FARID S. URQUIZU FLORES v. AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO., INC.

recover economic loss damages without the need to allege and prove personal injury or property damage." (North American, supra, 59 Cal.App.4th at p. 785 (emphasis added).) Thus, in failing to address whether a triable issue of material fact exists as to any of the six criteria set forth in North American, Carson Honda fails to meet its burden and the burden does not shift to Plaintiff. III. CONCLUSION Carson Honda's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. Case Number: 24CMCV01228-2 Hearing Date: August 25, 2026 Dept: E SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - SOUTH CENTRAL DISTRICT FARID S.

URQUIZU FLORES, an individual, Plaintiff, vs. AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO., INC. a California Corporation, and SONIC-HARBOR CITY H, INC., a California Corporation d/b/a CARSON HONDA, and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, Defendants. |))))))))))))))) | CASE NO: 24CMCV01228 [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: DEFENDANT AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO., INC.'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION DATE: August 25, 2026 TIME: 8:30 A.M.

DEPT.: E | Moving Party: Defendant American Honda Motor Co., Inc. Responding Party: Plaintiff Farid S. Urquizu Flores Notice: Ok SHAPE \* MERGEFORMAT Tentative Ruling: Defendant American Honda Motor Co., Inc.'s Motion for Summary Adjudication is GRANTED. SHAPE \* MERGEFORMAT I. BACKGROUND This is a Song-Beverly action filed on August 13, 2024. Plaintiff Farid S. Urquizu Flores ("Plaintiff") alleges that on October 28, 2023, he purchased a 2024 Honda CR-V, vehicle identification number 2HKRS3H45RH304709, (the "Subject Vehicle").

Through such purchase, Plaintiff entered a warranty contract with Defendant American Honda Motor Co. ("Honda"), including various warranties including, inter alia, a 3-year/36,000-mile express bumper-to-bumper warranty, a 5-year/60,000-mile powertrain warranty, and various emissions warranties with greater time and mileage limitations than the bumper-to-bumper and powertrain warranties. Plaintiff further alleges that subsequent to the purchase and during the express warranty period, the Subject Vehicle exhibited serious defects and nonconformities to warranty including, inter alia, electrical, steering, and suspension system defects.

Although Plaintiff presented the Subject Vehicle to Defendant Sonic-Harbor City H, Inc., d/b/a Carson Honda ("Carson Honda"), one of Honda's authorized repair facilities, for warranty repairs on multiple occasions, none of the repairs brought the Subject Vehicle in conformity with the express warranty. Plaintiff further alleges that Honda failed to promptly offer to repurchase or refund the Subject Vehicle. On August 13, 2024, Plaintiff filed the operative Complaint asserting cause of action for: (1) Violation of the Song-Beverly Act - Breach of Express Warranty; (2) Violation of the Song-Beverly Act - Breach of Implied Warranty; (3) Violation of the Song-Beverly Act Section 1793.2; and (4) Negligent Repair.

On April 23, 2026, Honda filed the instant Motion for Summary Adjudication (the "MSA"). On August 5, 2026, Plaintiff filed an Opposition. On August 14, 2026, Honda filed its Reply. II. ANALYSIS A.

Legal Standard

The purpose of a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication "is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties' pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute." (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) "Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and 'all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence' and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." (Adler v.

Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)¿¿ "On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact." (Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.) A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication "has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action ... cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action." (Code Civ.

Proc. Sec. 437c(p)(2).) "Once the defendant ... has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff ... to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto." (Ibid.) "If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted." (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467 (" Avivi ").)¿¿ A motion for summary judgment must be granted "if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." (Code Civ.

Proc. Sec. 437c(c).) On the other hand, a motion for summary adjudication must be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty. (Id., Sec. 437(f)(1).)¿ "When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection), as well as all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment." (Avivi, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 467; see also Code Civ.

Proc., Sec. 437c(c).) B. The Undisputed Material Facts ("UMF") Plaintiff purchased a 2024 Honda CR-V (VIN: 2HKRS3H45RH304709) on October 28, 2023. (UMF #1) [1] On November 4, 2023, the Subject Vehicle was presented to Honda's authorized repair facility, Riverside Honda, for complaints that the dash cluster intermittently turns on and off; the dealership confirmed the dash cluster is operating as designed and the repair was closed on November 4, 2023 indicating 1 day down. (Id., # 2.) [2] On November 19, 2023, Plaintiff presented the Subject Vehicle to Riverside Honda for complaints that the gauge

cluster intermittently turns off and on with half the lights showing; the dealership replaced the combination meter cluster and the repair was closed on December 4, 2023 indicating 15 days down. (Id., # 3.) On January 6, 2024, Plaintiff presented the Subject Vehicle to Long Beach Honda for routine maintenance and a complaint of a clunking noise when turning the steering wheel; the dealership torqued all suspension nuts and bolts to factory spec and the repair was closed on January 6, 2024 indicating 1 day down. (Id., # 4.)

