Julian Broadbery v. Ethan Light, et al.

now-operative enforcement regime; and (4) the collapse of numerosity, including the absence of any explanation for Ms. Ishibashi. Each ground was squarely raised in the Motion; each stands unrebutted; and each independently supports decertification. VCF requests that the Court issue an order decertifying the class.

The Court's Conclusions The Request for Judicial Notice is Granted as follows: 1. Plaintiffs' Complaint filed on September 7, 2023.

2. The Court's Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification, entered on March 20, 2025.

3. Santa Barbara County Ordinance No. 5244, adopted March 18, 2025, as modified and certified through Santa Barbara County Board of Supervisors Resolution No. 25-241.

The Court reminds counsel that Judicial Notice is the recognition and acceptance by the Court, for use by the trier of fact or by the Court, of the existence of a matter of law or fact that is relevant to an issue in the action without requiring formal proof of the matter. Judicial notice may not be taken of any matter unless authorized or required by law. Matters that are subject to judicial notice are listed in Evid. Code Sec.Sec. 451 and 452. A matter ordinarily is subject to judicial notice only if the matter is reasonably beyond dispute.

Taking judicial notice of a document is not the same as accepting the truth of its contents or accepting a particular interpretation of its meaning. While Courts take judicial notice of public records, they do not take notice of the truth of matters stated therein. When judicial notice is taken of a document, the truthfulness and proper interpretation of the document are disputable. Herrera v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co., (2011) 196 Cal. App. 4th 1366.) [Emphasis the Court's]

The Evidentiary Objections are all overruled. VCR attacks on the class list are without merit. The class list was prepared over many months (pursuant to the class notice procedures approved by this Court) by the class administrator hired by Plaintiffs: Simpluris. Plaintiffs' counsel then spent weeks investigating the proposed list and ultimately removed those individuals that counsel believed were not included in the class definition. After this process, the class list was presented to the attorneys for VCR who now assert that, because it disagrees with Plaintiffs' assessment of who should be removed from the Simpluris class list, the class is not ascertainable and must be decertified.

The fact that some individualized inquiry into whether an individual is a member of the class does not mandate that a class action be decertified when (as the Court has already held here) there are common questions of law and fact as to a Defendant's liability. There are no due process concerns raised by the inclusion of individuals that VCR believes are not properly in the class because VCR is fully permitted to challenge their inclusion at the time of trial. As is the case in many class actions, disputes over the inclusion of certain individuals in the class are either worked out between the parties or resolved at trial. These disputes should not result in the decertification of the entire class.

The depositions of unnamed class members offer nothing to indicate that this case cannot proceed as a class action. VCR contends that the deposition testimony of certain class members shows that each person perceives and is impacted by odor differently and, for this reason, it is necessary to individually assess the odors' impact on every member of the class. But, as argued in their Motion for Class Certification, Plaintiffs' claims for nuisance and trespass are based on an objective standard on what is offensive to the sense of a reasonable person, not the individual bringing the claim. This determination can be made with common proof as to the entire class irrespective of how absent class members themselves are impacted by the odors emanating from VCR's property.

The purportedly "new" expert opinions offered by VCR are nothing more than repackaged arguments that VCR has already offered in the past and are based entirely on an analysis of information that was available to VCR at the time it opposed Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification. Plaintiffs attempted to inspect VCR's property but were denied access; an issue that is now pending before this Court. It would be inequitable to allow VCR to benefit from arguments made in its Motion that are based on its failure to comply with its basic discovery obligations.

The declaration of Dr. Pamela Dalton should be discarded. Dr. Dalton offers improper legal opinions that step on this Court's role of determining whether there is an ascertainable and manageable class. These opinions are based on information that was available to VCR before they opposed Plaintiffs' class certification motion. The time to use that information has come and gone and it cannot now be used to support decertification.

The change in local ordinances does not render this case moot and is irrelevant to whether this case should proceed as a class action. It is by no means clear whether VCR's adoption of PCO Technology is in compliance with the County's newly adopted ordinances concerning odor abatement. Even assuming it is, nuisance and trespass claims include damages for the "annoyance and discomfort" class members have experienced while VCR refused to take any measures to reduce the odors out of its greenhouses.

