (3) any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest; or (4) any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest. (C.C.P. § 425.16(e).)

The purpose of the anti-SLAPP statute is to provide a procedural remedy to dispose of lawsuits that are brought to chill the valid exercise of constitutional rights. (No Doubt v. Activision Publishing, Inc. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1018, 1025-1026.) The anti-SLAPP statute allows defendants to request early judicial screening of legal claims targeting free speech or petitioning activities. (Ahmed v. Collect Access, LLC (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 1092, 1098.)

The purpose of the anti-SLAPP statute is to provide a procedural remedy to dispose of lawsuits that are brought to chill the valid exercise of constitutional rights. (No Doubt v. Activision Publishing, Inc. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1018, 1025-1026.) The anti-SLAPP statute allows

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

26CV170244: QUIROZ vs THE ESTATE OF JOSE M. QUIROZ, et al. 08/25/2026 Hearing on Motion - Other Special Motion to Strike (anti-SLAPP); filed by The Estate of Jose M. Quiroz (Defendant) + CRS# 994946167050 in Department 517 defendants to request early judicial screening of legal claims targeting free speech or petitioning activities. (Ahmed v. Collect Access, LLC (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 1092, 1098.)

The Court engages in a two-step process for determining whether an action is a SLAPP. (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 88.) “First, the court decides whether the defendant has made a threshold showing that the challenged cause of action is one arising from protected activity.” (Id.) “A defendant meets this burden by demonstrating that the act underlying the plaintiff’s cause fits one of the categories spelled out in section 425.16, subdivision (e).” (Id.) “If the court finds that such a showing has been made, it must then determine whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the claim.” (Id.) “Only a cause of action that satisfies both prongs of the anti-SLAPP statute -- i.e., that arises from protected speech or petitioning and lacks even minimal merit -- is a SLAPP, subject to being stricken under the statute.” (Id. at p. 89)

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice is DENIED as to Exhibit A and GRANTED IN PART as to Exhibit B. The existence of a contract between private parties is not established by judicial notice of facts. (CSHV 1999 Harrison, LLC v. County of Alameda (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 117, 135, fn. 12.) Notice is taken as to the Complaint in this action, but not the truth of factual matters asserted therein. (People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal. 4th 261, 280.)

Defendants’ Supplemental Request for Judicial Notice is GRANTED IN PART. As to Exhibits 1-5, notice is taken of the documents filed in Texas court proceedings, but not the truth of factual matters asserted therein.

EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS

Plaintiff’s Objections are not numbered, rendering it difficult for the Court to rule. Regardless, the evidentiary objections as to Paragraphs 2 – 6 of the Zink Declaration as well as to Paragraphs 3-4 and 6 of the Vives Declaration, the objections based on relevance, compound, and risk of unfair prejudice outweighing probative value are OVERRULED. As to settlement agreement submitted with the moving papers, the objections are moot as Defendants have addressed the objections on Reply.

DISCUSSION

Procedural Issues

As an initial matter, pursuant to the documents submitted with the supplemental declaration of Defendants’ counsel, there appears to be a related case in the Alameda County Superior Court, Case No. 24PR094440 Estate of: Jose M. Quiroz (“the Probate Action”). No party has filed a Notice of Related Case in this action pursuant to Rules of Court Rule 3.300. “Whenever a party

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

26CV170244: QUIROZ vs THE ESTATE OF JOSE M. QUIROZ, et al. 08/25/2026 Hearing on Motion - Other Special Motion to Strike (anti-SLAPP); filed by The Estate of Jose M. Quiroz (Defendant) + CRS# 994946167050 in Department 517 in a civil action knows or learns that the action or proceeding is related to another action or proceeding pending, dismissed, or disposed of by judgment in any state or federal court in California, the party must serve and file a Notice of Related Case.” (C.R.C. rule 3.300(b).) As Plaintiff is an objector in the Probate Action, it appears that Plaintiff was aware that the cases were related when he filed this case but failed to notify the Court as required. Plaintiff shall file a Notice of Related Case forthwith.

Allegations Arising From Protected Activity

Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s allegations that are the subject of this motion arise from protected activity as they are based upon Omni and Zink’s representation of Defendant Vives and work regarding pending judicial proceedings. Defendants do not seek to strike the entirety of any cause of action, but rather, specific allegations of protected activity that support Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages. (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 393 (“Baral”).) So long as a court determines that the relief is sought based on allegations arising from activity protected by the anti-SLAPP statute, the second step of an anti-SLAPP motion is reached. (Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1010.)

