Governing Board of the Los Alamitos Unified School District vs. Commission on Professional Competence

“The elements of a negligence cause of action are duty, breach, causation, and damages.” (Coyle v. Historic Mission Inn Corporation (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 627, 634.) Additionally, there exists a “common-law duty to perform with care, skill, reasonable expedience, and faithfulness the thing agreed to be done....” (Stonegate Homeowners Assn. v. Staben (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 740, 748.)

The undisputed evidence indicates that only a single repair was performed. (See ¶5 of Marrett Declaration and Exhibit 4 thereto; See also ¶9 of Marret Declaration and Exhibit 8 thereto [see pg. 271 of ROA No. 114].) Per Plaintiff, he did not bring his vehicle back to any Ford dealerships, for any other repairs. (Ibid.) Finally, Plaintiff indicates his transmission is now performing fine. (¶9 of Marret Declaration and Exhibit 8 thereto [see pg. 274 of ROA No. 114]; See, generally, SSUF Nos. 2, 5, 14, 28 and 29.)

Based on the above, the undisputed evidence indicates Defendant Ken Grody did not breach any duty to Plaintiff.

Of note, while Defendant offered only one legal argument directed towards the Sixth Cause of Action, “[t]he motion for summary judgment shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)

Here, reviewing all the offered evidence indicates there are no triable issues, as to the Sixth Cause of Action.

For the above reasons, Defendant’s request for summary adjudication on the Sixth Cause of Action is GRANTED.

Moving party to give notice.

14 Palomar CMC Specialty Insurance Company vs. Savant Construction, Inc. 15 Governing TENTATIVE RULING: Board of the Los Alamitos Petitioner Governing Board of the Los Alamitos Unified School Unified School District (“LAUSD”) has moved under Code Civ. Proc. § 1094.5(g) District vs.

Commission and (h) for an order to maintain the status quo pending a final on Professional decision on this writ of mandate. For the reasons set forth below, the Competence request for a stay is DENIED. by and through the Office of Legal Standard for Stay Administrative Hearings of CCP § 1094.5(g) provides: the State of California Except as provided in subdivision (h), the court in which proceedings under this section are instituted may stay the operation of the administrative order or decision pending the judgment of the court, or until the filing of a notice of appeal from the judgment or until the expiration of the time for filing the notice, whichever occurs first. However, no such stay shall be imposed or continued if the court is satisfied that it is against the public interest.

CCP § 1094.5(h)(1) states:

The court in which proceedings under this section are instituted may stay the operation of the administrative order or decision of any licensed hospital or any state agency made after a hearing required by statute to be conducted under the Administrative Procedure Act, as set forth in Chapter 5 (commencing with Section 11500) of Part 1 of Division 3 of Title 2 of the Government Code, conducted by the agency itself or an administrative law judge on the staff of the Office of Administrative Hearings pending the judgment of the court, or until the filing of a notice of appeal from the judgment or until the expiration of the time for filing the notice, whichever occurs first.

However, the stay shall not be imposed or continued unless the court is satisfied that the public interest will not suffer and that the licensed hospital or agency is unlikely to prevail ultimately on the merits. The application for the stay shall be accompanied by proof of service of a copy of the application on the respondent. Service shall be made in the manner provided by Title 4.5 (commencing with Section 405) of Part 2 or Chapter 5 (commencing with Section 1010) of Title 14 of Part 2.

This statute “unequivocally requires the superior court weigh the public interest in each individual case.” (Sterling v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd. (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 176, 187; see also Am. Indian Model Schs. v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist. (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 258, 295 (“The court is required to weigh “the public interest when

considering whether to grant the request for a preliminary injunction.”)).

Relevant Facts and the Parties’ Positions

Petitioner contends that on August 5, 2025, Petitioner adopted a statement of charges against Real Party in Interest David Moellenkamp to immediately suspend without pay and dismiss Real Party in Interest from his employment on the basis of immoral conduct, unprofessional conduct, and dishonesty, among other reasons.

An administrative hearing was conducted before Respondent, and Respondent issued a decision on May 22, 2026, overturning the District’s proposed immediate suspension without pay and dismissal.

Petitioner argues that a stay is necessary because Real Party-in-Interest was charged with immoral conduct. To the extent that the decision is reversed, protecting staff and students from such conduct would be in the public interest. Further, Petitioner argues that a stay would avoid significant disruption to the district’s operations because Moellenkamp’s reinstatement would require the District to find an open position or displace another employee at the very beginning of the 2026-2027 school year, interrupting the educational program and potentially impacting other employees’ rights.