Tentative Ruling: Julian Broadbery v. Ethan Light, et al. Tentative Ruling: Julian Broadbery v. Ethan Light, et al. Case Number

Case Type Civil Law & Motion Hearing Date / Time Wed, 06/17/2026 - 10:00 Nature of Proceedings Motion of Defendants Ethan Light and Pearl Light. for Terminating Sanctions or, in the Alternative, Evidentiary Sanctions, Against Plaintiff Julian Broadbery; Request for Monetary Sanctions Tentative Ruling For Plaintiff Julian Broadbery: Joseph S. Farzam For Defendants Ethan Light and Pearl Light: Andrew S. Meyers, Saira M. Mejia, Straus Meyers LLP RULING For the reasons set forth herein, the motion of Defendants for terminating sanctions or, in the alternative, evidentiary sanctions, is granted in part and denied in part as follows: Terminating sanctions are denied.

Plaintiff Julian Broadbery shall produce all responsive documents to Defendants' requests for production of documents no later than June 24, 2026, by 5:00 p.m. Any responsive documents not produced, or not previously produced, shall not be admitted into evidence, by Plaintiff, at trial. Monetary sanctions are imposed against Plaintiff's counsel, Joseph Farzam Law Firm, in the amount of $1,715.00, payable by Plaintiff's counsel to counsel for Defendants no later than June 24, 2026. The trial date of 8/26/26 is confirmed - again.

Background

The operative second amended complaint (SAC) in this action was filed on November 12, 2025. The SAC alleges that on July 26, 2022, while Plaintiff was delivering items to 6672 Abrego Road, Goleta, he was attacked by Defendants' dog and sustained injuries.

As the result of motions to compel by Defendants, on January 28, 2026, the Court ordered: "The motions to compel are granted. Defendants shall serve verified written responses to the first set of form interrogatories and requests for production of documents, without objection, and shall produce all responsive documents identified in the written responses as to be produced, on or before February 18, 2026. In the absence of any opposition, the Court awards monetary sanctions, constituting reasonable attorney fees and costs, in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff Broadbery for both motions in the total amount of $960.00, to be paid to counsel for Defendants on or before February 18, 2026." (January 28, 2026 Minute Order.)

On April 23, 2026, Defendants filed the present motion for terminating sanctions or, in the alternative, evidence sanctions and monetary sanctions. As of March 19, 2026, Plaintiff had not served any verified responses to Defendants' form interrogatories or requests for production of documents, nor had Plaintiff produced any responsive documents or paid the Court ordered monetary sanctions. (Mejia decl., P.P. 8, 9, 10.)

On June 5, 2026, Plaintiff filed opposition to the motion arguing that the discovery failures arose from internal staffing and case management failures involving previous employees of Plaintiff's counsel. Plaintiff's counsel declares that, since the filing of the present motion: "Plaintiff has served verified discovery responses and supplemental responses and has produced responsive documents presently available and within Plaintiff's possession, custody, or control. Additional supplementation has also been provided in good faith in an effort to address concerns raised by Defendants." (Farzam decl., P. 6.)

By way of reply, Defendants acknowledge that discovery responses were served after the filing of the present motion, but argue: "Crucially, a baseline analysis of these eleventh-hour responses reveals that they remain profoundly evasive, structurally incomplete, and highly conditional. Plaintiff continues to actively suppress material factual discovery. Because lesser discovery sanctions have already failed to yield compliant behavior, terminating or severe evidentiary and issue sanctions are fully warranted under California Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.030." (Reply, p. 2, ll. 10-14.) Defendants also argue that the responses continue to be deficient and evasive.

Analysis

Evidentiary and/or Terminating Sanctions "California's pretrial discovery procedures are designed to minimize the opportunities for fabrication and forgetfulness, and to eliminate the need for guesswork about the other side's evidence, with all doubts about discoverability resolved in favor of disclosure." (Glenfed Development Corp. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1119.)

"Misuses of the discovery process include, but are not limited to, the following: . . . "(d) Failing to respond or to submit to an authorized method of discovery. . . . "(g) Disobeying a Court order to provide discovery." (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 2023.010, subds. (d), (g).)

"To the extent authorized by the chapter governing any particular discovery method or any other provision of this title, the Court, after notice to any affected party, person, or attorney, and after opportunity for hearing, may impose the following sanctions against anyone engaging in conduct that is a misuse of the discovery process: "(a) The Court may impose a monetary sanction ordering that one engaging in the misuse of the discovery process, or any attorney advising that conduct, or both pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred by anyone as a result of that conduct.

