HILL vs PICK N PULL AUTO DISMANTLERS, LLC, AN OREGON LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY;, et al.

26CV007307: HILL vs PICK N PULL AUTO DISMANTLERS, LLC, AN OREGON LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY;, et al. 08/20/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay or Dismiss the Proceedings in Department 16C

Tentative Ruling

The motion to compel arbitration, filed by Defendants Radius Recycling, Inc. f/k/a Schnitzer Steel Industries, Inc.; Pick N Pull Auto Dismantlers, LLC; Toyota Tsusho America, Inc., Michael Limas, Carrie Camacho, and Angelo Tomasello (“Defendants”), is ruled upon as follows. Defendants’ objections are overruled. FACTS In this employment action, Plaintiff Nicholas Hill (“Plaintiff”) alleges causes of action for disability discrimination, failure to engage in the interactive process, retaliation under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) and the Labor Code, negligent hiring/supervision, wrongful termination in violation of public policy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Plaintiff was employed by Defendants from June 2024 until his termination on April 1, 2025. (Compl., ¶¶ 18, 33.) Defendants now move to compel Plaintiff’s claims to arbitration pursuant to an Arbitration Agreement. The Agreement provides that the “Agreement will govern the resolution of all disputes, claims and any other matters in question arising out of or relating in any way to the Individual’s employment or other relationship with the Company (including, but not limited to, application for or termination of employment or other relationship or any background check process associated with same).

The Parties shall resolve all disputes, claims and any other matters in question arising out of or related to their relationship in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement.” (Warren Decl., Exh. A, section 1, p. 1.) The Agreement applies to the following: any and all past, present, and future grievances, disputes, claims, complaints, or causes of action (collectively, “Claims”) that otherwise could be brought in a federal, state, or local court or agency under applicable federal, state, or local laws, arising out of or related in any way to Individual’s employment or other relationship with the Company and application for or termination thereof, including without limitation Claims Individual may have against the Company or against its parents, subsidiaries, affiliates, divisions, brands, clients, customers, alleged agents, and alleged joint or co-employers, and its and their respective officers, directors, principals, shareholders, partners, members, owners, supervisors, managers, employees, or agents, whether current, former, or future, in their capacity as such or otherwise, or that the Company may have against Individual (collectively, “Covered Claims”). [¶] Covered Claims include, but are not limited to, Claims arising out of or related in any way to breach of any contract or covenant (express or implied), tort, trade secrets, unfair competition, compensation (including, but not limited to, classification, minimum wage, unpaid wages, equal pay, expense reimbursement, overtime, breaks, meal periods, rest periods, or for or otherwise related in any way to wages, other compensation, or benefits), based on race,

26CV007307: HILL vs PICK N PULL AUTO DISMANTLERS, LLC, AN OREGON LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY;, et al. 08/20/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay or Dismiss the Proceedings in Department 16C

sex, gender, religion, national origin, age, marital status, uniformed service, medical condition, psychological condition, mental condition, disability, or sexual orientation), or for violation of any federal, state, local, or other governmental law, statute, regulation, or ordinance, including, but not limited to, any and all Claims arising under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, Defend Trade Secrets Act, Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §1981, Rehabilitation Act, Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1871, Civil Rights Act of 1991, 8 U.S.C. § 1324b (unfair immigration related practices), 41 U.S.C. § 4712, Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Equal Pay Act, Americans With Disabilities Act, Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Older Workers Benefit Protection Act, Occupational Safety and Health Act, Family and Medical Leave Act, Fair Labor Standards Act, Employee Retirement Income Security Act (except for claims for employee benefits under any benefit plan sponsored by the Employer and covered by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 or funded by insurance), Affordable Care Act, Genetic Information Non- Discrimination Act, Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act, Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, the False Claims Act, the Dodd-Frank Act, and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, all as amended, and together with all of their respective implementing regulations, and any other federal, state, local, or other governmental statutes or regulations, if any, addressing the same or similar subject matters or that otherwise govern the Parties’ employment relationship (including, but not limited to, the application, selection, employment, or termination of employment). wrongful termination (constructive or actual), privacy laws, or retaliation, discrimination, or harassment (including, but not limited to, harassment or discrimination. (Warren Decl., Exh.

