BEALE vs GENERAL MOTORS LLC, et al.

24CV014244: BEALE vs GENERAL MOTORS LLC, et al. 05/11/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment in Department 8D

Tentative Ruling

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24CV014244: BEALE vs GENERAL MOTORS LLC, et al. 05/11/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment in Department 8D

a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

***NOTICE: EFFECTIVE APRIL 13, 2026, THIS DEPARTMENT HAS MOVED TO THE TANI G. CANTIL-SAKAUYE COURTHOUSE LOCATED AT 500 G. ST. SACRAMENTO, CA. ALL MOTIONS NOTICED FOR DEPARTMENT 25 WILL BE HEARD IN DEPARTMENT 8D OF THE NEW COURTHOUSE. ALL PAPERS FOR THIS DEPARTMENT MUST BE FILED AT THIS NEW LOCATION AND WILL NOT BE ACCEPTED AT THE HALL OF JUSTICE. ALL HEARINGS WILL TAKE PLACE AT THIS NEW LOCATION****

TENTATIVE RULING:

Defendant General Motors LLC’s (“Defendant”) motion for summary judgment is ruled upon as follows.

Moving counsel failed to comply with California Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(g), requiring a single volume of evidence (including all declarations) with a table of contents when the evidence exceeds 25 pages.

Moving counsel failed to comply with California Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(d)(3) requiring citations to supporting evidence include reference to the exhibit, title, page, and line numbers.

I. Overview

This is a Lemon Law action arising out of Plaintiff Santon Beale’s (“Plaintiff”) purchase of a 2020 Chevrolet Silverado (the “Subject Vehicle”). Plaintiff’s operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) was filed on June 5, 2025 and asserts six causes of action for: (1) Breach of Warranty and Violation of the Magnuson Moss Warranty – Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act, (2) Breach of Warranty California Commercial Code, (3) Advertising Merchandise Without Disclosing Defects, Business & Professions Code § 17531, § 175356, (4) Violation of Consumer Legal Remedies Act, Civil Code §§ 1750, et seq., (5) Negligence, and (6) Violation of Civil Code section 1795.6. The first through fourth causes of action are brought against Defendant and Does 1-40. The fifth and sixth causes of action names only Defendant Does 41-50.[1]

Defendant moves for “Summary Judgment on Counts I, II, III, and IV of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint” on the ground that it is:

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV014244: BEALE vs GENERAL MOTORS LLC, et al. 05/11/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment in Department 8D

is entitled to judgment in its favor as a matter of law (i) on Count I because Plaintiff cannot maintain a Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (“Magnuson-Moss”) claim without a viable state law cause of action, of which there is none here; (ii) on Count II because GM was not the seller of the subject vehicle that Plaintiff bought used from a third-party dealership, and Plaintiff was not in privity of contract with GM; (iii) on Count III because Plaintiff cannot establish a violation of the Business & Professions Code; and (iv) on Count IV because Plaintiff cannot establish a transactional relationship as required by the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”).

(Amended Notice of Motion at 2:5-13.)

Defendant did not move for summary adjudication.

Plaintiff opposes. Trial is currently set for June 23, 2026.

II. Legal Standard for Summary Judgment

In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the Court engages in a three-step process.

First, the Court identifies the issues framed by the pleadings. The pleadings define the scope of the issues on a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication. (FPI Dev. Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381-382.) Because a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication is limited to the issues raised by the pleadings (Lewis v. Chevron (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 690, 694), all evidence submitted in support of or in opposition to the motion must be addressed to the claims and defenses raised in the pleadings.

The Court cannot consider an unpled issue in ruling on a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication. (Roth v. Rhodes (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 530, 541.) The papers filed in response to a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication may not create issues outside the pleadings and are not a substitute for an amendment to the pleadings. (Tsemetzin v. Coast Federal Savings & Loan Assn. (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1342.) Indeed, it has often been noted that “[i]t would be patently unfair to allow plaintiffs to defeat [defendant’s] summary judgment motion by allowing them to present a “moving target” unbounded by the pleadings.” (Melican v.

Regents of University of California, (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 168, 176-177.)

