Syed Zafar Hamdani v. Three Arch LLC et al.

Plaintiff also suffered from an untreated infection on his right foot. (Id. at ¶ 63.) Plaintiff alleges Defendants repeatedly failed to provide toilet, hygiene, dietary and wound care. (Id. at ¶ 80.) Plaintiff alleges these harms are the result of chronic understaffing and undertraining by Defendants who are instead engaged in a profitmaximizing scheme. (See id. at ¶¶ 14-17, 90.)

Plaintiff filed suit on December 30, 2025. Plaintiff alleges seven causes of action for (1) elder abuse/neglect under Welfare & Institutions Code section 15600 et seq; (2) negligence/willful misconduct; (3) violation of residents’ rights under Health & Safety Code section 1430(b) against Three Arch LLC; (4) intentional misrepresentation; (5) concealment; (6) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (7) premises liability. Plaintiff seeks general, special, statutory, and punitive damages, as well as attorneys’ fees, injunctive relief and a jury trial.

Defendants now move to compel arbitration of Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to the Resident – Facility Arbitration Agreement (the “Agreement”) signed by Plaintiff. Having considered the Agreement and the circumstances of its execution, the court will deny the motion to compel arbitration. Defendants’ evidentiary objections to the Declaration of Farzana Hamdani are OVERRULED. Ms. Hamdani’s declaration is based on her own personal knowledge of the facts set forth therein. Her testimony is offered as evidence of her brother’s state of mind during his residency at the facility and is not inadmissible hearsay pursuant to Evidence Code section 1250.

Likewise, Defendants’ evidentiary objections to the Declaration of Sikander Naqvi are also OVERRULED. Mr. Naqvi’s declaration and accompanying text message from Plaintiff speaks to Plaintiff’s state of mind at the time the message was sent and is relevant because the message was sent three days before he signed the Agreement.

LEGAL STANDARD

The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) applies. The Agreement provides that it is to be “governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. §§ 1-6) and the procedural rules set forth in the Federal Arbitration Act shall govern any and all arbitration proceedings, including any petition to compel arbitration[.]” (Defendants’ Compendium of Exhibits [“COE”], Ex. 1 at ¶ 7.) The Agreement further provides, “[t]his Agreement relates to the Resident’s admission to the Facility, and the Facility, among other things, participates in Medicare and/or Medi-Cal programs and/or procures supplies from out of state vendors.

The parties, therefore, agree that the underlying admission to the Facility involves interstate commerce.” (Ibid.) The FAA’s term “involving commerce” is interpreted broadly. The basic coverage provision of the FAA “makes the law applicable to contracts evidencing a transaction ‘involving commerce’ (9 U.S.C. § 2), which language reflects that Congress intended the law’s coverage to extend to the full reach of its commerce clause power.” (Nieto v. Fresno Beverage Co. (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 274, 279 [internal citations omitted].) “Congress Commerce Clause power ‘may be exercised in individual cases without showing any specific effect upon interstate commerce’ if in the aggregate the economic activity in question would represent ‘a general practice . . . subject to federal control.’” (Citizens Bank v.

Alafabco, Inc. (2003) 539 U.S. 52, 56-57 [quoting Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co. (1948) 334 U.S. 219, 236].) As noted above, Defendants receive funding from Medicare and Medi- Cal and procures supplies from out-of-state vendors. These activities meet the broad definition for interstate commerce. The Agreement notably excludes from application California Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2 (c) “as the parties mutually desire to have any and all disputes submitted to binding arbitration.” (COE, Ex. 1 at ¶ 6.)

Thus, the FAA applies. Under the FAA, the court’s role is limited to determining “(1) whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists, and if it does (2) whether the agreement encompasses the dispute at issue.” (Chiron Corp. v. Ortho Diagnostic Systems, Inc. (9th Cir. 2000) 207 F.3d 1126, 1130.) To determine “whether a valid contract to arbitrate exists,” courts apply “ordinary state law principles that govern contract formation.” (Davis v. Nordstrom, Inc. (9th Cir. 2014) 755 F.3d 1089, 1093 [citations omitted]; see also Ingle v.

Circuit City Stores, Inc. (9th Cir. 2003) 328 F.3d 1165, 1170.)

