TARP vs GENERAL MOTORS, LLC., et al.

A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the

24CV026294: TARP vs GENERAL MOTORS, LLC., et al. 08/06/2026 Hearing on Demurrer (Lemon Law) to plf's First Amended Complaint in Department 16D

hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

*** EFFECTIVE APRIL 13, 2026, THIS DEPARTMENT HAS MOVED TO THE TANI G. CANTIL-SAKAUYE COURTHOUSE LOCATED AT 500 G STREET IN SACRAMENTO, CA 95814. ALL HEARINGS NOTICED FOR DEPARTMENT 53 WILL BE HEARD IN DEPARTMENT 16D OF THE NEW COURTHOUSE. ***

TENTATIVE RULING:

Defendant General Motors, LLC’s demurrer to Plaintiff Kelly Ann Tarp’s first amended complaint (“FAC”) is overruled.

In this Lemon Law action, Plaintiff alleges she purchased Certified Pre-Owned 2017 GMC Yukon XL (“Vehicle”) with transmission defects. (FAC ¶¶ 6, 60.) Plaintiff alleges the defects result in “(1) hesitation or delayed acceleration, (2) harsh or hard shifting, (3) jerking, (4) shuddering, or juddering; (5) surging and/or inability to control the vehicle’s speed, acceleration, or deceleration, (6) symptoms requiring reprogramming of the transmission control module (“TCM”) and/or powertrain control module (“PCM”), (7) failure or replacement of the transmission ('Transmission Defect'). (Id. ¶ 61.) “These conditions present a safety hazard and are unreasonably dangerous to consumers because they can suddenly and unexpectedly cause the driver to be unable to control the speed and acceleration/deceleration of the vehicle.

Such unexpected loss of acceleration or inability to control the vehicle’s speed and acceleration/deceleration thereby, exposes Plaintiff and passengers (along with other drivers who share the road or garage with Plaintiff) to a serious risk of accident and injury.” (Ibid.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant was aware or should have been aware of the defect prior to her purchase of the Vehicle. Plaintiff alleges Defendant was aware of the defect “through sources not available to consumers such as Plaintiff, including but not limited to pre-production and post-production testing data; early consumer complaints about the Transmission Defect

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV026294: TARP vs GENERAL MOTORS, LLC., et al. 08/06/2026 Hearing on Demurrer (Lemon Law) to plf's First Amended Complaint in Department 16D

made directly to Defendant GM and its network of dealers; aggregate warranty data compiled from Defendant GM's network of dealers; testing conducted by Defendant GM in response to these complaints; as well as warranty repair and part replacements data received by Defendant GM from Defendant GM's network of dealers, amongst other sources of internal information.” (Id. ¶ 62.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant actively concealed and failed to disclose the defect at the time of the sale. (Id. ¶¶ 59-71.)

Defendant demurs to the fifth cause of action for fraudulent concealment. The Court notes that Plaintiff untimely filed an opposition on July 28, 2026, despite the requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 1005(b). While the Courts has, in its discretion, considered the opposition, the Court finds that Defendant has failed to satisfy its initial burden as demurring party for the reasons set forth herein.

A demurrer “tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters.” (SKF Farms v. Super. Ct. (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) The purpose of a demurrer is to test the legal sufficiency of a claim. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal. App. 4th 968, 994.) For the purpose of determining the effect of a complaint, its allegations are liberally construed, with a view toward substantial justice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 452; Amarel v. Connell (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 137, 140-141; Quelimane Co. v.

Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 43, fn. 7.) The Court treats the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law, and considers matters which may be judicially noticed. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d at 318; Poseidon Development, Inc. v. Woodland Lane Estates, LLC (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1111-1112.) A general demurrer does not admit contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law alleged in the complaint; facts impossible in law; or allegations contrary to facts of which a court may take judicial notice. (Blank, supra, 39 Cal.3d at 318; William S.

Hart Union High School Dist. v. Regional Planning Com. (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1612, 1616 fn.2.) Extrinsic evidence may not properly be considered on demurrer or on a motion to strike. (Ion Equipment Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal. App. 3d 868, 881; Hibernia Savings & Loan Soc. v. Thornton (1897) 117 Cal. 481, 482.)