Next, the Court must determine whether the moving party has met its burden. A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication bears the burden of persuasion that one or more elements of the plaintiff’s cause of action cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850 [quoting Code Civ. Proc. §437c(p)(2)].) A defendant is not required to conclusively negate one or more elements of the plaintiff’s cause of action. (Saelzer v. Advanced Group 400 (2001)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV014244: BEALE vs GENERAL MOTORS LLC, et al. 05/11/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment in Department 8D

25 Cal.4th 763, 780-781). Rather, to meet its burden, the defendant is required to show only that the plaintiff cannot prove an element of its cause of action, i.e., that the plaintiff does not possess and cannot reasonably obtain evidence necessary to show this element. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 853-855.) Further, the initial burden requires a showing that the plaintiff “could not prevail on any theory raised by the pleadings.” (Hawkins v. Wilton (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 936, 939-940.)

At the same time, a defendant cannot shift the burden to the plaintiff simply by suggesting the possibility that the plaintiff cannot prove its case; a moving defendant must still make “an affirmative showing” in support of its motion. (See Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 854-855, n.23; Addy v. Bliss & Glennon (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 205, 214.) Once the moving party has met its burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party to show that a material factual issue exists as to the cause of action alleged or a defense to it. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (p); see generally Bush v. Parents Without Partners (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 322, 326- 327.)

Finally, in ruling on the motion, the Court must consider the evidence and inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 843.)

III.

Discussion

The Court concludes Defendant has failed to meet its initial burden.

In this regard, Defendant relies on the following eight undisputed material facts (“UMF”) in support of the motion:

 The vehicle at issue is a model year 2020 Chevrolet Silverado, VIN: 1GCRYDED1LZ110445 (“Subject Vehicle” or “Silverado”). (UMF 1.)

 Plaintiff Stanton Beale (“Plaintiff”) purchased the Silverado used from Enterprise Rent-A-Car, on June 30, 2020, with 15,805 miles. (UMF 2.)

 GM was not a party to the transaction between Plaintiff and Enterprise. GM did not have any contact with Plaintiff, and GM did not make any representations to the Plaintiff, nor provide any “sample[s] or model[s]” to Plaintiff during Plaintiff’s purchase of the Silverado. (UMF 3.)

 Plaintiff was not the Silverado’s original owner(s). (UMF 4.)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV014244: BEALE vs GENERAL MOTORS LLC, et al. 05/11/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment in Department 8D

 Rydell Chevrolet delivered the Silverado to its original owner(s) on August 19, 2019, with 9 miles on its odometer. (UMF 5.)

 In connection with that delivery of the Silverado to its original owner(s), GM issued a New Vehicle Limited Warranty (the “Warranty”), providing bumper-to- bumper coverage for the earlier of 3 years or 36,000 miles, and powertrain coverage for the earlier of 5 years or 60,000 miles. (UMF 6.)

 The Warranty’s coverages began when Rydell Chevrolet delivered the Silverado to its original owner(s) on August 19, 2019. (UMF 7.)

 GM did not issue or provide any new or additional warranty coverage to Plaintiff or the vehicle when Plaintiff bought the Silverado used; Plaintiff received only the balance of any coverage remaining under the Warranty that GM issued when the Silverado was delivered to its original owner(s). (UMF 8.)

Based on the above facts, Defendant argues, citing to Ballesteros v. Ford Motor Co. (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 1196 (“Ballesteros”), that Plaintiff’s second cause of action for breach of express warranty under the California Commercial Code fails as a matter of law because Plaintiff purchased the Subject Vehicle from a third-party Dealership. (Moving MPA at 4:9-5:9.)

As to the first cause of action, Defendant argues that the Magnuson-Moss claim fails because the underlying California Commercial Code Claim is without merit. (Id., at 5:10-6:27.) Defendant next argues that the third cause of action fails as a matter of law because Plaintiff cannot establish a violation of the California Business and Professions Code. (Id., at 7:1-8:27.) Finally, Defendant argues that the fourth cause of action for violation of the Consumer legal Remedies Act fails because Plaintiff cannot establish a transactional relationship between the parties. (Id., at 9:1-10:11.)

Turning to Defendant’s first argument related to the second cause of action for breach of express warranty under the California Commercial Code, the Court finds that Defendant failed to carry its initial burden to show Plaintiff cannot prevail on this cause of action.

In this regard, Commercial Code § 2313 states:

(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:

(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV014244: BEALE vs GENERAL MOTORS LLC, et al. 05/11/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment in Department 8D

creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or promise.

(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the description.

(c) Any sample or model which is made part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the whole of the goods shall conform to the sample or model.

(2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the seller use formal words such as “warrant” or “guarantee” or that he have a specific intention to make a warranty, but an affirmation merely of the value of the goods or a statement purporting to be merely the seller’s opinion or commendation of the goods does not create a warranty.

