Magnolia Educational & Research Foundation vs. Irvine Unified School District

On November 25, 2025, the District rejected the School’s projection and counter-projected that only six in-district students, or 5.7 ADA, would enroll. (Petition ¶ 28.)

The School alleges the District improperly disregarded all 150 meaningful-interest statements based on a different school site’s low enrollment, alleged defects in 10 forms, and disagreement with the School’s methodology. (Petition ¶ 29.) Because the District’s counter-projection fell below the 80-ADA threshold, the District denied the School any Prop 39 facilities. (Petition ¶ 29.)

The School thereafter responded to the District’s objections and reaffirmed its 218.5 ADA projection. (Petition ¶¶ 30-31; Acar Decl., Ex. 3.) The District then issued a further response on January 30, 2026, maintaining its position that the School had not submitted a reasonable ADA projection. (Acar Decl., Ex. 4.) The School alleges the District refused to issue an actual preliminary proposal identifying facilities, locations, conditions, or a proposed agreement. (Petition ¶ 32.) The School submitted another response on February 26, 2026, and the District issued its final response on March 31, 2026, again confirming that it would not make any facilities offer. (Petition ¶¶ 35-38; Acar Decl., Exs. 5, 10.)

The School seeks a writ of mandate compelling the District to comply with Prop 39 by issuing a legally compliant facilities proposal based on the School’s projected 218.5 in-district ADA. (Petition ¶¶ 40-45; Prayer ¶ 1.) The School also seeks continuing jurisdiction to ensure compliance and costs and attorneys’ fees. (Prayer ¶¶ 2-4.)

Relevant Law

“A writ of mandate may be issued by any court to any inferior

tribunal, corporation, board, or person, to compel the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins, as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or to compel the admission of a party to the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which the party is entitled, and from which the party is unlawfully precluded by that inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or person.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1085, subd. (a).)

“‘The availability of writ relief to compel a public agency to perform an act prescribed by law has long been recognized. [Citation.] [¶] What is required to obtain writ relief is a showing by a petitioner of “(1) A clear, present and usually ministerial duty on the part of the respondent ...; and (2) a clear, present and beneficial right in the petitioner to the performance of that duty....” [Citations.]’ [Citations.] Courts have defined a ministerial act as ‘ “an act that a public officer is required to perform in a prescribed manner in obedience to the mandate of legal authority and without regard to his own judgment or opinion concerning such act's propriety or impropriety, when a given state of facts exists.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] ‘Thus, “[w]here a statute or ordinance clearly defines the specific duties or course of conduct that a governing body must take, that course of conduct becomes mandatory and eliminates any element of discretion.” [Citation.]’” (Bullis Charter School v.

Los Altos School Dist. (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1022, 1035 (Bullis).)

“Courts have recognized implicitly the right to enforce through traditional mandamus proceedings a school district's obligations under Proposition 39. For instance, in Sequoia Union High School Dist. v. Aurora Charter High School (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 185, 195 (Sequoia), the court found mandamus relief appropriate in order for a charter school to compel a school district to provide it with ‘reasonably equivalent’ facilities as required under section 47614, subdivision (b).” (Bullis, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at p. 1036.)

“Courts exercise limited review in ordinary mandamus proceedings. They may not reweigh the evidence or substitute their judgment for that of the agency. They uphold an agency action unless it is arbitrary, capricious, lacking in evidentiary support, or was made without due regard for the petitioner's rights. [Citations.] However, courts must ensure that an agency has adequately considered all relevant factors, and has demonstrated a rational connection between those factors, the choice made, and the purposes of the enabling statute. [Citation.] Because trial and appellate courts perform the same function in mandamus actions, an appellate court reviews the agency's action de novo. [Citation.]” (Sequoia, supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at p. 195.)