ANALYSIS

At issue is whether there is a valid agreement to arbitrate between the parties. “The moving party ‘can meet its initial burden by attaching to the [motion or] petition a copy of the arbitration agreement purporting to bear the [opposing party’s] signature. Alternatively, the moving party can meet is burden by setting forth the agreement’s provisions in the motion.’ ” (Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 165, internal citations and quotations omitted.) Defendants have attached a copy of the Arbitration Agreement bearing the Plaintiff’s signature. (COE, Ex. 1.) While Defendants have met their initial burden, Ms. Hamdani argues Plaintiff lacked capacity to enter into the Agreement. The court’s discussion of the capacity to enter into a contract in Algo-Heyres v. Oxnard Manor LP (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1064, 1070-1071 (Algo-Heyres) is instructive:

As noted by the trial court, “The party seeking to compel arbitration bears the burden of proving the existence of a valid arbitration agreement.” (Avila, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 844.) But the trial court also noted the “rebuttable presumption affecting the burden of proof that all persons have the capacity to make decisions and to be responsible for their acts or decisions.” (Prob. Code, § 810, subd. (a); see Wilson v. Sampson (1949) 91 Cal.App.2d 453, 459 [205 P.2d 753].) “A judicial determination that a person is totally without understanding, or is of unsound mind, or suffers from one or more mental deficits so substantial that, under the circumstances, the person should be deemed to lack the legal capacity to perform a specific act, should be based on evidence of a deficit in one or more of the person’s mental functions ... .” (Prob.

Code, § 810, subd. (c).) As the trial court acknowledged, Probate Code section 811 requires that incapacity to contract be supported by evidence of a deficit in at least one of four areas: alertness and attention, information processing, thought processes, and ability to modulate mood and affect. (Prob. Code, § 811, subd. (a).) The deficit must “significantly impair[] the person's ability to understand and appreciate the consequences of his or her actions with regard to the type of act or decision in question.” (Prob.

Code, § 811, subd. (b).) The capacity to make a decision requires the person have the ability to communicate the decision verbally or by other means, and to understand and appreciate the rights and responsibilities affected by the decision, the probable consequences, and the “significant risks, benefits, and reasonable alternatives involved in the decision.” (Prob. Code, § 812.) “[T]he determination of a person's mental capacity is fact specific, and the level of required mental capacity changes depending on the issue at hand ... with marital capacity requiring the least amount of capacity, followed by testamentary capacity, and on the high end of the scale is the mental capacity required to enter contracts.” (Greenway, supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 639.) “More complicated decisions and transactions ... require greater mental function ... .” (Andersen v.

Hunt (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 722, 730 [126 Cal. Rptr. 3d 736].)

The complexity of the Agreement here is not undermined by the fact that it was a twopage document because it included references to legal terms, statutes, and waived the constitutional right to a trial. Thus, Plaintiff’s capacity to enter into this Agreement required greater mental function. According to the Declaration of Dunia Aparicio, Ms. Aparicio states that she first contacted Ms. Hamdani to identify whether she had authority to execute the admission paperwork, including the Agreement, on behalf of Plaintiff since she had a Power of Attorney. (Declaration of Dunia Aparicio at ¶ 5.)

Ms. Aparicio states that during her conversation with Ms. Hamdani, she indicated that she only had a Power of Attorney for healthcare decisions and that Plaintiff could execute the paperwork himself. (Ibid.) Ms. Aparicio maintains Plaintiff remained alert and oriented while executing the Agreement. (Ibid.) Ms. Aparicio’s testimony is, however, contravened by Ms. Hamdani’s testimony.

First, Ms. Hamdani states that she does not recall speaking with Ms. Aparicio or anyone on behalf of Defendants concerning Plaintiff’s ability to sign admissions paperwork. (Declaration of Farzana Hamdani [“Hamdani Decl.”] at ¶ 10.) She does not recall telling anyone at the facility that her brother was capable of executing the admissions paperwork himself. (Ibid.) Second, Ms. Hamdani presents evidence of deficits in one or more of Plaintiff’s mental functions. Ms. Hamdani states her brother did not always know where he was and believed he was sleeping at a bank. (Hamdani Decl. at ¶ 5.)

