NORDSTROM, INC. vs EMER

A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will be forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

TENTATIVE RULING

***NOTICE: EFFECTIVE APRIL 13, 2026, THIS DEPARTMENT HAS MOVED TO THE TANI G. CANTIL-SAKAUYE COURTHOUSE LOCATED AT 500 G. ST. SACRAMENTO, CA. ALL MOTIONS NOTICED FOR DEPARTMENT 28 WILL BE HEARD IN DEPARTMENT 8C OF THE NEW COURTHOUSE. ALL PAPERS FOR THIS DEPARTMENT MUST BE FILED AT THIS NEW LOCATION AND WILL NOT BE ACCEPTED AT THE HALL OF JUSTICE. ALL HEARINGS WILL TAKE PLACE AT THIS NEW LOCATION****

Plaintiff Nordstrom, Inc.’s (“Nordstrom”) motion for a preliminary injunction against Defendant Alex Emer (“Defendant”) is ruled upon as follows.

Procedural History

On December 30, 2024, Defendant Alex Emer filed a separate demand for arbitration with the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”). (Williams Decl., ¶ 5.) That arbitration,

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV023298: NORDSTROM, INC. vs EMER 06/03/2026 Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction in Department 8C

captioned Alex Emer v. Nordstrom Arbitration Coordinator, Case No.: 01-24-0009-3531 (the “Arbitration”), is ongoing. (Williams Decl., ¶ 6.) The demand seeks damages based on Nordstrom’s alleged refusal to honor returns for purchases of merchandise, which Nordstrom asserts was never shipped back to Nordstrom. (Milstead Decl., ¶ 5, Ex. B.)

On September 30, 2025, Nordstrom filed this action alleging causes of action for fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, conversion, unjust enrichment, and receipt of stolen property against Defendant arising out of Defendant’s purported returns fraud scheme.

Nordstrom now seeks to enjoin Defendant from continuing to pursue his arbitration before the AAA on the grounds that Defendant is not a party to an arbitration agreement with Nordstrom and any such “agreement” is otherwise void due to fraud.

Legal Standard

Code of Civil Procedure section 526 authorizes injunctions prior to a full adjudication of the merits of claims when, “it appears by the complaint that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded,” “it appears by the complaint or affidavits that the commission or continuance of some act during the litigation would produce waste, or great or irreparable injury, to a party to the action,” or “[w]here the restraint is necessary to prevent a multiplicity of judicial proceedings.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 526(a)(1)-(2), (6).)

A preliminary injunction is issued to preserve the status quo pending a decision on the merits. (Continental Baking Co. v. Katz (1968).68 Cal.2d 512, 528.) The decision to grant relief pending a resolution on the merits depends on “two interrelated factors”: (1) “the likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits,” and (2) “the interim harm that the plaintiff is likely to sustain if the injunction were denied as compared to the harm that the defendant is likely to suffer if the preliminary injunction were issued.” (IT Corp. v. Cnty. of Imperial (1983) 35 Cal.3d 63, 69-70.) In making its determination, the Court must not determine the merits of the controversy or whether the plaintiff will prevail, but only whether there is a likelihood the plaintiff will prevail. (Youngblood v. Wilcox (1989) 207 Cal. App. 3d 1368, 1372.)

“The decision to grant a preliminary injunction rests in the sound discretion of the trial court,” and the “court will be found to have abused its discretion only when it has exceeded the bounds of reason or contravened the uncontradicted evidence.” (Ryland

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV023298: NORDSTROM, INC. vs EMER 06/03/2026 Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction in Department 8C

Mews Homeowners Ass’n v. Munoz (2015) 234 Cal. App. 4th 705, 711.)

Analysis

The Court focuses first on Nordstrom’s contentions that it has shown a likelihood of success on the merits of its claims. Nordstrom argues that it is likely to succeed on the merits because no valid agreement to arbitrate was formed between Nordstrom and Defendant. Nordstrom advances two theories in support of this contention. First, that “by Defendant’s own admission, Defendant did not enter into an arbitration agreement with Nordstrom.” (Motion at 10:5-6.) Second, even if Defendant admits he made the purchases at issue, any agreement between Defendant and Nordstrom as a result of those purchases is “void based on fraud.” (Id. at 11:11-13.)

Although not discussed by either party, a substantial body of state and federal case law exists on the question of how courts must treat arbitration provisions contained in contracts allegedly tainted with fraud. (See e.g., Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna (2006) 546 U.S. 440; Southland Corp. v. Keating (1984) 465 U.S. 1; Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co. (1967) 388 U.S. 395; Rosenthal v. Great Western Financial Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal. 4th 394; and Duffens v. Valenti (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 434.)

Perhaps counterintuitively, these cases indicate that where it is contended that the entire contract is tainted with fraud, courts may not enjoin enforcement of an arbitration provision contained therein absent a showing that the contract is void – not merely voidable. (Rosenthal, supra,14 Cal.4th 415-419; Duffens, supra, 161 Cal.App.4th 448-449.)

