BUTLER vs GENERAL MOTORS LLC

A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with

24CV020025: BUTLER vs GENERAL MOTORS LLC 06/09/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment in Department 16D

a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

TENTATIVE RULING:

*** NOTICE: EFFECTIVE APRIL 13, 2026, THIS DEPARTMENT HAS MOVED TO THE TANI G. CANTIL-SAKAUYE COURTHOUSE LOCATED AT 500 G STREET IN SACRAMENTO, CA. ALL MOTIONS NOTICED FOR DEPARTMENT 53 WILL BE HEARD IN DEPARTMENT 16D OF THE NEW COURTHOUSE. ALL PAPERS FOR THIS DEPARTMENT MUST BE FILED AT THIS NEW LOCATION AND WILL NOT BE ACCEPTED AT THE HALL OF JUSTICE. ALL HEARINGS WILL TAKE PLACE AT THIS NEW LOCATION. PARTIES MAY CONTINUE TO APPEAR REMOTELY IN DEPARTMENT 16D UNLESS SPECIFICALLY ORDERED OTHERWISE. ***

Defendant General Motors, LLC’s (“GM”) motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs’ complaint for “Violation of the Song-Beverly Act” (“SBA”) is ruled upon as follows.

*** If oral argument is requested, the parties are directed to notify the clerk and opposing counsel at the time of the request which of moving defendant’s six (6) Undisputed Material Facts and/or which of opposing plaintiffs’ four (4) Additional Material Facts will be addressed at the hearing and the parties should be prepared to point to specific evidence already in the record which is claimed to show the existence or non-existence of a triable issue of material fact. ***

Both moving and opposing counsel failed to comply with CRC Rule 3.1110(b)(3)-(4).

Moving counsel failed to comply with CRC Rule 3.1350(g), requiring a single volume of evidence (including declarations) with a table of contents when the evidence exceeds 25 pages.

Factual Background

Plaintiffs Michelle Butler and Bridge Billing Services, Inc. commenced this action on 10/3/2024, filing a complaint alleging three causes of action for violation of the SBA based on their 2022 purchase of a 2022 GMC Sierra 1500. On 11/8/2024, defendant GM filed its answer to complaint and on 10/2/2025, defendant GM filed the present motion for summary judgment. This matter is currently set for trial on 9/29/2026.

Moving Papers. According to the Notice of Motion, defendant GM now seeks summary

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV020025: BUTLER vs GENERAL MOTORS LLC 06/09/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment in Department 16D

judgment “because the undisputed facts show that GM promptly offered to repurchase Plaintiffs’ vehicle, satisfying its duties under the [SBA]” and “GM’s repurchase offer equaled the total available restitution prescribed by the [SBA],” such that plaintiffs “can neither prove that GM breached its warranty obligations nor resulting damages.” (Not. of Mot., p.2:4-10.) In support of this motion for summary judgment against plaintiffs, defendant GM has filed a Separate Statement which sets forth Undisputed Material Fact (“UMF”) Nos. 1-6 which generally assert that the subject 2022 GMC vehicle was purchased by plaintiffs in 2022 for $63,670 plus an additional $3,995 for “an optional, non-GM service contract;” despite several repair efforts from February 2024 through April 2024, “the customer’s concerns persisted;” and “[i]n response, GM conducted a repurchase review and just thirty-one days later, GM sent Plaintiff its preliminary repurchase offer letter dated July 1, 2024.”

Opposition. Plaintiffs oppose, claiming that this motion seeking summary judgment “based entirely on the argument that Defendant satisfied its obligations under the SBA because it “promptly offered to repurchase the Subject Vehicle for an amount equal to the total amount of restation that would be available to Plaintiffs under the [SBA]” but defendant GM’s “ ‘settlement offer’ was neither prompt, nor statutorily compliant.” (Opp., p.1:6-11.) According to the opposition, before this suit was filed, plaintiffs’ requested defendant GM to repurchase or replace the subject vehicle and although defendant did send a letter, it “failed to acurately [sic] provide an offer with stated terms, even after Plaintiffs provided Defendant with relevant financial information and ample time to make an offer, thereby giving rise to this lawsuit. (Id., at p.1:26-p.2:3.)