“The essential elements of a cause of action under the California Uniform Commercial Code for breach of an express warranty to repair defects are (1) an express warranty (Com.Code, § 2313) to repair defects given in connection with the sale of goods; (2) the existence of a defect covered by the warranty; (3) the buyer's notice to the seller of such a defect within a reasonable time after its discovery (id., § 2607, subd. (3)(A)); (4) the seller's failure to repair the defect in compliance with the warranty; and (5) resulting damages (id. §§ 2714, 2715; Cardinal Health 301, Inc. v. Tyco Electronics Corp. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 116, 145, 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 5).” (Orichian v. BMW of North America, LLC (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1322, 1333-1334.)

Here, GM argues that the second cause of action fails because Plaintiff purchased the Subject Vehicle used from a third-party dealership. (Moving MPA at 5:1-2.) As such, argues Defendant, Plaintiff’s second cause of action fails because “[Defendant] was not the seller of the [Subject Vehicle], [Defendant] did not have any contact with Plaintiff, and [Defendant] did not make any representations to the Plaintiff, nor provide any ‘samples[s] or model[s]’ to Plaintiff during Plaintiff’s purchase of the [Subject Vehicle].” (Id., at 5:5:2-5.)

In making this argument, Defendant quotes Ballesteros, supra, as stating that “express warranty provisions are limited to warranties given by the seller directly to the buyer.” (Moving MPA at 4:11-14.)

However, the Ballesteros court more fully stated:

The Commercial Code's express warranty provisions are limited to warranties given by the seller directly to the buyer. (Davis, supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 838, 319 Cal.Rptr.3d 517, review granted; Cal. U. Com. Code, §§ 2313, subd. (1)(a) &

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV014244: BEALE vs GENERAL MOTORS LLC, et al. 05/11/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment in Department 8D

2103, subd. (1)(d).) Moreover, “the warranty sections ... are not designed in any way to disturb those lines of law growth which have recognized that warranties need not be confined either to sales contracts or to the direct parties to such a contract.” (Official Comments on Cal. U. Com. Code, Deering's Ann. Cal. U. Com. Code (2024 ed.) foll. § 2313, italics added.) In other words, while express warranties apply under the Commercial Code only to a seller in privity with the buyer, the buyer may sue a third-party manufacturer for breach of an express warranty in the absence of privity. (Davis, at pp. 838–839, 319 Cal.Rptr.3d 517.)

(Ballesteros, supra, 109 Cal.App.5th 1196, 1216-1217.)

Similarly, the Appellate Court explained in Dagher v. Ford Motor Co. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 905 explained that:

However, Ford's respondent's brief admits, “Used car owners that obtain their vehicles via private sales and who comply with the warranty terms may seek to enforce the express warranty against the manufacturer by bringing an action under the Commercial Code based on breach of express warranty. Such an action does not require that the plaintiff purchase the vehicle from a retail seller.” Ford is correct that the Act was meant to supplement, not supersede, the provisions of the Commercial Code. (§ 1790.3; Park City Services, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th 295, 301–302, 50 Cal.Rptr.3d 373.)

(Dagher, supra, 238 Cal.App.4th 905, 928.)

Although Defendant has shown it was not the direct seller for the sale of the Subject Vehicle to Plaintiff, this alone is not sufficient to uphold its burden on summary judgment. As stated by the Ballesteros court, Plaintiff may sue a third-party manufacturer for breach of an express warranty in the absence of privity. As such, the burden does not shift to Plaintiff to raise a triable issue of material fact.

The failure to dispose of all causes of action necessarily precludes summary judgment. Summary judgment may be granted where it is shown that the “action has no merit” and summary judgment lies only where the opponent has no case at all. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(c); 24 Hour Fitness, Inc. v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1199, 1215.) Because Defendant has failed to satisfy its initial burden as to the second cause of action, the motion for summary judgment must be denied in its entirety, As discussed earlier, Defendant did not move for summary adjudication, and therefore, this Court need not consider the merits of Defendant’s specific contentions pertaining to the first, third, and fourth causes of action.

Disposition

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV014244: BEALE vs GENERAL MOTORS LLC, et al. 05/11/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment in Department 8D

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED in its entirety.

This minute order is effective immediately. Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312, Plaintiff shall prepare an appropriate order which conforms to Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (g).

[1] The Court does not find any Doe Amendments in its record.