| Case | County / Judge | Motion | Ruling | Indexed | Hearing |
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Motion to Compel Arbitration
address same outside of default proceedings which Defendant asserts are actively preventing Defendant from liquidating assets and repaying Plaintiff, Defendant's emotional distress and mental health issues over the death of his daughter which negatively impacted his ability to prevent a defense to the action and Defendant's diligence in acting to pursue relief herein, pursuant to the Court's inherent equitable jurisdiction, Defendant's motion is granted conditionally.”(Moghaddam v. Bone (2006), 142 Cal.App.4th 283; Rappleyea v. Campbell, (1994) 8 Cal. 4th 975; Civ. Proc. Code Sec. 473 (b)).
The grant of the requested relief is conditioned on the following: Within fourteen days of the date of this order Defendant shall provide a bond undertaking in the sum of $332,500 based on the compensatory damages determined recoverable by Plaintiff according to the Court's default judgment herein of November 17, 2025.
A fine of the minimum and attorney fees is appropriate. Defendant shall also reimburse Plaintiff for his reasonable attorney fees and costs of $15,597 so far incurred in this matter due to Defendant's inaction herein. A penalty of one thousand dollars ($1000) is imposed upon Defendant. (Civ. Proc. Code Sec. 473(c) (1)(A)).
A Case Management Conference is set for October 19, 2026, at 8:30 am in Department 24 of this Court.
CV-25-008189 - VERDUZCO, MARIA vs NAIDU, SHALVINA - Cross Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default/Judgment - GRANTED.
The Court finds that Defendant's Motion is timely and provides grounds for the grant of the exercise of the Court's discretion to grant the requested relief on the basis of a finding of mistake on the part of Cross Defendant's prior and current Counsel and on a finding that said relief does not prejudice Plaintiff. (Civ. Proc. Code Sec. 473 (b); Kramer v. Traditional Escrow, Inc., (2020) 56 Cal. App. 5th 13).
The Court does not consider Mr. Field's declaration as a complying attorney affidavit of fault. (Civ. Proc. Code Sec. 473 (b); Carmel, Ltd. v. Tavoussi, (2009) 175 Cal. App. 4th 393
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Defendant's Proposed Answer is attached to the motion as required by statute. (Civ. Proc. Code Sec. 473 (b); Carmel, Ltd. v. Tavoussi, (2009) 175 Cal. App. 4th 393, as modified (June 26, 2009 Accordingly, Defendant's motion is hereby granted. (Maynard v. Brandon, (2005) 36 Cal. 4th 364).
Cross Defendant shall file her Answer to the Cross Complaint within ten (10) days of the date of this order. Cross Defendant shall submit a Proposed Order within five (5) court days that comports with this ruling.
CV-25-007982 - GALLARDO, ROSARIO DAMAR ZEPEDA vs SKITTONE ALMOND SHELLER INC - Defendant Skittone Almond Sheller Inc's Motion to Compel Arbitration - GRANTED.
The Court finds that the parties' arbitration agreement, is governed by the Federal Arbitration Act. (9.U.S.C. Sec. 1 et seq.; Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., (2003). 539 U.S. 52; Aviation Data, Inc. v. Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co., (2007) 152 Cal. App. 4th 1522).
The Court finds that a valid arbitration agreement exists between the parties covering the instant dispute and that Plaintiff has discharged its burden of proving the existence of same by the preponderance of the evidence. (9. U.S.C.ASec. 1 et seq; Code of Civil Procedure, Sec. 1281; Sandquist v. Lebo Automotive, Inc. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 233, 244; Martinez v. BaronHR, Inc. (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 962, 967; Gamboa v. Ne. Cmty. Clinic, (2021) 72 Cal. App. 5th 158).
The Court finds that to the extent that Plaintiff was not required to execute the Dispute Resolution Agreement as a condition of employment and that the Dispute Resolution contained an optout provision which was in bold font the Dispute Resolution Agreement was not a contract of adhesion. (Civil Code section 1670.5; Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 102; Pardee Construction Co. v. Superior Court (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1081; Ayala-Ventura v. Superior Court of Fresno County (2026) 119 Cal.App.5th 241, 254-255.)
A high degree of substantive unconscionability would therefore be required to render the Dispute Resolution Agreement unenforceable. The more substantively oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of procedural unconscionability is required for court to come to the conclusion that the term is unenforceable, and vice versa. (Nelson v. Dual Diagnosis Treatment Ctr., Inc., (2022)77 Cal. App. 5th 643).