Claims arising from communications made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a judicial body are protected activity. (C.C.P. § 425.16(e)(2).) All communicative acts performed by attorneys as part of their representation of a client in a judicial proceeding or other petitioning context are per se protected as petitioning activity under section 425.16. (Cabral v. Martins (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 471, 479-480.) Statements, writings, and pleadings in connection with civil litigation are covered by the anti-SLAPP statute. (Rohde v. Wolf (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 28, 35.) Statements are connected to litigation where they relate to substantive issues in the litigation and are directed to persons having some interest in the litigation. (Seltzer v. Barnes (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 953, 962.) Generally, settlement negotiations are protected activity. (Id. at p. 964.)

Paragraph 10 of the Complaint alleges that Defendant Vives acted in her individual capacity when she negotiated and executed the February 2024 settlement and retained and directed counsel regarding Plaintiff’s eviction. Paragraph 13 alleges that Defendant Vives employed Omni and Zink for purposes of vicarious liability, and Paragraphs 15 and 29 allege Defendant Vives’ work with Zink. Paragraphs 14, 16, and 42 discuss Zink’s advice to Defendants. Paragraphs 18 and 22 alleges Zink’s representation of the Estate. Paragraphs 20 and 43 alleges communications between Zink and Plaintiff’s counsel. As such, these allegations are communicative acts performed by Zink and Omni as part of their representation of Defendants and legal advice provided to Defendants.

Plaintiff contends that the allegations are based upon non-protected administrative and property management conduct relating to the failure to maintain and repair a habitable property and unlawfully causing the termination of Plaintiff’s tenancy (“implementing the wrongful eviction of Plaintiff”). (Compl. ¶¶ 10, 29.) However, for anti-SLAPP purposes, claims arise from the

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

26CV170244: QUIROZ vs THE ESTATE OF JOSE M. QUIROZ, et al. 08/25/2026 Hearing on Motion - Other Special Motion to Strike (anti-SLAPP); filed by The Estate of Jose M. Quiroz (Defendant) + CRS# 994946167050 in Department 517 adverse actions allegedly taken, notwithstanding Plaintiff’s allegations that the actions were taken for an improper purpose and regardless of alleged motivations that support Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages. (Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 892.) Here, the targeted allegations are based upon Zink and Omni’s legal communications to Defendants and Plaintiff’s counsel relating to the ownership of the Property, Plaintiff’s tenancy, and settlement of the dispute.

Plaintiff further contends that the allegations sought to be stricken are contextual only, and as such, cannot be subject to strike. (Baral at p. 394.) However, Paragraphs 109, 126, 142, 157, 172, 186, 216, and 241 expressly state that they are “Specific Allegations of Malice, Oppression and Fraud” as required to support a request for punitive damages. Paragraph 13 supports Plaintiff’s theory of liability under vicarious liability, and Paragraphs 5-7 support theories of agency, conspiracy, and/or joint venture liability. Paragraphs 19, 20, 22, 23, and 43 allege intentional conduct and concealment by Defendants working in concert with Zink and Omni, which further support requested punitive damages. As alleged, the allegations Defendants seek to strike support Plaintiff’s request for punitive damage and theories of liability.

Based upon the foregoing, Defendants have met their burden to establish that the targeted claims are protected conduct under C.C.P. § 425.16.

Probability of Prevailing on the Allegations

As Plaintiff’s allegations arise from protected activity, the Court considers whether Plaintiff can establish a probability of prevailing on his claims. To establish a probability of prevailing on a claim under section 425.16(b)(1), a plaintiff must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by an adequate prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable of judgment if the evidence submitted by plaintiff is credited. (Wilson v. Parker, Covert & Chidester (2002) 28 Cal.4th 811, 821.) To meet this burden, plaintiff must provide admissible evidence; plaintiff cannot rely on the allegations in the complaint, even if verified. (Newport Harbor Offices & Marina, LLC v. Morris Cerullo World Evangelism (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 28, 49.) The Court does not weigh credibility or comparative probative strength of the competing evidence. (Id.)

Plaintiff’s evidence consists of his sworn declaration. Plaintiff states that Defendant Vives failed to repair the Property; that Zink “was managing the House in a role of an administrator or property manager;” he was not told by Zink that he was entitled to relocation and written notice of termination of his tenancy; he never received “any bona fide written notice of tenancy;” and he would not have moved out of the Property had he been aware of his rights as a tenant. (Pltf. Decl. ¶¶ 7-12.) There are no further exhibits attached to Plaintiff’s declaration.