Plaintiffs proceed to explain why they believe defendant GM’s “settlement offer” was neither code-compliant not “prompt.” (Id., at p.3:20-p.10:28.)

In their Separate Statement, plaintiffs admit that UMF Nos. 1-5 are “undisputed” but contend UMF No. 6 is “disputed” for various reasons. Plaintiffs also offer four (4) Additional Material Facts (“AMF”) claimed to independently preclude summary judgment in favor of defendant GM.

Reply. In the reply, defendant GM insists plaintiffs failed to present a triable issue of material fact. According to GM, “this case turns on whether GM fulfilled its obligations under the [SBA]” and GM did, because “[t]he undisputed evidence shows that GM evaluated Plaintiffs’ request and promptly approved a repurchase.” (Reply, p. 1:23-25.) The reply adds that plaintiffs’ claim that GM’s repurchase approval “was not prompt and did not conform to the requirements of the SBA” is “incorrect” inasmuch as GM, like the defendant in Carver v. Volkswagen Grp. of Am., Inc. (2024 (Rev. denied) 107 Cal.App.5th 864 “provided a prompt repurchase offer that complied with [the SBA],” making summary judgment proper. (Id., at p.1:25-p.2:3.)

Standards for Summary Judgment/Adjudication

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV020025: BUTLER vs GENERAL MOTORS LLC 06/09/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment in Department 16D

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment/adjudication, the Court engages in a threestep process. First, the issues framed by the pleadings must be identified since the pleadings themselves define the scope of what may be addressed via a motion for summary judgment/adjudication (FPI Development Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381-382) and the evidence submitted in support of or in opposition to the motion must be addressed to the claims and defenses raised in the pleadings. The Court cannot consider an unpleaded issue in ruling on a motion for summary judgment/adjudication. (Roth v. Rhodes (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 530, 541.) The papers filed in response to such a motion may not create triable issues beyond the scope of the pleadings, nor are they a substitute for filing amended pleadings. (Tsemetzin v. Coast Federal Savings & Loan Assn. (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1342.)

Next, the Court must determine whether the moving party has met its initial burden of production. A defendant moving for summary judgment “bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that [the defendant] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850; Chavez v. Glock, Inc. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1283, 1301.) This burden may be met by establishing either that one or more elements of a cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ.

Proc. §437c(p)(2).) A defendant cannot successfully shift the burden to a plaintiff by merely suggesting the possibility that the latter cannot prove his/her case but must make “an affirmative showing” in support of its motion. (Addy v. Bliss & Glennon (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 205, 214.) If a plaintiff pleads several theories of liability against the defendant, then the latter has the burden of demonstrating there are no material facts requiring trial on any of them. A moving defendant whose evidence omits facts as to any theory of liability effectively permits that portion of the complaint to be unchallenged and even where no opposition is presented, a moving defendant must still make a showing sufficient to eliminate all triable issues of fact. (Wright v.

Stang Manufacturing Co. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1218, 1228; see also Juarez v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 377, 397.)

A plaintiff opposing summary judgment has no evidentiary burden unless the moving defendant has first met its initial burden. (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 840; see also Rubenstein v. Rubenstein (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1131, 1151-1152; Thatcher v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1081, 1085-1086.) If a moving defendant has met its initial burden, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to show the existence of a material factual issue as to the cause of action alleged or the defense to it. (Code Civ. Proc. §437c(p)(2); see also, Bush v. Parents Without Partners (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 322, 326-327.) Only where the moving defendant makes the requisite initial showing does a court need to examine the opposition papers to determine if the latter demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of material fact.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV020025: BUTLER vs GENERAL MOTORS LLC 06/09/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment in Department 16D

(Salazar v. Southern Cal. Gas Co. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1370, 1376; Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 840.) The opposing party must present admissible evidence and may not rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleading. (Id.) In ruling on the motion, a court must construe the evidence of the opposing party liberally and that of the moving party strictly, resolving any doubts in the opposing party’s favor. (Miller v. Bechtel Corp. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 868, 874; Cortez v. Vogt (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 917, 925-926; see also, Salazar v. Southern Cal. Gas Co. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1370, 1376; Brown v. FSR Brokerage, Inc. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 766, 773.)