On February 17, 2024, Plaintiff presented the Subject Vehicle to Carson Honda complaining of a cracking noise when turning the steering wheel; the dealership verified the noise and added felt tape to the cable reel and confirmed the noise was no longer present. (Id., # 5.) The dealership closed the repair order on February 17, 2024 indicating 1 day down. (Id.) On March 19, 2024, Plaintiff presented the Subject Vehicle to Carson Honda complaining of cracking noise when turning the steering wheel to the left or right. (Id., # 6.)

The repair order was closed on March 19, 2024, indicating one day down. (Id.) On April 13, 2024, Plaintiff presented the Subject Vehicle to Carson Honda for the replacement of the cable reel causing the cracking noise from the steering wheel; the dealership replaced the cable reel and confirmed that the noise was no longer present when turning the wheel (Id., # 7.) The repair order was closed on April 13, 2024 indicating 1 day down. (Id.) On July 4, 2024, Plaintiff presented the Subject Vehicle to Carson Honda with a complaint that the sensors were intermittently not working; the dealership was unable to duplicate the complaint and this repair was closed on July 4, 2024 indicating 1 day down. (Id., # 8.)

On August 10, 2024, Plaintiff presented the Subject Vehicle to Carson Honda for routine maintenance; the dealership performed a multipoint inspection and changed the vehicle's oil and this repair was closed on August 10, 2024 indicating 1 day down. (Id., # 9.) On April 22, 2025, Plaintiff presented the Subject Vehicle to Penske Honda of Ontario for routine maintenance and Safety Recall 24-117; the dealership performed a multipoint inspection, an oil change, and completed the Safety Recall and closed the repair on April 22, 2025 indicating 1 day down. (Id., # 10.)

On May 12, 2025, Plaintiff presented the Subject Vehicle to Penske Honda of Ontario with complaints of Bluetooth cutting out, the vehicle losing power and not accelerating, and the steering column feeling stiff when turning in both directions; the dealership performed a factory data reset on the Subject Vehicle, tested Bluetooth and radio operation, and found both to be working normally. (Id., # 11.) The dealership test drove the Subject Vehicle for 10 miles and confirmed it had normal power, no misfires, and the power steering felt normal during the test drive; the repair was closed on May 12, 2025 indicating 1 day down. (Id.)

On August 14, 2025, Plaintiff

presented the Subject Vehicle to Penske Honda of Ontario with a complaint that a lane mitigation warning line kept appearing on the dash; the dealership replaced the multipurpose camera and the repair order was closed on August 21, 2025 indicating eight days down. (Id., # 12.) No repair presentation took more than 30 days to complete. (Id., # 13.) The longest time the Subject Vehicle was out of service for repairs was fifteen days. (Id., # 14.) [3] C.

Discussion

Honda moves for summary adjudication of Plaintiff's Third Cause of Action for Violation of the Song-Beverly Action Section 1793.2(b), arguing that there is no evidence that any repair presentation was not commenced within a reasonable time or lasted more than thirty days. Plaintiff opposes, arguing that the language of Civil Code Sec. 1793.2 is better understood to mean that the Subject Vehicle remains unrepaired for a period of longer than thirty days, rather than whether any specific repair visit lasted longer than 30 days.

Civil Code Sec. 1793.2(b) states, in pertinent part: Where. . . service and repair facilities are maintained in this state and service or repair of the goods is necessary because they do not conform with the applicable express warranties, service and repair shall be commenced within a reasonable time by the manufacturer or its representative in this state. Unless the buyer agrees in writing to the contrary, the goods shall be serviced or repaired so as to conform to the applicable warranties within 30 days.

Delay caused by conditions beyond the control of the manufacturer or its representatives shall serve to extend this 30-day requirement. Where delay arises, conforming goods shall be tendered as soon as possible following termination of the condition giving rise to the delay. (Civ. Code Sec.1793.2(b).) Honda contends that Section 1793.2(b)'s [4] 30-day requirement should be read as 30 consecutive days during which it has to service or repair a vehicle and argues that, since the undisputed facts show that there was no repair lasting more than 30 consecutive days, no triable issue of material fact exists regarding Plaintiff's Third Cause of Action.