A, section 3, pp. 1-2.) The Agreement indicates that the arbitration will be administered by the AAA. (Warren Decl., Exh. A, section 2, p. 1.) Defendants now move to compel Plaintiff’s claims to be arbitrated in accordance with the Agreement. DISCUSSION A written agreement to submit a controversy to arbitration is valid, enforceable, and irrevocable, consistent with standard contract principles. There is a strong public policy favoring the enforcement of arbitration agreements. (Code Civ. Proc. §1281; Madden v.

Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1976) 17 Cal.3d 699, 706.) On the petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the matter if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists, unless it determines that: (a) the right to compel arbitration was waived by the petitioner; (b) grounds exist for the revocation of the agreement; or, (c) a party to the arbitration agreement is also a party to a pending court action or special proceeding with a

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV007307: HILL vs PICK N PULL AUTO DISMANTLERS, LLC, AN OREGON LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY;, et al. 08/20/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay or Dismiss the Proceedings in Department 16C

third party, arising out of the same transaction or series of related transactions and there is a possibility of conflicting rulings on a common issue of law or fact. (Code Civ. Proc. §1281.2; Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413.)

Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) is essentially the same:

A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. (9 U.S.C. § 2.) 'Under both federal and state law, the threshold question presented by a petition to compel arbitration is whether there is an agreement to arbitrate.' (Sparks v.

Del Mar Child and Family Svcs. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1511, 1517.) 'Absent a clear agreement to submit disputes to arbitration, courts will not infer that the right to a jury trial has been waived.' (Id. at 1518.) That said, the Court finds that the written contract here provides for the arbitration of this dispute. Therefore, the opposing party, Plaintiff, bears the burden of producing evidence of, and proving by a preponderance of the evidence, any fact necessary to the defense. (Rosenthal, supra, 14 Cal.4th at 413.)

It bears noting, '[A]rbitration agreements should be liberally interpreted, and arbitration should be ordered unless the agreement clearly does not apply to the dispute in question.' (Vianna v. Doctors’ Management Co. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1186, 1189 [quoting Weeks v. Crow (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 350, 352.) 'Doubts as to whether an arbitration clause applies to a particular dispute are to be resolved in favor of sending the parties to arbitration.” (United Transportation Union v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 804, 808.)

Indeed, there is a strong public policy favoring the enforcement of arbitration agreements. (Code Civ. Proc. §1281; Madden v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1976) 17 Cal.3d 699, 706.) 'A party seeking to compel arbitration of a dispute 'bears the burden of proving the existence of an arbitration agreement, and the party opposing arbitration bears the burden of proving any defense, such as unconscionability. [Citation.]' (Jenks v. DLA Piper Rudnick Gray Cary US LLP (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 1, 8.) Plaintiff does not dispute the existence of the Agreement, but instead opposes arbitration on the grounds that the Agreement is procedurally and substantively unconscionable.

Both procedural and substantive unconscionability must be present in order for a contract provision to be unenforceable under the unconscionability doctrine. (Parada v. Superior Court (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1554, 1570.) 'But they need not be present in the same degree.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV007307: HILL vs PICK N PULL AUTO DISMANTLERS, LLC, AN OREGON LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY;, et al. 08/20/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay or Dismiss the Proceedings in Department 16C

'Essentially a sliding scale is invoked which disregards the regularity of the procedural process of contract formation, that creates the terms, in proportion to the greater harshness or unreasonableness of the substantive terms themselves.' In other words, the more substantively oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of procedural unconscionability is required to come to the conclusion that the term is unenforceable, and vice versa.' (Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th at 114.) Plaintiff has the burden to prove unconscionability. (Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., LLC (2015) 61 Cal.4th 899, 911.)

Procedural Unconscionability

The procedural aspect of unconscionability 'concerns the manner in which the contract was negotiated and the circumstances of the parties at that time. [Citation.] It focuses on factors of oppression and surprise. [Citation.] The oppression component arises from an inequality of bargaining power of the parties to the contract and an absence of real negotiation or a meaningful choice on the part of the weaker party.'” (Morris v Redwood Empire Bancorp (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th at 1305, 1319.) According to Plaintiff, the Agreement is procedurally unconscionable on several grounds.

First, Plaintiff argues that the Agreement was presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, it was not explained to him what he was signing, and the applicable rules are unclear. As seen from the Agreement, it was a condition of Plaintiff's employment and Plaintiff’s understanding was that if he did not sign it, he would not be employed by Defendants. (Hill Decl., ¶¶ 2-4, 6-7.) That said, Plaintiff admits that he had the option of selecting “Yes” or “No” and that selecting “Yes” affirmed Plaintiff’s agreement to resolve disputes under the terms of the arbitration agreement. (Id. ¶ 3.)

