Sandra Page Taylor v. Levi's Stadium et al.

SUPERIOR COURT, STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA Department 10 Honorable Jeffrey B. El-Hajj Blanca Than, Courtroom Clerk 191 North First Street, San Jose, CA 95113

DATE: August 18, 2026 TIME: 9:00 A.M. / 9:01 A.M. To contest the ruling, call (408) 808-6856 before 4:00 P.M. Make sure to let the other side know before 4:00 P.M. that you plan to contest the ruling. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1308(a)(1); Local Rule 8.D.)

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9:00 A.M. LINE # CASE # CASE TITLE RULING Line 1 23CV415724 Sandra Page Taylor v. Click LINE 1 or scroll down for ruling. Levi's Stadium et al. Line 2 23CV415724 Sandra Page Taylor v. Click LINE 1 or scroll down for ruling. Levi's Stadium et al.

Calendar Lines 1 and 2 Case Name: Sandra Taylor v. Levi’s Stadium et al. Case No.: 23CV415724

This is an action for negligence and premises liability brought by plaintiff Sandra Taylor (Plaintiff). The original and still operative complaint was filed in April 2023. It alleges two causes of action: (1) general negligence and (2) premises liability against defendants Levi’s Stadium, San Francisco Forty-Niners (Forty Niners), Landmark Event Staffing Services, Inc. (Landmark), and Doe defendants.

The complaint makes little distinction between the defendants other than to allege that Landmark is an employee of the other named defendants. The first cause of action for general negligence alleges:

Plaintiff was a paying customer at a public event held at Levi’s Stadium on May 15, 2022 put on by defendant, San Francisco Forty Niners. Plaintiff was urged by employees of defendant, Landmark Event Staffing Services, Inc., to try the large slide that had been placed on the premises. Plaintiff went on the slide which was so negligently designed and maintained, that Plaintiff suffered a fracture of her right foot and other personal injuries, as well as other damages as a result of her using the slide in the manner directed by Defendants.

(Complaint, GN-1.) The complaint does not identify any negligently designed feature of the slide or any specific maintenance issue with the slide.

The second cause of action for premises liability alleges:

Plaintiff was a paying customer at a public event held at Levi’s Stadium on May 15, 2022 put on by defendant, San Francisco Forty Niners. Plaintiff was urged by employees of defendant, Landmark Event Staffing Services, Inc., to try the large slide that had been placed on the premises.

(Complaint, Prem.L-1.) The premises liability cause of action has boxes checked for negligence (count 1) and willful failure to warn (count 2). The first count is alleged against only Levi’s Stadium, the San Francisco Forty Niners, and Does 1-5. The second count is alleged against “All Defendants” and Does 6-10. (Complaint, Prem.L-2 and Prem.L-3.)

Landmark answered the complaint in August 2023. Plaintiff attempted to file a first amended complaint (FAC) in September 2023 and October 2023. Both filings were rejected by the clerk’s office because Landmark had already filed an answer and Plaintiff had not obtained leave of court to file a FAC. (Code Civ. Proc., § 472, subd. (a) [“A party may amend its pleading once without leave of court at any time before the answer, demurrer, or motion to strike is filed.”].) That has led to some confusion. Defendant Forty Niners Stadium Management Company LLC (Forty Niners) filed an answer to the nonexistent FAC in October 2023. It is unclear whether Plaintiff knows that no FAC was ever accepted for filing.

At issue are two motions for summary judgment. The first, by Landmark and directed at the operative original complaint, was filed in July 2025. It was originally set for hearing in March 2026. It was later continued by the court to the current date. The second, by defendant 5

Forty Niners, was filed in May 2026 and is directed at the unfiled FAC. That motion was advanced by the court to the current hearing date. Plaintiff opposes both motions.

GENERAL STANDARDS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The pleadings limit the issues presented for summary judgment or summary adjudication. Such a motion may not be granted or denied based on issues not raised by the pleadings. (Laabs v. City of Victorville (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1258 (Laabs); Nieto v. Blue Shield of Calif. Life & Health Ins. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 60, 73 (Nieto).) The moving party bears the initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850 (Aguilar).)

A motion for summary judgment or adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of an entire cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an “issue of duty.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1); McCaskey v. California State Auto. Ass’n (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 947, 975; Palm Spring Villas II Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Parth (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 268, 288.)

“A defendant seeking summary judgment must show that at least one element of the plaintiff’s cause of action cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” “The burden then shifts to the plaintiff to show there is a triable issue of material fact on that issue.” (Alex R. Thomas & Co. v. Mutual Service Casualty Ins. Co. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 66, 72; internal citations omitted.) “There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable finder of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.” (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850.)