“Generally, mandamus may be used only to compel the performance of a duty that is purely ministerial in character. [Citation.] The remedy may not be invoked to control an exercise of discretion, i.e., to compel an official to exercise discretion in a particular way.” (Ridgecrest Charter School v. Sierra Sands Unified School Dist. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 986, 1002.) However, a school district is obligated to follow the law and to provide a charter school with facilities that are “reasonably equivalent” and, where applicable, “contiguous,” even if the manner of allocating facilities is largely committed to the school district’s discretion. (Id. at p. 1003.)

A school district is not required to accept a charter school’s ADA projection merely because the charter school submits a facilities request. (Environmental Charter High School v. Centinela Valley Union High School Dist. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 139, 151-153.) A district may deny a facilities request where the charter school fails to provide documentation sufficient to establish a reasonable foundation for its projection. (Ibid.) Although the charter school’s showing need not be arithmetically precise, it must be reasonable in the sense that it has some basis in logic, reason, and experience. (Id. at p. 153.)

When a court issues a writ requiring a district to comply with Proposition 39, the court may require the district to file a return demonstrating compliance. (Los Angeles Internat. Charter High School v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1348, 1355.) A return should state that the respondent has satisfied the writ in full compliance and should set out the actions taken to meet the writ’s terms. (Ibid.)

“In November 2000, [Education Code] section 47614 was amended when the voters approved Proposition 39. (Prop. 39, § 6, as approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 2000).)” (Sequoia, supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at p. 189.) As amended, section 47614 states the voters’ intent that public school facilities should be shared fairly among all public school pupils, including those in charter schools. (Ed. Code, § 47614, subd. (a).) To implement that intent, section 47614 provides that “[e]ach school district shall make available, to each charter school operating in the school district, facilities sufficient for the charter school to accommodate all of the charter school’s in-district students in conditions reasonably equivalent to those in which the students would be accommodated if they were attending other public schools of the district.” (Id., subd. (b).)

Each year, each charter school desiring facilities from a school district in which it is operating shall provide the school district with a reasonable projection of the charter school’s average daily classroom attendance

by in-district students for the following year, and the district shall allocate facilities to the charter school for that following year based upon this projection. (Id., subd. (b)(2).) Facilities requests based upon projections of fewer than 80 units of average daily classroom attendance for the year may be denied by the school district. (Id., subd. (b)(4).)

To receive facilities during a particular fiscal year, a charter school must submit a written facilities request to the school district on or before November 1 of the preceding fiscal year. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5, § 11969.9, subd. (b).) A charter school must be operating in the school district as defined in Education Code section 47614 before it submits a request for facilities. (Id., subd. (a).) A new or proposed new charter school is operating within the school district and, therefore, eligible to request facilities for a particular fiscal year only if it submitted its charter petition pursuant to Education Code sections 47605, 47605.5, 47605.6, or 47605.8 on or before November 1 of the fiscal year preceding the year for which facilities are requested; a new charter school is entitled to be allocated and/or provided access to facilities only if it receives approval of the petition before March 15 of the fiscal year preceding the year for which facilities are requested. (Ibid.)

The written facilities request consists of reasonable projections of indistrict and total ADA and in-district and total classroom ADA, based on ADA claimed for apportionment, if any, in the fiscal year prior to the fiscal year in which the facilities request is made, adjusted for expected changes in enrollment in the forthcoming fiscal year; a description of the methodology for the projections; the charter school’s operational calendar; information regarding the district school site and/or general geographic area in which the charter school wishes to locate; and information on the charter school’s educational program, if any, that is relevant to assignment of facilities. (Cal.

Code Regs., tit. 5, § 11969.9, subd. (c)(1)(A), (B), (D)-(F).) If relevant (i.e., when a charter school is not yet open or to the extent an operating charter school projects a substantial increase in in-district ADA), the written facilities request must also include documentation of the number of in-district students meaningfully interested in attending the charter school that is sufficient for the district to determine the reasonableness of the projection, but that need not be verifiable for precise arithmetical accuracy. (Id., subd. (c)(1)(C).)