In other words, Plaintiff had an initial opportunity to review, and to decline, the terms of the arbitration agreement. Plaintiff also admits that after Defendants notified him that he was hired, he was presented with the Agreement, and electronically signed it. (Id. at ¶ 4.) As part of the electronic signature process, Plaintiff was required to click “View & Sign” to enter the Agreement for review and signature. (Warren Decl., ¶ 10.) Upon clicking “View & Sign,” Plaintiff was then afforded the opportunity to review the entire Agreement. (Id.)

At the end of the Agreement, Plaintiff clicked the “Sign Here” button to electronically sign. (Id.) Plaintiff was required to review and scroll through the Agreement before placing his electronic signature. (Id.) In addition, Defendants aver that Plaintiff was not required to sign the Agreement prior to his employment start date. (Warren Decl., ¶ 11.) Rather, he had the option to begin work and ask any questions about the Agreement before providing his electronic signature. (Id.) He chose not to do so. (Id.; Limas Decl., ¶ 6.)

Furthermore, Plaintiff had the opportunity to withdraw his assent to the Agreement. (Warren Decl., ¶ 13; Exh. A, sec. 16, p. 5.) He claims he did not know how to do so, or even that he would have revoked the agreement. (Hill Decl., ¶ 6, Warren Decl., Exh. A, sec. 16, p. 5.) '[T]he initial question regarding procedural unconscionability is whether the contract was one of

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV007307: HILL vs PICK N PULL AUTO DISMANTLERS, LLC, AN OREGON LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY;, et al. 08/20/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay or Dismiss the Proceedings in Department 16C

adhesion, namely, a '''standardized contract, which, imposed and drafted by the party of superior bargaining strength, relegates to the subscribing party only the opportunity to adhere to the contract or reject it.'''' (Dougherty v. Roseville Heritage Partners (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 93, 103.) An adhesion contract establishes 'some degree of procedural unconscionability.' (Sanchez, supra, 61 Cal.4th at 914.) 'A finding of a contract of adhesion is essentially a finding of procedural unconscionability.' (Flores v.

Transamerica HomeFirst, Inc. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 846, 853.) In the employment context, the inequality of bargaining power that exists between an employee and an employer is sufficient on its own to demonstrate the oppression required for a finding of procedural unconscionability in an employment contract presented on a take it or leave it basis. (Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc. (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1519, 1534.) Nonetheless, the conclusion that the Agreement is an adhesion contract 'heralds the beginning, not the end, of our inquiry into its enforceability.' (Mayers v.

Volt Management Corp. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1194, 1207.) Case law has found that procedural unconscionability exists where, for example, in the context of an employment relationship, the applicable arbitration rules were not provided, and the employee could not read English and requested translation of the documents, but was not given the translations, was not given an opportunity to negotiate, and understood they had to sign the documents in order to work. (Carmona v. Lincoln Millennium Car Wash, Inc. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th74, 80-81; Samaniego v.

Empire Today, LLC (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1138, 1145- 1146.) No such circumstances exist here. There is no evidence that Plaintiff lacked any ability to understand the documents. While Plaintiff claims he “had no legal knowledge, did not know what arbitration meant, and would not have signed the Agreement if he knew he was signing away his rights to a judge and jury.” (Pl. Opp. at 6:20-22.) The objective facts show Plaintiff’s assertion to be meritless: the Agreement was written in English and stated on the first page that “the Company and Individual agree that any and all Covered Claims (as hereinafter defined in Section 3) shall be submitted to binding arbitration[.]” (Warren Decl., Exh.

A, sec. 2, p. 1.) Further, the Agreement clearly stated, in boldface type: “WAIVER OF TRIAL BY JURY. THE PARTIES UNDERSTAND AND FULLY AGREE THAT BY ENTERING INTO THIS AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE, THEY ARE EXPRESSLY WAIVING ANY RIGHT TO HAVE A TRIAL BY JURY, AND ANY RIGHT OF APPEAL FOLLOWING THE RENDERING OF A DECISION EXCEPT AS THE LAW PROVIDES FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS.” (Warren Decl., Exh. A, sec. 7, p. 3 [capitalization in original].) Essentially, Plaintiff contends that, despite the foregoing plain language, he did not understand what he was signing and Defendants did not explain the arbitration provision to him.