Finally, before turning to the specific issues raised by this motion, the Court reminds the parties of the “Golden Rule” of summary judgment/adjudication: “If it is not set forth in the separate statement, it does not exist.” (See, Zimmerman, Rosenfeld v. Larson (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1466, 1477 (italics in original).) Moreover, according to Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, a moving party’s inclusion of facts in its separate statement effectively concedes each fact’s “materiality,” whether intended or not, and if there is a triable dispute relating to any one of these facts, the motion must be denied. (Nazir, at 252 (citing Weil & Brown, Civil Procedure Before Trial, Ch.10:95.1); see also, Insalaco v. Hope Lutheran Church of West Contra Costa County (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 506.)

That said, the Court now turns to the specific contentions advanced in support of and opposition to this motion for summary judgment.

Objections to Evidence

The Court finds no written objections to evidence on file.

Discussion

Defendant GM Failed to Satisfy its Initial Burden of Production. The threshold question here is whether the moving papers here are sufficient to satisfy defendant GM’s initial burden of production under Code of Civil Procedure §437c(p)(2) with respect to the sole ground on which summary judgment is sought: The undisputed facts show that “GM promptly offered to repurchase Plaintiffs’ vehicle, satisfying its duties under the [SBA]” and “GM’s repurchase offer equaled the total available restitution prescribed by the [SBA],” such that plaintiffs “can neither prove that GM breached its warranty obligations nor resulting damages.” (Not. of Mot., p.2:4-10.) For the reasons explained below, the Court concludes the moving papers are fail to meet defendant GM’s initial burden of production, thereby mandating denial of the present motion for summary judgment.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV020025: BUTLER vs GENERAL MOTORS LLC 06/09/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment in Department 16D

As noted above, defendant GM’s moving Separate Statement sets forth UMF Nos. 1-6 which generally assert that the subject 2022 GMC vehicle was purchased by plaintiffs in 2022 for $63,670 plus an additional $3,995 for “an optional, non-GM service contract;” despite several repair efforts in early 2024, “the customer’s concerns persisted;” and just thirty-one days later, GM sent Plaintiff its preliminary repurchase offer letter dated July 1, 2024.” After careful consideration of the specific factual assertions made in UMF Nos. 1-6, this Court concludes that defendant GM has failed to carry its initial burden of production under Code of Civil Procedure §437c(p)(2) with respect to the sole ground on which summary judgment is sought: “GM promptly offered to repurchase Plaintiffs’ vehicle, satisfying its duties under the [SBA]” and “GM’s repurchase offer equaled the total available restitution prescribed by the [SBA],” such that plaintiffs “can neither prove that GM breached its warranty obligations nor resulting damages.” (Not. of Mot., p.2:4- 10.)

First, defendant GM’s UMF No. 6 asserts that “[i]n response” to vehicle repair efforts in February 2024 through April 2024 (see, UMF No. 4) which ultimately failed to address “the customer’s concerns” (see, UMF No. 5), defendant GM “conducted a repurchase review and just thirty-one days later, GM sent Plaintiff [sic] its preliminary repurchase offer letter dated July 1, 2024.” The only evidence cited as support for UMF No. 6 is Paragraph 8 of the Jensen Declaration and Exhibit E thereto. (GM’s Itemized Repurchase Offer Letter, dated July 1, 2024).

However, neither Paragraph 8 of the Jensen Declaration nor Exhibit E thereto provides evidence which affirmatively establishes either that GM actually “conducted a repurchase review” following the unsuccessful repair efforts in February 2024 through April 2024 or that GM actually “sent Plaintiff [sic] its preliminary repurchase offer letter dated July 1, 2024.” In particular, Paragraph 8 of the Jensen Declaration merely attests to the authenticity of Exhibit E, which exhibit itself includes no statement about GM having “conducted a repurchase review.” Likewise, Paragraph 8 of the Jensen Declaration does not include any statement about Exhibit E ever being mailed or otherwise transmitted to plaintiffs, nor does the mere existence of Exhibit E establish that it was actually sent to plaintiffs at any time.

