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Motion for Final Approval of Class Settlement
This is a putative class and Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”) action. Plaintiff Jesus Montoya alleges that defendant Fujifilm Dimatix, Inc. committed various wage and hour violations.
Before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for final approval of settlement, which is unopposed. As discussed below, the Court GRANTS the motion.
I. BACKGROUND
According to the allegations of the operative first amended complaint (“FAC), Plaintiff worked as an hourly, non-exempt employee for Defendant in positions generally pertaining to providing installation, maintenance, and repair services in connection with Defendant’s process-related systems and equipment. (FAC, ¶ 2.)
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to: pay overtime wages; provide meal and rest periods; pay minimum wages for all hours worked; pay all wages owed upon discharge; provide complete or accurate wage statements; keep complete or accurate payroll records; and reimburse for all necessary business-related expenses.
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff initiated this action on January 16, 2024, with the filing of the Complaint, which asserted the following causes of action: (1) failure to pay minimum wages; (2) failure to pay wages and overtime under Labor Code § 510; (3) meal period liability under Labor Code § 226.7; (4) rest break liability under Labor Code § 226.7; (5) violation of Labor Code § 226; (6) violation of Labor Code § 221; (7) violation of Labor Code § 204
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On June 6, 2024, he filed the operative FAC, which asserts the same causes of action and adds an eleventh cause of action for PAGA penalties. On November 17, 2025, the Court (Hon. Adams) issued its order which granted Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary approval of class action and PAGA settlement.
Plaintiff now seeks final approval of the class action and PAGA settlement (the “Settlement”).
II. LEGAL STANDARDS FOR SETTLEMENT APPROVAL
A. Class Action
Generally, “questions whether a [class action] settlement was fair and reasonable, whether notice to the class was adequate, whether certification of the class was proper, and whether the attorney fee award was proper are matters addressed to the trial court’s broad discretion.” (Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc. (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 234–235 (Wershba), disapproved of on other grounds by Hernandez v. Restoration Hardware, Inc. (2018) 4 Cal.5th 260.)
In determining whether a class settlement is fair, adequate and reasonable, the trial court should consider relevant factors, such as the strength of plaintiffs’ case, the risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of further litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status through trial, the amount offered in settlement, the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings, the experience and views of counsel, the presence of a governmental participant, and the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement.
(Wershba, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at pp. 244–245, internal citations and quotations omitted.)
In general, the most important factor is the strength of the plaintiffs’ case on the merits, balanced against the amount offered in settlement. (See Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 130 (Kullar).) But the trial court is free to engage in a balancing and weighing of relevant factors, depending on the circumstances of each case. (Wershba, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 245.) The trial court must examine the “proposed settlement agreement to the extent necessary to reach a reasoned judgment that the agreement is not the product of fraud or overreaching by, or collusion between, the negotiating parties, and that the settlement, taken as a whole, is fair, reasonable and adequate to all concerned.” (Ibid., citation and internal quotation marks omitted.)
The trial court also must independently confirm that “the consideration being received for the release of the class members’ claims is reasonable in light of the strengths and weaknesses of the claims and the risks of the particular litigation.” (Kullar, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 129.) Of course, before performing its analysis the trial court must be “provided with basic information about the nature and magnitude of the claims in question and the basis for concluding that the consideration being paid for the release of those claims represents a reasonable compromise.” (Id. at pp. 130, 133.)
B. PAGA
Labor Code section 2699, subdivision (l)(2) provides that “[t]he superior court shall review and approve any settlement of any civil action filed pursuant to” PAGA. The court’s review “ensur[es] that any negotiated resolution is fair to those affected.” (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 549.) Seventy-five percent of any penalties recovered under PAGA go to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency (LWDA), leaving the remaining twenty-five percent for the aggrieved employees. (Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC (2014) 59 Cal.4th 348, 380, overruled on other grounds by Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana (2022) 596 U.S. 639, 2022 U.S. LEXIS 2940.)
