PEREZ SAVEDRA, et al. vs GENERAL MOTORS, LLC., et al.

24CV025958: PEREZ SAVEDRA, et al. vs GENERAL MOTORS, LLC., et al. 09/04/2025 Hearing on Demurrer in Department 53

Tentative Ruling

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24CV025958: PEREZ SAVEDRA, et al. vs GENERAL MOTORS, LLC., et al. 09/04/2025 Hearing on Demurrer in Department 53

will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

TENTATIVE RULING This is a lemon law action arising from Plaintiffs Alejandro Perez Savedra and Leticia Perez’s (“Plaintiffs”) purchase of a 2019 Chevrolet Silverado 1500 (“Subject Vehicle”) on January 15, 2019. (Complaint, ¶ 6.) Plaintiffs filed a Complaint for Violations of Statutory Obligations on December 18, 2024, including a violation of the Song-Beverly Act and a common law “fraudulent inducement-concealment” claim against Defendant General Motors LLC (“GM”).

GM demurs to the fifth cause of action for fraudulent inducement-concealment on the grounds that it is barred by the statute of limitations, fails to state facts sufficient to establish the fraud cause of action, and fails to state facts sufficient to establish a transactional relationship giving rise to a duty to disclose. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10(e).)

Yet again, and despite being notified countless times across multiple cases by this Court, the notice of motion filed by Defendant’s counsel does not provide notice of the Court’s tentative ruling system as required by Local Rule 1.06(D). The Court notes that Defendant’s counsel’s repeated failures suggest that Defendant’s counsel is simply ignoring and failing to comply with the Court’s rulings. The Court advises Defendant’s counsel that its repeated failures may lead to the future imposition of sanctions and/or denial of motions. As with prior rulings on Defendant’s demurrers/motions, Defendant’s counsel is ordered to notify Plaintiffs’ counsel immediately of the tentative ruling system and to be available at the hearing, in person, via Zoom or by telephone, in the event Plaintiffs’ counsel appears without following the procedures set forth in Local Rule 1.06(B).

Although Plaintiffs filed no timely opposition, the Court finds that Defendant has failed to satisfy its initial burden as demurring party. The demurrer is OVERRULED as follows.

Legal Standard

The function of a demurrer is to test the sufficiency of the pleading it challenges by raising questions of law. (Salimi v. State Comp. Ins. Fund (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 216, 219; Nordlinger v. Lynch (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1259, 1271.) A demurrer “tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters.” (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) Extrinsic evidence may not properly be considered on demurrer or on a motion to strike. (Ion Equipment Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881; Hibernia Savings & Loan Soc. v. Thornton (1897) 117 Cal. 481, 482.)

For the purpose of determining the effect of a complaint, its allegations are liberally construed, with a view toward substantial justice. (Code Civ. Proc. § 452; Amarel v. Connell (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 137, 140-141; Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 43, fn. 7.) In this respect, the Court treats the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV025958: PEREZ SAVEDRA, et al. vs GENERAL MOTORS, LLC., et al. 09/04/2025 Hearing on Demurrer in Department 53

pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law, and considers matters which may be judicially noticed. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Poseidon Development, Inc. v. Woodland Lane Estates, LLC (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1111-1112.) A demurrer may be sustained only if the complaint lacks any sufficient allegations to entitle the Plaintiffs to relief. (Financial Corp. of America v. Wilburn (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 764, 778.) “Plaintiffs need only plead facts showing that he may be entitled to some relief . . ., we are not concerned with Plaintiff’s possible inability or difficulty in proving the allegations of the complaint.” (Highlanders, Inc. v. Olsan (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 690, 696-697.)

Discussion

Statute of Limitations GM first demurs to the fifth cause of action on the ground that it is barred by the applicable three-year statute of limitations. GM contends the causes of action accrued on the date the Subject Vehicle was purchased, January 15, 2019 and expired on January 15, 2023. (Defendant’s Demurrer, 9:21-23.) Plaintiffs did not file their Complaint until December 18, 2024. GM relies upon Plaintiffs’ allegation that the purported fraudulent concealment-inducement occurred during the sale of the Subject Vehicle, which took place on January 15, 2019—more than three years before Plaintiffs filed suit (Complaint ¶ 6) as support that Plaintiffs cannot invoke the delayed discovery rule.

However, Plaintiffs’ allegation that the Subject Vehicle began experiencing defects within the warranty period does not affirmatively demonstrate when the cause of action for fraudulent concealment-inducement accrued.

When and how Plaintiffs should have reasonably become aware that GM concealed facts at the time of purchase is a question of fact that cannot be determined at the pleading stage. Resolution of a statute of limitations issue is normally a question of fact. (Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 810.) Further, “[a] demurrer based on a statute of limitations will not lie where the action may be, but is not necessarily, barred. In order for the bar of the statute of limitations to be raised by demurrer, the defect must clearly and affirmatively appear on the face of the complaint; it is not enough that the complaint shows that the action may be barred.” (Guardian North Bay, Inc. v.

Superior Court (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 963, 971-972 [citation omitted]. [emphasis added].) The defect of the statute of limitations does not appear on the face of the Complaint and the demurrer is OVERRULED on this basis.