Nothing in Plaintiff’s declaration supports the targeted allegations that are the basis of Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages. Plaintiff fails to provide evidence to establish that any of the purported conduct was oppressive, fraudulent, or malicious, under Civil Code § 3294. Plaintiff

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

26CV170244: QUIROZ vs THE ESTATE OF JOSE M. QUIROZ, et al. 08/25/2026 Hearing on Motion - Other Special Motion to Strike (anti-SLAPP); filed by The Estate of Jose M. Quiroz (Defendant) + CRS# 994946167050 in Department 517 cannot rely upon his bare allegations asserted in the Complaint as evidence for purposes of opposing Defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion. As such, Plaintiff fails to meet his burden pursuant to the second prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis to establish a probability of prevailing on the allegations to support his request for punitive damages.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, Defendants’ arguments regarding the applicability of the litigation privilege and attorney-client privilege are addressed below. The Court does not reach Defendants’ other arguments regarding the applicability of Civil Code § 1714.10, whether a duty is owed to Plaintiff, or whether the settlement agreement bars Plaintiff’s recovery of punitive damages.

Litigation Privilege

Defendants contend that the litigation privilege pursuant to Civil Code § 47(b) bars Plaintiff’s allegations that are the subject of this motion. The litigation privilege applies to any communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of litigation; and (4) that has some connection or logical relation to the action. (Winslett v. 1811 27th Avenue, LLC (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 239, 253.) The privilege may extend beyond statements made during a trial or other proceedings, to steps taken prior thereto or after. (Id.) The litigation privilege is absolute in nature and applies to all torts except for malicious prosecution. (Silberg v. Anderson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 205, 215.)

As discussed above, the targeted allegations here allege communications and acts by Defendants’ counsel to Defendants as part of the attorney-client relationship between Defendants and Zink/Omni. The allegations include communications between Zink and Defendant Vives regarding Plaintiff’s tenancy at the Property, statutory notices to provide to Plaintiff, landlord insurance, and interpretation of the settlement agreement. These communications were made within the context of pending litigation with Plaintiff. The allegations further include communications between Zink and Plaintiff’s counsel. As such, the litigation privilege applies here as the allegations are based upon conduct made in or before judicial proceedings by litigants and their counsel to achieve the objects of litigation, with connection to the action.

Plaintiff contends that litigation privilege does not apply here where the conduct relates to business advice, property management, and fiduciary conduct. Plaintiff’s case law in support of this contention are inapposite. (E.g., Labert v. Carneghi (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 1120 [litigation privilege does not apply where homeowners sue their own appraisal expert]; Fiduciary Trust International of California v. Klein (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 1184 [discussion as to whether documents may be properly withheld by a predecessor trustee on the basis of attorney-client privilege to the successor trustee]; Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106 [defendant not required to demonstrate that statement made before or in connection with an issue considered by legally authorized official proceeding concerned issue of public significance].)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

26CV170244: QUIROZ vs THE ESTATE OF JOSE M. QUIROZ, et al. 08/25/2026 Hearing on Motion - Other Special Motion to Strike (anti-SLAPP); filed by The Estate of Jose M. Quiroz (Defendant) + CRS# 994946167050 in Department 517

Attorney-Client Privilege

Defendants further contend that Plaintiff cannot establish a probability of prevailing because evidence supporting Plaintiff’s allegations are protected by the attorney-client privilege, pursuant to Evidence Code § 954.

While Plaintiff contends that Defendants’ arguments regarding the attorney-client privilege is overbroad, Plaintiff provides no evidence to show that any evidence to support his allegations would fall outside of the privilege. Similarly, although Plaintiff contends that the crime fraud exception under Evidence Code § 956 applies to take these communications out of the scope of the privilege, Plaintiff provides no evidence to establish that the exception applies. Plaintiff again only cites the allegations in the complaint, which cannot establish a probability of prevailing for purposes of the instant motion.

Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff has not met his burden to establish the probability of prevailing on his allegations supporting his request for punitive damages, and has not established that evidence that would not be barred by the litigation privilege or protected by the attorneyclient privilege.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, Defendants’ anti-SLAPP Motion to Strike is GRANTED.

The following paragraphs are hereby STRICKEN from the Complaint: Paragraphs 5-7 to the extent they incorporate allegations against Zink and Omni; and 10, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 20, 22, 29, 42, 43,109, 126, 142, 157, 172, 186, 216, and 241.

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SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

26CV170244: QUIROZ vs THE ESTATE OF JOSE M. QUIROZ, et al. 08/25/2026 Hearing on Motion - Other Special Motion to Strike (anti-SLAPP); filed by The Estate of Jose M. Quiroz (Defendant) + CRS# 994946167050 in Department 517 8. Select "Proceed"

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