Even if true, this does not assist him. (Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Company, LLC (2015) 61 Cal.4th 899.) Defendants 'w[ere] under no obligation to highlight the arbitration clause of its contract, nor was it required to specifically call out that clause to [the Plaintiff’s] attention.' (Id. at 914.) Again, the general rule is that 'ordinarily one who signs an instrument which on its face is a contract is deemed to assent to all its terms.' (Rodriguez v. American Technologies, Inc. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1124.)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV007307: HILL vs PICK N PULL AUTO DISMANTLERS, LLC, AN OREGON LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY;, et al. 08/20/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay or Dismiss the Proceedings in Department 16C

The Court finds that Plaintiff has demonstrated that the Agreement is procedurally unconscionable on the basis that it is an adhesion contract presented in the context of an employment agreement on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. There is no other indication of oppression or surprise, nor does Plaintiff argue any. '[T]he degree of procedural unconscionability of an adhesion agreement is low, and the agreement will be enforceable unless the degree of substantive unconscionability is high.'' (Peng, supra, 219 Cal.App.4th at 1470 [citations omitted].)

Given the low degree of procedural unconscionability, Plaintiff here is now required to demonstrate a high level of substantive unconscionability, which, as explained below, he has not. Substantive Unconscionability “Substantive unconscionability examines the fairness of a contract’s terms. This analysis ‘ensures that contracts, particularly contracts of adhesion, do not impose terms that have been variously described as “‘“overly harsh”’” [citation], “‘unduly oppressive’” [citation], “‘so one-sided as to “shock the conscience”’” [citation], or “unfairly one-sided” [citation].

All of these formulations point to the central idea that the unconscionability doctrine is concerned not with “a simple old-fashioned bad bargain” [citation], but with terms that are “unreasonably favorable to the more powerful party.”’” (Ayala-Ventura v. Superior Court (2026) 119 Cal. App. 5th 241, 255; see Parada, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at 1573.) This “‘component of unconscionability looks to whether the contract allocates the risks of the bargain in an objectively unreasonable or unexpected manner.’” (Magno v.

The College Network, Inc. (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 277, 288.) Plaintiff asserts several grounds to argue that the Agreement is substantively unconscionable. The Court addresses each argument, below.

a. Scope of Agreement Here, Plaintiff first argues that the Agreement is substantively unconscionable because it its scope, suggesting that the Agreement is overly broad in requiring Plaintiff to arbitrate “any and all” claims, present and future, on any basis. Relying on Phan v. Knight Sacramento SU Inc. (2026) 121 Cal.App.5th 641, and Cook v. University of Southern California (2024) 102 Cal. App. 5th 312, Plaintiff claims that the international business interests of the parent company here, Toyota Tsusho, are so varied and broad that he would effectively be required to arbitrate claims against any of Toyota Tsusho’s entities or subdivisions, unrelated to his employment, and without even knowing that fact at the time that he signed the Agreement. (Pl.

Opp. at p. 8.) While Plaintiff’s argument might have some surface appeal, in fact, it is little more than speculation. With regard to Phan and Cook, the Court finds them distinguishable based on context. (Sanchez, supra, 61 Cal.4th at 911 [“an evaluation of unconscionability is highly dependent on context.”].) Seemingly similar to this case, the agreements in both Phan and Cook potentially

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV007307: HILL vs PICK N PULL AUTO DISMANTLERS, LLC, AN OREGON LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY;, et al. 08/20/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay or Dismiss the Proceedings in Department 16C

covered a broad range of claims, even arguably claims arising out of insurance disputes or car accidents. Generally, the Agreement specifies clearly a vast array of claims that, when read in context would seem to apply only in the context of employment. (See Warren Decl., Exh. A, sec. 3, pp. 2-3.) However, within section 3 of the Agreement is language stating that the Agreement applies to any claim “arising out of or related in any way to Individual’s employment or other relationship with the Company and application for or termination thereof.” (Warren Decl., Exh.

A, sec. 3, p. 1 [emphasis added].) While Plaintiff seems to argue that this language can be interpreted to mean any and all claims for the remainder of Plaintiff’s life, the Court finds this interpretation to be unlikely and incongruous with the remainder of the Agreement. Section 3 of the Agreement pertains to “Covered Claims.” All the listed claim types are those that could arise in the employment context. (Id.) Moreover, the end of Section 3 contains catch-all language invoking “any other federal, state, local or other governmental statutes or regulations, if any addressing the same or similar subject matters or that otherwise govern the Parties’ employment relationship.” (Id. at p. 2.)

