Shirlee N. Ruffus v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc.

directed at a custodian of records or PMQ; it must be directed at an individual, who must be personally served with the subpoena, (b) Diamond Valley's PMQ lacks relevant evidence, and (c) the affidavit served with the subpoena does not establish good cause for the production sought. CCP Sec.1987(a) requires the party propounding the trial subpoena to personally serve it on the witness being ordered to appear at trial. Plaintiff necessarily failed to do so, as Plaintiff seeks only to have the PMQ appear at trial. In the absence of opposition, the motion to quash is granted.

Sanctions CCP Sec.1987.2 authorizes sanctions if a subpoena is propounded without good cause or substantial justification. The Court has previously granted similar motions to quash with Plaintiff's attorney acting as opposing counsel, and therefore Plaintiff's attorney is aware that serving these types of subpoenas are not authorized. The Court therefore finds imposition of sanctions appropriate. Honda seeks sanctions in the amount of $1500/motion (the notices of motion seek sanctions in the amounts of $1500 and $2500, but the declarations both seek sanctions in the amount of $1500).

Honda's attorney's declarations establish fees well in excess of the amount sought have been incurred. The Court reviewed Honda's notices of motion, however, and they fail to comply with CCP Sec.2023.040, which requires Honda to identify each person, party, and/or attorney against whom sanctions are sought. The Court has repeatedly denied Honda's requests for sanctions due to this failure, and the Court denies the request again at this time.

Conclusion

The motions to quash are granted. Despite the appropriateness of sanctions, sanctions are not imposed due to Honda's failure to properly notice its requests for sanctions. Honda is ordered to give notice.

American Honda Motor Co., Inc. Opposing Party: Plaintiff, Shirlee N. Ruffus Notice: OK On 5/18/26, the Court heard Defendant's ex parte application for an order continuing trial and related dates because Plaintiff had not participated in a deposition or made her vehicle available for inspection. The Court ordered Plaintiff to appear for deposition by 6/15/26. The Court also ordered Plaintiff to make her vehicle available for inspection by 6/15/26.

On 6/17/26, Defendant filed this motion for terminating sanctions based on Plaintiff's failure to comply with the 5/18/26 order, setting the motion for hearing on 10/01/26. Because 10/01/26 is after the scheduled trial date, Defendant made an ex parte application to advance the hearing on the motion. The Court granted the application on 7/08/26, setting the motion for hearing on 8/18/26.

Plaintiff opposes the motion, contending her vehicle was produced for inspection on 6/04/26 but conceding the second session of her deposition has not yet gone forward. She contends she is ready, willing, and able to sit for the second session of her deposition and has offered dates for the deposition, such that terminating sanctions are not appropriate. The Court wishes to hear from the parties, at the time of the hearing, concerning the status of Plaintiff's deposition. The case is set for trial on 9/08/26, such that time is of the essence. If the parties submit on the tentative, the Court will presume the parties have resolved their issues and the motion will be denied. Defendant is ordered to give notice. Case Number: 25LBCV02848 Hearing Date: August 18, 2026 Dept: S27 1.

Background

Facts Plaintiff, Michelle Broza filed this action against Defendants, City of Los Angeles and Charles Lamont for damages arising out of a trip and fall on a sidewalk owned by the City and adjacent to the property owned by Lamont. Plaintiff filed her complaint on 10/15/26. Plaintiff filed proof of service on Lamont by substitute service on 11/03/25; the POS indicates Plaintiff's registered process server served Lamont by substitute service on Maria Ann Howell, the co-occupant of 941 W. 29 th St., on 10/30/25, with the papers mailed thereafter. The City answered and filed a cross-complaint against Lamont on 12/22/25.

2. Motion to Vacate Default a. Default On 1/28/26, Plaintiff attempted to have Defendant's default entered, but the Clerk rejected the request due to Plaintiff's failure to include a declaration re: diligence. On 2/03/26, Plaintiff filed a declaration re: diligence, which shows efforts were made to serve Defendant on 10/25/25 and 10/27/25 before substitute service was effectuated on 10/30/25. On 2/04/26, at Plaintiff's request, the Clerk entered Defendant's default.

b. Default Judgment On 5/29/26 and 6/01/26, Plaintiff filed papers in support of a request for judgment against Defendant. The Court has not, to date, entered judgment. Indeed, a default judgment prove-up hearing is scheduled for 12/04/26, three days before the jury trial in the action.