Similar to its review of class action settlements, the Court must “determine independently whether a PAGA settlement is fair and reasonable,” to protect “the interests of the public and the LWDA in the enforcement of state labor laws.” (Moniz v. Adecco USA, Inc. (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 56, 76–77.) It must make this assessment “in view of PAGA’s purposes to remediate present labor law violations, deter future ones, and to maximize enforcement of state labor laws.” (Id. at p. 77; see also Haralson v. U.S. Aviation Servs. Corp. (N.D. Cal. 2019) 383 F. Supp. 3d 959, 971 [“when a PAGA claim is settled, the relief provided for under the PAGA [should] be genuine and meaningful, consistent with the underlying purpose of the statute to benefit the public ....”], quoting LWDA guidance discussed in O’Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (N.D. Cal. 2016) 201 F.Supp.3d 1110 (O’Connor).)
The settlement must be reasonable in light of the potential verdict value. (See O’Connor, supra, 201 F.Supp.3d at p. 1135 [rejecting settlement of less than one percent of the potential verdict].) But a permissible settlement may be substantially discounted, given that courts often exercise their discretion to award PAGA penalties below the statutory maximum even where a claim succeeds at trial. (See Viceral v. Mistras Group, Inc. (N.D. Cal., Oct. 11, 2016, No. 15-CV-02198-EMC) 2016 WL 5907869, at *8–9.)
C. Terms and Administration of Settlement
The non-reversionary gross settlement amount is $1,000,000. Attorneys’ fees of up to one-third of the gross settlement amount, which is approximately $333,333.33, litigation costs of up to $40,000, and administrative costs of up to $8,700. $50,000 will be allocated to PAGA penalties, 75% ($37,500) of which will be paid to the LWDA and the remaining 25% ($12,500) will be dispensed to “Aggrieved Employees” who are defined as “all Class Members who worked during the PAGA Period.”2 Plaintiff will seek a class representative service award of $10,000.
The net settlement amount—estimated to be $579,266.58—will be allocated to members of the Class, who are defined as “all non-exempt, hourly-paid individuals that worked for Defendant in California during the Settlement Class Period.”3 For tax purposes, 20% of each Class Member’s payment will be allocated to wages and 80% will be allocated to penalties and interest. Funds associated with checks uncashed after 180 days will be transmitted to State Controller’s Unclaimed Property Fund.
In exchange for settlement Class Members who do not opt out will release:
[A]ny and all claims alleged or which could have reasonably been alleged based on the facts alleged in the Operative Complaint, including claims for: failure to pay for all hours worked/compensation due; failure to pay minimum wages; failure to pay overtime, including alleged failure to pay overtime at the proper regular rate (including accounting for bonuses and premium payments); failure to provide meal periods; failure to provide rest periods; failure to pay reporting time pay; failure to provide payment of wages during employment and payment of wages at termination; failure to maintain and provide accurate and complete records; failure to reimburse for necessary business expenses; and any and all claims for alleged violations of California Labor Code §§ 90.5, 201, 202, 203, 204, 206.5, 210, 218, 218.5, 218.6, 221, 226, 226.2, 226.3, 226.4, 226.7, 246, 248 et. seq., 248.1, 248.2, 248.5, 432.5, 510, 511, 512, 551, 552, 558, 558.1, 1174, 1174.5, 1182.12, 1185, 1194, 1194.1, 1194.2, 1197, 1197.1, 1198, 1198.5, 1199, 1198.5, and 2802; the Fair Labor Standards Act; California Business & Professions Code § 17200 et seq.; California Code of Civil Procedure § 1021.5; and the California Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Orders MW-2014.
Aggrieved Employees, who consistent with the statute will not be able to opt out of the PAGA portion of the settlement, will release:
2 The PAGA Period is defined as “the period from January 16, 2023 through June 25, 2025.” 3 The Class Period is defined as “the period from January 16, 2020 through June 23, 2025.”
