Motion by Defendant GENERAL MOTORS, LLC for Judgment on the Pleadings
Browse all Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings rulings statewide →
FITZGERALD v. GENERAL MOTORS, LLC Case No. cu25-02687
Motion by Defendant GENERAL MOTORS, LLC for Judgment on the Pleadings
TENTATIVE RULING
For statutory lemon law claims in which restitution or replacement is sought on a vehicle which was issued an express warranty, and when the vehicle manufacturer opted in to its coverage, a six year from date of purchase limitations period applies to cases filed after December 31, 2024. C.C.P. §§871.20 and 871.21.
Plaintiff purchased the subject vehicle on February 23, 2019, and did not file his initial complaint until March 21, 2025, which is more than six years later.
However, the court finds that the six-year limitations period does not bar this action, for a couple of independent reasons.
First, GM did not opt in to the application of this limitations period until April 23, 2025, over a month after Plaintiff had filed the initial complaint.
It does not seem fair to the court to allow a manufacturer’s actions subsequent to the filing of a complaint to determine whether the complaint was or was not timely filed.
Alternatively, the court finds that Emergency Rule 9 extended by approximately six months the deadline for filing a complaint, as that rule states:
Notwithstanding any other law, the statutes of limitations and repose for civil causes of action that exceed 180 days are tolled from April 6, 2020, until October 1, 2020.
While GM argued that it was a Judicial Council rule that was subordinate to statutes enacted by the Legislature, the case GM relied upon is easily distinguished. Ables v. A. Ghazale Brothers, Inc. (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 823, 827.
Ables involved Emergency Rule 10, which extended by six months the five years to trial deadline. The plaintiff had failed to make it to trial within five and a half years, and argued that the Emergency rule also constituted a statute that under C.C.P. §583.310 tolled the running of the statute of limitations an additional six months. It was in that context that the Ables court found Emergency Rule 10 was not a statute, and so did not both extend by six months and toll for an additional six months that five year rule.
As a later case explained:
Looking for case law or statutes not cited here? Search published authorities
Examples: “Why did the court rule this way?” · “What were the procedural grounds?” · “Is appearance required?”
Government Code section 68115, subdivision (a) provides the Judicial Council with special authority during an event that poses a substantial risk to the health
and welfare of court personnel and the public or a condition that results in the United States President or the Governor declaring a state of emergency. This includes the express authority to extend the time under section 583.310 to bring an action to trial. (Gov. Code, § 68115, subd. (a)(6).) As discussed above, emergency rule 10(a) was one of 11 rules enacted as a direct result of Governor Newsom’s declaration of a state of emergency during the COVID-19 pandemic. Therefore, the Judicial Council had full authority under Government Code section 68115 to pass emergency rule 10(a) and extend the time in which matters could be brought to trial under section 583.310. Accordingly, at the time of the hearing on Santa Clara VTA’s motion to dismiss, Barron still had until July 31, 2022, or five years six months from the time of filing her complaint, to bring her matter to trial.
In the trial court and on appeal, Santa Clara VTA argues that the Ables holding effectively invalidated emergency rule 10(a) by finding that Judicial Council rules were not statutes and therefore could not amend existing statutory deadlines. We find Ables legally and factually inapposite.
In Ables, the plaintiff filed a complaint for negligence in July 2015. (Ables, supra, 74 Cal.App.5th at p. 826.) After conducting discovery for a number of years, the plaintiff filed a request in November 2019 for the trial date to be continued. (Ibid.) The court subsequently continued the trial date to March 2021, which was over five years seven months from when the plaintiff first filed her complaint. (Ibid.) After the defendants filed motions to dismiss for failure to prosecute within five years, the plaintiff argued that emergency rule 10(a) entitled her to an additional six months under section 583.350 in which to bring the matter to trial, thus giving her a total time of six years to bring the case to trial after filing. (Ables, at p. 826.)
The trial court rejected this argument, stating that while emergency rule 10(a) extended the time in which the action could be brought to trial by six months under section 583.310, it did not constitute a statute entitling the plaintiff to an additional six-month extension under section 583.350. (Ables, at p. 828, italics added.) As the plaintiff’s case was not brought to trial within the five-year sixmonth period, the court granted the motions to dismiss. (Id. at p. 826.)
In affirming the trial court’s decision, the appellate court agreed that emergency rule 10(a) was not a statute and therefore did not trigger the extra six-month period provided under section 583.350. (Ables, supra, 74 Cal.App.5th at p. 828.) However, at no time did the court state that emergency rule 10(a) was invalid, which Santa Clara VTA concedes. The court simply noted that the rule did not toll the five-year period in section 583.310 but instead extended the time in which to bring an action to trial. (Ables, at p. 828, fn. 5.)
