Janine Chun Lu vs. Marc Goubert, et.al.

Case Name: Lu v. Goubert, et al. Case No.: 23CV428070

After substituting in as counsel for Plaintiff and reviewing the case, Plaintiff’s counsel sought permission from Defendants’ counsel to file the proposed FAC in December 2025; however, Defendants’ counsel Missy Cornejo declined in January 2026. On March 2, 2026, plaintiff “Janine” Chun Lu (“Plaintiff”) filed a motion for leave to file a first amended complaint against defendants Marc Goubert (“Goubert”), Sam Arvayo (“Sam”) and Serena Arvayo (“Serena”)1, asserting causes of action for:

1) Civil harassment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 527.6; 2) Private nuisance; 3) Nuisance per se; 4) Negligence; and, 5) Intentional infliction of emotional distress.2

Defendants Sam, Serena and Ezekiel filed an opposition to the motion on April 20, 2026. On April 22, 2026, Goubert, Sam, Serena and Ezekiel (collectively, “Defendants”) filed a second opposition to the motion.

As to Defendants’ arguments that the proposed first amended complaint (“FAC”) is subject to a special motion to strike pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, that motion is not before the Court. Regardless, even if it were, Defendants do not here demonstrate

1 The initial complaint included minor Ezekiel S. Aravayo, erroneously sued as “J.D.” (“Ezekiel”), as a defendant. 2 The initial complaint also included causes of action for abatement of public nuisance, statutory liability of parents for torts of a minor, and negligent infliction of emotional distress.

4 that the activity is protected by the anti-SLAPP statute, as is required by a special motion to strike. (See Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 884, 902 (stating that “[t]he defendant’s first-step burden is to identify the activity each challenged claim rests on and demonstrate that that activity is protected by the anti-SLAPP statute... [t]hose charged with defamation cannot, by their own conduct, create their own defense by making the claimant a public figure”); see also Baughn v. Department of Forestry & Fire Protection (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 328, 336 (stating that “the focus of the speaker’s conduct should be the public interest rather than a mere effort ‘to gather ammunition for another round of [private] controversy’”).)

As to Defendants’ argument that the causes of action are untimely because they are premised on publications occurring on March 14, 2024, and the applicable statute of limitations is two years, the motion for leave to file the proposed FAC was filed on March 2, 2026—within two years of the asserted publication date. The new causes of action of the proposed FAC are not untimely.

As to Defendants’ argument that the proposed FAC fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, this order does not preclude Defendants from objecting to the proposed FAC by demurrer, answer or motion for judgment on the pleadings.

As to Defendants’ argument regarding prejudice, Defendants fail to submit any evidence supporting such a claim and apparently rely on their bald assertions made in opposition. However, “[a] mere claim of prejudice is not sufficient; there must be some showing that [the non-moving defendant] ‘was unfairly disadvantaged or deprived of the opportunity to present facts or evidence which it would have offered had the . . . amendments been timely.’” (Dole v. Arco Chemical Co. (3d Cir. 1990) 921 F.2d 484, 488; see also L&S Framing, Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Appeals Bd. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 995, 1012 (stating that “[a]s to

5 a claim of prejudice, the showing must demonstrate that the party was ‘unfairly disadvantaged or deprived of the opportunity to present facts or evidence which it would have offered had the... amendments been timely... [p]rejudice will not be presumed but must be affirmatively demonstrated through production of evidence”); see also Highland Springs Conference & Training Center v. City of Banning (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 267, 273 (stating that “the motion to amend was erroneously denied based solely on plaintiffs’ delay in filing the motion, because SCCA made an insufficient evidentiary showing that it was prejudiced by the delay”).)

“Generally, motions for leave to amend are liberally granted.” (Foroudi v. The Aerospace Corp. (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 992, 1000; see also Hirsa v. Super. Ct. (Vickers) (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 486, 488-489 (stating that “[t]rial courts are vested with the discretion to allow amendments to pleadings ‘in furtherance of justice’... [t]hat trial courts are to liberally permit such amendments, at any stage of the proceeding, has been established policy in this state since 1901”); see also Nestle v. Santa Monica (1972) 6 Cal.3d 920, 939 (California Supreme Court stating that “the general rule of liberal construction of pleadings [citation] and of liberal allowance of amendments [citations] should prevail”).) “[C]ourts are bound to apply a policy of great liberality in permitting amendments to the complaint at any stage of the proceedings, up to and including trial...

It is an abuse of discretion to deny leave to amend where the opposing party was not misled or prejudiced by the amendment.” (Atkinson v. Elk Corp. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 739, 761; see also Higgins v. Del Faro (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 558, 564 (stating that “[w]here no prejudice is shown to the adverse party, the liberal rule of allowance prevails”); see also Berman v. Bromberg (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 936, 945 (stating that “[i]t is an abuse of discretion to deny leave to amend where the opposing party was not misled or prejudiced by the amendment”).)

Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file the proposed FAC is GRANTED. Plaintiff shall file the FAC within 5 calendar days of the Court’s order.