In opposition, Plaintiff contends that Section 1793.2(b)'s requirement is cumulative rather than consecutive. Courts have not conclusively addressed the question of whether Section 1793.2(b) creates liability for a failure to repair the vehicle within 30 consecutive days or within 30 cumulative days. Given that the plain text of Section 1793.2(b) is unclear in that it could be read to mean either 30 consecutive days or 30 cumulative days, the Court turns to the legislative history of Section 1793.2. [5] Under well-established rules of statutory construction, we must ascertain the intent of the drafters so as to effectuate the purpose of

the law. Because the statutory language is generally the most reliable indicator of legislative intent, we first examine the words themselves, giving them their usual and ordinary meaning and construing them in context. Every statute should be construed with reference to the whole system of law of which it is a part, so that all may be harmonized and have effect . . . When the plain meaning of the statutory text is insufficient to resolve the question of its interpretation, the courts may turn to rules or maxims of construction which serve as aids in the sense that they express familiar insights about conventional language usage.

Courts also look to the legislative history of the enactment. Both the legislative history of the statute and the wider historical circumstances of its enactment may be considered in ascertaining the legislative intent. Finally, the court may consider the impact of an interpretation on public policy, for where uncertainty exists consideration should be given to the consequences that will flow from a particular interpretation." (Mejia v. Reed (2003) 31 Cal. 4th 657, 663 (internal citations and quotations omitted, cleaned up).)

Prior to 1992, former Section 1793.2(e)(1) read "It shall be presumed that a reasonable number of attempts have been made to conform a new motor vehicle to the applicable express warranties if, within one year from delivery to the buyer or 12,000 miles on the odometer of the vehicle, whichever occurs first, either (A) the same nonconformity has been subject to repair four or more times by the manufacturer or its agents and the buyer has at least once directly notified the manufacturer of the need for the repair of the nonconformity or (B) the vehicle is out of service by reason of repair of nonconformities by the manufacturer or its agents for a cumulative total of more than 30 calendar days since delivery of the vehicle to the buyer.

The 30-day limit shall be extended only if repairs cannot be performed due to conditions beyond the control of the manufacturer or its agents." (Civ. Code Sec. 1792.3(e)(1)(1991)(emphasis added).) The language as to "cumulative total of more than 30 calendar days," along with other language, was deleted from Section 1793.2(b) via Senate Bill 1762 in 1992. (See Stats.1992, c. 1232 (S.B. 1762, Sec. 6.) The same Senate Bill, S.B. 1762, added Civil Code Sec. 1793.22 (a component of the Song-Beverly Act called the "Tanner Consumer Protection Act") which governed new motor vehicles. (Id.)

Importantly, in deleting the language regarding a "cumulative total of more than 30 calendar days" from Section 1793.2 and creating Section 1793.22 regarding new motor vehicles, the legislature added language to Section 1793.22 mirroring what was deleted from Section 1793.2. (See Civ. Code Sec. 1793.22(b)(3)("It shall be presumed that a reasonable number of attempts have been made to conform a new motor vehicle to the applicable express warranties if . . . [t]he vehicle is out of service by reason of repair or nonconformities by the manufacturer or its agents for a cumulative total of more than 30 calendar days since the delivery of the vehicle to the buyer ")(emphasis added).)

By the Legislature deleting the "cumulative" language from Section 1793.2 and simultaneously adding the "cumulative" language to Section 1793.22, the Court understands that: (1) had the Legislature intended Section 1793.2(b)'s 30-day provision to be cumulative, the Legislature knew how to make it so; and (2) the Legislature intended Section 1793.22, created specifically to deal with new motor vehicles, to be cumulative and

further intended Section 1793.2 to not be cumulative. Accordingly, the Court finds Honda's interpretation of Section 1793.2(b)'s 30-day provision to be consecutive comports with legislative intent and to be more persuasive. The Court therefore agrees with Honda that, for liability to attach under Section 1793.2(b) for excessive time to repair the vehicle, the vehicle must be in for repairs for longer than thirty consecutive days. Plaintiff's position that "30 days" should be read as 30 cumulative days does not comport with legislative intent.