The Court may also impose this sanction on one unsuccessfully asserting that another has engaged in the misuse of the discovery process, or on any attorney who advised that assertion, or on both. If a monetary sanction is authorized by any provision of this title, the Court shall impose that sanction unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. "(b) The Court may impose an issue sanction ordering that designated facts shall be taken as established in the action in accordance with the claim of the party adversely affected by the misuse of the discovery process.

The Court may also impose an issue sanction by an order prohibiting any party engaging in the misuse of the discovery process from supporting or opposing designated claims or defenses. "(c) The Court may impose an evidence sanction by an order prohibiting any party engaging in the misuse of the discovery process from introducing designated matters in evidence. "(d) The Court may impose a terminating sanction by one of the following orders: "(1) An order striking out the pleadings or parts of the pleadings of any party engaging in the misuse of the discovery process.

"(2) An order staying further proceedings by that party until an order for discovery is obeyed. "(3) An order dismissing the action, or any part of the action, of that party. "(4) An order rendering a judgment by default against that party. "(e) The Court may impose a contempt sanction by an order treating the misuse of the discovery process as a contempt of Court. "(f)(1) Notwithstanding subdivision (a), or any other section of this title, absent exceptional circumstances, the Court shall not impose sanctions on a party or any attorney of a party for failure to provide electronically stored information that has been lost, damaged, altered, or overwritten as the result of the routine, good faith operation of an electronic information system. "(2) This subdivision shall not be construed to alter any obligation to preserve discoverable information." (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 2023.030.)

The discovery statutes evince an incremental approach to discovery sanctions, starting with monetary sanctions and ending with the ultimate sanction of termination. (Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967, 991.) A terminating sanction should generally not be imposed until the Court has attempted less severe alternatives and found them to be unsuccessful, and the record clearly shows lesser sanctions would be ineffective. (Lopez v. Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 566, 604-605.) "A Court has broad discretion in selecting the appropriate penalty" for a party's refusal to obey a discovery order. (Lopez v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 566, 604.)

Here, Plaintiff has admittedly failed to comply with the Court order to respond to discovery no later than February 18, 2026. As an excuse, Plaintiff's counsel declares: "This case was originally assigned within my office to an associate attorney who was responsible for handling discovery obligations, calendaring deadlines, and supervising the assigned paralegal on the matter. The associate attorney and the paralegal assigned to assist him are no longer employed with my firm." (Farzam decl., P. 3.) "Unbeknownst to me at the time, the assigned associate and his support staff failed to properly manage and prosecute this matter, including failing to timely comply with certain discovery obligations and Court-ordered deadlines.

Their mishandling of this file was not an isolated incident and was part of broader performance and case management issues which ultimately resulted in their separation from the firm." (Farzam decl., P. 4.) "Upon discovering the extent of the deficiencies and neglect in this case, my office immediately undertook efforts to correct the issues, review the outstanding discovery, communicate with opposing counsel, and bring the Plaintiff into compliance. (Farzam decl., P. 5.) "Since that time, Plaintiff has served verified discovery responses and supplemental responses and has produced responsive documents presently available and within Plaintiff's possession, custody, or control.

Additional supplementation has also been provided in good faith in an effort to address concerns raised by Defendants." (Farzam decl., P. 6 & Exh. 1.)

It is axiomatic that Farzam, as Plaintiff's attorney of record, is ultimately the attorney responsible for the handling of this case and for the supervision of subordinates who perform work on the case. While Defendants argue that Plaintiff's responses are still deficient in some respects, the amended responses give the parties the opportunity to further meet and confer, and, if necessary, to bring a further motion regarding the responses. The providing of responses largely moots the present motion. However, the Court will order that Plaintiff fully comply with the order that he produce all responsive documents to the request for production of documents. If he fails to do so, evidence sanctions will be imposed that will prevent Plaintiff from introducing any non-produced documents into evidence at trial.

Monetary Sanctions Defendants seek sanctions in the amount of $2,625.00 for the necessity of bringing the present motion. Defendants' counsel declares: "I spent a total of 4.8 hours researching, reviewing and preparing for Defendant's motion for order compelling