The court finds that the provision of the Dispute Resolution Agreement that requires the arbitration to be kept confidential is a substantively unconscionable provision. (Ramos v. Superior Ct., (2018), 28 Cal. App. 5th 1042, as modified (Nov. 28, 2018).
The Court finds that the provision of the Dispute Resolution Agreement that limits Plaintiff's remedies to those that would be available to a party in his or her individual capacity in a court of law and that prevents forfeiture of claims " that otherwise would be available to an individual in a court of law" is not substantively unconscionable.
The Court also finds that to the extent that the attorney fee provision provides for each party to pay its own fees "subject to remedies the party may later be entitled to under applicable law", that any applicable fee shifting provisions are incorporated into said provisions and applicable to the Dispute Resolution Agreement.
The provision of the Dispute Resolution Agreement that extends Plaintiff's arbitration obligations to Defendant's officers, directors etc. is not bilateral, is unjustifiably one-sided and substantively unconscionable. (Cook v. Univ. of S. California, (2024), 102 Cal. App. 5th 312, reh'g denied (June 13, 2024)).
The arbitration agreement meets the minimum requirements of enforceability in that it: (1) provides for neutral arbitrators, (2) provides for more than minimal discovery, (3) requires a written award, (4) provides for all of the types of relief that would otherwise be available in court, and (5) does not require employees to pay either unreasonable costs or any arbitrators' fees or expenses as a condition of access to the arbitration forum. (Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 102.)
The Court further finds that the provision that requires the arbitration of disputes including those related to "harassment" is not substantively unconscionable and does not violate the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment to the extent that the statute gives the party alleging sexual harassment the option to elect to proceed with their claims per the predispute agreement in arbitration or not. (9 U.S.C.A. Sec. 401 and 402).
The Court finds that the two substantively unconscionable provisions do not permeate the entire arbitration agreement with unconscionability. (Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83.)
Therefore, the Court exercises its discretion as provided for in the Dispute Resolution Agreement to sever said provisions and enforce the remaining provisions of the arbitration agreement. (Civil Code section 1670.5(a); (Alberto v. Cambrian Homecare, (2023) 91 Cal. App. 5th 482).
Defendant's motion is accordingly hereby granted. Plaintiff's individual Private Attorney General Action (PAGA) claims are hereby ordered to arbitration. Plaintiff's representative Private Attorney General Action (PAGA) action is hereby pending the conclusion of said arbitration. (Adolph v Uber Techs Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5 th 1104, C ode of Civil Procedure, Sec. 1281.4)
Plaintiff's general objections to Ms. Aschwanden's supplementary declaration on grounds that it is new evidence submitted in Reply is rendered moot as the Court has granted Plaintiff leave to file a Sur-Reply. (Plenger v. Alza Corp., 11 Cal.App.4th 349, 362 (1992) quoting Weiss v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 1094, 1098.)
Objections to paragraph 6 of said declaration on the grounds of Improper Authentication -Evid. Code Sec.Sec. 1400, 1401; California Rules of Court Rule 3.1110(g); Lack of Foundation - (Evid. Code Sec.Sec. 403, 405, 702(a); Civ. Proc. Sec. 482.040; Lack of Personal Knowledge - Evid. Code Sec. 702 and Hearsay. Cal. Evid. Code Sec. 1200 are overruled based on the contents of paragraph 1 of said declaration including that Ms. Aschwanden attestation to having worked with Defendant in the summer of 2022, to her responsibilities with onboarding and personnel matters etc., as well as on a review of Plaintiff's personnel records and onboarding records.
Objections to paragraphs 7 and 8 which refer to the Microsoft Word document properties for the Spanish DRA and the native metadata respectively based on Improper Authentication -Evid. Code Sec.Sec. 1400, 1401; California Rules of Court Rule 3.1110(g); Lack of Foundation - (Evid. Code Sec.Sec. 403, 405, 702(a); Civ. Proc. Sec. 482.040; Lack of Personal Knowledge - Evid. Code Sec. 702 and Hearsay. Cal. Evid. Code Sec. 1200 are sustained on all grounds except on the hearsay ground.
Objections to paragraph 12 of said declaration are overruled on the same grounds as the objection to paragraph 6.
Defendant shall submit a Proposed Order conforming to the Court's ruling within five (5) court days.
The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Commissioner Jared D. Beeson in Department 19 located at the Turlock Division at 300 Starr Avenue, Turlock, CA: ***There are no tentative rulings in Department 19***