[A]ll claims for PAGA civil penalties that were alleged, or reasonably could have been alleged, based on the facts stated in the Operative Complaint and the PAGA Notice, including PAGA claims premised on: California Labor Code §§ § 90.5, 201, 202, 203, 204, 206.5, 210, 218, 218.5, 221, 226, 226.2, 226.3, 226.4, 226.7, 227.3, 246, 248, 248.1, 248.2, 248.5, 351, 354, 432.5, 510, 511, 512, 551, 558, 558.1, 1174, 1174.5, 1182.12, 1185, 1194, 1194.1, 1194.2, 1197, 1198, 1198.5, 1199, 2802, 2810.5, 2698, and 2699, et seq.; failure to pay for all hours worked/compensation due; failure to pay all minimum wages; failure to pay all overtime, including alleged failure to pay overtime at the proper regular rate (including accounting for bonuses and premium payments); failure to provide meal periods; failure to provide rest periods; failure to pay reporting time pay; failure to provide payment of wages during employment and payment of wages at termination; failure to maintain and provide accurate and complete records; and failure to reimburse for necessary business expenses.
The notice period has now been completed. Katie Tran (“Tran”), a case manager for settlement administrator Apex Class Action, LLC (“Apex”), submitted a declaration in support of the instant motion. On October 3, 2025, Class Counsel provided Apex with the Class notice. On December 8, 2025, Apex received the Class list file from defense counsel. Apex processed the names and addresses against the National Change of Address database. On December 12, 2025, Apex informed defense counsel that the escalator clause had been triggered. On December 26, 2025, the Class notices were sent to 325 Class Members. As of the date of Tran’s declaration, 7 Class notices were returned as undeliverable. Apex conducted a skip-trace, found 4 updated addresses, and those notices were promptly re-mailed. Thus, 3 Class notices have been considered undeliverable.
The deadline to respond was February 20, 2026. As of the date of Tran’s declaration, Apex has received 8 valid requests for exclusion, 0 objections, and 1 workweek dispute.4 Consequently, there are 317 participating Class Members, which is approximately 97.5% of the Settlement Class. The average individual settlement payment will be approximately $1,827.34, the highest will be $3,812.81, and the lowest will be $3.84. The average PAGA payment will be $44.80, the highest will be $66.00, and the lowest will be $0.52.
Plaintiff requests $8,700 for administration costs. This request is supported by Tran’s declaration. Thus, the amount is reasonable and therefore, it is approved.
At the preliminary approval, the Court found that the proposed settlement provides a fair and reasonable compromise to Plaintiff’s claims. It finds no reason to depart from these findings now, especially considering that there are no objections. Therefore, the Court finds that the Settlement is fair and reasonable for the purposes of final approval.
D. Attorneys’ Fees, Litigation Costs, and Plaintiff’s Service Award
Class Counsel seeks a fee award of $333,333.33 or one-third of the gross settlement amount, which is not an uncommon contingency fee in a wage and hour class action. Class
4 Apex received 1 untimely request for exclusion.
Counsel provides a lodestar figure of $107,520.50, based on 119.4 hours of work at billings rates ranging from $250 to $1,250 per hour, resulting in a multiplier of 3.1. This is within the range of multipliers that courts typically approve. (See Wershba, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 255 [“[m]ultipliers can range from 2 to 4 or even higher”]; Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp. (9th Cir. 2002) 290 F.3d 1043, 1051, fn. 6 [stating that multipliers ranging from one to four are typical in common fund cases and citing the court’s own survey of large settlements funding a range of 0.6-19.6, with most (20 to 24, or 83%) from 1.0-4.0 and a bare majority (13 of 24, or 54%) in the 1.5-3.0 range”].)