While the same standards of admissibility govern both sides’ supporting evidence, the opposition evidence is liberally construed while the moving party’s evidence is strictly construed. (Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 768.) The evidence must be liberally construed in support of the opposing party, resolving any doubts in favor of that party. (Yanowitz v. L'Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1037 (Yanowitz).)

A reply “shall not include any new evidentiary matter, additional material facts, or separate statement submitted with the reply and not presented in the moving papers or opposing papers.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (b)(4); Jay v. Mahaffey (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1522, 1537-38; Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, 252.) The court has not considered the reply separate statement filed by Landmark.

LANDMARK’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Landmark moves for summary judgment and in the alternative for summary adjudication of four “issues,” none of which describe an issue of duty. (See Notice of Motion at p. 2:15-27.) The court construes the motion as seeking summary adjudication of each cause of action. Landmark’s motion is directed at the operative original complaint. (See memorandum at pp. 1:5-8, 4:15.)

First Cause of Action—General Negligence

“An action in negligence requires a showing that the defendant owed the plaintiff a legal duty, that the defendant breached the duty, and that the breach was a proximate or legal 6

cause of injuries suffered by the plaintiff.” (Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center (1993) 6 Cal.4th 666, 673.) “The issue of whether a legal duty exists is an issue of law, not an issue of fact for the jury.” (Kentucky Fried Chicken of California, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 14 Cal.4th 814, 819.)

Landmark argues that the first cause of action fails as alleged against it because Plaintiff cannot establish that any breach of a duty it owed proximately caused Plaintiff’s injuries, and because the assumption of the risk doctrine provides a complete defense. Landmark’s answer to the complaint raised assumption of the risk as an affirmative defense.

The primary assumption of the risk doctrine bars a plaintiff’s recovery for negligence when “it can be established that, because of the nature of the activity involved and the parties’ relationship to the activity, the defendant owed the plaintiff no duty of care.” (Neighbarger v. Irwin Industries, Inc. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 532, 538; see also Avila v. Citrus Community College Dist. (2006) 38 Cal.4th 148, 161 (Avila) [“[p]rimary assumption of the risk arises when, as a matter of law and policy, a defendant owes no duty to protect a plaintiff from particular harms”].) “Primary assumption of risk is a complete bar to recovery.” (Childs v. County of Santa Barbara (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 64, 69 (Childs), citation omitted.)

The doctrine of primary assumption of risk applies “where ‘conditions or conduct that otherwise might be viewed as dangerous often are an integral part of the sport [or activity] itself.’” (Saville, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at p. 867.) In other words, under the primary assumption of risk doctrine, “participants in and operators of certain activities have no duty of ordinary care to protect other participants from risks inherent in the activity.” (Nalwa v. Cedar Fair, L.P. (2012) 55 Cal.4th 1148, 1152 & 1162 (Nalwa) [finding that primary assumption of the risk applies to the use of bumper cars at an amusement park].)

To determine whether the primary assumption of risk doctrine applies, a court must examine “the nature of the sport itself,” as well as “the defendant’s role in, or relationship to, the sport.” (Knight v. Jewett (1992) 3 Cal.4th 296, 317.) “[T]he primary assumption of risk doctrine is not limited to activities classified as sports, but applies as well to other recreational activities ‘involving an inherent risk of injury to voluntary participants . . . where the risk cannot be eliminated without altering the fundamental nature of the activity.’” (Nalwa, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1156, citing Beninati v. Black Rock City, LLC (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 650, 658.)

The risks inherent in a given recreational activity can be resolved on summary judgment. “Such a determination is a legal question within the province of the courts and is reached from common knowledge.” (Griffin v. The Haunted Hotel, Inc. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 490, 499 (Griffin) [finding that doctrine applied to a haunted trail attraction].) “Primary assumption of the risk is an objective test.” (Saville v. Sierra College (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 857, 866.) “Under the primary assumption of risk doctrine, ‘a court need not ask what risks a particular plaintiff subjectively knew of and chose to encounter, but instead must evaluate the fundamental nature of the [recreational activity] and the defendant's role in or relationship to that [activity] to determine whether the defendant owes a duty to protect a plaintiff from the particular risk of harm.’ ” (Griffin, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at 499.) “Owners and operators ‘owe participants the duty not to unreasonably increase the risks of injury’ beyond those inherent in the activity.” (Ibid.)