The projections of in-district ADA, in-district classroom ADA, and the number of indistrict students shall be broken down by grade level and by the school in the school district that the student would otherwise attend. (Id., subd. (c)(2).)

The school district shall review the charter school’s projections of indistrict and total ADA and in-district and total classroom ADA and, on or before December 1, express any objections in writing and state the projections the district considers reasonable. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5, § 11969.9, subd. (d).) If the school district does not express objections in writing and state its own projections by the deadline, the charter school’s projections are no longer subject to challenge and the school district shall base its offer of facilities on those projections. (Ibid.)

On or before January 2, the charter school shall respond to any objections expressed by the school district and to the district’s projections provided pursuant to subdivision (d). The charter school shall reaffirm or modify its previous projections as necessary to respond to the information received from the district pursuant to subdivision (d). If the charter school does not respond by the deadline, the district’s projections provided pursuant to subdivision (d) are no longer subject to challenge and the school district shall base its offer of facilities on those projections. (Id., subd. (e).)

On or before February 1, the school district shall prepare in writing a preliminary proposal regarding the space to be allocated to the charter school and/or to which the charter school is to be provided access. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5, § 11969.9, subd. (f).) On or before March 1, the charter school shall respond in writing to the school district’s preliminary proposal made pursuant to subdivision (f), expressing any concerns, addressing differences between the preliminary proposal and the charter school’s facilities request as submitted pursuant to subdivision (b), and/or making counter proposals. (Id., subd. (g).)

On or before April 1, having reviewed any concerns and/or counter proposals made by the charter school pursuant to subdivision (g), the school district shall submit in writing a final notification of the space offered to the charter school. The notification shall include a response to the charter school’s concerns and/or counter proposals (if any). (Id., subd. (h).)

Analysis

The School submitted a Prop 39 request projecting 230 in-district students, resulting in 218.5 in-district ADA, which it asserted was supported by signed meaningful-interest statements from 150 indistrict students and a methodology explaining how it calculated its projection. (Petition ¶¶ 25-27; Acar Decl. ¶¶ 10-11, Ex. 1.) The District rejected the School’s 218.5 ADA projection and counterprojected that only six in-district students, or 5.7 ADA, would enroll. (Petition ¶¶ 28-29; Acar Decl. ¶ 12, Ex. 2.)

The School seeks a writ of mandate on the grounds that the District failed to perform its ministerial duty to allocate facilities and applied erroneous legal standards in rejecting the School’s request. Specifically, the School alleges the District disregarded all 150 meaningful-interest statements based on a different school’s low enrollment, alleged defects in 10 forms, and disagreement with the School’s methodology. (Petition ¶ 29.)

The District, in opposition, contends its actions were not arbitrary or capricious, were supported by evidence in the record, and complied with the regulatory process. The District further contends it did not have a ministerial duty to accept the School’s projection, but instead had discretion to evaluate whether the School submitted a reasonable ADA projection supported by sufficient documentation. The District also contends that, because its counter-projection fell below 80 units of average daily classroom attendance, it was permitted to deny the request without issuing a facilities offer.

In reply, the School contends it submitted 150 signed meaningfulinterest statements, provided a methodology, and received no preliminary proposal or final facilities offer. The School argues the District imposed a level of arithmetical certainty that Prop 39 does not require and relied on one prior school’s enrollment outcome to reject the School’s meaningful-interest documentation.

The record shows that the District rejected the School’s ADA projection and provided its own below-80 ADA counter-projection, explaining in pertinent part as follows:

• The District relied in part on enrollment data from the School’s other countywide campuses, stating that the Anaheim and Placentia-Yorba Linda campuses had a combined enrollment of only 83 students, contrary to the School’s claim that its recruitment efforts had consistently resulted in full enrollment at newly launched campuses. (Acar Decl., Ex. 2 [Letter p. 3]) • The School used essentially the same methodology in its prior Placentia Yorba Linda Unified School District (“PYLUSD”) Prop 39 request, where it projected 206.8 ADA based on 143 interest forms but enrolled only five students. (Id. [Letter p. 4].) • The District identified alleged deficiencies in the meaningful- interest (“MIF”) forms, including unconfirmed addresses and birthdate issues. The District stated that the School claimed to have submitted 150 in-district MIF forms, but the District found that the School submitted 141 forms, of which 10 were

not valid expressions of meaningful interest, resulting in 131 in-district MIF forms. The District also stated that the School failed to explain how the forms supported the specific projection of 230 in-district students, and instead relied on the existence of the forms without tying them to a reliable projection methodology. (Id. [Letter pp. 5, 10-12].) • The District also objected to the School’s grade-level and school-in-the-district projections, stating that the School did not explain how it projected grade-level enrollment or the District schools students would otherwise attend.

For example, the District stated that the School had nine in- district forms from projected first-grade students but projected 20 first-grade students, and eight in-district forms from projected second-grade students but projected 21 second- grade students, without explaining how it reached those figures. (Id. [Letter pp. 14-15].) • The District applied the PYLUSD enrollment result of 2.3 percent of projected enrollment to the School’s projected 230 in-district students, resulting in a projected enrollment of six students and 5.7 in-district ADA after applying the School’s 95 percent ADA rate. (Id. [Letter pp. 15-16].)

As noted above, Prop 39 does not require a school district to accept a charter school’s ADA projection merely because the charter school submits meaningful-interest forms. Rather, the charter school must provide a reasonable projection supported by sufficient documentation, and the school district may timely object and state the projection it considers reasonable. (Ed. Code, § 47614, subd. (b)(2); Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5, § 11969.9, subd. (d).)

Thus, the District was permitted to scrutinize the School’s request and was not required to accept the 218.5 ADA projection automatically. Nor was the District required to issue a preliminary proposal or final facilities notification if it properly determined that the request was based on fewer than 80 units of average daily classroom attendance.

The record demonstrates the District had a reasonable basis to reject the School’s 218.5 ADA projection. The District identified recordbased concerns regarding the School’s reliance on claimed historical enrollment success, the poor enrollment outcome at PYLUSD, alleged defects in some meaningful-interest forms, the lack of a clear bridge between the forms and the 230-student projection, and unexplained grade-level and school-in-the district allocations. These concerns are sufficient to show the District did not act arbitrarily by declining to accept the School’s requested 218.5 ADA figure.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition is DENIED.

Respondent to give notice.

9 Vega vs. TENTATIVE RULING: General Motors LLC For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff Angelica Vega’s motion for attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

The court awards Plaintiffs a total fees, costs, and expenses award of $6,336.26, consisting of $5,757.50 in attorney fees plus $578.76 in costs.

Standard on Motions for Attorney’s Fees

On a motion for attorney’s fees, the moving party has the burden of: (1) establishing entitlement to an award, and (2) documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates. (ComputerXpress, Inc. v. Jackson (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 993, 1020.)

The Song-Beverly Act provides for the recovery of attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses. (Civ. Code, § 1794(d).) Courts use the lodestar adjustment method to determine the amount of attorney’s fees to award in Song-Beverly actions. (Reynolds v. Ford Motor Co. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 1105, 1112.) “[T]he lodestar is the basic fee for comparable legal services in the community.” (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132.) It is “based on the ‘careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney . . . involved in the presentation of the case.’ [Citation.] [The California Supreme Court] expressly approved the use of prevailing hourly rates as a basis for the lodestar...

In referring to ‘reasonable’ compensation, [the Court] indicated that trial courts must carefully review attorney documentation of hours expended; ‘padding’ in the form of inefficient or duplicative efforts is not subject to compensation. (Id. at 1131- 1132.)

When determining a reasonable attorneys’ fees award using the lodestar method, the court begins by deciding the reasonable hours the prevailing party’s attorney spent on the case and multiplies that number by the reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney. (Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967, 998; see also Environmental Protection Info. Ctr. v. California Dep’t of Forestry & Fire Protection (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 217, 248.) “The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar