Dodson vs. Lacilento

her responses after being reminded of her obligations at her May 6, 2026 deposition. Her self-represented status does not exempt her from compliance with the Civil Discovery Act. (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984-985.)

Plaintiff was served with Defendant’s notice of motion on May 8, 2026, which expressly stated that Defendant seeks $500 in monetary sanctions against her (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.040), and she never opposed the request. The $500 requested is reasonable relative to the expenses Defendant incurred in preparing and bringing the Motion. (Bocker Decl., ¶ 19.)

Moving party to give notice by mail.

6 Dodson Motion to Seal vs. Lacilento Defendant Arthur J. LaCilento’s unopposed motion to seal certain excerpts from the Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant LaCilento’s Demurrer is GRANTED.

Under current law, certain court records are presumptively confidential, including paternity case files in actions filed before January 1, 2023. (See Family Code, § 7643, subd. (a).) Family Code section 7643, subdivision (a) provides, in pertinent part: “ all papers and records, other than the final judgment, pertaining to the action or proceeding, whether part of the permanent record of the court or of a file in a public agency or elsewhere, are subject to inspection and copying only in exceptional cases upon an order of the court for good cause shown.”

Here, the action underlying this legal malpractice case (“Underlying Action”) commenced in 2015. (Notice of Lodging, Exh. 1). As a designated paternity case, the record in the Underlying Action is confidential. The motion to seal the portions in the Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant referring to this record is granted.

Defendant LaCilento to give notice.

Demurrer to First Amended Complaint

Defendant Arthur J. LaCilento’s demurrer to the first through six causes of action asserted in Plaintiff Nicole Dodson’s First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) is SUSTAINED. LaCilento’s unopposed request for judicial notice is granted.

In ruling on a demurrer, a court must accept as true all allegations of fact contained in the complaint. Blank v. Kirwan, 39 Cal.3d 311, 318 (1985). A demurrer challenges only the legal sufficiency of the affected pleading, not the truth of the factual allegations in the pleading or the pleader’s ability to prove those allegations. (Cundiff v. GTE Cal., Inc. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 1395, 1404-05.)

As an initial matter, Plaintiff concedes that her first cause of action for beach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and her sixth cause of 7 action for intentional infliction of emotional distress should be dismissed. The demurrer is sustained as to the first cause of action for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and the sixth cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress without leave to amend.

Second Cause of Action for Legal Malpractice

LaCilento contends the second cause of action for legal malpractice is barred by the statute of limitations set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 340.6. “A demurrer based on a statute of limitations will not lie where the action may be, but is not necessarily, barred.” (Lee v. Hanley (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1225, 1232.) On demurrer, “the defect must clearly and affirmatively appear on the face of the complaint; it is not enough that the complaint shows that the action may be barred.” (Ibid. [internal quotation marks omitted].)

Legal malpractice claims are governed by Code of Civil Procedure section 340.6, which states: “An action against an attorney for a wrongful act or omission, other than for actual fraud, arising in the performance of professional services shall be commenced within one year after the plaintiff discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the facts constituting the wrongful act or omission, or four years from the date of the wrongful act or omission, whichever occurs first.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 340.6, subd. (a).) Thus, the statute provides “two distinct and alternative limitation periods: one year after actual or constructive discovery, or four years after occurrence (the date of the wrongful act or omission), whichever occurs first.” (Radovich v. Locke- Paddon (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 946, 966.)

Under the discovery rule, a plaintiff does not have to discover all the relevant facts supporting a cause of action. (Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1103, 1111.) But “[o]nce the plaintiff has a suspicion of wrongdoing, and therefore an incentive to sue, she must decide whether to file suit or sit on her rights.” (Ibid.)

Plaintiff and Defendant LaCilento entered into an attorney-client contract on August 18, 2021. (FAC ¶ 8.) LaCilento substituted out as Plaintiff’s attorney in October 2023. (Notice of Lodging, Exh. 17.)

