Motion for attorneys' fees
order was made; and (4) what new or different facts, circumstances or law are claimed to be shown. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1008(a).) A party seeking reconsideration also must provide a satisfactory explanation for the failure to produce the evidence at an earlier time. (New York Times Co. v. Superior Court (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 206, 213.)
A motion for reconsideration must be filed within 10 days of service on him of notice of entry of the order in question. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1008(a).) The 10-day deadline for seeking reconsideration is extended under Code Civ. Proc. § 1013 for service by mail, fax, electronic service or overnight delivery, which applies “in the absence of a specific exception provided for by this section or other statute or rule of court.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 1013(a), (c), (e).)
Plaintiff’s motion is titled, “NOTICE OF MOTION RECONSIDERATION TO PLAINTIF VEXATIOUS LITIGANT, POS WAS UNTIMELY, WRONG CASE NUMBER, WRONG HEARING DATE OF 1/22/2025, SERVICE WAS VOID RICKIE HULSEY’S DECLARATION.” However, Plaintiff’s notice of motion states that Plaintiff seeks “an order vacating as void the Court's order declaring Plaintiff a vexatious litigant and imposing a prefiling order.” (Motion at p. 1.) Thus, it is not even clear that Plaintiff seeks reconsideration. Indeed, Plaintiff’s motion does not even reference Code Civ. Proc. § 1008, the statute governing motions for reconsideration.
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Insofar as it is a motion to vacate to set aside the January 22, 2026, order declaring Plaintiff a vexatious litigant, it is duplicative of the motion filed on January 29, 2026, and is denied for the same reasons that motion was denied.
Insofar as it is a motion for reconsideration, Plaintiff provides no basis for reconsideration of the January 22, 2026, order. Plaintiff provides no new or different facts, circumstances, or law than those before the court at the time of the original ruling. The Court has already addressed Plaintiff’s challenges to that January 22, 2026, order and ruled that those challenges lack merit.
The motion is denied.
Clerk to give notice. 4 NiMO Holdings, Plaintiff NiMO Holdings, LLC’s motion for attorneys’ fees is GRANTED, LLC vs. All Home in part. Lending, Inc. The court awards attorneys’ fees in the reduced amount of $20,111.00.
The court awards cost in the amount of $1,134.00, as previously set forth in this court’s 5/21/26 ruling on the motion to tax costs.
Basis for Attorneys’ Fees
“As explained by our Supreme Court in Conservatorship of McQueen (2014) 59 Cal.4th 602. . . post judgment costs and fees are distinct from prejudgment costs and fees, and they are governed by different laws. ‘The statutes and rules distinctly address three different types of costs and fees: prejudgment costs, including attorney fees where authorized by contract, statute or law (§ 1033.5, subd. (a)(10)), are recovered through procedures established under section 1034, subdivision (a) and [California Rules of Court,] rules 3.1700 and 3.1702(b); appellate costs and fees are recovered under section 1034, subdivision (b) and [California Rules of Court,] rules 3.1702(c) and 8.278; and post judgment enforcement costs and fees are recovered under the Enforcement of Judgments Law, specifically sections 685.040 to 685.095.’ [Citation].” (Elmi v. Related Management Co., L.P. (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 683, 699.)
Pursuant to Section 685.040, there are two requirements before a motion for an award of post judgment attorney fees may be awarded as costs: (1) the fees must have been incurred to “enforce” a judgment, and (2) the underlying judgment had to include an award for attorney fees pursuant to subdivision of Code of Civil Procedure providing that attorney fees may be awarded when authorized by contract. (Guo v. Moorpark Recovery Service, LLC (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 745, 750.)
Here, the underlying lease agreement contains an attorney’s fee provision in favor of the prevailing party. (See Decl. of Oh-Kubisch, ¶ 4, Exhs. C and D [Lease Agreement and Judgment]).
Plaintiff/Judgment Creditor is requesting $28,602.50 in attorneys’ fees for enforcement of the judgment and also anticipates expending an additional $4,460.00 in bringing the instant motion, for a total amount of $33,062.50 in attorneys’ fees.
Accord and Satisfaction
In the Defendants’ Motion to Tax Costs and Reply in support thereof, Defendants contend that the claim against Defendants has been discharged under Commercial Code § 3311, and that all of the elements of an accord and satisfaction were met when Mr. Ahmari dropped off a check in the amount Plaintiff claimed was due with “Payment in Full” in the memo section. This court already rejected this argument in the ruling on the motion to tax costs. (See 5/21/26 Order [ROA 296]).
Lodestar
The lodestar method for calculating attorneys’ fees applies to any statutory attorneys’ fees award, unless the statute authorizing the award provides for another method of calculation. (Galbiso v. Orosi Pub. Util. Dist. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1063, 1089; see also K.I. v. Wagner (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1425.)
When determining a reasonable attorneys’ fees award using the lodestar method, the court begins by deciding the reasonable hours the prevailing party’s attorney spent on the case and multiplies that number by the reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney. (Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967, 998).
Defendants challenged the requested attorney’s fees in their Motion to Tax Costs on the grounds that Plaintiff failed to submit competent evidence, such as attorney declarations or billing records, establishing that the fees were reasonably incurred and necessary to enforce the judgment.