Thus, the question becomes whether Nordstrom has demonstrated that the agreement here is “void” for fraud, as it contends, or whether the agreement is merely “voidable.” When fraud occurs in the “inception” or “execution,” the agreement is void; when the situation concerns “fraud in the inducement,” however, the agreement is voidable. So what is the distinction between “fraud in the inception” versus fraud “in the inducement”? As explained in Duffens v. Valenti (2008) 161 Cal. App. 4th 434:

“California law distinguishes between fraud in the ‘execution’ or ‘inception’ of a contract and fraud in the ‘inducement’ of a contract. In brief, in the former case ‘“the fraud goes to the inception or execution of the agreement, so that the promisor is deceived as to the nature of his act, and actually does not know what he is signing, or does not intend to enter into a contract at all, mutual assent is lacking, and [the contract] is void. In such a

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV023298: NORDSTROM, INC. vs EMER 06/03/2026 Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction in Department 8C

case it may be disregarded without the necessity of rescission.” ’ [Citation.] Fraud in the inducement, by contrast, occurs when ‘ “the promisor knows what he is signing but his consent is induced by fraud, mutual assent is present and a contract is formed, which, by reason of the fraud, is voidable. In order to escape from its obligations the aggrieved party must rescind.”’ . . . (Rosenthal, supra, 14 Cal.4th 394, 415, italics added.)

(Id. at 449.)

Here, Nordstrom’s contentions sound in fraud in the inducement. Nordstrom does not contend it did not know that it was entering into an agreement with Defendant as a purchaser, or that it did not know to what the agreement created by its terms and conditions pertained. Rather, Nordstrom’s point is that the agreement created by its terms and conditions are predicated on the purchaser making certain representations, including that they are authorized to use the payment method used, and that they are not using the website in a way that “violate[s] any law or regulation” or to “impersonate any person. . . or perform any other fraudulent activity.” (Motion at 12:13-18.)

Indeed, Nordstrom explicitly argues that it was “misled and deceived and induced to act” by Defendant’s (admittedly) false representations that he was authorized to use another person’s credit card for the purchases at issue. (Id. at 12:19, italics added.) The problem for Nordstrom is that, under the governing case law, while such fraudulent inducement makes the contract voidable through recission, it is not a basis to find the contract “void” and enjoin enforcement of the arbitration provision therein.

In these circumstances, the validity of the contract based on Nordstrom’s claims of fraud are for the arbitrator to decide in the first instance, not the court. (See Rosenthal, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 419; Duffens, supra, 161 Cal. App. 4th at. 448-449 [Fraud in the inducement (claims not going to the “making” of the agreement to arbitrate), are to be decided by the arbitrator rather than the court, unless the parties have agreed otherwise.].)

Moreover, it is clear from the language of the arbitration provision itself that such matters are arbitrable. The arbitration provision in Nordstrom’s terms and conditions reads, in part:

Arbitration Agreement

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV023298: NORDSTROM, INC. vs EMER 06/03/2026 Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction in Department 8C

Binding Individual Arbitration. Any claim, controversy, or dispute arising out of or relating to these Terms, your access or Use of our Site or any products or Services offered by or purchased from Nordstrom through our Site or store, or any aspect of your relationship with Nordstrom, whether based in contract, tort, statute, fraud, misrepresentation, or any other legal theory, ('Dispute') will be resolved through binding individual arbitration as set forth in this Mandatory Dispute Resolution Section, except (a) either you or Nordstrom may initiate a Dispute in or take a Dispute to small claims court so long as it isn't removed or appealed to a court of general jurisdiction and (b) as otherwise expressly provided herein.

Whether a Dispute falls within the jurisdictional limits of small claims court is for the small claims court to decide in the first instance and otherwise for a court of competent jurisdiction to decide.

Dispute will be given the broadest possible meaning permitted by law. It includes, but is not limited to: (a) any dispute or claim that arose before the existence of these or any prior Terms (including, but not limited to, claims relating to advertising); (b) any dispute or claim that is currently the subject of a purported class action litigation in which you are not a member of a certified class; and (c) any dispute or claim that may arise after termination of these Terms and our relationship with you. Dispute, however, does not include disagreements or claims concerning patents, copyrights, trademarks, trade secrets, or other intellectual property, and claims of piracy or unauthorized use of intellectual property.

(Williams Decl., Ex. 5. [Emphasis added.])

Nordstrom fails to address the scope of “dispute[s]” covered by its arbitration clause, why the matters of Defendant’s alleged fraud in the inducement are not arbitable, and the fact that the scope is not limited to customers who made legitimate authorized purchases.

Finally, to the extent Nordstrom argues that Defendant admitted he did not enter into an

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV023298: NORDSTROM, INC. vs EMER 06/03/2026 Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction in Department 8C

arbitration agreement with Nordstrom, none of Defendant’s statements referenced by Nordstrom clearly support this contention. Instead, Nordstrom relies on statements by Defendant regarding who placed the alleged underlying merchandise orders. (Motion, 16:5-27.) Again, because the scope of the disputes covered by the arbitration clause is not limited to verified purchasers of merchandise, the admissions referenced by Nordstrom do not support their argument.

Since Nordstrom has not shown a likelihood of success on the merits of its claims that the agreement is “void” or that there was no agreement to arbitrate in the first instance, the Court need not reach Defendant’s opposition.

Disposition

Nordstrom’s motion for preliminary injunction against Defendant is DENIED.

The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to CRC Rule 3.1312 or further notice is required.