Because GM has failed to provide any evidentiary support for its claims of “conduct[ing] a repurchase review” and/or “sen[ding to] Plaintiff [sic] its preliminary repurchase offer letter dated July 1, 2024,” GM has necessarily failed to carry its initial burden of production with respect to UMF 6 and thus, summary judgment must be denied regardless of whether the opposition has presented evidence sufficient to create a triable issue of material fact.

Second, while UMF No. 6 specifically asserts that GM sent “its preliminary repurchase offer letter” “just thirty-one days later,” GM has failed to provide any evidence which demonstrates that its “preliminary repurchase offer letter” was actually sent “just thirty-one days” after GM conducted its purported “repurchase review.” Indeed, as discussed in the preceding paragraph, the Court finds no evidence of GM actually “conduct[ing] a repurchase review” or sending “its preliminary repurchase offer letter dated July 1, 2024” to plaintiffs, as claimed in UMF No.

6. Moreover, to the extent this UMF was intended to

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV020025: BUTLER vs GENERAL MOTORS LLC 06/09/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment in Department 16D

assert that GM sent “its preliminary repurchase offer” “just thirty-one days” after the unsuccessful repair efforts in February 2024 through April 2024 (see, UMF No. 4), it is clear that the “preliminary repurchase offer letter dated July 1, 2024” was prepared far more than “just thirty-one days” after the unsuccessful repair efforts which concluded in April 2024. Alternatively, if UMF No. 6 were intended to indicate that GM sent “its preliminary repurchase offer” “just thirty-one days” after learning “the customer’s concerns persisted” (see, UMF No. 5) despite the February 2024 through April 2024 repair efforts, defendant GM has provided no evidence of when it first learned these repair efforts failed to address “the customer’s concerns,” thereby precluding this Court from determining whether or not the “preliminary repurchase offer letter dated July 1, 2024” was actually sent within “just thirty-one days,” as expressly asserted in UMF No.

6. For these reasons as well, the Court holds that GM has failed to provide evidentiary support for its claim that its “preliminary repurchase offer letter dated July 1, 2024” was sent to plaintiffs “just thirty-one days later” and this, in turn, precludes summary judgment in favor of defendant GM without regard to whether plaintiffs have proffered evidence demonstrating a triable issue of material fact.

Additionally, because defendant GM has failed to meet its initial evidentiary burden with respect to UMF No. 6, defendant GM has likewise failed to carry its initial burden of demonstrating that it “promptly offered to repurchase Plaintiffs’ vehicle, satisfying its duties under the [SBA],” as asserted in the Notice of Motion. (Not. of Mot., p.2:5-7.) Accordingly, summary judgment must be denied regardless of whether plaintiffs filed any opposition to this motion.

Similarly, although this motion is explicitly premised at in part on the ground that “GM’s repurchase offer equaled the total available restitution prescribed by the [SBA]” (Not. of Mot., p.2:7-8), none of the six UMFs included in GM’s moving separate statement purports to address the sufficiency of GM’s “preliminary repurchase offer letter dated July 1, 2024” or to otherwise identify what constitutes “the total available restitution prescribed by the [SBA].” As noted above, the “Golden Rule” of summary judgment/adjudication provides: “If it is not set forth in the separate statement, it does not exist.” (See, Zimmerman, Rosenfeld v.

Larson, supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at 1477 (italics in original).) Because the six UMFs advanced by GM in its moving separate statement do not by their own terms establish that “GM’s repurchase offer equaled the total available restitution prescribed by the [SBA]” as claimed in the Notice of Motion (Not. of Mot., p.2:7-8), this Court holds that defendant GM has in this regard as well failed to satisfy its initial burden of production under Code of Civil Procedure §437c(p)(2) with respect to the specific grounds cited in the Notice of Motion, thereby mandating denial of summary judgment in favor of defendant GM regardless of whether plaintiffs filed any opposition or produced evidence shows the existence of any triable issue of material fact.

In light of the foregoing, the Court need not proceed further but it nevertheless does so in order to address separate and distinct reasons why the present motion for summary

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV020025: BUTLER vs GENERAL MOTORS LLC 06/09/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment in Department 16D

judgment must be denied.