In fact, the court acknowledged the validity of emergency rule 10(a) in the opinion by noting twice that the plaintiff had until January 2021, or a total time of five years six months, to bring the matter to trial. (Ables, at p. 828; see also id. at p. 828, fn. 5; see also State ex rel. Sills v. Gharib-Danesh (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 824, 840 [304 Cal. Rptr. 3d 865] [citing Ables for the proposition that emergency rule 10(a) extended the five-year
rule to five years six months for any cases filed on or before Apr. 6, 2020].) Barron v. Santa Clara County Valley Transportation Authority (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 1115, 1124-1125.
Thus, the court denies GM’s motion to strike the first three causes of action.
The court also denies GM’s motion as to the 4th cause of action, for breach of implied warranty.
In general, an implied warranty of habitability is “coextensive in duration with an express warranty which accompanies the consumer goods”. Mexia v. Rinker Boat Co., Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1297, 1304.
GM argued that a four year limitations period applies, running from the date of delivery.
Commercial Code §2725 sets a four year limitations period for breach of warranty, running from the date of delivery of the goods unless the parties expressly extended it to future performance.
The key case cited by GM involved a warranty that a spring probe connector would have a “mechanical life” of 50,000 cycles. Cardinal Health 301, Inc. v. Tyco Electronics Corp. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 116. It was because the warranty did not set a specific time deadline that the court found the four years ran from date of delivery. Id. at 130 [“the ‘future performance’ exception applies only when the future warranty refers to a specific future time period”].
The Cardinal Health court then distinguished this from a situation where the manufactured item was a vehicle, and the express warranty stated a specific number of years that it applied.
[The case of Krieger v. Nick Alexander Imports, Inc. (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 205] provides an example of a warranty that explicitly extends to future performance because it contains an express time limit. The automobile warranty stated the defendant would repair defects for 36 months or the first 36,000 miles, whichever occurs first—thus creating a defined three-year outer limit for the warranty period (Krieger, supra, 234 Cal.App.3d at p. 216.) Moreover, the Krieger court focused on the promise to repair the vehicle during the warranty period. The court stated: “A promise to repair defects that occur during a future period is the very definition of express warranty of future performance ... .” (Id. at p. 217.) Here, the warranty did not include a similar promise to repair. Id. at 133.
In the present case, GM provided a 3 year, 36,000 mile express warranty, in effect warranting future performance until February 23, 2022 (three years after date of purchase). Plaintiff filed his initial complaint on March 21, 2025, a little more than three years thereafter, and thus within the four-year breach of implied warranty cause of action.
The court grants GM’s motion for judgment on the pleadings on the 5th cause of action for fraudulent inducement—concealment.
C.C.P. §338(d) sets a three-year from discovery limitations period to bring a cause of action for fraud.
Plaintiff’s first amended complaint alleges that “Defects and nonconformities to warranty manifested themselves within the applicable express warranty period, including but not limited to engine defects, transmission defects, electrical defects, among other defects and non-conformities” [¶11].
As earlier noted, GM’s express warranty was for 3 years or 36,000 miles. Thus, for the purchase date of February 23, 2019, that period ended as of February 23, 2022.
Plaintiff’s initial complaint was filed on March 21, 2025, more than three years later.
Unlike for the longer six-year limitations period, no part of the three-year limitations period from this admitted discovery involved the almost six month time period back in 2020, which Emergency Rule 9 covers (or if the claim was discovered within a year or two after purchase, the three-year limitations period including COVID tolling would have expired long before Plaintiff filed his initial complaint).
GM is therefore entitled to judgment on the pleadings on the 5th cause of action for fraudulent inducement—concealment, without leave to amend.
With GM having earlier filed an answer to the 1st amended complaint, the pleadings are now set.
MARQUIEL YOUNG v. SHAILA HOLDINGS LLC et al. Case No. CU25-07357
SHAILA and JUNAID’s Motion to Strike Punitive Damages
TENTATIVE RULING
Defendants SHAILA HOLDINGS LLC and NADER JUNAID (“Moving Defendants”) move to strike the allegations and prayer within Plaintiff MARQUIEL YOUNG’s first amended complaint (“1AC”) concerning punitive damages. Summarized, Plaintiff alleges that she rented a residence from Defendants (including Defendant VIRGINIA HILLS LLC) that was not habitable due to cockroaches, mold, a dirty air system, cracking paint, and more. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants retaliated against her in violation of Civil Code section 1942.5 by moving to evict her because she complained about the uninhabitable premises.