The second cause of action alleges LaCilento: (a) colluded with opposing counsel, (Bonnie Rosen, Esq.); (b) failed to pursue child support for Plaintiff; (c) failed to pursue “back” child support for Plaintiff; (d) failed to pursue reimbursement for pregnancy and delivery expenses; (e) coerced Plaintiff into hiring a “fake” investigator; (6) hollered and cursed at Plaintiff; (7) failed to argue that Plaintiff was never served with the petition; (8) failed to get an answer on-file for Plaintiff; (9) failed to pursue DNA testing of the putative father; (10) failed to pursue drug testing of the putative father; (11) failed to obtain any discovery documents from the putative father; (12) failing to act upon Plaintiff’s allegations of sexual abuse; (13) charged $5,000 for an anti-SLAPP motion LaCilento never 8 filed; (14) failed to recognize obviously “fake” court orders; (15) committed HIPAA violations (concerning psych eval); (16) failed to obtain a paternity-litigation budget for Plaintiff in the Underlying Action; (17) failed to hold putative father in contempt for not filing a judgment; (18) failed to advocate the rights of the minor child under Indian Child Welfare Act; (19) failed to advocate for Plaintiff’s constitutional right to parent; and (20) failed to halt the termination of Plaintiff’s right to custodial access. (FAC ¶ 59.)

Although Plaintiff realized that LaCilento colluded with opposing counsel on or about August 16, 2024 (FAC ¶ 10), Plaintiff knew or should have known of all the facts required to put her on notice of a potential claim in October 2023. The wrongdoing LaCilento is alleged to have committed was completed while LaCilento served as Plaintiff’s attorney. (See FAC ¶ 59.) Because Plaintiff had notice or information of circumstances that would put her on inquiry in October 2023, Plaintiff’s lawsuit is time-barred under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.6. The demurrer to the second cause of action is sustained.

Third Cause of Action for Fraud/Misrepresentation

The elements of a claim for intentional misrepresentation are (1) misrepresentation of a material fact, (2) knowledge of falsity, (3) intent to defraud, (4) justifiable reliance, and (5) damages. (Manderville v. PCG&S Group, Inc. (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1486, 1498.) Fraud causes of action must be pled with specificity. “...This particularity requirement necessitates pleading facts which ‘show how, when, where, to whom and by what means the representations were tendered.”’ (Stansfield v. Starkey (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 59, 73, quoting Hills Trans.

Co. v. Southwest (1968_ 266 Cal.App.2d 702, 707.) “ ‘Promissory fraud’ is a subspecies of the action for fraud and deceit. A promise to do something necessarily implies the intention to perform; hence, where a promise is made without such intention, there is an implied misrepresentation of fact that may be actionable fraud.” (Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 638.) The elements of promissory fraud are; (1) a promise made regarding a material fact without any intention of performing it; (2) the existence of the intent not to perform at the time the promise was made; (3) intent to deceive or induce the promisee to enter into a transaction; (4) reasonable reliance by the promisee; (5) nonperformance by the party making the promise; and (6) resulting damage to the promise. (Behnke v.

State Farm Gen. Ins. Co. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1443, 1453.) As with any other form of fraud, each element of a promissory fraud claim must be alleged with particularity.” (Rossberg v. Bank of America N.A. (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1498.) “...This particularity requirement necessitates pleading facts which ‘show how, when, where, to whom and by what means the representations were tendered.”’ (Stansfield v. Starkey (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 59, 73, quoting Hills Trans. Co. v. Southwest (1968_ 266 Cal.App.2d 702, 707.)

The third cause of action alleges LaCilento colluded with opposing counsel and knowingly made false representations to Plaintiff. (FAC ¶ 65.) LaCilento represented to Plaintiff that he would fight to obtain custody of her 10-year old boy, fight to obtain child support, and fight to obtain discovery documents. (Id. at ¶ 66.) The FAC, however, does not allege how, when, where, and by what means the representations were made and, thus, does not meet the particularly requirement. The demurrer is sustained as to the third cause of action.