However, Plaintiff has now submitted this evidence in support of the Motion for Attorneys’ Fees. Plaintiff attaches to the motion the declaration of Sharon Oh-Kubisch along with copies of the billing statements from April 2023 to January 2026. (Decl. of Oh-Kubisch, ¶ 10, Ex. G). Defendants did not file an Opposition to this motion and did not challenge these exhibits.
Hourly Rates
The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work. (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal. 4th 1084, 1095.).
Plaintiff’s counsel claims the following hourly rates:
Sharon Oh-Kubisch-$400, Alexa Stephenson-$400, Daniel Yu-$400, Megan P. Lee-$350, $805 Christine Dockery (Paralegal)- $265.
The court finds these rates reasonable.
Costs/Fees more than two years prior
Code Civ. Proc., § 685.070, subd. (b) provides:
Before the judgment is fully satisfied but not later than two years after the costs have been incurred, the judgment creditor claiming costs under this section shall file a memorandum of costs with the court clerk and serve a copy on the judgment debtor. Service shall be made personally or by mail. The memorandum of costs shall be executed under oath by a person who has knowledge of the facts and shall state that to the person's best knowledge and belief the costs are correct, are reasonable and necessary, and have not been satisfied.
As previously mentioned, Counsel’s billed work, as reflected in the billing sheets, dates back to April 2023. However, Plaintiff did not file the instant motion until February 9, 2026. And while Plaintiff filed a memorandum of costs on December 17, 2025, Plaintiff only sought fees for work going as far back until January 1, 2024, in the memorandum of costs. (See Memo. Of Costs [ROA 245] at ¶ 7). 7
Accordingly, Plaintiff can no longer seek fees for any time prior to January 1, 2024.
Hours Reasonably Expended
“[T]he verified time statements of the attorneys, as officers of the court, are entitled to credence in the absence of a clear indication the records are erroneous." (Horsford v Board of Trustees of California State University (2005)132 Cal.App.4th 359, 396; Raining Data Corp. v. Barrenechea (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1367 [declarations of counsel are also "sufficient to meet the burden of establishing the reasonableness of the fees incurred, without the need to produce copies of counsel's detailed billing statements."].) Contemporaneous records are not required to support a motion for attorney fees. (Raining Data Corp. v. Barrenechea (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1375; Martino v. Denevi (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 553, 559.) Here, Mr. Stanley attached the time records to his declaration. (See Decl. of Stanley, Ex. 2).
The Court will reduce the hours it determines were excessive or not supported. (Levy v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 807, 816 [party seeking attorney fees has the “burden of showing that the fees incurred were allowable, were reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation, and were reasonable in amount” (internal quotation marks omitted)]; Christian Research Institute v. Ahor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1326-29 [affirming award for 71 hours of attorney time in case where attorneys sought fees for over 600 hours].)
Fee award amounts are matters within the trial court’s discretion: the “trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court, and while his judgment is of course subject to review, it will not be disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that it is clearly wrong.” (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132.)
In challenging attorney fees as excessive, “it is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence. General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice.” (Premier Med. Mgmt. Sys. v. Cal. Ins. Guarantee Assoc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th at pp. 550, 564.)
However, the Court “may not rubber stamp a request for attorney fees but must determine the number of hours reasonably expended.” (Donahue v. Donahue (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 259, 271.)
The total amount accrued from January 1, 2024, is $17,711. (See Decl. of Oh-Kubisch, Ex. G). The court finds that this time is reasonable. Furthermore, Defendants failed to present any challenges to the billing entries.
In addition, counsel declares as follows: “I have spent approximately five (5) hours researching and drafting the instant Motion. I also anticipate 8
spending an additional four (4) hours reviewing the opposition and drafting a reply to any opposition to this Motion and another two (2) hours preparing for and appearing at the hearing on this Motion for a total of 11.0 hours. At $400 per hour, that amounts to $4,400.00 plus the motion filing fee of $60.00, totaling an additional $4,460.00.” (Decl. of Oh-Kubisch, ¶ 23).
However, there is no opposition. Therefore, the court awards a total of four hours, for an additional total of $2,400.
The total award is $20,111.
Costs
Plaintiff has already filed a memorandum of costs, and this court ruled on Defendants’ motion to tax costs on 5/21/26, deducting a total of $473. Accordingly, the total cost award is $1,134.
Plaintiff shall give notice.
5 Lam vs. Bui Defendants Hong Bui and Yen Hai Bui’s Motion for Protective Order is DENIED.
Standard for Issuance of Protective Order
Pursuant to sections 2017.020, subdivision (a) and 2025.420, subdivision (a) of the Code of Civil Procedure, a party may move for a protective order to protect it from unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression, or undue burden and expense, or if the Court determines the burden, expense, or intrusiveness of that discovery clearly outweighs the likelihood that the information sought will lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
The party seeking the protective order must show good cause for whatever order is sought. (Nativi v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 261, 318; see GT, Inc. v. Superior Court (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 748, 754 [“the party seeking the protective order is required to meet the usual burden of showing ‘good cause’ ”].)
Defendants Did Not Comply With their Obligation to Meet-and-Confer Prior to Filing the Motion
When a party seeks a protective order, whether under section 2017.020 or 2025.420 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Motion “shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.” (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2017.020, subd. (a), 2025.420, subd. (a).)
In turn, the present version of section 2016.040 of the Code of Civil Procedure requires the parties meet and confer, “either in person, by telephone, or by video conference....” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2016.040, subd. (a), italics added.) 9