Thus, while Defendants may operate an international conglomerate, it is clear this Agreement is specifically intended for and limited to the employment relationship. Indeed, even the words “or other relationship” (id., at p. 1), while not expressly defined, would refer to contract workers or independent contractors, in this context. Thus, unlike Cook and Phan, the Agreement is not unconscionably broad. Finally, the Court notes that the Agreement is specifically administered in accordance with the AAA Employment Rules (Warren Decl., Exh.

A, sec. 2, p. 1), thereby reinforcing the conclusion that the Agreement pertains strictly to the employment setting.

b. Third-Party Non-Signatories Plaintiff next argues that the Agreement is substantively unconscionable on the grounds that it lacks mutuality because it requires arbitration with regard to “third-party non-signatories.” (Pl. Opp. at 9:12-18.) The telling part of Plaintiff’s limited argument – and the only practical effect Plaintiff argues – is that “[n]on-signatories to the Agreement may easily enforce the Agreement against Plaintiff. All they are required to do is to show that they are an intended third-party beneficiary of the agreement or by showing that they fall within[] one of the classes of beneficiaries identified in the arbitration agreement.” (Pl.

Opp. at 9:22-25.) Plaintiff further argues that “for Plaintiff to enforce the Agreement against such non signatory third parties, Plaintiff would have to demonstrate that those individuals or entities ‘actually accepted a benefit under the [Agreement] [and that] it is difficult to imagine how Plaintiff could demonstrate that those third-party entities or individuals actually benefited from the agreement unless they first moved to compel arbitration.” (Pl. Opp. at 9:27-10:3.) While Plaintiff’s concerns in this regard may be legitimate, they do not tell the full story.

As a general matter, only signatories to an arbitration agreement may enforce it or be bound by it. (CMS Services, 205 Cal.App.4th at 1352-1353; see Jones v. Jacobsen (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1, 15; see Code Civ. Proc. § 1281.2.) When a non-signatory seeks to enforce an arbitration agreement against a signatory, the non-signatory bears the burden of establishing that it is a

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV007307: HILL vs PICK N PULL AUTO DISMANTLERS, LLC, AN OREGON LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY;, et al. 08/20/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay or Dismiss the Proceedings in Department 16C

party to the arbitration agreement covering the dispute. (Id. at 15-17; Jarboe v. Hanlees Auto Grp. (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 539, 548.) Only in limited circumstances may an arbitration agreement be enforced by non-signatories. (Jarboe, at 549.) One such circumstance is where a benefit is conferred on the non-signatory as a result of the agreement, making the non-signatory a third-party beneficiary of the arbitration agreement. (Jensen v. U-Haul Co. of California (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 295, 301.) “Nonsignatory defendants may enforce arbitration agreements ‘where there is sufficient identity of parties.’ [Citation.]

Enforcement is permitted where the nonsignatory is the agent for a party to the arbitration agreement [citation], or the nonsignatory is a third party beneficiary of the agreement. In addition, a nonsignatory may enforce an arbitration agreement under the doctrine of equitable estoppel. (Jenks v. DLA Piper Rudnick Gray Cary US LLP (2015) 243 Cal. App. 4th 1, 8–9.) “As one authority has stated, there are six theories by which a nonsignatory may be bound to arbitrate: ‘(a) incorporation by reference; (b) assumption; (c) agency; (d) veil-piercing or alter ego; (e) estoppel; and (f) third-party beneficiary’” (Suh v.

Superior Court (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1504, 1513, 105 Cal.Rptr.3d 585.) These exceptions to the general rule that one must be a party to an arbitration agreement to invoke it or be bound by it ‘generally are based on the existence of a relationship between the nonsignatory and the signatory, such as principal and agent or employer and employee, where a sufficient “identity of interest” exists between them.’ ” (Id. at 9-10.) Here, the Court notes that Plaintiff does not identify the non-signatory third parties of concern.

In general, the Court will not infer an argument not made; however, based on the arguments in Plaintiff’s Opposition, he may be concerned that parent company Toyota Tsusho has wideranging international interests and that any of those interests could subject him to arbitration. As before, such arguments have potential appeal, but the specific facts and context of this case speak otherwise. Again, the Agreement pertains to Plaintiff’s employment by its explicit terms. The Agreement defines “Company” as Schnitzer Steel and its subsidiaries (Warren Decl., Exh.

