James Starkman, et al. v. Rouhel Feinstein, et al.

judgment on the action, the defendant shall pay all costs awarded to the plaintiff and all damages that the plaintiff may sustain by reason of the loss of possession of the property." (Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 512.020(b).)

With conflicting information as to the existence of a lien, the Court is unable to determine whether an undertaking is required and, if so, by which party. In the absence of a properly asserted and perfected lien, Xclusive may have unpaid repair bills but nothing further. Accordingly, the Court might find no undertaking is necessary and waive Plaintiff's undertaking requirement. In contrast, should a lien exist, the Court would need the amount of any such lien in order to properly set Santander's undertaking.

III. CONCLUSION

Plaintiff's Application for Writ of Possession is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Plaintiff may re-file its Application addressing the issues noted above.

[1] See Vargas Decl., Exh. A, p. 3, Section 3d. ("If you default, we may take (repossess) the vehicle from you if we do so peacefully and the law allows it.")

[2] See also Complaint P. 38, alleging that "Plaintiff contends that the registered owner(s) are required to make the payments called for in the subject contract and to keep the SUBJECT VEHICLE free and clear of any secondary liens (which they have failed to do." (Emphasis in original.)

OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - SOUTH CENTRAL DISTRICT JAMES STARKMAN, an individual; and STARQUEST REALTY INVESTMENTS 1242 WEST 134TH CORPORATION, a California corporation, Plaintiffs, vs. ROUHEL FEINSTEIN, an individual; DAVID WEISELMAN, Trustee of the Weiselman Family Trust; and DOES 1 through 20, inclusive, Defendants. |)))

)))))))))))) | Case No. 26TRCV00572 Related Case No. 24CMCV01131 [TENTATIVE] ORDERS RE: (1) MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT AND TO DEEM IT FILED NUNC PRO TUNC; AND (2) MOTION FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST PLAINTIFF PURSUANT TO CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Sec. 128.7 DATE: August 18, 2026 TIME: 8:30 A.M. DEPT.: E | Moving Parties: Plaintiffs James Starkman and Starquest Realty Investments 1242 West 134th Corporation (Amend) Defendant David Weisleman, Trustee of the Weiselman Family Trust (Sanctions) Responding Parties: Defendant David Weisleman, Trustee of the Weiselman Family Trust (Amend) Plaintiffs James Starkman and Starquest Realty Investments 1242 West 134th Corporation (Sanctions) Notice: Ok SHAPE \* MERGEFORMAT Tentative Rulings: (1) Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint is GRANTED IN PART. (2) Defendants' Motion for Sanctions Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Sec. 128.7 is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

SHAPE \* MERGEFORMAT

I. BACKGROUND

This is an action for breach of contract, wrongful eviction, promissory fraud and quiet title. Plaintiffs James Starkman and Starquest Realty Investments 1242 West 134th Corporation (collectively, the "Plaintiffs") allege that Defendants Rouhel Feinstein ("Feinstein") and David Weiselman, Trustee of the Weiselman Family Trust ("Weiselman")(collectively, the "Defendants") refused to perform a binding, court-approved settlement and escrow purchase agreement allowing Plaintiffs to purchase the commercial real property located at 1242 West 134th Street in Gardena, California (the "Property").

Plaintiffs allege Defendants discovery the Property's substantially increased value, refused to complete the sale, and wrongfully evicted Plaintiffs from the Property forcing Plaintiffs to cease their location-dependent commercial production business. Plaintiffs contend Defendants' actions resulted in the loss of millions of dollars of business revenue, among other things.

On February 18, 2026, Plaintiffs filed the instant Verified Complaint against Defendants and Does 1 through 20, inclusive, alleging causes of action for: (1) Specific Performance; (2) Breach of Contract; (3) Wrongful Eviction; (4) Intentional Interference with Contractual Relations; (5) Promissory Fraud; (6) Quiet Title; and (7) Violation of Bus. & Prof. Code Sec.17200.

On March 26, 2026, Weiselman filed a Notice of Related Case identifying the instant action and a previously filed unlawful detainer, Los Angeles Superior Court Case No.: 24CMCV01131 Weiselman v. Starquest Media, LLC dba Lightspace Studios (the "UD Action"), as potentially related matters.

On March 30, 2026, the Court issued an order relating the instant matter to the UD Action, designating the UD matter as "the lead case," and transferring the instant matter to Department E at the Compton Courthouse. (See Minute Order, 3/30/26.)

1. Motion for Sanctions

On June 17, 2026, Weiselman filed the instant Motion for Sanctions against Plaintiffs pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Sec.128.7. On July 9, 2025, Plaintiffs filed their Opposition. On August 5, 2026, Weiselman filed his Reply.