Plaintiffs Met Their Burden of Production. Even assuming arguendo that the moving papers were sufficient to meet defendant GM’s initial burden of production and thereby successfully shifted to plaintiffs the burden to provide evidence which establishes the existence of at least one triable issue of material fact, plaintiffs have carried their burden of production especially in light of current California law requiring the evidence in opposition to be construed liberally while the evidence in support is construed narrowly. (See, e.g., Miller v. Bechtel Corp., supra, 33 Cal.3d at 874; Cortez v. Vogt, supra, 52 Cal.App.4th at 925-926.)

As previously indicated, UMF No. 6 states that GM “conducted a repurchase review and just thirty-one days later, GM sent Plaintiff [sic] its preliminary repurchase offer letter dated July 1, 2024.” In response to UMF No. 6, plaintiffs insist they “contacted Defendant [GM] on May 16, 2024” via letter, notifying GM “[t]he dealership cannot fix [the] vehicle” and demanding GM “either replace the vehicle or refund my money.” (See, Martinez Decl., Ex. B.) Notably, GM did not submit any written objections to this evidence and Exhibit B itself further indicates this 5/16/2024 letter was actually delivered to GM on 5/21/2024.

As such, even assuming arguendo that GM actually ““conducted a repurchase review” and sent “its preliminary repurchase offer letter dated July 1, 2024” to plaintiffs on such date as claimed in UMF No. 6, GM’s letter was according to the evidence in opposition sent more than “just thirty-one days” after GM was on notice of the dealership’s inability to fix the vehicle and plaintiffs’ express demand for refund or replacement. This alone constitutes a triable issue of material fact which mandates denial of summary judgment. (See, e.g., Nazir v.

United Airlines, Inc., supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at 252 [moving party’s inclusion of facts in its separate statement effectively concedes each fact’s “materiality,” whether intended or not, and if there is a triable dispute relating to any one of these facts, the motion must be denied].)

Moreover, the dealership repair records attached as Exhibit A to the Martinez Declaration in opposition tend to show that GM knew or should have known of the dealership’s inability to fix the vehicle or resolve plaintiffs’ concerns well before GM’s receipt of plaintiffs’ 5/16/2024 letter demanding for refund or replacement and thus, the Court finds a triable issue relating to the question of whether GM’s “preliminary repurchase offer letter dated July 1, 2024” was sufficiently “prompt” so as to comport with the requirements of the SBA, thereby precluding judgment as a matter of law in favor of defendant GM.

Although the opposition also includes four (4) AMFs claimed to mandate denial of summary judgment, these AMFs need not be specifically addressed here because they are essentially duplicative of plaintiffs’ response to defendant GM’s UMF No.

6. In short, AMF Nos. 2-4 assert that despite various repair efforts beginning in December 2023 and continuing into early May 2024, the subject vehicle still did not conform to GM’s warranty

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV020025: BUTLER vs GENERAL MOTORS LLC 06/09/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment in Department 16D

(UMF No. 2); plaintiffs therefore demanded by letter dated 5/16/2024 that GM either refund the purchase price or replace the vehicle (UMF No. 3); and defendant GM’s “preliminary repurchase offer letter dated July 1, 2024” was 46 days after plaintiffs’ 5/16/2024, not “just thirty-one days later” as claimed by GM in UMF No.

6. As explained above, the evidence offered in opposition is when construed liberally sufficient to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of material fact which precludes the granting of summary judgment in favor of defendant GM.

Disposition

Having determined that the moving papers are not sufficient to satisfy defendant GM’s initial burden of production under Code of Civil Procedure §437c(p)(2) with respect to the sole grounds on which summary judgment is sought (i.e., “GM promptly offered to repurchase Plaintiffs’ vehicle, satisfying its duties under the [SBA]” and “GM’s repurchase offer equaled the total available restitution prescribed by the [SBA],” such that plaintiffs “can neither prove that GM breached its warranty obligations nor resulting damages” (Not. of Mot., p.2:4-10)), defendant GM’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs Michelle Butler and Bridge Billing Services, Inc.’s complaint is DENIED in its entirety.

Moving defendant to provide notice of this ruling and file proof of service of same within five (5) court days.

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code Civ. Proc. §1019.5; CRC Rule 3.1312.)