A, p. 1). The Complaint specifies that Schnitzer Steel is a dba for Radius Recycling (Compl. Caption), that Pick-N-Pull is owned by Radius (Compl. ¶¶ 15-16), and that Toyota Tsusho acquired Radius in 2025, after Plaintiff began work in 2024 (Compl. ¶ 17). By suing each and all of the Defendants here, Plaintiff effectively acknowledges the existence of an employment relationship with all of the entities that survived the acquisition(s) between them, thereby entitling any of the named Defendants to invoke the arbitration agreement. (See Marenco v.

DirectTV LLC (233 Cal.App.4th 1409, 1419.) Moreover, “‘under both federal and California decisional authority, a nonsignatory defendant may invoke an arbitration clause to compel a signatory plaintiff to arbitrate its claims when the causes of action against the nonsignatory are “intimately founded in and intertwined” with the underlying contract obligations. [Citations.] By relying on contract terms in a claim against a nonsignatory defendant, even if not exclusively, a plaintiff may be equitably estopped from repudiating the arbitration clause contained in that agreement.’” (Boucher v.

Alliance Title Co., Inc. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 262, 271-272; see Marenco, at 1419-1420.) The true practical effect of the foregoing in this case is that, regardless of Toyota Tsusho’s

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV007307: HILL vs PICK N PULL AUTO DISMANTLERS, LLC, AN OREGON LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY;, et al. 08/20/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay or Dismiss the Proceedings in Department 16C

interests, the Court has already concluded that the Agreement pertains to Plaintiff’s employment. Thus, the only non-signatories that could potentially invoke the Agreement are those who played an employer role in the employment. Any efforts by any as-yet unidentified non-signatory to invoke arbitration for some relationship other than the employment relationship in question at issue here, based on the terms of the Agreement, would almost certainly be unsuccessful. Again, Plaintiff speculates about future, mysterious, unnamed parties somehow related to Toyota Tsusho coming out of the proverbial woodwork to force into arbitration any unstated claims Plaintiff may have at any time.

Such speculation is improper. Under the controlling California authorities cited above, it is clear that non-signatories can benefit from the Agreement. Plaintiff’s own pleading establishes that exceptions of agency, estoppel, and/or third-party beneficiary apply, but that benefit is confined to the terms of the Agreement. Given that the terms limit the possibility of Arbitration to claims arising out of the employment relationship, the Court finds no substantive unconscionability in this regard.

c. Limits on Discovery in Mass Arbitration Next, Plaintiff argues that the Agreement “unreasonably limits discovery in mass arbitration.” (Pl. Opp. at pp. 10-11.) Indeed, arbitration agreements must permit employees sufficient discovery to adequately arbitrate any statutory claims. (Ramirez v. Charter Communications, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 478, 505.) The assessment of whether a discovery clause is unconscionable focuses on general factors, including the types of claims covered by the agreement, the amount of discovery allowed, the degree to which that amount may differ from the amount available in conventional litigation, any differences between the parties with regard to discovery, and the arbitrator’s authority to order additional discovery. (Id. at 506.)

Plaintiff specifically argues that the Agreement limits discovery in mass arbitration and, therefore, is unconscionable. The Court disagrees in several respects. First, this case is not a mass arbitration. Beyond that, the Agreement makes clear that if there are 15 or more separate arbitrations involving substantially similar claims against Defendants, any party may rely on written discovery responses or deposition testimony from one such proceeding instead of responding to substantially similar discovery requests in substantially similar proceedings. (Warren Decl., Exh.

A, sec. 6 [emphasis added].) In other words, should there be more than 15 essentially identical cases filed against Defendants at the same time, discovery in one case can (but is not required to) be used in the related case. Moreover, to the extent this is a limitation of any kind, it is not one that, on its face, causes Plaintiff or anyone else to have discovery insufficient to “adequately arbitrate their statutory claim, including access to essential documents and witnesses, as determined by the arbitrator(s).” (Armendariz, 24 Cal.4th at 105-106.)

Next, Plaintiff ignores the Agreement's express language regarding discovery. The Agreement states that “The Parties shall be entitled to conduct reasonable discovery that is relevant, material, and proportional to the value of the Claims and defenses made. The Arbitrator selected according to this Agreement shall decide all discovery disputes.” (Warren Decl., Exh.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV007307: HILL vs PICK N PULL AUTO DISMANTLERS, LLC, AN OREGON LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY;, et al. 08/20/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay or Dismiss the Proceedings in Department 16C

A, sec. 10, p. 4.) This is sufficient. While adequate discovery is required for vindication of statutory claims, “adequate discovery does mean unfettered discovery.” (Mercuro v. Superior Court (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 167, 184.) Armendariz recognized that even limitations on discovery are “important component[s] of the ‘simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration.’” (24 Cal.4th at 106, fn. 11.) Plaintiff is “at least entitled to discovery sufficient to adequately arbitrate his statutory claim, including access to eseential documents and witnesses, as determined by the arbitrator and subject to limited judicial review. ” (Id. at 106.)