2. Motion to Amend

On July 14, 2026, Plaintiffs filed the instant Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint and to Deem it Filed Nunc Pro Tunc. On August 5, 2026, Weiselman filed his Opposition. On August 11, 2026, Plaintiffs filed their Reply.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard

1. Motion to Amend

The court may, in furtherance of justice, allow a party to amend any pleading upon any terms as may be proper. (Code Civ. Proc. Sec.Sec. 473(a), 576.) California courts liberally exercise discretion to permit the amendment of pleadings in light of a strong policy favoring resolution of all disputes between parties in the same action. (Nestle v. Santa Monica (1972) 6 Cal.3d 920, 939; Morgan v. Superior Court (1959) 172 Cal.App.2d 527, 530.)

Accordingly, requests for leave to amend generally will be granted unless the party seeking to amend has been dilatory in bringing the proposed amendment, and the delay in seeking leave to amend will cause prejudice to the opposing party if leave to amend is permitted. (Hirsa v. Superior Court (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 486, 490.) Absent a showing of prejudice, delay in seeking to amend, by itself, generally will not justify a denial of leave to amend. (Higgins v. Del Faro (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 558, 564-565.) Thus, the policy favors amendment in the absence of both unexcused delay and prejudice.

Pursuant to Rule of Court 3.1324(a), "a motion to amend a pleading before trial must: [P.] (1) Include a copy of the proposed amendment or amended pleading ...; [P.] (2) State what allegations in the previous pleading are proposed to be deleted, if any, and where, by page, paragraph, and line number, the deleted allegations are located; and [P.] (3) State what allegations are proposed to be added to the previous pleading, if any, and were, by page, paragraph, and line number, the additional allegations are located." (Cal. R. Ct., Rule 3.1324(a).)

The motion to amend a pleading must also include a supporting declaration specifying (1) the effect of the amendment, (2) why the amendment is necessary, (3) when the facts giving rise to the amended allegations were discovered, and (4) why the proposed amendment was not made earlier. (Id., Rule 3.1324(b).)

2. Code of Civil Procedure Sec. 128.7

A motion for sanctions can be brought against an attorney or a party for presenting to the court a frivolous paper or a paper for an improper purpose. (Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 128.7.)¿To prevail on a motion for sanctions under Section 128.7 [1], the movant must establish that (1) a challengeable paper (2) was presented to the court and (3) the paper was frivolous (i.e., without legal or factual merit) or brought for an improper purpose. (Code Civ. Proc. Sec.Sec. 128.7(b), (c).)¿Sanctions under Section 128.7 may only be awarded if a party or attorney's conduct was objectively unreasonable. (In re Marriage of Sahafzadeh-Taeb, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at p. 133.)

Section 128.7 is modeled after, and nearly identical to, the 1993 amended version of FRCP 11. (Guillemin v. Stein (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 156, 167 (" Guillemin"); see Bucur v. Ahmad (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 175, 190 (" Bucur").) When the California Legislature enacted Sec. 128.7, it also adopted the Advisory Committee's notes to Rule 11 as a statement of legislative intent. (Barnes v. Department of Corr. (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 126, 132 (" Barnes").) Thus, cases interpreting the amended FRCP 11 and the Advisory Committee's notes to Rule 11 can be used as persuasive authority. (See Bucur, supra, at p. 190; see, e.g., Barnes, supra, at p. 136 (court relied on Advisory Committee's notes to conclude that formal, rather than informal, notice is required under Sec. 128.7).)

"As with Rule 11 (28 U.S.C.) sanctions, Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7 sanctions should be 'made with restraint' [citation], and are not mandatory even if a claim is frivolous. [Citations.] Further, when determining whether sanctions should be imposed, the issue is not merely whether the party would prevail on the underlying factual or legal argument. Instead, courts should apply an objective test of reasonableness, including whether 'any reasonable attorney would agree that [the claim] is totally and completely without merit.' [Citations.] Thus, the fact that a plaintiff fails to provide a sufficient showing to overcome a demurrer or to survive summary judgment is not, in itself, enough to warrant the imposition of sanctions. [Citations.]" (Peake v. Underwood (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 428, 448.)

B. Motion for Leave to Amend

Plaintiffs move the Court for leave to file a First Amended Complaint (the "FAC") and to deem the FAC filed and served nunc pro tunc as of June 8, 2026, the date Plaintiffs electronically submitted and served the FAC on Defendants' counsel. Defendants object, arguing that Plaintiff's motion is "an attempt to use the amendment process to manufacture a retroactive 'safe harbor' cure for a pending sanctions motion." (Opp, p. 1:25-26.)