He became upset and confused when Ms. Hamdani told him he was in a care facility. (Ibid.) Ms. Hamdani also states her brother told her he was buying shirts in a store when he was not. (Hamdani Decl. at ¶ 6.) She further states her brother demonstrated confusion between his old caregiver and new caregiver. (Id. at ¶ 9.)

Additionally, the Declaration of Sikander Naqvi especially shows Plaintiff lacked mental capacity in the days leading up to his execution of the Agreement. Mr. Naqvi attaches a text message he received three days before Plaintiff signed the Agreement. (Declaration of Sikander Naqvi, Ex. A.) Therein, Plaintiff states he had attended business meetings in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Belgium when he had just been admitted to the facility the day prior. (Ibid.) The evidence thus supports deficits in each of the four areas described by Probate Code section 811, subdivision (a). Plaintiff, therefore, lacked the ability to understand and appreciate the consequences of signing the Agreement.

To the extent Defendants cite to Dr. Haggerty’s medical records, those records are not attached and nevertheless indicate Plaintiff lacked capacity to make medical decisions just three days prior to the execution of the Agreement. Furthermore, the Court may rely on testimony from family members regarding their personal observations of the individual’s confusion, memory issues, and inability to understand the nature and effect of the document at the time of execution. (Algo-Heyres, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 1071.)

Defendants’ reliance on Harrod v. Country Oaks Partners (2024) 15 Cal.5th 939, 966 is misplaced. That case addressed whether a health care agent with power of attorney for health care decisions had authority to sign an arbitration agreement on behalf of the principal. The California Supreme Court held the health care agent lacked such authority because signing an optional arbitration agreement is not a “health care decision” within the scope of the health care power of attorney. (Id. at p. 966.)

Nevertheless, Harrod did not eliminate the requirement that the principal himself must have capacity to enter into a contract. Thus, the question in Harrod was about the agent’s authority and not the principal’s capacity. Even in the absence of medical records, Ms. Hamdani and Mr. Naqvi’s declarations about Plaintiff’s state of mind cast doubt as to whether Plaintiff had the capacity to understand the legal effect of the Agreement. The evidence creates a factual dispute in this regard. Apart from the testimony of Ms.

Aparicio which is challenged by Plaintiff’s evidence, Defendants have not met their burden by a preponderance of the evidence. “This is a classic example of a trial court drawing a conclusion from conflicting evidence.” (Bannister v. Marinidence Oppo, LLC (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 541, 545 [denying the motion to compel arbitration based on conflicting evidence regarding the respondent’s signature] .) With Plaintiff’s capacity drawn into question, the Court cannot conclude there is a valid agreement to arbitrate.

For these reasons, the motion to compel arbitration is DENIED. The Court need not reach the parties’ remaining arguments.

II. MOTION FOR TRIAL PREFERENCE

A. LEGAL STANDARD

Code of Civil Procedure section 36(a) provides: "A party to a civil action who is over 70 years of age may petition the court for a preference, which the court shall grant if the court makes both of the following findings: (1) The party has a substantial interest in the action as a whole. (2) The health of the party is such that a preference is necessary to prevent prejudicing the party's interest in the litigation.".

The statute is mandatory: where a party meets the requisite standard for calendar preference under subdivision (a), "preference must be granted.". Section 36(a) "was intended by the Legislature to be mandatory and thus requires that a litigant qualifying under its terms be given preferential trial setting irrespective of the circumstances leading to the motion for preference.". The provision is "mandatory and absolute in its application and does not allow a trial court to exercise the inherent or statutory general administrative authority it would otherwise have.".

"[F]ailure to complete discovery or other pretrial matters does not affect the absolute substantive right to trial preference for those litigants who qualify for preference under subdivision (a) of section 36.". "The trial court has no power to balance the differing interests of opposing litigants in applying the provision.". "Mere inconvenience to the court or to other litigants is irrelevant.".

The issue under subdivision (a) is not whether an elderly litigant might die before trial or become disabled; rather, "all subdivision (a) requires is a showing that that party's health ... is such that a preference is necessary to prevent prejudicing [the party's] interest in the litigation.". Section 36(a) "includes no requirement of a doctor's declaration" and "says nothing about 'death or incapacity.'". Only a minimal amount of evidentiary support is required for a movant to prevail on a motion for preference. Section 36.5 permits the medical diagnosis and prognosis to be established through an attorney declaration "based upon information and belief," and such a declaration "can consist entirely of hearsay and conclusions.".

