Bryan Finkel vs. General Motors, LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company

for: (1) Breach of Implied Warranty of Merchantability under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act; (2) Breach of Express Warranty under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act; and (3) Fraudulent Concealment.

On April 14, 2026, GM filed this judgment on the pleadings as to the third cause of action for fraudulent inducement-concealment cause of action on the ground that Plaintiff fails to state facts sufficient to establish fraud and fails to plead such facts with the requisite specificity. Defendant also moves for judgment on the pleadings on the basis that Plaintiff fails to allege a transactional relationship giving rise to a duty to disclose. The Court notes that while GM cites Code of Civil Procedure section 438(c)(2)(B)(ii) as grounds for its motion in the text of its notice, GM subsequently and inconsistently states that its motion is made based upon Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10(e) which applies to demurrers and has no application to a motion for judgment on the pleadings. (Motion at 2:18-24.)

While this defect alone warrants denial of GM’s motion, the Court will proceed to address additional bases requiring denial of this motion.

Additionally, the Court notes that on May 23, 2022, GM filed a demurrer which included GM’s argument that “[t]he third cause of action, for Fraudulent Inducement- Concealment, fails to state facts sufficient to establish the fraud cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., §430.10(e).)” (Demurrer at 2:11-12.) On September 20, 2022, the Court (Judge Krueger) stayed GM’s demurrer “pending the California Supreme Court’s ruling on the question certified to it by Rattagan v. Uber Technologies (9th Cir. 2021) 19 F.4th 1188.” (Minute Order, September 20, 2022.)

The Court specifically directed GM “to place this matter back on calendar for hearing after the Supreme Court’s opinion in Rattagan is issued.” (Ibid.) According to the Register of Actions, despite the Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Rattagan, GM apparently failed to comply with the Court’s order and did not place its demurrer back on calendar. As such, GM’s demurrer – which in part is based upon the same argument raised in the present motion – remains pending. GM’s failure to comply with the Court’s September 20, 2022 order warrants denial of this motion in part as to the same challenge which still remains pending in GM’s demurrer.

Nonetheless, again, the Court will proceed to address additional bases requiring denial of GM’s present motion.

Plaintiff opposes GM’s motion.

II.

Legal Standard

A motion for judgment on the pleadings has the same function as a general demurrer,

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2022-00318084-CU-BC-GDS: Bryan Finkel vs. General Motors, LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company 07/23/2026 Hearing on Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings in Department 16D

but may be made after the time for demurrer has expired. (See Code Civ. Proc. §438.) The motion may be directed either at the entire complaint or answer, or at any cause of action or affirmative defense set forth in the pleadings (Code Civ. Proc. §438(c)(2).) When the moving party is the defendant, as in the instant motion, there are two permissible grounds: (a) The court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, or (b) the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the defendant. (Code Civ. Proc. §438(c)(1)(B).)

Except as provided by statute, a motion for judgment on the pleadings is analyzed like a general demurrer. (Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 999.) Thus, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the Court may extend consideration to matters that are subject to judicial notice; in doing so, the Court performs essentially the same task as ruling on a general demurrer. (Smiley v. Citibank (1995) 11 C.4th 138, 146.) The Court sets out the general rules governing demurrers below.

A demurrer “tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters.” (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) The purpose of a demurrer is to test the legal sufficiency of a claim. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) For the purpose of determining the effect of a complaint, its allegations are liberally construed, with a view toward substantial justice. (Code Civ. Proc. §452; Amarel v. Connell (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 137, 140-141; Quelimane Co. v.

Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 43, fn. 7.) The Court treats the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law, and considers matters which may be judicially noticed. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Poseidon Development, Inc. v. Woodland Lane Estates, LLC (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1111-1112.) A general demurrer does not admit contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law alleged in the complaint; facts impossible in law; or allegations contrary to facts of which a court may take judicial notice. (Blank, supra, 39 Cal. 3d at p. 318; William S.

Hart Union High School Dist. v. Regional Planning Com. (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1612, 1616, fn. 2.) Extrinsic evidence may not properly be considered on demurrer or on a motion to strike. (Ion Equipment Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881; Hibernia Savings & Loan Soc. v. Thornton (1897) 117 C.481, 482.)