1. Requests for Judicial Notice ("RJN") [2]

Plaintiffs request the Court take judicial notice of: (1) Plaintiffs' Verified Complaint in this action filed on February 18, 2026 (RJN, Exh. A); (2) Defendant David Weiselman's Verified Answer filed April 27, 2026 (RJN, EXh. B); (3) The Court's Notice of Rejection of First Amended Complaint dated June 10, 2026 (RJN, Exh. C); (4) The Minute Order dated April 18, 2025 reciting the terms of the parties' settlement placed on the record in Case No.: 24CMCV01131 (RJN, Exh. D); (5) The Notice of Court Rejection of Electronic Filing generated June 10, 2025, rejecting Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint (Supp. RJN, Exh. A); and (6) Weiselman's Reply in Support of Motion for Sanctions, served on August 6, 2026 (Supp. RJN, Exh. B).

Evidence Code Sec. 452 permits the Court to take judicial notice of "[r]ecords of (1) any court of this state or (2) any court of record of the United States or of any state of the United States." (Evid. Code Sec. 452(d).) Although the Court need not take judicial notice of records in its own docket, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs' Requests for Judicial Notice pursuant to Evidence Code Sec. 452(d).

2. Evidentiary Objections

Weiselman makes the following objections to the evidence submitted by Plaintiffs in support of their Motion to Amend. As to each, the Court rules as follows:

Objection No. 1: SUSTAINED. Starkmans' purported open court admission is not presented in conformity with the evidence code such that it might be relied upon by the Court and, further, any such admission is not particularly relevant to the Court's decision as to whether leave to amend should be permitted.

Objection No. 2: SUSTAINED. Each of the factual assertions is again not presented in conformity with the evidence code such that any might be relied upon by the Court.

3. Discussion

i. Leave to Amend

Plaintiffs contend that this Court should "confirm by formal order what the record already shows: that on June 8, 2026 Plaintiffs prepared, electronically submitted, and served a First Amended Complaint that corrects their pleading" arguing that the Court's rejection of the FAC for failure to obtain leave of Court to file the FAC after Defendants had answered "is a curable procedural prerequisite, not a defect in the substance of the amendment." (Mot., . 1:25-2:2.)

Plaintiffs argue that not only should the Court grant leave to amend, but the Court should also deem the amended complaint filed and served as of June 8, 2026 because they "did everything within their control by June 8, 2026"and "backdating prejudices no one" because the FAC was served as of June 8, 2026 and an attempt at filing was made on the same date and therefore they corrected their filing within the time period allowed by Code of Civil Procedure Sec. 128.7. (Id., p. 4:16-28.)

Plaintiffs further argue they fulfill the requirements of Rule of Court 3.1324 because FAC is attached as Exhibit 1 to counsel's declaration and the declaration specifies the changes, the effect of the amendments, why the amendments are necessary and proper, when the facts were discovered, and why the amendments were not made earlier.

In Opposition, Weiselman contends that Plaintiffs' request is a blatant attempt to circumvent their failure to amend within the time permitted by Code of Civil Procedure Sec. 128.7 and that leave to amend may be denied where the amendment is futile. Weiselman contends that Plaintiffs' amended pleading is futile because the corporate Plaintiff did not exist during the possession it claims and the causes of actions asserted in the FAC are foreclosed by the prior unlawful detainer action and the parties' settlement thereof. Weiselman further argues that Plaintiffs' request that any order be granted nunc pro tunc is improper because "[n]unc pro tunc orders exist to make the record speak the truth about what a court or party actually did - to correct clerical error, not to create a fiction." (Opp., p. 5:18-19.)

Plaintiffs filed their original Verified Complaint on February 18, 2026, and Weiselman filed a Verified Answer on April 27, 2026. Weiselman subsequently served a Motion for Sanctions pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Sec. 128.7 on May 18, 2026 and Plaintiffs filed and served an FAC on June 8, 2026. (Declaration of Borna Houman ("Houman"), P.P. 6-8.) On June 10, 2026, the Court rejected the FAC because a Court Order was required for the FAC to be filed after Weiselman had answered. (Houman Decl., P. 9.) Weiselman filed his Motion for Sanctions on June 17, 2026.

As is noted above, leave to amend is liberally granted and the Court finds no reason to deny Plaintiffs leave to amend here. Here, the declaration of Borna Houman filed in support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to Amend satisfies the requirements of Rule of Court 3.1324. Houman's declaration attaches as Exhibit 1 the proposed FAC. (Houman Decl., P. 3, Exh. 1.) Houman attests to the specific changes in the FAC. (Id., at P.P. 3-5.) And Houman attests the amendment is necessary because the FAC presents Plaintiffs' claims accurately and corrects the matters Weiselman identified in his Motion for Sanctions. (Id., at P. 6.) Finally, Houman attests the need to amend arose from Weiselman's Motion for Sanctions and Plaintiffs did not make amendments earlier because the occasion for the amendment was Weiselman's Motion for Sanctions. (Id., at P. 7.)

Weiselman's claims that amendment is futile because of the belated existence of the corporate Plaintiff and the substance of the unlawful detainer action and settlement agreement as compared to the FAC are not properly presented with admissible evidence and are better made in motion practice challenging the substance of the pleading rather than a challenge to allowing the amended pleading to be filed at all.

ii. Nunc Pro Tunc Order

While the Court has found that leave to amend is warranted, the Court does not find any good cause or reason to issue any order deeming the FAC filed as of any date other than the date it is actually filed with the Court. Putting Plaintiffs' attempt to downplay the requirements of the Code of Civil Procedure aside, the procedure here is clear, unequivocal and longstanding: after an Answer has been filed, a plaintiff must obtain leave of Court to file an amended pleading. (See Code Civ. Proc. Sec.Sec. 472(a), 473(a)(1), 576.)

Plaintiffs cite Rojas v. Cutsforth (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 774 (" Rojas ") in support of their position that the proper remedy for a paper returned for a defect is to order it filed nunc pro tunc as of the date it was presented. (See Rojas, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at p. 778.) However, Plaintiffs' is not an accurate reading of the Rojas Court's ruling or the rationale behind the ruling. In Rojas, the issue was that a clerk rejected a complaint because the declaration for court assignment was not signed and the summons contained the address of the wrong branch of court and the rejection caused Plaintiff to miss the statute of limitations to file the action. (Rojas, supra, 67 Cal. App. 4th at 776.)

The Rojas Court held that the clerk had no proper basis for rejecting the complaint because the local rule did not specify when the court assignment form was to be filed and it could have been filed at any time. (Id., at p. 777.) Specifically, the Rojas Court noted that the defect was insubstantial, and the clerk should have filed the complaint and notified plaintiff to correct the defect. (Id.) The Court determined that the appropriate remedy was to deem the complaint filed when it was first presented because the clerk had no proper basis for rejecting the plaintiff's complaint. (Id., at p. 779.)

Here, Plaintiffs' attempt to file their FAC without leave of Court was contrary to the requirements of the Code of Civil Procedure and Plaintiffs' FAC was therefore properly rejected by the Clerk of the Court. Code of Civil Procedure section 472(a) provides, in pertinent part, that "[a] party may amend its pleading once without leave of the court at any time before the answer, demurrer, or motion to strike is filed...." (Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 472(a).) And Code of Civil Procedure Sec.Sec. 473(a)(1) and 576 make it clear that leave of Court is required to file any amended pleading outside the one "amendment by right" allowed pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Sec. 472(a).

Plaintiffs filed an amended pleading without leave of court on June 8, 2026, after Defendant filed an Answer on April 27, 2026, which was an improperly filed amended pleading. The defect in Plaintiffs' FAC filing was not insubstantial and was not a defect that the Clerk could have simply notified Plaintiff to correct after filing. Thus, this case is dissimilar to Rojas and the rationale employed by the Rojas Court in deeming the Rojas complaint filed nunc pro tunc does not exist here.

Further, Weiselman is correct in his assertion that the function of a nunc pro tunc order is to correct clerical errors. (See StopC-19, LLC v. Tooling Express (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 803, 815-816; see also Hamilton v. Laine (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 885.) Plaintiffs do not ask the Court to correct a clerical error but instead to change the record to reflect that Plaintiffs had obtained the proper leave to file their amended complaint as of June 8, 2026, something that did not occur. That is not the purpose of a nunc pro tunc order and the Court sees no reason to retroactively validate actions taken in contravention of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend is GRANTED IN PART. Plaintiffs are granted leave to file their FAC; Plaintiffs' request for a nunc pro tunc order is DENIED.

C. Motion for Sanctions

1. Request for Judicial Notice ("RJN")

Plaintiffs request the Court take judicial notice of: (1) Plaintiffs' Verified Complaint in this action filed on February 18, 2026 (RJN, No. 1); (2) Defendant's Verified Answer, filed in this action on April 27, 2026 (RJN, No. 2); (3) The Court's Notice of Rejection of the First Amended Complaint in this action, dated June 10, 2026 (RJN, No. 3); (4) Minute Order, dated April 18, 202t in the UD Action (RJN, No. 4); (5) Stipulated Judgment in the UD Action entered on June 6, 2025 (RJN, No. 5); (6) Minute Order, dated February 4, 2026 in the UD Action (RJN, No. 6); (7) Notice of Related Case, filed March 26, 2026 in this action (RJN, No. 7);

Evidence Code Sec. 452 permits the Court to take judicial notice of "[r]ecords of (1) any court of this state or (2) any court of record of the United States or of any state of the United States." (Evid. Code Sec. 452(d).) Although the Court need not take judicial notice of records in its own docket, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs' Request for Judicial Notice pursuant to Evidence Code Sec. 452(d).

2.

Discussion

Weiselman seeks an order imposing monetary sanctions in the amount of $18,150.00 against Plaintiffs, striking the Complaint, dismissing the action, and assessing reasonable attorneys fees and costs, jointly and severally, against Plaintiffs. Weiselman argues that the Complaint is "without factual or legal merit and was filed primarily for an improper purpose to harass Defendant" because all causes of action pleaded in the Complaint are "subject to Collateral estoppel, as the causes of action are predicated upon issues that were fully litigated and necessarily decided in [the UD Action]." (Mot., p. 2:4-15.) In essence, Weiselman claims that the entirety of Plaintiffs' Complaint is an attempt to circumvent and collaterally attack the results of the UD Action and is barred by res judicata.

In Opposition, Plaintiffs first assert that Weiselman's motion is procedurally incorrect as it was filed in the UD Action while referencing and seeking to affect the Complaint filed in the instant action; as the matters have not been consolidated, Plaintiffs allege procedural error such that Weiselman's motion cannot be heard. Further, Plaintiffs argue that they are not parties to the UD Action and, given that the instant pleading is filed in the UD Action, the Court has no jurisdiction over them. [3]

On substance, Plaintiff allege that they did in fact correct their pleading by withdrawing and amending the challenged portions of their pleading within the 21-day window allowed by Code of Civil Procedure Sec. 128.7.

Procedurally, the Court finds Plaintiffs' arguments persuasive. Neither Plaintiff here was a party in the UD Action. [4] Although the UD Action and the instant action were ordered related on March 30, 2026 (see Minute Order, 3/30/26), no motion to consolidate the cases was made or granted and no order consolidating the cases was issued. In all, while the matters are related, the UD Case and the instant matter remain separate. [5] Thus, Plaintiffs are correct in their assertions that Weiselman's motion is: (a) filed in the incorrect matter; and (b) seeks sanctions against parties who are not parties to the action in which the moving papers were filed.

Because the Court finds that Weiselman's motion fails on the procedural front, the Court does not reach the substance of the motion. Weiselman's Motion for Sanctions is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

III. CONCLUSION

Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend is GRANTED IN PART. Plaintiffs are granted leave to file their FAC. Plaintiff's FAC is ordered filed and served no later than August 21, 2026. In all other respects, Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend is DENIED. Weiselman's Motion for Sanction is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

The Case Management Conference is CONTINUED to November 4, 2026 at 8:30 a.m. in Dept. E. The OSC re: Proof of Service is converted to an OSC re: $250 Sanctions Pursuant to Rule of Court 3.110 for Failure to Serve Defendant Feinstein and CONTINUED to November 4, 2026 at 8:30 a.m. in Dept. E.

[1] Where not otherwise specified, Code references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.

[2] Plaintiffs filed two Requests for Judicial Notice - an initial Request, filed July 14, 2026 and a Supplemental Request, filed August 11, 2026. Both contain exhibits starting with "Exhibit A." For differentiation and specification, Plaintiff's July 14 Request is referred to herein as "RJN" and Plaintiff's August 11 Request is referred to herein as "Supp. RJN."

[3] Plaintiffs have noted their "special appearance" in their Opposition papers.

[4] Plaintiff Starman appeared as representative for a party in the UD Action but was not personally named as a Defendant. (See, generally, UD Action Docket; see also Minute Order, 10/9/25.) The Plaintiff corporation was not a named Defendant in the UD Action. (See, generally, U.D. Action Docket; see also Minute Order, 2/4/26 (Specifically noting that Starquest Realty (the Plaintiff in the instant action) was a "third party" to the UD Action).)

[5] The Court notes that the Minute Order relating the cases indicates that the UD Action is the "lead case." (See Minute Order, 3/30/26.) However, no order was issued deeming the parties to file all papers in the UD Action. | Home -->)" -->