“Generally, one owes a duty of ordinary care not to cause an unreasonable risk of harm to others.” (Shin v. Ahn (2007) 42 Cal.4th 482, 488 (Shin).) Under the primary assumption of risk doctrine, “the defendant owes no duty to protect a plaintiff from a particular risk that the plaintiff is construed to have assumed. In the sports context, the plaintiff is deemed to have assumed those risks inherent in the sport in which plaintiff chooses to participate.” (Id. at p. 498.) Where the doctrine of primary assumption of risk applies, the defendant owes the plaintiff “only the duty not to act so as to increase the risk of injury over that inherent in the activity.” (Nalwa, supra, at p. 1154.)

This is a “limited duty of care . . . to refrain from intentionally injuring . . . another or engaging in conduct that is ‘so reckless as to be totally outside the range of the ordinary activity involved in the sport.’ ” (Shin, supra, 42 Cal.4th at pp. 489-490.) That is “‘a duty not to increase the risks inherent in the sport, not a duty to decrease the risks.’ ” (Avila, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 166.)

Landmark has met its initial burden to establish through admissible evidence that the assumption of the risk doctrine applies to the activity Plaintiff, an adult woman, was engaged in when she was injured: sliding down a playground slide. (Landmark undisputed material facts (UMFs) 10-19.) The complaint acknowledges that Plaintiff was engaged in an activity, recreational use of a playground slide, that the assumption of the risk doctrine may logically be applied to. (Griffin, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at 501 [determination is a question of law based on general characteristics of activity that can be made by judge based on their own and common experience].)

The fundamental nature of the activity is that a person ascends to the top of the slide and then slides down it, typically feet first, gaining momentum as they go, until reaching the bottom. Gaining momentum and speed as a person approaches the bottom of the slide and perhaps hitting the ground more forcefully than anticipated is a risk inherent in the activity.

Because the doctrine applies, the duty Landmark owed to Plaintiff regarding her use of the playground slide was to not increase the inherent risks of the activity; Landmark had no duty to decrease the inherent risks. Plaintiff’s deposition testimony and verified responses to requests for admission (exhibits 2 and 3 to Landmark’s compendium of evidence) confirm that while her and her companion’s interest in the slide may have been initially prompted by a comment from an alleged Landmark employee, she made her own decision to go down the slide and was not pressured to do so by any Landmark employee. Nor did any Landmark employee take any action toward Plaintiff or the slide that could reasonably be interpreted as increasing the risk inherent in the activity when Plaintiff went down the slide.

When the burden shifts to Plaintiff, she does not raise any triable issue as to the application of the assumption of the risk doctrine. The opposition’s argument that a statement from a Landmark employee that Plaintiff and her companions should try the slide increased the risks inherent in the activity is unpersuasive. And Landmark had no duty to decrease the risks of the activity.

Furthermore, the first cause of action alleges that what caused Plaintiff’s injury was the negligent design and maintenance of the slide. Plaintiff is bound by her verified responses to requests for admission where she admits that she was not forced to use the slide, that she did so of her own free will, and that Landmark did not design or maintain the slide. (See Landmark ex. 3, responses 1-5, 12.) Plaintiff’s declaration, the only evidence submitted with the opposition to Landmark’s motion, fails to raise any triable issue of material fact or of law. A declaration in opposition to motion for summary judgment cannot service as an amendment or 8

expand the issues set forth in the pleading. (Nativi v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 261, 290.) Nor can it contradict deposition testimony or responses to written discovery. (Whitmire v. Ingersoll-Rand Co. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1078, 1087; Shin v. Ahn (2007) 42 Cal.4th 482, 500, fn. 12.) And it is inadmissible to the extent that it discusses subsequent remedial measures. (Evid. Code, § 1151 [“When, after the occurrence of an event, remedial or precautionary measures are taken, which, if taken previously, would have tended to make the event less likely to occur, evidence of such subsequent measures is inadmissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection with the event.”].)

Second Cause of Action—Premises Liability

“Broadly speaking, premises liability alleges a defendant property owner allowed a dangerous condition on its property or failed to take reasonable steps to secure its property against criminal acts by third parties.” (Delgado v. American Multi-Cinema, Inc. (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1406.) “Premises liability is a form of negligence ... and is described as follows: The owner of premises is under a duty to exercise ordinary care in the management of such premises in order to avoid exposing persons to an unreasonable risk of harm. A failure to fulfill this duty is negligence.” (Brooks v. Eugene Burger Management Corp. (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 1611, 1619.)