A demurrer may be sustained only if the complaint lacks any sufficient allegations to entitle the plaintiff to relief. (Financial Corp. of America v. Wilburn (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 764, 778.) “Plaintiff need only plead facts showing that he may be entitled to some relief . . ., we are not concerned with plaintiff’s possible inability or difficulty in

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2022-00318084-CU-BC-GDS: Bryan Finkel vs. General Motors, LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company 07/23/2026 Hearing on Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings in Department 16D

proving the allegations of the complaint.” (Highlanders, Inc. v. Olsan (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 690, 696-697.) “[Courts] are required to construe the complaint liberally to determine whether a cause of action has been stated, given the assumed truth of the facts pleaded.” (Picton v. Anderson Union High School Dist. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 726, 733.) A demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pled and the sole issue raised by a general demurrer is whether the facts pled state a valid cause of action - not whether they are true. (Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 591.)

Where “a motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted as to the original complaint, denial of leave to amend constitutes an abuse of discretion if the pleading does not show on its face that it is incapable of amendment.” (Virginia G. v. ABC Unified School Dist. (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1848, 1852.)

III. Fifth Cause of Action - Fraudulent Inducement- Concealment

A. Specificity

GM argues that Plaintiff fails to allege the fraud cause of action with specificity because he purportedly fails to allege the specific “facts” that GM allegedly failed to disclose; allegations establishing that GM knew of those “facts” at the time Plaintiff purchased his vehicle; what specific advertisements, brochures, or other materials where GM could have disclosed the allegedly omitted “facts” that Plaintiff reviewed and relied upon in purchasing the Subject Vehicle; how long prior to purchasing the vehicle he viewed them; whether those materials, if any, were prepared by GM or someone else (such as a dealership), and that GM intended to defraud him.

The elements of a claim for fraudulent concealment require the plaintiff to show that: “(1) the defendant ... concealed or suppressed a material fact, (2) the defendant [was] under a duty to disclose the fact to the plaintiff, (3) the defendant ... intentionally concealed or suppressed the fact with the intent to defraud the plaintiff, (4) the plaintiff [was] unaware of the fact and would not have acted as he did if he had known of the concealed or suppressed fact, and (5) as a result of the concealment or suppression of the fact, the plaintiff must have sustained damage. [Citation.]” (Prakashpalan v.

Engstrom, Lipscomb & Lack (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1105, 1130.) A duty to disclose material facts may arise not only when the defendant is in a fiduciary relationship with the plaintiff but also when the defendant has exclusive knowledge of material facts not known to the plaintiff or when the defendant actively conceals a material fact from the plaintiff. (LiMandri v. Judkins (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 326, 336.)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2022-00318084-CU-BC-GDS: Bryan Finkel vs. General Motors, LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company 07/23/2026 Hearing on Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings in Department 16D

The Court’s consideration of GM’s motion for judgment on the pleadings as to Plaintiff’s fraudulent concealment cause of action is guided by two principles. First, in evaluating the factual underpinnings of a fraudulent concealment claim at the pleading stage, the Court focuses its inquiry on the unique elements of the claim as asserted by Plaintiff. (Rattagan v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2024) 17 Cal.5th 1, 43-44 [citations omitted].) “For instance . . . [i]f the duty [of disclosure] allegedly arose by virtue of the parties’ relationship and the defendant’s exclusive knowledge or access to certain facts the complaint must also include specific allegations establishing all the required elements, including (1) the content of the omitted facts, (2) the defendant’s awareness of the materiality of those facts, (3) the inaccessibility of the facts to the plaintiff, (4) the general point at which the omitted facts should or could have been revealed, and (5) justifiable and actual reliance, either through action or forbearance, based on the defendant’s omission.” (Ibid.)

Second, although in California, fraud must be pled specifically, courts have repeatedly recognized that “‘it is harder to apply [the requirement of specificity] to a case of simple nondisclosure. “How does one show ‘how’ and ‘by what means’ something didn’t happen, or ‘when’ it never happened, or ‘where’ it never happened?”’ [Citation.]” (Jones v. ConocoPhillips Co. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1187, 1199.) At the same time, allegations that merely plead legal conclusions of fraud are insufficient. (Tindell v.

Murphy (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1239, 1249.) Thus, even in cases involving claims of fraudulent concealment, “‘the facts and circumstances which constitute the fraud should be set out clearly, concisely, and with sufficient particularity to apprise the opposite party of what he is called on to answer, and to enable the court to determine whether, on the facts pleaded, there is any foundation, prima facie at least, for the charge of fraud.’ [Citation.]” (Scafidi v. Western Loan & Bldg. Co. (1946) 72 Cal.App.2d 550, 553.)