A demurrer may be sustained only if the complaint lacks any sufficient allegations to entitle the plaintiff to relief. (Financial Corp. of America v. Wilburn (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 764, 778.) “Plaintiff need only plead facts showing that he may be entitled to some relief . . ., we are not concerned with plaintiff's possible inability or difficulty in proving the allegations of the complaint.” (Highlanders, Inc. v. Olsan (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 690, 696-697.) “[Courts] are required to construe the complaint liberally to determine whether a cause of action has been stated, given the assumed truth of the

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV026294: TARP vs GENERAL MOTORS, LLC., et al. 08/06/2026 Hearing on Demurrer (Lemon Law) to plf's First Amended Complaint in Department 16D

facts pleaded.” (Picton v. Anderson Union High School Dist. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 726.) A demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pled and the sole issue raised by a general demurrer is whether the facts pled state a valid cause of action - not whether they are true. (Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 591.)

Fifth Cause of Action (Fraudulent Inducement-Concealment)

Defendant’s demurrer is overruled. Defendant argues that the fraud cause of action fails because it is barred by the statute of limitations, Plaintiff failed to plead fraud with specificity, and failed to allege a transactional relationship.

Statute of Limitations

Defendant first argues that Plaintiff’s Fifth Cause of Action is barred by the three-year statute of limitations in Code of Civil Procedure section 338(d) governing fraud claims. The Court disagrees.

Defendant contends the statute of limitations accrued on the date the Vehicle was purchased, August 1, 2018, and that it expired three years later on August 1, 2021.[1] The initial Complaint was filed on December 24, 2024. Plaintiff alleges that she did not discover the facts giving rise to their claims, or even have reason to suspect any wrongdoing until shortly before the action was filed as the Vehicle continued to exhibit symptoms after Defendant’s unsuccessful attempts to repair. (FAC ¶¶ 23, 26–33.)

The statute of limitations for a fraud cause of action is three years. (Code Civ. Proc., § 338, subd. (d).) The statute provides that a fraud cause of action does not accrue until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake. The statute begins to run when the plaintiff “obtains knowledge of facts sufficient to make a reasonably prudent person suspicious of fraud. The action therefore accrues when a plaintiff has notice or information of circumstances sufficient to put a reasonable person on inquiry: i.e., when ‘the plaintiff’ suspects or should suspect that her injury was caused by wrongdoing.” (Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1103, 1110; see also Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 807.)

Plaintiff alleges that the defect was fraudulently concealed at the time she purchased the Vehicle and thus, she could not have been on notice of the defects on that date. When and how Plaintiff should have reasonably become aware that Defendant concealed facts at the time she purchased the Vehicle is an inherent question of fact that cannot be resolved at the pleading stage. Resolution of a statute of limitations issue

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV026294: TARP vs GENERAL MOTORS, LLC., et al. 08/06/2026 Hearing on Demurrer (Lemon Law) to plf's First Amended Complaint in Department 16D

is normally a question of fact. (Fox, supra, 35 Cal.4th at 810.) To that end, “[a] demurrer based on a statute of limitations will not lie where the action may be, but is not necessarily, barred. In order for the bar of the statute of limitations to be raised by demurrer, the defect must clearly and affirmatively appear on the face of the complaint; it is not enough that the complaint shows that the action may be barred.” (Guardian North Bay, Inc. v. Super. Ct. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 963, 971-972 [citation omitted]. [emphasis added].)

Indeed, it may have taken numerous unsuccessful repair attempts before a reasonable person would even begin to suspect fraudulent concealment. Plaintiff pled she was unaware of the defects in the Vehicle and that Defendant had knowledge of the defects. (FAC ¶¶ 60-65.) Plaintiff further pleads that she discovered the facts giving rise to the complaint shortly before the action was filed. (Id. ¶¶ 23-33.) This is sufficient. Plaintiff has not, as Defendant implies, admitted she discovered the wrongful conduct by alleging that the Vehicle contained/developed defects during the warranty period. Those allegations simply set forth when the alleged defects that arose, not when Plaintiff discovered them. They are not allegations of discovery of fraudulent concealment.

The statute of limitations defect does not appear on the face of the complaint.

The demurrer on the basis that the Fifth Cause of Action is barred by the statute of limitations is overruled.

