Oakhurst Income Fund II, LP v. Caverhill

(Santa Monica Courthouse: Dept. P) August 20, 2026 DEPARTMENT P LAW AND MOTION RULINGS

Ruling Oakhurst Income Fund II, LP v. Caverhill, Case No. 23SMCV05356 Hearing date August 20, 2026 Plaintiff Oakhurst Income Fund II, LP's Motion for Attorney Fees

Background

On November 14, 2023, Plaintiff Oakhurst Income Fund II, LP ("Oakhurst") sued Defendant Don Caverhill for breach of three continuing guaranty agreements dated August 26, 2022. (Complaint, P. BC-1.) Oakhurst alleged that Caverhill owed it $1,087,459.48 under the guaranty agreements. (Id. at P. BC-4.)

On December 14, 2023, Oakhurst applied for a writ of attachment, right to attach order, and temporary protective order on Caverhill's real property located at 2500 Briarcrest Rd., Beverly Hills, CA 90210.

On February 2, 2024, the Court granted Oakhurst's application.

On February 7, 2024, Oakhurst entered default against Caverhill.

On May 22, 2024, the Court granted Oakhurst default judgment against Caverhill, awarding Oakhurst $639,035.74 in damages, $11,266.60 in pre-judgment interest, $9,180.40 in attorneys' fees, and $2,523.50 in costs.

On May 22, 2024, the Court found that this case was not related to LASC Case No. 24SMCV01151, Oakhurst Income Fund II, LP v. 2500 Briarcliff Road, LLC ("Briarcliff Action").

Two hearings on applications for orders for appearance and examination took place between July 2024 and July 2026.

On July 6, 2026, the Court tentatively granted Oakhurst's motion for $17,182.50 in post-judgment attorneys' fees and $911.00 in post-judgment costs, but tentatively denied Oakhurst's motion in part because it claimed fees incurred in the Briarcliff Action, not this one.

Oakhurst requested a continuance to brief the propriety of the Briarcliff Action fees. The Court continued the hearing and granted leave for Oakhurst to file supplemental briefing.

Oakhurst filed its supplemental brief on August 6, 2026.

Analysis

Oakhurst cites Conservatorship of McQueen (2014) 59 Cal.4th 602 (McQueen) for the proposition that the Court may award fees incurred in a fraudulent transfer action as post-judgment fees in a prior case, where the fraudulent transfer action was litigated for purposes of recovering the underlying judgment.

According to Oakhurst, the Briarcliff Action is necessary to unwind Caverhill's transfers of property to avoid the judgment in this action; thus, fees incurred in the ongoing Briarcliff Action are recoverable here.

In McQueen, an estate conservator prevailed in an action for elder abuse perpetrated against her conservatee. After the judgment in the elder abuse action (which permits recovery of statutory attorney fees), the defendant in the elder abuse action transferred real property to third persons to avoid the judgment. The conservator brought a separate action to prevent or reverse those transfers, and the parties settled the separate action.

In the course of the ruling, the Supreme Court held that "Plaintiff's separate action to prevent transfer of assets was ... brought in aid of the judgment's enforcement". (McQueen, supra, at pp. 604-605.)

In those circumstances, McQueen plainly stated that fees in a fraudulent transfer action may be recovered as post-judgment enforcement fees associated with an underlying judgment in a separate action: "Although incurred in a separate proceeding, the attorney fees plaintiff claims for prosecuting the fraudulent transfer action were expended in an effort to maintain assets in defendant's hands for potential satisfaction of the judgment in this case. They therefore came within the scope of what could be claimed, in this case, under section 685.040. 'Attorney fees incurred in one action may be considered necessary litigation costs in another.' [Citations.]" (Conservatorship of McQueen (2014) 59 Cal.4th 602, 612-613, italics in original.)

There is, however, an important distinguishing factor for all of the cases cited by Oakhurst: in all three cases Oakhurst relies on, the underlying fraudulent transfer action was resolved before the plaintiff sought the fees it had incurred.

In McQueen, the fraudulent transfer action was resolved by settlement. In Globalist Internet Technologies, Inc. v. Reda (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1267, the judgment creditor successfully defended itself against a judgment debtor's attempts to undermine the judgment debt. In Jaffe v. Pacelli (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 927, the creditor had successfully obtained dismissal of a bankruptcy filing endeavoring to discharge the judgment debt.

Here, by contrast, the Briarcliff action is unresolved. There is no final adjudication whether the underlying transfer is, in fact, fraudulent, or whether it has anything to do with this judgment.

And in support of Oakhurst's motion in this action, Oakhurst's counsel only attested that "it has been necessary for Oakhurst to commence and prosecute a related fraudulent-transfer action" and "[t]he fraudulent-transfer action is prosecuted solely to enable Oakhurst to collect the unpaid Judgment entered in this action." (Landau Decl., P. 6.)

Because the Briarcliff action is not yet resolved, the Court finds that the request to award those fees in this action is premature.

Accordingly, the Court adopts its tentative ruling of July 6, 2026, and grants Oakhurst's motion for attorneys' fees in the amount of $17,182.50, plus $911 in costs. The remaining fees sought by Oakhurst are denied without prejudice and can be requested once the Briarcliff action has been resolved.

Case Number: 24SMCV06111 Hearing Date: August 20, 2026 Dept: P Tentative Ruling Deen v. Culver City et al., Case No. 24SMCV06111 Hearing date August 20, 2026 Defendant Culver City's Motion to Compel Compliance with Deposition Subpoena for Business Records to Nonparty Deen & Company CPA

Background

Plaintiff Susan Deen (Plaintiff) filed this premises liability action against defendants Culver City (Defendant) and the United State Postal Service on December 12, 2024.

Defendant now moves to compel nonparty Deen & Company CPA (Deponent) to comply with a subpoena for business records. The motion is unopposed.

Analysis

Defendant has failed to prove effective service of its subpoena or its motion.

A motion lies to compel a non-party witness to obey a deposition subpoena, and contempt is available where the non-party consciously refused to attend the deposition, and had knowledge of the subpoena, and an ability to comply. (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 1987.1; Person v. Farmers Insurance Group of Cos. (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 813, 818; Chapman v. Superior Court (1968) 261 Cal.App.2d 194, 200; Weil & Brown, Civ. Pro. Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2011) P.P.8:609.1 and 8:611.)

However, for a nonparty subpoena to be effective, a deposition subpoena must be personally served. (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 2020.220(b).)

Personal service is a condition both for enforcement of the subpoena and for attendance at any court session purporting to enforce the subpoena. (Id., subd. (c).)

Moreover, the Rules of Court require that "[a] written notice and all moving papers supporting a motion to compel an answer to a deposition question or to compel production of a document or tangible thing from a nonparty deponent ... be personally served on the nonparty deponent unless the nonparty deponent agrees to accept service by mail or electronic service at an address or electronic service address specified on the deposition record." (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1346.)