The express language of the Agreement ensures that Plaintiff will be able to conduct sufficient discovery as required by Armendariz. Further, even if the Agreement did not expressly provide for discovery, Defendants “by agreeing to arbitrate the FEHA claim[s], has already impliedly consented to such discovery.” (Id. at 106.) In addition, as noted above, the Agreement is subject to the AAA Employment Rules. Case law has rejected contentions that the AAA rules do not comply with Armendariz's minimum discovery requirements. (See, e.g., Lane v.

Francis Capital Management, LLC (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 676, 693-694.) AAA employment rules permit the arbitrator to 'order such discovery, by way of deposition, interrogatory, document production, or otherwise, as the arbitrator considers necessary to a full and fair exploration of the issues in dispute, consistent with the expedited nature of the arbitration.' (Roman v. Superior Court (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1462, 1475.) 'There appears to be no meaningful difference between the scope of discovery approved in Armendariz and that authorized by the AAA employment dispute rules, certainly not the role of the arbitrator in controlling the extent of actual discovery permitted.' (Id. at 1476.)

Here, the Agreement can be interpreted to comply with Armendariz's requirements, especially as the Agreement does not in any manner attempt to impose anything that was not permitted by Armendariz.

d. Carve-Out for Injunctive Relief Plaintiff next argues lack of mutuality based on a purported carve-out for accessing the courts for injunctive relief. The Court disagrees. The Agreement specifically states that “[e]ither party may seek provisional remedies” including injunctive relief “in the U.S. district Court or other court of competent jurisdiction in the district or county where the arbitration is or may be conducted.” (Warren Decl., Exh. A, sec. 13a, p. 4.) The Court has reviewed the legal authorities Plaintiff cites in support of this argument, and finds them contextually distinguishable.

For example, in Samaniego v. Empire Today, LLC (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1138, the court found the agreement was substantively unconscionable, not merely because the arbitration provisions excluded injunctive relief claims, but because of multiple one-sided provisions that gave the employer a greater advantage. (See id. at 1147.) Those unfair provisions are not present in this Agreement, nor does Plaintiff argue such. Likewise, in Carbajal v. CWPSC, Inc. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 227, the court found substantive unconscionability not merely due to the injunctiverelief carve-out, but because it also eliminated the employee’s right to recovery attorney fees even where statutes provided for them, and eliminated only the employee’s right to appeal. (Id.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV007307: HILL vs PICK N PULL AUTO DISMANTLERS, LLC, AN OREGON LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY;, et al. 08/20/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay or Dismiss the Proceedings in Department 16C

at 248-253.) None of those circumstances is present here. Plaintiff’s reliance on Mercuro, supra, fares no better. While the court there concluded that the carve-out was substantively unconscionable, it invalidated the entire arbitration agreement on the grounds that the procedural unconscionability was very high and therefore the plaintiff “need only make a minimal showing of the agreement’s substantive unconscionability.” (96 Cal.App.4th at 175.) Thus, even a single aspect of potential unconscionability would have sufficed. (Id. at 175-177.)

The agreement was deemed substantively unconscionable because “an arbitration agreement ‘lacks basic fairness and mutuality if it requires one contracting party, but not the other, to arbitrate all claims arising out of the same transaction or occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences.’' (Id. at 176 [quoting Armendariz, at 120].) The terms in this Agreement are bilateral and do not indicate a lack of mutuality. Moreover, even assuming arguendo that this provision could give rise to a finding of substantive unconscionability, it would be merely one factor in a larger assessment.

e. Revocation Finally, Plaintiff argues that the Agreement is substantively unconscionable because it can only be revoked by Defendants’ General or Assistant Counsel. Examination of the Agreement establishes that this is not exactly true. Section 16 of the Agreement states: “This Agreement to arbitrate shall survive the termination of Individual's employment or other relationship with the Company. It can only be revoked or modified in a writing signed by both Parties that specifically states an intent to revoke or modify this Agreement and which is signed by the Company’s General Counsel or Assistant General Counsel.” In other words, both parties must assent to modification and the modified terms.