Adequacy of Fraud Allegations

The elements of fraud “are (a) misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (b) knowledge of falsity (or ‘scienter’); (c) intent to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (d) justifiable reliance; and (e) resulting damage.” (Lazar v. Super. Ct. (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 638.) A failure to disclose a material fact can constitute actionable fraud. (Collins v. eMachines, Inc. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 249, 255.)

When pleading a claim for fraud/negligent misrepresentation, each and every element must be alleged, 'and the facts constituting the fraud must be alleged with sufficient specificity to allow defendant to understand fully the nature of the charge made.” (Stansfield v. Starkey (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 59, 73; Cadlo v. Owens-Illinois, lnc. (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 513, 519 (stating that '[e]ach element in a cause of action for fraud or negligent misrepresentation must be factually and specifically alleged').

“The required elements for fraudulent concealment are (1) concealment or suppression

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV026294: TARP vs GENERAL MOTORS, LLC., et al. 08/06/2026 Hearing on Demurrer (Lemon Law) to plf's First Amended Complaint in Department 16D

of a material fact; (2) by a defendant with a duty to disclose the fact; (3) the defendant intended to defraud the plaintiff by intentionally concealing or suppressing the fact; (4) the plaintiff was unaware of the fact and would have acted differently if the concealed or suppressed fact was known; and (5) the plaintiff sustained damage as a result of the concealment or suppression of the material fact.” (Rattagan v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2024) 17 Cal. 5th 1, 40; Bigler-Engler v. Breg, Inc. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 276, 310 311 [same]; see also Lazar, supra, 12 Cal.4th at 638.)

The Court first rejects Defendant’s arguments that the fraudulent omission claim is not pled with the requisite specificity. Plaintiff alleges Defendant was aware, or should have been aware of the defect, but failed to disclose this fact at the time of the sale, causing her harm. (FAC ¶¶ 60-71.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant was aware or should have been aware of the defect prior to their purchase of the Vehicle. Plaintiff alleges Defendant was aware of the defect “through sources not available to consumers such as Plaintiff, including but not limited to pre-production and post-production testing data; early consumer complaints about the Transmission Defect made directly to Defendant GM and its network of dealers; aggregate warranty data compiled from Defendant GM's network of dealers; testing conducted by Defendant GM in response to these complaints; as well as warranty repair and part replacements data received by Defendant GM from Defendant GM's network of dealers, amongst other sources of internal information.” (Id. ¶ 62.)

Plaintiff alleges that she would not have purchased the Vehicle had she been aware of the defect. (Id. ¶¶ 63, 68.) Plaintiff also alleges that the defect poses safety risks. (Id. ¶ 61.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant knowingly and intentionally concealed these facts which were material to any decision to purchase the Vehicle. (Id. ¶¶ 59-71.)

While Defendant argues Plaintiff failed to allege fraud with the specificity required when it is alleged against a corporation, this is a fraudulent omission cause of action, not a fraud claim based upon an affirmative misrepresentation. Plaintiff cannot plead that anyone at Defendant made a false representation because the claim is premised on a failure to disclose. A plaintiff asserting a concealment theory will “not be able to specify the time, place, and specific content of an omission as precisely as would a plaintiff in a false representation claim.” (Falk v.

General Motors Corp. (N.D.Cal. 2007) 496 F.Supp.2d 1088, 1098-99.) Such a claim “can succeed without the same level of specificity required by a normal fraud claim.” (Ibid.) The specificity rule is relaxed in actions premised on intentional concealment or nondisclosure. (Alfaro v. Community Housing Improvement System & Planning Assn. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1356, 1384.) “How does one show ‘how’ and ‘by what means’ something didn’t happen, or ‘when’ it never happened, or ‘where it never happened?” (Ibid. [noting that the statement of the

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV026294: TARP vs GENERAL MOTORS, LLC., et al. 08/06/2026 Hearing on Demurrer (Lemon Law) to plf's First Amended Complaint in Department 16D

specificity rule 'reveals that it is intended to apply to affirmative misrepresentations'].)

To the extent Defendant argues Plaintiff failed to specifically allege facts about its knowledge of the defects, its intent to induce reliance, or any active concealment, as set forth above, Plaintiff has alleged extensive facts regarding Defendant’s specific knowledge of the transmission defect and the intent to induce Plaintiff’s reliance. (FAC ¶¶ 60–73.) Contrary to Defendant’s argument, Plaintiff alleges the content of the omitted facts, specifically that the Vehicle had defects which pose safety risks. (Id. ¶ 61.)