“While the percentage method has been generally approved in common fund cases, courts have sought to ensure the percentage fee is reasonable by refining the choice of a percentage or by checking the percentage result against the lodestar-multiplier calculation.” (Laffitte v. Robert Half Intern, Inc. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 480, 495 (Laffitte).) Applying the latter approach, [T]he percentage-based fee will typically be larger than the lodestar based fee. Assuming that one expects rough parity between the results of the percentage method and the lodestar method, the difference between the two computed fees will be attributable solely to a multiplier that has yet to be applied.
Stated another way, the ratio of the percentage-based fee to the lodestar-based fee implies a multiplier, and that implied multiplier can be evaluated for reasonableness. If the implied multiplier is reasonable, then the cross-check confirms the reasonableness of the percentage-based fee; if the implied multiplier is unreasonable, the court should revisit its assumptions. (Laffitte, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 496, quoting Walker & Horwich, The Ethical Imperative of a Lodestar Cross-check: Judicial Misgivings About “Reasonable Percentage” Fees in Common Fund Cases (2005) 18 Geo.
J. Legal Ethics 1453, 1463.) As described by the California Supreme Court, “[i]f the multiplier calculated by means of a lodestar crosscheck is extraordinarily high or low, the trial court should consider whether the percentage used should be adjusted so as to bring the imputed multiplier within a justifiable range, but the court is not necessarily required to make such an adjustment.” (Laffitte, supra, 1 Cal.5th at 505.)
Here, while the multiplier sought by Class Counsel is on the higher end of what California courts typically award, it is within the acceptable range, and it is supported by the percentage cross-check and Class Counsel’s declaration. Thus, the Court finds Class Counsel’s requested fee award is reasonable.
Class Counsel also seeks $18,700.09 in litigation costs, which is below the $40,000 allowed for in the Settlement. The request is supported by Class Counsel’s declaration. This amount is reasonable and thus, it is approved.
Plaintiff requests a Class Representative Enhancement payment of $10,000.
The rationale for making enhancement or incentive awards to named plaintiffs is that they should be compensated for the expense or risk they have incurred in conferring a benefit on other members of the class. An incentive award is appropriate if it is necessary to induce an individual to participate in the suit. Criteria courts may consider in determining whether to make an incentive award include: 1) the risk to the class representative in commencing suit, both financial and otherwise; 2) the notoriety and personal difficulties encountered by the class
representative; 3) the amount of time and effort spent by the class representative; 4) the duration of the litigation and; 5) the personal benefit (or lack thereof) enjoyed by the class representative as a result of the litigation. These “incentive awards” to class representatives must not be disproportionate to the amount of time and energy expended in pursuit of the lawsuit. (Cellphone Termination Fee Cases (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1380, 1394-1395, internal punctuation and citations omitted.) Incentive awards are particularly appropriate where a plaintiff undertakes a significant reputational risk in bringing an action against an employer. (Covillo v. Specialty’s Café (N.D. Cal. 2014) 2014 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 29837, at *29.)
At preliminary approval, the Court found that Plaintiff is entitled to an award and preliminarily approved the request. The Court does not find any reason to depart from this ruling at this time. Thus, Plaintiff’s request is approved.
III. CONCLUSION
In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED THAT:
Plaintiff’s motion for final approval is GRANTED.
Judgment will be entered through the filing of this order and judgment. (Code Civ. Proc., § 668.5.) Plaintiff and the members of the Class will take from the operative complaint only the relief set forth in the settlement agreement and this order and judgment. Pursuant to Rule 3.769(h) of the California Rules of Court, the Court will retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the terms of the settlement agreement and the final order and judgment.
The Court sets a compliance hearing for January 14, 2027 at 2:30 P.M. in Department 22. At least ten court days before the hearing, class counsel and the settlement administrator shall submit a summary accounting of the net settlement fund identifying distributions made as ordered herein; the number and value of any uncashed checks; amounts remitted pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 384, subdivision (b); the status of any unresolved issues; and any other matters appropriate to bring to the Court’s attention. Counsel shall also submit an amended judgment as described in Code of Civil Procedure section 384, subdivision (b). Counsel may appear at the compliance hearing remotely.
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