PEREZ vs SCHAAL, et al.

25CV019484: PEREZ vs SCHAAL, et al. 08/18/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint in Department 16D

Tentative Ruling

NOTICE:

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A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the

25CV019484: PEREZ vs SCHAAL, et al. 08/18/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint in Department 16D

hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

*** EFFECTIVE APRIL 13, 2026, THIS DEPARTMENT HAS MOVED TO THE TANI G. CANTIL-SAKAUYE COURTHOUSE LOCATED AT 500 G STREET IN SACRAMENTO, CA 95814. ALL HEARINGS NOTICED FOR DEPARTMENT 53 WILL BE HEARD IN DEPARTMENT 16D OF THE NEW COURTHOUSE. ***

TENTATIVE RULING:

Defendants Sacramento Drilling and Jon Ferla’s (“Defendants”) demurrer to Plaintiff in pro per Joseph Marion Perez’s first amended complaint is ruled upon as follows.

Defendants’ request for judicial notice is granted for the limited purposes permitted for judicial notice. (Evid. Code, § 453, subd. (a); Johnson & Johnson v. Super. Ct. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 757, 768 [court may take judicial notice of the existence of court documents but not the truth of the statements contained therein].)

In Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), Plaintiff alleges causes of action against numerous defendants for intentional interference with economic relationship, trade libel, slander, defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, unjust enrichment, fraud, and intentional interference with expected inheritance. Plaintiff, who formerly operated a construction company, alleges that the various defendants conspired in a scheme to harm his business and personal reputation.

In March 2026, this Court sustained former Defendant Jane Deacon’s demurrer to causes of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress and civil conspiracy in Plaintiff’s original complaint. Plaintiff filed the operative FAC on March 18, 2026.

Plaintiff alleges that the conspiracy to destroy Perez’s business and reputation was fully

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV019484: PEREZ vs SCHAAL, et al. 08/18/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint in Department 16D

realized by December 2021, with all Defendants “joined together in a common plan to commit the tortious acts alleged herein.” (FAC, ¶¶ 1, 79.) Plaintiff divides the conspiracy into the “Business Conspirators,” including Defendants, and the “Family Conspirators,” with Defendant Amy Lopez being “the primary conduit” between the two groups. (FAC ¶¶ 80, 81.) Plaintiff alleges that all Defendants had knowledge of the conspiracy’s object to harm him and intended to aid its achievement. (FAC, ¶ 82.)

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Jon Ferla and his employer Defendant Sacramento Drilling became involved with the conspiracy from October 2021 to January 2022 through their work on a residential construction project for Defendants Schaal and Trujillo, for which Plaintiff was the general contractor. (FAC ¶¶ 40, 55.) Plaintiff alleges that, as part of the conspiracy, Defendant Ferla interfered with his construction contract, filed a false complaint with the Contractors State License Board (“CSLB”), and disparaged him to Shaal and Trujillo as a pretext to breach the construction contract. (FAC, ¶ 55(c), (f), (g).)[1]

Defendants now demur to the first cause of action, intentional interference with economic relationship; the fifth cause of action, intentional infliction of emotional distress; and the seventh cause of action, fraud. Plaintiff opposes.[2]

Legal Standard

The function of a demurrer is to test the sufficiency of the pleading it challenges by raising questions of law. (Salimi v. State Comp. Ins. Fund (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 216, 219; Nordlinger v. Lynch (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1259, 1271.) “A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters.” (SKF Farms v. Super. Ct. (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.)

For the purpose of determining the effect of a complaint, its allegations are liberally construed, with a view towards substantial justice. (Code Civ. Proc. § 452; Amarel v. Connell (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 137, 140–141; Quelimane Co., Inc. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 43, fn. 7.) In this respect, the Court treats the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law, and considers matters which may be judicially noticed. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Poseidon Development, Inc. v. Woodland Lane Estates, LLC (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1111–1112.)

A demurrer may be sustained only if the complaint lacks any sufficient allegations to entitle the plaintiff to relief. (Financial Corp. of America v. Wilburn (1987) 189

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV019484: PEREZ vs SCHAAL, et al. 08/18/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint in Department 16D

Cal.App.3d 764, 778.) “[P]laintiff need only plead facts showing that he may be entitled to some relief . . . [W]e are not concerned with plaintiff’s possible inability or difficulty in proving the allegations of the complaint.” (Highlanders, Inc. v. Olsan (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 690, 697.) A demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pled and the sole issue raised by a general demurrer is whether the facts pled state a valid cause of action, not whether they are true. (Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 591.) The Court draws all reasonable implications and inferences in favor of upholding the complaint. (Poseidon Development, Inc. v. Woodland Lane Estates, LLC, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at p. 1112.)

Analysis

The Court first considers Plaintiff’s arguments that Defendants’ demurrer is procedurally barred.

Plaintiff quotes Adorh Farms, Co. v. Love (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 366 at p. 371: “The filing of an answer effected a waiver of the right to demur.” (Opp., at p. 8: 19–21.) This is at best an incomplete statement of law. “A party objecting to a complaint or cross-complaint may demur and answer at the same time.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (c); see § 472a, subd. (a) [“A demurrer is not waived by an answer filed at the same time.”].) More importantly, although the Adorh Farms opinion exists,[3] it does not contain the quoted language. Nor can the court find the quoted language in any other case reported in California or elsewhere.

This quotation may be the result of irresponsible use of generative artificial intelligence (“AI”). Generative AI and its propensity to “hallucinate” is becoming a greater concern for courts. (See Noland v. Land of the Free, L.P. (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 426, 443–447.) Relying on fabricated legal authority is sanctionable and violates the California Rules of Court. (Ibid.) AI-generated authorities and quotations are neither existing law nor a nonfrivolous ground to extend existing law or establish new law, and citation to nonexistent authority is an abuse of the adversary system. (Id. at p. 445.) “To state the obvious, it is a fundamental duty of attorneys to read the legal authorities they cite to determine that the authorities stand for the propositions for which they are cited.” (Ibid.)

An unrepresented party is held to the same standards as a licensed attorney. (Hopkins & Carley v. Gens, 200 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1413.)

The Court declines to begin the process of imposing sanctions at this time but strongly cautions Plaintiff to take better care in making only good-faith, well-researched, legally sound arguments in future. All citations and quotations submitted to the Court must

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV019484: PEREZ vs SCHAAL, et al. 08/18/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint in Department 16D

be verified. Future submissions of fabricated authority may result in sanctions.

As to the substance of Plaintiff’s contention, Plaintiff’s filing of the FAC completely superseded the original complaint and began a new round of pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 471.5; Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 884.) This allows all defendants the opportunity to demur. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.40, subd. (a).) Even if the FAC did not make substantive changes to the allegations against moving Defendants—which the Court does not determine at this time—all defendants are given the opportunity to respond. (Carrasco v. Craft (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 796, 809.)

Plaintiff also contends that this demurrer is barred by the law of the case doctrine. The “law of the case” doctrine precludes repeated appellate review of the same issue in a single case. (In re Rosenkrantz (2002) 29 Cal.4th 616, 668.) No appeals have been taken in this case, and the doctrine has no application here.

Conspiracy

Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s allegations of a conspiracy to ruin Plaintiff’s business and personal reputation are purely conclusory. Defendants then argue that all the allegations specifically directed at them are barred by the statute of limitations or fail to state sufficient facts to make a cause of action.

“Conspiracy provides a remedial measure for affixing liability to all who have agreed to a common design to commit a wrong when damage to the plaintiff results.” (IIG Wireless, Inc. v. Yi (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 630, 652.) “By participation in a civil conspiracy, a coconspirator effectively adopts as his or her own the torts of other coconspirators within the ambit of the conspiracy. In this way, a coconspirator incurs tort liability coequal with the immediate tortfeasors.” (Applied Equipment Corp. v.

Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 503, 511 [citation omitted].) “[T]he major significance of the conspiracy lies in the fact that it renders each participant in the wrongful act responsible as a joint tortfeasor for all damages ensuing from the wrong, irrespective of whether or not he was a direct actor and regardless of the degree of his activity.” (Ibid.) The elements of a conspiracy are defendant’s knowledge of and agreement to the objective and course of conduct, a wrongful act committed under the agreement, and resulting harm. (IIG Wireless, Inc., supra, at p. 652.)

Defendants cite 117 Sales Corp. v. Olsen (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 645 for the contention that conclusory allegations of a conspiracy will not survive demurrer. (MPA at p. 12:11– 27.) In Olsen, the plaintiff alleged that defendant’s filing of a small claims action was

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV019484: PEREZ vs SCHAAL, et al. 08/18/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint in Department 16D

part of a conspiracy to interfere with plaintiff’s prospective business relationships. (Olsen, supra, at p. 648.) The Appellate Court found that the complaint did not state a civil conspiracy because it failed to allege facts to “spell out the causal relationship between a charged conspiracy to file a small claims lawsuit and the unspecified, unjustified interference with business relations.” (Id. at 650.) “The requisite improper objective of the ‘conspiracy’ remains undefined by any factual allegations. Factual charges of consequential damage are missing.” (Ibid.) The complaint in Olsen failed because it did not allege how plaintiff’s filing of the small claims action was connected to a broader conspiracy to tortiously interfere with plaintiff’s business.

The FAC is quite different. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants improperly attempted to expand a contractual scope of work (FAC ¶ 55(c)), fabricated evidence at Defendant Schaal’s request (FAC ¶ 55(d)), filed a false CSLB complaint at Schaal’s direction (FAC ¶ 55(f)), and disseminated false and disparaging statements about Plaintiff to co- Defendants (FAC ¶ 55(g)). Defendants are alleged to have joined the conspiracy and to have been used as instruments for the conspiracy’s goals. (FAC ¶ 10.) Even if the latter allegations are somewhat conclusory, Plaintiff has alleged specific conduct directed by another party, alleged to be a co-conspirator.

Liberally construing the allegations, the Court finds that Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to connect Defendants’ alleged conduct to a broader conspiracy.

Statutes of Limitations

Defendants argue that the first, fifth, and seventh causes of action are barred by statutes of limitations imposing either two- or three-year limitations periods.

Plaintiff filed the initial complaint in August 18, 2025. Defendants contend that all of the conduct alleged against Defendants occurred from October to December 2021, other than an allegation of an August 2023 CSLB complaint. That allegation, Defendants argue, is pled solely to avoid the statutes of limitation and, when considered with pleadings in a related lawsuit, is a sham allegation.

On August 4, 2026, two days before this demurrer was originally set to be heard, Plaintiff filed a Declaration in which he avers that the FAC contains an incorrect date and that the CSLB complaint alleged in Paragraph 55 was actually filed in October 2022, not August 2023. To that extent, Plaintiff concedes Defendants’ arguments.

Regardless, Plaintiff’s conspiracy allegations defeat Defendants’ statute of limitations

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV019484: PEREZ vs SCHAAL, et al. 08/18/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint in Department 16D

arguments. “A demurrer based on a statute of limitations will not lie where the action may be, but is not necessarily, barred. In order for the bar of the statute of limitations to be raised by demurrer, the defect must clearly and affirmatively appear on the face of the complaint; it is not enough that the complaint shows that the action may be barred.” (Guardian North Bay, Inc. v. Super. Ct. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 963, 971-972 [citation omitted]. [emphasis added].) When a civil conspiracy is properly alleged, “the statute of limitations does not begin to run on any part of a plaintiff’s claims until the ‘last overt act’ pursuant to the conspiracy has been completed.” (Wyatt v. Union Mortgage Co. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 773, 786.)

Even if Defendants were a part only of the “business conspiracy,” Plaintiff alleges that Defendant A. Lopez told one of Plaintiff’s contractors to “stop doing business with plaintiff because plaintiff doesn’t pay his sub-contractors” on August 22, 2023. (FAC, ¶ 34.) Plaintiff commenced this action on August 18, 2025, within two years of August 22, 2023. The causes of action are not barred by the statutes of limitations.

Intentional Interference with Economic Relationships

The elements of a cause of action for intentional interference with existing contractual relations are (1) a contract between plaintiff and a third party; (2) defendant’s knowledge of the contract; (3) defendant’s intentional acts to induce a breach or disruption; (4) actual breach or disruption; and (5) resulting damages. (Quelimane Co. V. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 55.) The cause of action for intentional interference with prospective business relations is similar, except a plaintiff must also allege that the intentional acts are independently wrongful for some reason other than the impact on the prospective relationship. (Id. at 55–56; Della Penna v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 376, 392–393.)

Plaintiff alleges “existing and prospective economic relationships with numerous clients, including but not limited to the Castro Family, Pastor Fair of Calvary Church, Cold Stone Creamery, and others, which offered a probable future economic benefit.” (FAC ¶ 86.) He alleges that Defendants were aware of these relationships and intentionally made false statements with the purpose of disrupting his business relationships. (FAC ¶ 87.) He alleges that this conduct caused contracts to be terminated and prevented the formation of new business relationships. (FAC, ¶ 88.)

More particularly as to moving Defendants, Plaintiff alleges that they attempted to expand their scope of work on his existing Schaal contract leading to constructive termination and that they provided false pretext for breach. (FAC ¶ 55(d), (g).) As to the

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV019484: PEREZ vs SCHAAL, et al. 08/18/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint in Department 16D

broader conspiracy, Plaintiff alleges the termination of at least two contracts as a result of misinformation (FAC, ¶¶ 28, 35) and that several clients and subcontractors received unsolicited disparaging contacts (FAC, ¶¶ 32, 34, 38). The conspiracy allegation renders all conspirators jointly liable “irrespective of whether or not he was a direct actor and regardless of the degree of his activity.” (Applied Equipment Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 511.)

Defendants’ demurrer to the first cause of action is OVERRULED.

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

The elements of a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress are (1) extreme and outrageous conduct with either the intention of causing or reckless disregard for the probability of causing emotional distress; (2) severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate cause. (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050.) In this context, outrageous conduct is “so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” (Id. at p. 1051.) The conduct must be more than “mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities.” (Ibid.) Whether conduct is sufficiently outrageous is usually a question of fact that survives demurrer. (Bock v. Hansen (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 215, 235.)

Defendants argue that the FAC fails to allege any conduct specifically attributable to them that could be extreme and outrageous. But again, Plaintiff’s conspiracy allegation renders Defendants jointly liable for all of the conspirators’ conduct. Indeed, a member of a conspiracy may be liable for all acts of the conspiracy, whether occurring before or after the person joined the conspiracy. (De Vries v. Brumback (1960) 53 Cal.2d 643, 648.)

Plaintiff alleges a multi-year campaign to intentionally destroy his business and personal reputation. Plaintiff primarily alleges outrageous conduct in the “probate conspiracy” events. (FAC § F [¶¶ 69–73].) But he also alleges that Defendant Amy Lopez’s business disruptions are outrageous and extreme. (See FAC ¶ 105 [referring to FAC §§ E (¶¶ 60–68) & F], ¶ 67 [alleging business interference].) Whether the alleged conduct within a conspiracy to destroy Plaintiff’s business and personal reputation is extreme and outrageous is one of fact that cannot be resolved on demurrer.

Defendants’ demurrer to the fifth cause of action is OVERRULED.

Fraud

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV019484: PEREZ vs SCHAAL, et al. 08/18/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint in Department 16D

The elements of fraud are (1) a misrepresentation (2) with knowledge of its falsity (3) intended to induce reliance; (4) plaintiff’s justifiable reliance; (5) damages. (Lazar v. Super. Ct. (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 638.) The California Civil Code states fraud liability as follows: “One who willfully deceives another with intent to induce him to alter his position to his injury or risk, is liable for any damage which he thereby suffers.” (Civ. Code, § 1709 [emphasis added].) In other words, fraud is a falsehood made to a person that induces that same person to rely to the person’s detriment.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants made “false statements to Plaintiff’s clients,” on which “Plaintiff’s clients and others justifiably relied.” (FAC ¶ 109.) The FAC contains allegations of false statements to clients and subcontractors, false CSLB complaints, false probate petitions, and false bond claims. This is not fraud.

The FAC alleges false statements and claims about Plaintiff made to other people. For instance, in his opposition papers Plaintiff argues that Defendant Ferla’s alleged false representations to a bond company is fraud. (See Opp. at p. 7.) Plaintiff’s FAC fails to allege falsehoods made to Plaintiff and on which Plaintiff relied to his detriment.

The Court finds that the FAC does not allege fraud actionable by Plaintiff. Accordingly, Defendants’ demurrer to the seventh cause of action is SUSTAINED.

Disposition

Defendants’ demurrer to the seventh cause of action, fraud, is SUSTAINED. The Court grants leave to amend as this is the first adjudicated challenge to this cause of action.

Defendants’ demurrer to the first cause of action, intentional interference with economic relationships, and the fifth cause of action, intentional infliction of emotional distress, is OVERRULED.

Plaintiff may file and serve a Second Amended Complaint no later than September 17, 2026. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1320(g).) If Plaintiff chooses to amend, he may also correct the inaccurate date of the alleged CSLB complaint in Paragraph 55(f). Although not required by statute or court rule, Plaintiff is directed to present the clerk a copy of this ruling at the time of filing the Second Amended Complaint. Defendants may file and serve a response within 30 days of service of the Second Amended Complaint, 35 days if served by mail.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV019484: PEREZ vs SCHAAL, et al. 08/18/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint in Department 16D

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1019.5; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1312.)

[1] Paragraph numbers 54 and 55 are repeated three times each in the FAC. The

specific factual allegations against moving Defendants are mostly on pages 21 through 25 of the FAC. [2] Plaintiff filed his opposition papers five days late. The Court exercised its discretion to

consider the papers and continued the hearing to allow Defendants time to file a substantive reply. [3] The correct case name is Adohr Milk Farms, Inc. v. Love.