Fourth Cause of Action for Fraud upon the Court

A cause of action for fraud comprises of five elements: (1) misrepresentation; (2) knowledge of falsity; (3) intent to defraud; (4) justifiable reliance; and (5) resulting damage. (Manderville v. PCG&S Group, Inc. (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1486, 1498.) However, fraud upon the court “embrace[s] only that species of fraud which does or attempts to defile the court itself, or is a fraud perpetrated by officers of the court.” (Appling v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. (9th Cir. 2003) 340 F.3d 769, quoting In re Levander (9th Cir. 1999) 180 F.3d 1114, 1119.) “Fraud upon the court includes both attempts to subvert the integrity of the court and fraud by an officer of the court.

Furthermore, it ‘must involve an unconscionable plan or scheme which is designed to improperly influence the court in its decision.’ ” (Pumphrey v. K.W. Thompson Tool Co. (9th Cir. 1995) 62 F.3d 1128, 1131 [internal citations omitted].)

The fourth cause of action alleges LaCilento colluded with opposing counsel and created a false record in Plaintiff’s paternity proceedings. (FAC ¶¶ 75. 77.) Despite Plaintiff’s doubts regarding whether the putative father is Plaintiff’s son’s biological father, LaCilento instructed Plaintiff to address the putative father as the biological father, lest Plaintiff “appear ‘crazy’ ”. (FAC ¶ 77.)

The FAC’s allegations are insufficient to constitute a cause of action for fraud upon the court. The FAC does not adequately allege an unconscionable plan or scheme designed to improperly influence the court in its decision. The demurrer to the fourth cause of action is sustained.

Fifth Cause of Action for Civil Conspiracy

The elements of a civil conspiracy are the formation and operation of the conspiracy and damage resulting to plaintiff from an act done in furtherance of the common design.” (Stueve Bros. Farms, LLC v. Berger Kahn (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 303, 323 [citations omitted].) “The major significance of a conspiracy cause of action lies in the fact that it renders each participant in the wrongful act responsible as a joint tortfeasor for all damages ensuing from the wrong ... regardless of the degree of his activity. The essence of the claim is that it is merely a mechanism for imposing vicarious liability; it is not itself a substantive basis for liability. Each member of the conspiracy becomes liable for all acts done by others pursuant to the conspiracy, and for all damages caused thereby.” (Id. at pp. 323-324 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted].)

The fifth cause of action alleges LaCilento colluded with opposing counsel to “rig” the Underlying Action and “judicially kidnap [Plaintiff’s] 10-year old boy.” (FAC ¶ 83.) Counsel agreed LaCilento “would do a lousy job representing [Plaintiff]” and “that the putative father would be awarded sole and exclusive custody.” (Id. at ¶ 84.)

As discussed above, the underlying torts of legal malpractice and fraud have not been adequately pled as to LaCilento. The demurrer is sustained as to the fifth cause of action.

Should Plaintiff desire to file an amended complaint that addresses the issues in this ruling, Plaintiff must file and serve within 15 days of service of the notice of ruling.

Defendant LaCilento to give notice.

Motion to Strike Portions of First Amended Complaint

Defendant Arthur J. LaCilento’s motion to strike portions of Plaintiff Nicole Dodson’s First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) is DENIED as moot.

In light of the court’s concurrent ruling regarding LaCilento’s demurrer, the motion to strike is denied as moot.

The Case Management Conference is continued to November 19, 2026, at 09:00 am in Department C10.

Defendant LaCilento to give notice.

7 Ketzel vs. Laguna Defendant City of Laguna Beach moves for summary judgment on the Beach Police Complaint of Plaintiff Hunter Ketzel. For the following reasons, the motion Department is DENIED.

The court OVERRULES Defendant City’s evidentiary objection nos. 3, 6, and 7 to the Ketzel Declaration. The court does not rule on the remainder of objections asserted by Defendant City or Plaintiff, as they are not material to the disposition of this motion. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(q).)

Standard on MSJ

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 437c(c), a summary judgment motion shall be granted if all the papers submitted show there is no triable issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A defendant meets its burden on summary judgment by showing that the plaintiff cannot prove its causes of action, or by establishing a complete defense to the plaintiff’s causes of action. (Code Civ. Proc., 437c(p)(2).) If a defendant does not meet this initial burden, the plaintiff need not oppose the motion and the motion must be denied. (Binder 11