Villa v. Cal Door and Drawer, Inc., et al.

On September 18, 2023, Plaintiff initiated this action with the filing of the complaint, which asserts the following causes of action: (1) failure to pay all wages; (2) failure to provide meal periods or compensation in lieu thereof; (3) failure to permit rest periods or provide compensation in lieu thereof; (4) knowing and intentional failure to provide accurate and itemized wage statements; (5) waiting time penalties; (6) failure to reimburse business expenses; (7) violations of the Unfair Competition Law; (8) PAGA civil penalties; (9) violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act; (10) violations of the California Investigative Consumer Reporting Agencies Act; and (11) violations of the Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act.

On October 31, 2024, the Court (Hon. Adams) issued its order which granted summary judgment as to California Kitchen; denied summary judgment as to Cal Door; granted Cal Door’s motion for summary adjudication as to the claims regarding failure to pay all hours worked, sick leave, vacation pay and the ninth, tenth, and eleventh causes of action.

II. MOTION TO LEAVE TO AMEND

Plaintiff moves for leave to file an FAC.

A.

Legal Standard

Code of Civil Procedure sections 473, subdivision (a), and 576 provide that the court “may, in the furtherance of justice,” allow a party to amend any pleading. “It is well

1 Any reference to “Defendant” in the singular refers to Defendant Cal Door.

2 established that ‘California courts have “a policy of great liberality in allowing amendments at any stage of the proceeding so as to dispose of cases upon their substantial merits where the authorization does not prejudice the substantial rights of others.” Indeed, “it is a rare case in which ‘a court will be justified in refusing a party leave to amend his [or her] pleading so that he [or she] may properly present his [or her] case.’ ” Thus, absent a showing of prejudice to the adverse party, the rule of great liberality in allowing amendment of pleadings will prevail.” (Board of Trustees v. Superior Court (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1163 [internal citations omitted].)

“Leave to amend a complaint is thus entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial court. . . .” (Branick v. Downey Savings & Loan Assn. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 235, 242 [internal citations omitted.) “[I]t is an abuse of discretion to deny leave to amend where the opposing party was not misled or prejudiced by the amendment.” (Kittredge Sports Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1045, 1048, (Kittredge).) The court does not abuse its discretion by denying leave to amend where the facts stated do not constitute a cause of action. (See IIG Wireless, Inc. v. Yi (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 630, 654.)

A motion to amend filed before trial must (1) include a copy of the proposed amended pleading, (2) state what allegations in the previous pleading are proposed to be deleted, and (3) state what allegations are proposed to be added to the previous pleading. (Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 3.1324(a).) The motion must also include a separate declaration that explains “(1) The effect of the amendment; (2) Why the amendment is necessary and proper; (3) When the facts giving rise to the amended allegations were discovered; and (4) The reasons why the request for amendment was not made earlier.” (Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 3.1324(b).)

B.

Discussion

Plaintiff moves for leave to file an FAC in order to: (1) add Rene Botello Alcantar, Daniel Casro Mendoza, and Anahi Margarita Ramirez as Plaintiffs to the action; (2) add additional facts with regard to Plaintiff’s eighth cause of action under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (“PAGA”); (3) make minor stylistic and verbiage changes; and (4) add facts regarding meal, reimbursement, and suitable seating violations. (Motion, p. 2:5-9.)

In opposition, Defendant argues that Plaintiff and other truck drivers belong to a distinct category from other Cal Door factual workers such that there is no commonality or typicality between them. (Defendant’s Opposition (“Opp.”), p. 10:4-9.) Defendant further argues it would be prejudiced if Plaintiff was given the opportunity to file the FAC because there are fundamental issues regarding class certification and the FAC would not “cure” those issues. (Opp., p. 12: 7- 14.) The Court is not persuaded by this argument as typicality and commonality of the claims are more appropriately addressed in a motion for class certification, not in the instant motion. As a motion for class certification is not before the Court at this time, it declines to rule on the class certification issues.

Lastly, Defendant argues that the proposed additional plaintiffs’ claims will not relate back to Plaintiff’s claims. In support, Defendant relies on Hargrove v. Legacy Healthcare, Inc. (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 782 (Hargrove) to argue that proposed additional plaintiffs’ PAGA claims will not relate back. In Hargrove, the plaintiff initiated the action in 2016 against defendants. (Id. at p. 785.) In 2020, the plaintiff died and the plaintiff’s attorney requested leave to amend the pleading so the PAGA claims could be pursued by Makiya Cornell (“Cornell”).

3 (Id. at p. 786.) The trial court denied the request but explained that Cornell could file her own claim. Cornell appealed the decision. (Ibid.) The appellate court found that Cornell lacked standing to appeal the order to dismiss the case, however, it concluded that it would treat the unsuccessful motion to amend as an unsuccessful motion to intervene from which she could appeal. (Id. at p. 789.) The appellate court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the motion to amend because Cornell was not able to meet the PAGA prerequisites as she was not an aggrieved employee at the time the Hargrove filed her complaint. (Id. at p. 792.)

On this basis, the appellate court rejected Cornell’s relation -back argument because she did not qualify as an aggrieved employee for the Hargrove’s 2016 PAGA claims, therefore, she would not have been able to comply with the prefiling notice for the 2016 PAGA claims. (Ibid.) Thus, applying the relation-back doctrine to Cornell would allow her to litigate untimely PAGA claims without giving notice to the LWDA within the limitations period. (Ibid.) Moreover, the appellate court found that the amended complaint did not rest on the same general set of facts or involve the same injury because Hargrove and Cornell were never employed during the same year; they held different employee positions; and Cornell alleged an injury that was not alleged by Hargrove but could reach back six years. (Id. at p. 793.)

This is distinguishable from the instant matter as Plaintiff states the proposed plaintiffs worked for Cal Door during the same time as Plaintiff and they allege the same Labor Code violation—thus, it appears the proposed amended complaint rests on the same set of facts and involved the same injuries. (Reply, pp. 7:25-8:1.) While the proposed additional plaintiffs seek to assert a claim/violation that is not asserted by Plaintiff, the Court does not find the facts are comparable to those in Hargrove.

Consequently, at this time, the Court cannot conclude that the proposed additional plaintiffs PAGA claims will not relate back to Plaintiff’s claims.

Defendants fail to proffer any other arguments regarding prejudice that would result from allowing Plaintiff to amend his complaint. Plaintiff’s request is procedurally proper and accompanied by the required declarations and facts. (See Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 3.1324(a) & (b).) The Court will address the issues regarding class certification on the proper motion.

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend is GRANTED.

III. CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend is GRANTED.

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