The specific positions (i.e. his assignment, work location, classroom, etc.) from which Moellenkamp was suspended have been filled with other permanent employees who have ongoing rights to retain those positions. (See Declaration of Dr. Ryan Weiss-Wright In Support of Request to Stay Decision ([“Weiss-Wright Decl.”], ¶ 4, attached as Exhibit 3.) If the decision were reversed, then the District would be disrupted in having a new position to fill.

Further, Petitioner argues that in Education Code section 44944, subsection (f), the legislature intended to stay the payment of fees if an appeal to a decision is made.

Real Party-in-Interest argues that Petitioner cannot meet the standard to grant a stay under section 1094.5. The statute provides that the court must deny the stay unless “the court is satisfied that the public interest will not suffer and that the licensed hospital or agency is unlikely to prevail ultimately on the merits” (CCP § 1094.5(h)(1)). Moellenkamp argues that the District has failed to establish that the public interest will not suffer and/or that Petitioner is likely to prevail on the merits.

Specifically, Moellenkamp argues that the administrative scheme intended for immediate payment of his salary under Education Code §

44946, that unpaid suspension is reversed upon the CPC having actually conducted a hearing on the merits and issuing a decision in favor of the teacher, as it did here, and the teacher must be reinstated and paid full back salary within five days of the CPC’s decision.

Further, Moellenkamp argues that he would be prejudiced such that staying the CPC decision would be against the public interest. (See Bostean v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 95, 110 (Education Code statutory scheme requires procedural due process before a permanent employee may be deprived of their property interest in their employment) The Legislature’s scheme reflects a desire that public employees who are ordered reinstated to their jobs “should not ordinarily be left without employment and backpay for several years” pending appeals by the public agency. (Lomeli v.

Department of Corrections (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 788, 798.) As a result of the District’s continued refusal to reinstate Moellenkamp, he has sustained, and will continue to sustain, lost wages, lost pension contributions and service credits, lost sick and other leave accruals, and lost salary step increases.

Finally, Moellenkamp argues that Petitioner has not established by admissible evidence that Petitioner is likely to prevail on the merits of this writ.

The Court’s Analysis

The court finds that Petitioner has not met the legal standard to satisfy CCP § 1094.5 (g) or (h)(1) for a stay.

First, Petitioner has not established that a stay would benefit the public interest. Petitioner offers speculative hypotheticals as to Petitioner’s harm. While Moellenkamp’s position may have been filled, there is no showing that Petitioner is unable to comply with the Respondent’s decision. Further, Petitioner’s argument that other employees will have a difficult time with Real Party-in-Interest is not supported by any admissible evidence. The declaration of Dr. Ryan Weiss-Wright only mentions the difficulty of back-pay, but does not mention any conflicts with current employees. Instead, the court finds that the harm to Real Party-in-Interest is more prevalent with real wages, service hours, and salary step considerations that will be affected.

Further, Petitioner relies on Education Code section 44944, subsection (f), which provides the following, in part.

• “(4) If either the governing board of the school district or the employee petitions a court of competent jurisdiction for review

of the decision of the Commission on Professional Competence, the payment of expenses to members of the commission required by this subdivision shall not be stayed.” (Ed. Code, § 44944(f)(2)).

• “(5) If the decision of the Commission on Professional Competence is reversed or vacated by a court of competent jurisdiction, either the state, having paid the commission members' expenses, shall be entitled to reimbursement from the governing board of the school district for those expenses, or the governing board of the school district, having paid the expenses, shall be entitled to reimbursement from the state. If either the governing board of the school district or the employee petitions a court of competent jurisdiction for review of the decision to overturn the administrative law judge's decision, the payment of the expenses of the hearing, including the cost of the administrative law judge required by this paragraph, shall be stayed until no further appeal is sought, or all appeals are exhausted.” (Ed. Code, § 44944(f)(5).

Under Petitioner’s authority, therefore, the legislature intended to stay the expenses of the administrative hearing—not stay the payment of back-pay and withhold the salary of a reinstated employee.

The court finds the legislative intent of Real Party-in-Interest’s authority more persuasive. Under Education Code § 44946, “[i]f the employee has been suspended pending the hearing, he shall be reinstated within five days after the governing board's decision in his favor, and shall be paid full salary by the governing board for the period of his suspension.” That the Legislature requires reinstatement and back pay within only five days establishes the Legislature’s intent to make an employee whole and reinstate an employee’s rights as soon as possible.

The public interest, therefore, favors an employee who has been withheld pay during suspension, be made whole if the suspension decision is overturned.

Further, the court finds that Petitioner has not established by admissible evidence that Petitioner is likely to prevail on the merits. Petitioner’s papers for the request to stay makes several arguments about the evidence that Respondent did or did not consider and allow. At this stage, without more, the arguments are pure speculation as to how the proceeding would have resulted if certain evidence was excluded/included.

For these reasons, the request for a stay is DENIED.

Respondent to give notice.

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