There is also a separate notice requirement: “An owner is liable for harm caused by a dangerous condition, of which the owner had actual or constructive knowledge. An injured plaintiff has the burden of showing that the owner had notice of the defect in sufficient time to correct it, but failed to take reasonable steps to do so.” (Howard v. Omni Hotels Management Corp. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 403, 431, citations omitted.) “Although no two accidents happen in the same way, to be admissible for showing notice to a landowner of a dangerous condition, evidence of another similar accident must have occurred under substantially the same circumstances.” (Id. at p. 432.)

“An owner of real property is ‘not the insurer of [a] visitor’s personal safety . . .’ However, an owner is responsible ‘for an injury occasioned to another by [the owner’s] want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property . . .’ Accordingly, landowners are required ‘to maintain land in their possession and control in a reasonably safe condition,’ and to use due care to eliminate dangerous conditions on their property.” (Taylor v. Trimble (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 934, 943-944, internal citations and quotation marks omitted.) “The proper test to be applied to the liability of the possessor of land . . . is whether in the management of his property he has acted as a reasonable man in view of the probability of injury to others.” (Alcaraz v. Vece (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1149, 1156 (Alcaraz).)

Landmark argues that the second cause of action as alleged against it fails as a matter of law because Landmark did not own, lease, occupy, or control Levi’s Stadium. (See notice of motion at p. 2:13-14; 26-27.) Landmark does not assert assumption of risk as a defense to the second cause of action.

The second cause of action does not allege that any defendant had actual or constructive notice of any dangerous condition. That is an essential element of the claim that a plaintiff must plead and prove. (Howard, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at 431.) In addition, only count two of the second cause of action is alleged against Landmark. The count is based on Civil Code section 846. (Complaint, Prem.L-3.) Civil Code section 846 generally provides 9

private property owners with immunity where persons who enter their property for recreational purposes are injured. There is an exception to the immunity “where permission to enter for [recreational purposes] was granted for a consideration.” (Civ. Code, § 846, subd. (d)(2).) The second cause of action does not clearly allege that this exception applies, even though all parties appear to assume that it does. Even when Civil Code section 846 applies, the statute “does not create a duty of care or ground of liability for injury to person or property.” (Civ.

Code, § 846, subd. (e).) Because only count two of the second cause of action is alleged against Landmark, it is dependent upon the first cause of action, and assumption of the risk provides Landmark a complete defense to the first cause of action. For these reasons, the second cause of action arguably fails as a matter of law as alleged against Landmark.

Landmark’s argument is primarily based on Plaintiff’s verified responses to requests for admission, numbers 6-11, admitting both that Plaintiff has no facts to support any contention that Landmark owned or possessed Levi’s Stadium, and that on May 15, 2022, Landmark in fact did not own, possess, or control Levi’s Stadium. Landmark also relies on its contract with the Forty Niners. (See exhibits 3 and 4 to Landmark’s appendix of evidence.) The foregoing evidence is sufficient to meet Landmark’s initial burden as to the second cause of action.

When the burden shifts to Plaintiff, she does not raise any triable issues of material fact as to the second cause of action as alleged against Landmark. Plaintiff’s declaration, the only evidence submitted with the opposition to Landmark’s motion, cannot refute her verified discovery responses.

Landmark’s motion for summary judgment is therefore granted.

FORTY NINERS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

As already discussed, the motion by the Forty Niners’ motion is not directed at the operative complaint, but rather at a FAC that was never accepted for filing. (See Forty Niners’ memorandum at p. 2:10-12 [“In her First Amended Complaint (the operative complaint), Plaintiff brings two cause of action against Defendant Forty Niners Stadium Management Company LLC: general negligence and premises liability.”) The Forty Niners have submitted a copy of the FAC (it is not file-endorsed) as exhibit E to its packet of supporting evidence (an exhibit to the declaration of Maria Lampasona). And several of the undisputed material facts in its separate statement rely on this exhibit E for support. Forty Niners’ motion for summary judgment was filed on May 29, 2026, more than two years after the proposed FAC was rejected for filing in October 2023.

Because the Forty Niners’ motion for summary judgment is not directed at the operative pleading in this lawsuit, the motion must be denied for failure to meet the initial burden. The court does not reach the arguments made in the motion, Plaintiff’s opposition, or the Forty Niners’ objections to evidence.

CONCLUSION

Defendant Landmark’s motion for summary judgment is granted.

Defendant Forty Niners’ motion for summary judgment is denied for failure to meet the initial burden. 10

The court will prepare the order.

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