The fact that counsel is referenced merely means that someone with authority to bind Defendants has signed any modified Agreement. Again, Plaintiff’s reliance on Cook to suggest that this provision is unconscionable is misplaced. The Agreement in Cook, in addition to the other deficiencies discussed above, was unconscionable because it survived the plaintiff’s employment indefinitely until the parties agreed to terminate it. (102 Cal.App.5th at 325-326.) The language at issue in Cook provided that the agreement “‘shall survive the termination of Employee’s employment, and may only be revoked or modified in a written document that expressly refers to the “Agreement to Arbitrate Claims” and is signed by the President of the University.’” (Cook, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at 317.)

While that language seems similar to the language at issue here, it is contextually different. (See Ayala-Ventura, supra, 119 Cal.App.5th at 258.) As noted in Ayala-Ventura, in analyzing the Cook agreement, duration was a problem there because “[t]he various potential claims that could arise against [Defendant] together with the agreement’s infinite duration made it unconscionable.” (Id.) The agreement in Cook pertained to every possible claim of any type of description that the plaintiff there could have had against defendant USC in perpetuity.

By comparison, the duration of the Agreement here, by its terms (as discussed above), pertains only to Plaintiff’s employment. The fact that it endures beyond Plaintiff’s employment is a necessity; otherwise, as Defendants correctly observe, a party could simply resign and then

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV007307: HILL vs PICK N PULL AUTO DISMANTLERS, LLC, AN OREGON LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY;, et al. 08/20/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay or Dismiss the Proceedings in Department 16C

bring a lawsuit. Even then, the claims are not of unlimited duration, as each is governed by applicable statutes of limitations for employment claims. Thus, by implication, unless Plaintiff and Defendants’ General/Assistant General Counsel agree otherwise, the Agreement is of limited duration because it cannot survive statutes of limitation to the employment-related claims that Plaintiff may allege. The Court concludes that this provision, read in context, is not substantively unconscionable. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has shown only a low degree of procedural unconscionability and has failed to demonstrate the requisite high degree of substantive unconscionability.

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion is granted. Plaintiff’s claims must be arbitrated in compliance with the Agreement. In addition, the Court grants Defendants’ request that the entire action be stayed pending arbitration. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1281.4.) The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to CRC Rule 3.1312 or other notice is required.

NOTICE: Consistent with Local Rule 1.06(B), any party requesting oral argument on any matter on this calendar must comply with the following procedure: To request limited oral argument, on any matter on this calendar, you must call the Department 16C Oral Argument Request Line at (916) 874-1475 by 4:00 p.m. the Court day before the hearing and advise opposing counsel. At the time of requesting oral argument, the requesting party shall leave a voice mail message: a) identifying themselves as the party requesting oral argument; b) indicating the specific matter/motion for which they are requesting oral argument; and c) confirming that it has notified the opposing party of its intention to appear and that opposing party may appear via Zoom using the Zoom link and Meeting ID indicated below.

If no request for oral argument is made, the tentative ruling becomes the final order of the Court. Unless ordered to appear in person by the Court, parties may appear remotely either telephonically or by video conference via the Zoom video/audio conference platform with notice to the Court and all other parties in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure §367.75. Although remote participation is not required, the Court will presume all parties are appearing remotely for non-evidentiary civil hearings.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV007307: HILL vs PICK N PULL AUTO DISMANTLERS, LLC, AN OREGON LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY;, et al. 08/20/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay or Dismiss the Proceedings in Department 16C

The Department 16C Zoom Link is https://saccourt-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/j/16030877014 and the Zoom Meeting ID is 160 3087 7014. To appear on Zoom telephonically, call (833) 568-8864 and enter the Zoom Meeting ID referenced above. NO COURTCALL APPEARANCES WILL BE ACCEPTED. Parties requesting services of a court reporter will need to arrange for private court reporter services at their own expense, pursuant to Government code §68086 and California Rules of Court, Rule 2.956. Requirements for requesting a court reporter are listed on the Court Reporter Services webpage available on the Sacramento Superior Court website at https://saccourt.ca.gov/general-information/court-reporter-services-transcripts.

Parties may contact Court- Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore by utilizing the list of Court Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore available at https://saccourt.ca.gov/home/showpublisheddocument/227/639084034465370000. A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list. Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk.

If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.