Here, Honda submitted undisputed evidence that each time Plaintiff presented his vehicle for repair, the repair facility repaired the vehicle in less than 30 days. The undisputed material facts demonstrate that when Plaintiff presented his concerns to the authorized repair facilities, the facility closed the repairs within one day, or at most within 15 days. (UMF ## 2-12.) Honda has therefore met its burden to demonstrate that there is no triable issue of material facts as to Plaintiff's Third Cause of Action for violation of Civil Code Section 1793.2(b), and the burden shifts to Plaintiff to raise a triable issue of material fact.

Plaintiff has not president evidence sufficient to establish a question as to whether any of the repairs lasted longer than 30 days and therefore has not met his burden to demonstrate that triable issues exist as to the total time the vehicle was out of service by reason of repair of nonconformities. Accordingly, a ruling granting Honda's MSA is warranted. Honda also argues the evidence shows that Honda' authorized repair facilities commenced all repairs promptly. (Mot., p. 5:8-10.) In support of that contention, Honda presents evidence showing that, with the exception of the November 19, 2023 visit (see UMF # 3, indicating 15 days down) and the August 14, 2025 visit (see UMF # 12, indicating 8 days down), service was commenced on the same date the Subject Vehicle was brought in for repairs. (See UMF ### 2, 4-11.)

Plaintiff fails to present evidence that Honda's authorized facilities did not promptly commence any of the repairs and presents no argument that repairs were not commenced promptly as to either the 15 day service period in 2023 or the 8 day service period in 2025. Accordingly, a ruling granting Honda's MSA is warranted on the basis of commencing repairs within a reasonable time. Based on the foregoing, Honda's Motion for Summary Adjudication is GRANTED. III. CONCLUSION Honda's Motion for Summary Adjudication is GRANTED. [1] The seller or dealership appears to be a disputed fact.

Defendant states Plaintiff purchased the Subject Vehicle from Carson Honda, but Plaintiff disputes that the Sales Contract states Riverside Honda. The Court does not find this dispute material to its determination of Honda's MSA. [2] Throughout, Plaintiff inserts into his Separate Statement what appear to be evidentiary objections, which

objections are not made in compliance with the Rules of Court. Rule of Court 3.1354 requires that, when submitted in opposition to motion for summary judgment, "[a]ll written objections to evidence must be served and filed separately from the other papers in support of or in opposition to the motion. Objections to specific evidence must be referenced by the objection number in the right column of a separate statement in opposition or reply to a motion, but the objections must not be restated or reargued in the separate statement.

Each written objection must be numbered consecutively and must: (1) [i]dentify the name of the document in which the specific material objected to is located; (2) [s]tate the exhibit, title, page, and line number of the material objected to; (3) [q]uote or set forth the objectionable statement or material; and (4) [s]tate the grounds for each objection to that statement or material." (Cal. R. Ct., Rule 3.1354(b).) Additionally, "[a] party submitting written objections to evidence must submit with the objections a proposed order.

The proposed order must include places for the court to indicate whether it has sustained or overruled each objection. It must also include a place for the signature of the judge." (Id., Rule 3.1354(c).) A party failing to object in the manner required by Rule 3.1354 waives any objections. (See Superior Dispatch, Inc. v. Insurance Corp. of New York (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 175, 192-193.) The Court accordingly deems Plaintiff's evidentiary objections included within the Separate Statement waived. [3] Plaintiff presents two unnumbered additional material facts, the first of which simply confirms that there is no triable issue of material fact as to identification of the Subject Vehicle or Plaintiff's purchase of the Subject Vehicle.

Plaintiff's second additional material fact references "Plaintiff's Complaint" as its supporting evidence. (See Plaintiff's Separate Statement of Additional Material Facts, filed 8/5/26, p. 7:21-25.) A party opposing a motion for summary adjudication may not rely upon its pleadings but rather must set forth specific facts showing the existence of a triable issue of material fact. (Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 437c(p)(2); Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.App.4th 826, 849.) Because Plaintiff's additional material facts either add nothing for the Cout's consideration or are not supported by proper evidence, neither is included in the Court's summary of undisputed material facts. [4] Unless otherwise specified, Section references are to the Civil Code.

Subdivision references are references to the subdivisions of Civil Code Sec. 1793.2. [5] The Court has determined that the rules and maxims of statutory construction do not provide substantial assistance in determining the "cumulative" versus "consecutive" question presented. The plain meaning of the statute is unclear and, even when read in context with the intention of giving effect to the entirety of the Act, either interpretation suits. Case Number: 24CMCV01413 Hearing Date: August 25, 2026 Dept: E SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - SOUTH CENTRAL DISTRICT JASON RIOS, by and through his Guardian ad Litem, Maria Chavez;