Hulsey vs. Nguyen

shows no opposition by Clients or any indication Defendants received notice of the motion and hearing date.

In addition, there is no proof the moving papers were not served on Plaintiff. The moving papers must be served on all parties who have appeared in the action, whether or not the motion seeks relief against such parties. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1014 [requiring service of all papers on defendants after appearance].)

No later than nine (9) court days before the continued hearing, Moving Counsel shall file proof of service of all moving papers on Clients and on all parties who have appeared in this action.

Clients Segler Concrete Finishing LLC and Scott Segler may file and serve a response or opposition no later than five (5) court days before the continued hearing.

Moving Counsel shall provide notice of this ruling and continued hearing date on the client by non-electronic means and all parties who have appeared in this action. 1:30 p.m. 1

2 Hulsey vs. Nguyen Cross-Defendant Rickie Hulsey’s motion regarding satisfaction of judgment, determination of legal effect of tender, and to toll post-judgment interest is DENIED.

Cross-Defendant Rickie Hulsey moves for an order finding that Hulsey made good faith efforts to satisfy the judgment against him and to toll and stop the accrual of post-judgment interest under Code of Civil Procedure section 685.030. Hulsey contends that Hulsey obtained sufficient funds to satisfy the judgment in full, but that Hulsey was unable to complete payment due to the absence of a workable method for acceptance.

Cross-Complainant contends that a complete satisfaction of the judgment as of July 2025 was $36,758.24, consisting of $27,737.77 in principal and $9,020.47 in accrued interest from February 2023 through May 2026. Cross- Defendant tendered payment of $27,737.77 in July 2026. Because payments apply first to accrued interest, there is an unpaid principal balance of $9,020.47 still remaining.

Here, Cross-Defendant Hulsey does not provide any authority to stop the accrual of interest despite Hulsey’s payment of $27,737.77 in July 2026. Hulsey cites to Code of Civil Procedure section 685.030(b), which states: “If a money judgment is satisfied in full other than pursuant to a writ under this title, interest ceases to accrue on the date the judgment is satisfied in full.” (emphasis added).

There is insufficient evidence that the judgment here was satisfied in full. “The amount required to satisfy a money judgment is the total amount of the judgment, plus costs added after judgment (including attorney fees), plus accrued interest on the judgment, less payments and any amounts no longer enforceable.” (Lucky United Properties Investment, Inc. v. Lee (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 125, 139 (citing Code of Civ. Proc. § 695.210) (emphasis added)).

“Payment on a judgment is allocated first to accrued interest on the principal amount, and then to the principal.” (Id.)

As such, under these principals, Hulsey’s payment of $27,737.77 first applied to the accrued interest due on the total judgment amount of $36,758.24, leaving a balance of $9,020.47 in principle still owed. Hulsey’s payment constitutes partial satisfaction of the judgment. “If a money judgment is partially satisfied pursuant to a writ under this title or is otherwise partially satisfied, interest ceases to accrue as to the part satisfied on the date the part is satisfied.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 685.030(c)). Accordingly, interest continues to accrue only on the unsatisfied portion of the award, or $9,020.47.

Hulsey cites to no authority that suggests otherwise.

The motion is, therefore, denied.

Moving party to give notice. 3

4 Adjemian vs. Gallo Plaintiff and Cross-Defendant Kevork Adjemian moves to set aside the default entered against him on the Cross-Complaint filed by Cross- Complainant John Mussen. For the following reasons, the motion is GRANTED.

The proof of service attached to the motion reflects service of an ex parte application for order setting aside the default, as opposed to the instant motion to set aside the default. However, this defect in service is immaterial, and Mussen opposed the motion on the merits. (Carlton v. Quint (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 690, 697 [“It is well settled that the appearance of a party at the hearing of a motion and his or her opposition to the motion on its merits is a waiver of any defects or irregularities in the notice of motion. This rule applies even when no notice was given at all.”.].)

Code Civ. Proc. § 473(b) provides in pertinent part,

“The court may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a party or his or her legal representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. Application for this relief shall be accompanied by a copy of the answer or other 3