Jesus Ernesto Flores v. DCOR, LLC

26CV00402 Case Type Civil Law & Motion Hearing Date / Time Wed, 07/15/2026 - 10:00 Nature of Proceedings Motion re Consolidation Tentative Ruling Plaintiffs: David Yeremian Defendant Santiago Charco: Robert Phillips Defendant LYF: Aaron Reisner

DENIED.

Analysis

On September 10, 2024, Plaintiff Graciela Cisneros de Porras filed the complaint in case No. 24CV04992 against Defendants Santiago Charco Sanchez and Lyft, Inc.

On October 3, 2025, the Court entered its order on the parties' stipulation to arbitrate the claim between Plaintiff and Defendant Sanchez, and to dismiss Defendant Lyft, Inc.

On January 20, 2026, Plaintiff Jason Jeremy Carter filed the complaint in case No. 26CV00402 against Defendants Santiago Charco and Lyft, Inc. (Note: Defendant Santiago Charco is the same person as Defendant Santiago Charco Sanchez in case No. 24CV04992.)

Answers were filed in case No. 26CV00402 by Defendant Charco Sanchez on April 8, 2026, and by Defendant Lyft, Inc., on April 28, 2026.

On April 24, 2026, Defendant Charco Sanchez filed this motion in both case No. 24CV04992 and case No. 26CV00402 to consolidate both cases for all purposes.

No opposition or other response has been filed by any party.

"When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the Court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay." (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 1048, subd. (a).)

Both cases arise out of the same automobile accident. (Mendez decl., P.P. 2, 7, 8.) Consequently, there is overlap in questions of fact with respect to the accident.

However, in presenting this motion, Defendant Charco Sanchez does not explain how the different procedural postures of the cases would be affected by consolidation.

In particular, the remaining parties in case No. 24CV04992 were ordered to arbitration in 2025.

In case No. 26CV00402, Lyft remains a party to the action but has indicated an intent to move to compel arbitration.

Additionally, this motion is not presented as a motion to consolidate arbitrations under Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.3, but as a motion to consolidate the Court actions under section 1048.

There is no showing that there would be judicial efficiency in consolidating a case that is pending in arbitration with a case that may be tried, partially or fully, in Court.

The motion to consolidate will be denied without prejudice.

Tentative Ruling: Jesus Ernesto Flores v. DCOR, LLC Tentative Ruling: Jesus Ernesto Flores v. DCOR, LLC Case Number

Case Type Civil Law & Motion

Hearing Date / Time Wed, 06/24/2026 - 10:00 Nature of Proceedings Motion of Defendant DCOR, LLC, to Compel Arbitration Tentative Ruling For Plaintiff Jesus Ernesto Flores: Kevin A. Lipeles, Thomas H. Schelly, Jasmine J. Badawi, Lipeles Law Group, APC For Defendant DCOR, LLC: Bryan L. Hawkins, Robert Sarkisian, Kyndall Banales, Stoel Rives LLP

RULING

For all reasons stated herein, the motion of Defendant DCOR, LLC, to compel arbitration is granted.

The individual claims alleged by Plaintiff Jesus Ernesto Flores are ordered to arbitration pursuant to the parties' arbitration agreement.

This action is stayed pending the completion of the arbitration proceedings.

Background:

On February 19, 2026, Jesus Ernesto Flores initiated this action by filing a class action complaint against Defendant DCOR, LLC (DCOR), setting forth eight causes of action for violations of the Labor Code as to overtime, minimum wages, meal breaks, rest breaks, wage statements, reimbursement of business expenses, failure to pay wages at termination, and failure to permit records inspection, as well as unfair competition under Business and Professions Code section 17200, et seq.

As alleged in the complaint, Plaintiff and similarly situated employees of DCOR who worked at oil platform operations in Carpinteria and in other locations in Santa Barbara County were subjected to these wage and hour violations.

On April 10, 2026, DCOR filed a motion to compel arbitration.

The motion seeks an order compelling the individual claims in this action to arbitration pursuant to the parties' arbitration agreement and dismissing or staying this pending action in Court.

On June 10, 2026, Plaintiff filed a notice of non-opposition stating that, "Plaintiff JESUS ERNESTO FLORES does not oppose Defendant DCOR, LLC's Motion to Compel Arbitration currently set for hearing on June 24, 2026, at 10:00 a.m. in Department 3 of the above-entitled Court." (Non-Opp., p. 1, ll. 23-25.)

Analysis

"Private arbitration is a matter of agreement between the parties ...." (Platt Pacific, Inc. v. Andelson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 307, 313.)

"There is no public policy favoring arbitration of disputes which the parties have not agreed to arbitrate.... Whether the parties formed a valid agreement to arbitrate is determined under general California contract law. [Citation.] Hence, when ruling on a petition to compel arbitration, the superior Court may consider evidence on factual issues such as contract formation bearing on the threshold issue of arbitrability." (City of Vista v. Sutro & Co. (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 401, 407.)

"Under 'both federal and state law, the threshold question presented by a petition to compel arbitration is whether there is an agreement to arbitrate.' " (Fleming v. Oliphant Financial, LLC (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 13, 19.)

"The party seeking to compel arbitration bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence an agreement to arbitrate a dispute exists." (Trinity v. Life Ins. Co. of North America (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1111, 1120.)

"It is essential to the existence of a contract that there should be: [P.]

1. Parties capable of contracting; [P.]

2. Their consent; [P.]

3. A lawful object; and, [P.]

4. A sufficient cause or consideration." (Civ. Code, Sec. 1550.)

"The consent of the parties to a contract must be: [P.]

1. Free; [P.]

2. Mutual; and, [P.]

3. Communicated by each to the other." (Civ. Code, Sec. 1565.)

"Consent is not mutual, unless the parties all agree upon the same thing in the same sense...." (Civ. Code, Sec. 1580.)

"The existence of mutual consent is determined by objective rather than subjective criteria, the test being what the outward manifestations of consent would lead a reasonable person to believe. [Citation.] Accordingly, the primary focus in determining the existence of mutual consent is upon the acts of the parties involved." (Monster Energy Co. v. Schechter (2019) 7 Cal.5th 781, 789 (Monster).)

If consent to arbitrate is established, subject to certain exceptions, "the Court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy ...." (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 1281.2.)