In the context of a case alleging fraudulent concealment of transmission defects in a purchased vehicle, the Court of Appeal in Dhital v. Nissan North America, Inc. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 828, 844, held that the plaintiffs had adequately alleged the elements of fraudulent concealment/suppression where they alleged: (1) the transmissions in numerous vehicles, including the one purchased by the plaintiffs, were defective; (2) the manufacturer knew of the Defects and the hazards posed; (3) the manufacturer had exclusive knowledge of the defects but intentionally concealed and failed to disclose the information, (4) the plaintiff would not have purchased the car if they knew of the defects; and (5) the plaintiffs suffered damages in the form of the money paid to purchase the car.

The Dhital Court found sufficient allegations that the defects caused hesitation, shaking, jerking, and failure to function as well as allegations that the manufacturer was aware of the defects based on premarket testing and consumer

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2022-00318084-CU-BC-GDS: Bryan Finkel vs. General Motors, LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company 07/23/2026 Hearing on Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings in Department 16D

complaints. (Ibid.)

Here, Plaintiff alleges that GM was aware of the transmission defects, but it failed to disclose this fact at the time of the sale. (Complaint, ¶¶ 15-20.) Plaintiff alleges that GM was aware of the defect based “the numerous complaints it has received directly from consumers, information provided to authorized dealers via Technical Service Bulletins, information received directly from Defendants’ authorized dealers. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (‘NHTSA’) complaints, and its own internal records (including durability testing and failure rates), requests from Defendants’ authorized dealerships for technical assistance regarding the Defective Transmission and warranty costs outlaid due to the Defective Transmission.” (Id., ¶ 19, 40-59.)

Plaintiff also alleges that he would not have purchased the Subject Vehicle or would have paid substantially less for it if he had been aware of the defects. (Id., ¶ 22, 66.) Plaintiff alleges that GM had a duty to disclose the defect given its knowledge thereof prior to Plaintiff’s purchase and due to Plaintiff’s inability to have discovered the defects until after he purchased the Subject Vehicle. (Id., ¶ 70-83.) Plaintiff alleges GM knowingly and intentionally concealed these facts, which were material to any decision to purchase the Subject Vehicle. (Id., ¶¶ 33, 57, 65.)

Plaintiff alleges that he has suffered actual damages as a result. (Id., ¶¶ 24, 113.)

Accepting Plaintiff’s allegations at true, the Court concludes that Plaintiff pleads the cause of action with the requisite specificity. The motion on this ground is DENIED.

B. Duty to Disclose

GM also argues that Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to establish a duty to disclose, including a direct transactional relationship between GM and Plaintiff.

This argument is rejected. Contrary to GM’s argument, no transactional relationship between the manufacturer of a product and subsequent purchasers is necessary to bring a fraudulent omission claim because a manufacturer has a duty to disclose material facts not only to immediate purchasers, but to subsequent purchasers when the manufacturer has reason to know that the subject product will be resold. (See OCM Principal Opportunities Fund v. CIBC World Markets Corp. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 835, 859-860.) The case law cited by GM does not involve such a scenario and in any event dealt with the sufficiency of evidence at trial. (Bigler-Engler v. Breg, Inc. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 276, 312-313.)

In addition, the Song-Beverly Act treats a manufacturer and its representatives in “this

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2022-00318084-CU-BC-GDS: Bryan Finkel vs. General Motors, LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company 07/23/2026 Hearing on Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings in Department 16D

state” or “agents” as a single entity. (Ibrahim v. Ford Motor Co. (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 878, 889; Dhital, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th 828, 844-845 [finding allegations sufficient for pleading stage where the plaintiffs alleged that they bought the car from a manufacturer dealership, the manufacturer backed the car with an express warranty, and the manufacturer’s authorized dealerships are to be agents for purposes of the sale of their vehicles to consumers].)

In this case, Plaintiff alleges facts sufficient to show that GM was aware that the Subject Vehicle would be sold on the open market. Plaintiff also alleges that he the Subject Vehicle was backed by express warranties from GM. Plaintiff further alleges that GM had a warranty relationship with Plaintiff. These allegations are sufficient to withstand GM’s challenge that a transactional relationship was not alleged because Plaintiff did not allege he purchased the Subject Vehicle directly from GM.

Additionally, the Court further notes that a duty to disclose material facts may arise not only when the defendant is in a fiduciary relationship with the plaintiff but also when the defendant has exclusive knowledge of material facts not known to the plaintiff or when the defendant actively conceals a material fact from the plaintiff. (LiMandri v. Judikins (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 326, 336.) As discussed above, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged such facts. (Complaint, ¶¶ 40-59, 70-83.)

Thus, the motion for judgment on the pleadings is DENIED on this ground as well.

IV.

Disposition

Accordingly, Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is DENIED in its entirety.

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1019.5; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1312.)