Specificity Plaintiffs’ fifth cause of action is premised on allegations that GM fraudulently concealed information regarding defects in the subject vehicle. The elements of a claim for fraudulent concealment require the Plaintiffs to show that: “(1) the defendant ... concealed or suppressed a material fact, (2) the defendant [was] under a duty to disclose the fact to the Plaintiff, (3) the defendant ... intentionally concealed or suppressed the fact with the intent to defraud the Plaintiff, (4) the Plaintiff [was] unaware of the fact and would not have acted as he did if he had known of the concealed or suppressed fact, and (5) as a result of the concealment or suppression of the fact, the Plaintiff must have sustained damage. [Citation.]” (Prakashpalan v. Engstrom,

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV025958: PEREZ SAVEDRA, et al. vs GENERAL MOTORS, LLC., et al. 09/04/2025 Hearing on Demurrer in Department 53

Lipscomb & Lack (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1105, 1130.)

Although claims of fraud must be pled with specificity, “[i]t is harder to apply [the requirement of specificity] to a case of simple nondisclosure. ‘How does one show ‘how’ and ‘by what means’ something didn’t happen, or ‘when’ it never happened, or ‘where’ it never happened?’” (Jones v. ConocoPhillips Co. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1187, 1199 [internal citations omitted.].) “Even under the strict rules of common law pleading, one of the canons was that less particularity is required when the facts lie more in the knowledge of the opposite party.” (Id. [internal citations omitted.].)

A plaintiff asserting a concealment theory will “not be able to specify the time, place, and specific content of an omission as precisely as would a plaintiff in a false representation claim.” (Falk v. General Motors Corporation (N.D. Cal. 2007) 496 F.Supp.2d 1088, 1098-99.) Such a claim “can succeed without the same level of specificity required by a normal fraud claim.” (Id.) Thus, the specificity rule is relaxed in actions premised on intentional concealment or nondisclosure. (Alfaro v. Community Housing Improvement System & Planning Association (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1356, 1384.)

Given the allegations that the alleged fraud involved a concealment, a relaxed standard is appropriate. (Committee on Children’s Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp., (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 214; Turner v. Milstein (1951) 103 Cal.App.2d 651, 658.) Plaintiffs sufficiently alleges (1) concealment (Complaint, ¶¶ 46, 47, 54-55), (2) knowledge of falsity (Complaint, ¶¶ 49-51) (3) intent to induce reliance (Complaint, ¶¶ 51-52), (4) justifiable reliance (Complaint, ¶ 56), and (5) damages (Complaint, ¶ 57).

Plaintiffs allege they entered into a warranty contract with GM on May 25, 2018 (Complaint, ¶ 6); Plaintiffs identify the material facts GM knew prior to their acquisition of Subject Vehicle and withheld from Plaintiffs (Complaint, ¶¶ 48, 49, 51); Plaintiffs allege that Defendant had superior knowledge of the facts (Complaint, ¶ 53b); the safety risks posed by the defect (Complaint, ¶¶ 48, 51, 53); the materiality of that information (Complaint, ¶ 51); Plaintiffs’ reliance on the non-disclosure (Complaint, ¶ 56); and damages (FAC, ¶ 57.)

The demurrer on this basis is OVERRULED.

Duty to Disclose GM next demurs Plaintiffs’ fifth cause of action on the grounds that fails to state facts sufficient to establish a transactional relationship giving rise to a duty to disclose. A duty to disclose material facts may arise not only when the defendant is in a fiduciary relationship with the Plaintiffs, but also when the defendant has exclusive knowledge of material facts not known to the Plaintiffs or when the defendant actively conceals a material fact from the Plaintiffs. (LiMandri v. Judkins (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 326, 336.)

First, while it may be true that Plaintiffs did not purchase the Subject Vehicle directly from GM, paragraph 6 of the Complaint explicitly alleges that Plaintiffs entered into a “warranty contract with GM regarding a 2019 Chevrolet Silverado 1500” on or about January 15, 2019 “which was manufactured and or distributed by Defendant GM.” This allegation must be accepted as true for

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV025958: PEREZ SAVEDRA, et al. vs GENERAL MOTORS, LLC., et al. 09/04/2025 Hearing on Demurrer in Department 53

purposes of this demurrer and is sufficient, in this Court’s view, to establish a direct “transactional relationship” between Plaintiffs and GM.

Second, no transactional relationship between a vendor and subsequent purchasers is necessary to bring a fraudulent concealment-inducement claim because a vendor has a duty to disclose material facts not only to immediate purchasers, but to subsequent purchasers when the vendor has reason to know that the subject product will be resold. (OCM Principal Opportunities Fund v. CIBC World Markets Corp. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 835, 859-860.) Those are the allegations here, in addition to the allegation that Defendant has a warranty relationship with Plaintiffs.

The case law cited by Defendant does not involve such a scenario. In fact, Defendant’s principal cited case dealt with the scenario where the manufacturer was not aware that its device was provided to the plaintiff, and in any event dealt with the sufficiency of evidence at trial. (Bigler- Engler v. Breg, Inc. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 276, 312-313.) In addition, the Song-Beverly Act treats a manufacturer and its representatives in “this state” or “agents” as a single entity. (Ibrahim v. Ford Motor Co. (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 878, 889.)

The allegations are sufficient under the authority cited above to show that Defendant was aware that the Subject Vehicle would be sold on the open market and also that Defendant had a warranty relationship with Plaintiffs. These allegations are sufficient to withstand Defendant’s specific challenge that a transactional relationship was not alleged.

The demurrer is OVERRULED on this basis.

GM is required to file their Answer no later than September 18, 2025.

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code Civ. Proc. §1019.5; CRC, Rule 3.1312.)