In order to be actionable, a fraudulent omission “must be contrary to a representation actually made by the defendant, or an omission of a fact the defendant was obliged to disclose.” (Daugherty v. Amer. Honda Motor Co., Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 824, 835.) According to the allegations, GM was under a duty to disclose material facts given the allegations that it had exclusive knowledge of the alleged defect which was not known to Plaintiff and also because it actively concealed such information. (LiMandri v.

Judkins (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 326, 336.) Whether non-disclosed information is material is generally a question of fact. “In order for non-disclosed information to be material, a Plaintiff must show that had the omitted material been disclosed, one would have been aware of it and behaved differently.” (Mirkin v. Wsserman (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1082, 1093.) For pleading purposes, Plaintiff pled that the defects were material given the safety risks they allegedly posed and the allegations that Plaintiff would not have purchased the Vehicle if the information had been disclosed.

Indeed, even non-safety risks that manifest within the warranty period are material. '[A] manufacturer has a duty to disclose any defects that fall within the warranty period, whether relating to safety or to costly repairs that would have caused the consumer to not purchase the car if they had been disclosed. (Jekowsky v. BMW of N. Am., LLC (N.D.Cal. 2013) 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175374, at *15-16.) Thus, even if Plaintiff had not alleged that the defect was a safety risk, she alleged the defect arose during the warranty period. (FAC ¶ 11.)

In sum, Plaintiff’s fraudulent inducement-concealment claim is pled with the requisite specificity. Plaintiff alleged that Defendant concealed material facts regarding the defect at the time she purchased the vehicle and thereafter by failing to disclose the defect at the time of purchase and repair at Defendant’s authorized repair facilities. Plaintiff sufficiently alleged facts showing concealment of a material fact, that Defendant had a duty to disclose that fact, that Defendant intended to defraud Plaintiff by intentionally concealing the fact, that Plaintiff was unaware of the fact and would have acted differently if the concealed fact was known, and that she suffered damage as a result of the concealment or suppression of the material fact.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV026294: TARP vs GENERAL MOTORS, LLC., et al. 08/06/2026 Hearing on Demurrer (Lemon Law) to plf's First Amended Complaint in Department 16D

Transactional Relationship

The Court rejects Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff failed to allege any transactional relationship between itself and Plaintiff giving rise to a duty to disclose essentially because Plaintiff did not allege she purchased the Vehicle directly from Defendant. Contrary to Defendant’s argument, no transactional relationship between a vendor and subsequent purchasers is necessary to bring a fraudulent omission claim because a vendor has a duty to disclose material facts not only to immediate purchasers, but to subsequent purchasers when the vendor has reason to know that the subject product will be resold. (OCM Principal Opportunities Fund v. CIBC World Markets Corp. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 835, 859-860.) Those are the allegations here, in addition to the allegation that Defendants have a warranty relationship with Plaintiff.

The case law cited by Defendant does not involve such a scenario. In fact, the primary case cited dealt with the scenario where the manufacturer was not aware that its device was provided to the plaintiff, and in any event dealt with the sufficiency of evidence at trial. (Bigler-Engler v. Breg, Inc. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 276, 312-313.) In addition, the Song-Beverly Act treats a manufacturer and its representatives in “this state” or “agents” as a single entity. (Ibrahim v. Ford Motor Co. (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 878, 889.) The allegations are sufficient under the authority cited above to show that Defendant was aware that the Vehicle would be sold on the open market and also that Defendant had a warranty relationship with Plaintiff. These allegations are sufficient to withstand Defendant’s specific challenge that a transactional relationship was not alleged.

The demurrer is OVERRULED in its entirety.

No later than August 20, 2026, Defendant shall file and serve its answer to the FAC.

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1019.5; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1312.)

[1] Defendant’s argument states facts not in issue on this case. Defendant contends that

Plaintiff purchased the Vehicle on or about January 19, 2016, and filed the FAC on December 5, 2024. (MPA, at p. 9: 22–24.) But the FAC alleges that Plaintiff purchased the Vehicle on August 1, 2018, and the initial Complaint was filed on December 24, 2024.