Defendants erroneously conflate section 36(a) with section 36(d). Section 36(d) requires "clear and convincing medical documentation" showing "substantial medical doubt of survival ... beyond six months" and grants discretionary authority to the court. Section 36(a) contains no such requirements and is mandatory, not discretionary.

I. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff Is Over 70 Years of Age - Plaintiff is 71 years old (turning 72 since the motion was filed). The Court takes judicial notice of Exhibit A to the Kang Gordon Declaration, which shows Plaintiff's date of birth as July 21, 1954. This element is satisfied.

Plaintiff Has a Substantial Interest in the Action – Defendants do not contest that Plaintiff has a substantial interest in the action. This element is satisfied.

Plaintiff's Health Is Such That Preference Is Necessary to Prevent Prejudicing His Interest in the Litigation - Plaintiff presents evidence that he is 72 years old and suffers from multiple comorbid health conditions including chronic congestive heart failure, atherosclerotic heart disease, hyperlipidemia, and hypertension. Medical records attached to the Kang Gordon Declaration confirm these diagnoses.

Dr. Venita Chandra, Plaintiff's treating vascular surgeon at Stanford Health Care, states that Plaintiff has been treated by the Vascular Surgery Department since 2023 for peripheral artery disease and has undergone multiple interventions including a left trans-metatarsal amputation and, most recently, a right below-knee amputation. Dr. Chandra opines that "due to his history of amputations, it has been difficult for Mr. Hamdani to mobilize out of bed despite assistance of physical therapy" and that "due to his fall history, general deconditioning, and recent amputations, the patient has been bedridden despite recovering at skilled nursing facility and physical therapist evaluation.". Dr. Chandra concludes: "Given these ongoing issues, time is of the essence for Mr. Hamdani to have his claims heard sooner rather than later.".

Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to provide sufficient evidence of his prognosis and that Dr. Chandra's statement that Plaintiff is "recovering" undermines the motion. This argument misapprehends the legal standard. Section 36(a) does not require evidence of imminent death or a specific prognosis; it requires only a showing that "the health of the party is such that a preference is necessary to prevent prejudicing the party's interest in the litigation.". The evidence shows an elderly plaintiff with serious chronic conditions, bilateral amputations, significant mobility limitations, and a bedridden status. This is sufficient to show that delay in bringing the case to trial would prejudice his ability to participate meaningfully in the litigation.

Defendants' reliance on section 36(d)'s "clear and convincing" standard and requirement of medical doubt of survival beyond six months is misplaced. Plaintiff proceeds under section 36(a), which imposes no such requirements.

Defendants' Arguments Regarding Court Authority and Arbitration.

Since the petition to compel arbitration is denied, there is no impediment to ruling on the motion for preference.

Defendants' Arguments Regarding Prejudice and Discovery

Defendants argue that granting preference would deprive them of adequate time to prepare for trial and conduct discovery, particularly given the complexity of the elder abuse and Residents' Rights claims.

This argument is foreclosed by controlling authority. Section 36(a) is "mandatory and absolute in its application" and does not permit the court to balance competing interests or consider the convenience of other parties. "[F]ailure to complete discovery or other pretrial matters does not affect the absolute substantive right to trial preference for those litigants who qualify for preference under subdivision (a) of section 36.". "The trial court has no power to balance the differing interests of opposing litigants in applying the provision.". "Mere inconvenience to the court or to other litigants is irrelevant.".

The Legislature has determined that when a party over 70 years of age demonstrates substantial interest in an action and that his or her health is such that preference is necessary to prevent prejudice, the motion "shall" be granted "irrespective of the circumstances leading to the motion for preference.". Defendants' concerns about discovery and trial preparation, while understandable, are not relevant considerations under section 36(a).

DISPOSITION

The motion to compel arbitration is DENIED.

Motion for Trial Preference is GRANTED.

Pursuant to CCP section 36(f), the matter shall be set for trial not more than 120 days from the date of this order, absent a showing of physical disability of a party or attorney, or other exceptional circumstances stated in the record. The parties are ordered to appear to set all related pretrial and trial dates consistent with this ruling.

Discovery and motion cutoff dates shall be set in accordance with the trial date.

The Court will prepare the Order.

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