JOHNSON vs BRIDGEWAY CIVIL CONSTRUCTORS, INC., et al.

A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will be forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

TENTATIVE RULING

***NOTICE: EFFECTIVE APRIL 13, 2026, THIS DEPARTMENT HAS MOVED TO THE TANI G. CANTIL-SAKAUYE COURTHOUSE LOCATED AT 500 G STREET SACRAMENTO, CA. ALL MOTIONS NOTICED FOR DEPARTMENT 28 WILL BE HEARD IN DEPARTMENT 8C OF THE NEW COURTHOUSE. ALL PAPERS FOR THIS DEPARTMENT MUST BE FILED AT THIS NEW LOCATION AND WILL NOT BE ACCEPTED AT THE HALL OF JUSTICE. ALL HEARINGS WILL TAKE PLACE AT THIS NEW LOCATION***

Defendants Bridgeway Civil Constructors, Inc. (“Bridgway”) and Francisco Roman Bautista’s (“Bautista”) (collectively, “Defendants”) motion to compel Plaintiff David Raheem Johnson (“Plaintiff”) to withdraw his objection to Defendants’ demand to produce his vehicle for inspection and to produce his vehicle for inspection within 20 days is ruled upon as follows.

Background

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV012802: JOHNSON vs BRIDGEWAY CIVIL CONSTRUCTORS, INC., et al. 04/29/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses and Production an Inspection of Vehicle in Department 8C

This is a personal injury action arising from an alleged motor vehicle collision that occurred on February 22, 2024. On January 13, 2026, Defendants served a Demand for Production requesting Plaintiff produce his vehicle for inspection on February 20, 2026. The demand requested that Plaintiff produce the vehicle “and permit the inspection of the vehicle including but not limited to downloading of the EDR and all other electronic information stored in the vehicle, also to include but not limited to testing, scanning, measuring, sampling, videotaping, and photographing” of the vehicle. (Carter Decl., Exh. A, pp. 1:28-2:3.) Prior to serving the demand, Defendants’ counsel had confirmed with Plaintiff’s counsel that Plaintiff still possessed the vehicle and would make it available for inspection.

On February 10, 2026, Plaintiff served an objection to the demand. The objection stated that the date of the inspection was unilaterally set by Defendants and indicated that Plaintiff and/or Plaintiff’s counsel was not available on the noticed date. The objection also asserted that the demand was overbroad and not sufficiently specific as to the manner of testing that would be conducted, and that Defendants have not shown a need for the EDR data. Plaintiff also asserted a right to observe and record the inspection and demanded that any data obtained and reports generated from the inspection be provided to Plaintiff.

Thereafter, the parties exchanged several correspondence to meet and confer on the disputes raised in the demand and Plaintiff’s objection. During this process, Plaintiff’s counsel raised Vehicle Code section 9951, which was not specifically cited in the objection. Plaintiff’s also counsel also demanded, among other conditions, that the EDR data only for the date of the subject collision be downloaded, to which Defendants’ counsel responded that this was not possible.

Defendants’ motion states that after the meet and confer process, the only remaining issues of disagreement were (1) Plaintiff’s demand that Defendants produce all reports, photographs, notes, and other data obtained and generated by Defendants’ expert from the inspection, and (2) Plaintiff’s demand that the EDR download be limited to the date of the subject collision. Plaintiff’s opposition identifies a third issue: (3) that Defendants only be permitted one inspection. Defendants’ reply confirms that Defendants do not agree to only conducting one inspection, although Defendants do not anticipate needing to conduct an additional inspection and thus requests that its right to seek leave of court for an additional inspection be preserved.

Defendants’ motion contends that the inspection is necessary to obtain and review the EDR data on the vehicle and that this data is relevant to this case, both for the date of the collision and for the entire vehicle’s history. Defendants further contend that any privacy concerns Plaintiff has in the EDR data are minimal and significantly outweighed by Defendants’ need for the evidence. Defendants also argue, both in the moving papers and further in the reply, that Vehicle Code

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV012802: JOHNSON vs BRIDGEWAY CIVIL CONSTRUCTORS, INC., et al. 04/29/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses and Production an Inspection of Vehicle in Department 8C

section 9951 does not preclude Defendants from conducting the inspection. As a threshold matter, Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s failure to cite to section 9951 in his objection constitutes a waiver.

Plaintiff’s opposition contends that the motion is procedurally defective because Vehicle Code section 9951 requires Defendants to first obtain a court order authorizing the inspection before it can seek an order compelling the inspection. Plaintiff reads Vehicle Code section 9951 as imposing a “two-prong analysis” that requires Defendants to first obtain a court order allowing an inspection and EDR download, and if Plaintiff fails to obey the order, Defendants may then move to compel. Plaintiff asserts that the present motion is appropriate only at the second step of this analysis.

Alternatively, Plaintiff argues that if the Court reaches the merits, it should only order inspection of the vehicle subject to the conditions that (1) Defendants be permitted only one inspection; (2) that the data download be limited in time and scope in some capacity; and (3) that Defendants be required to produce to Plaintiff’s counsel Defendants’ expert’s reports, notes, photographs, and other data following the inspection.

Discussion

A party may demand that another party “produce and permit the party making the demand to inspect and to photograph, test, or sample any tangible things that are in the possession, custody, or control of the party on whom the demand is made.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.010(c).) Plaintiff’s vehicle clearly falls within this section.

Vehicle Code section 9951 provides that EDR data “may not be downloaded or otherwise retrieved by a person other than the registered owner of the motor vehicle, except under the following circumstances: (2) In response to an order of a court having jurisdiction to issue the order.” (Veh. Code § 9951(c)(2).) The Court does not agree with Plaintiff’s reading of this statute as requiring a two-step procedure. Even assuming that the discovery of EDR data is not self-executing like most other forms of discovery, but instead requires a court order to obtain (which is a questionable proposition), that still would not require the two-step procedure argued for by Plaintiff.

The present motion to compel, which addresses the discoverability of the EDR data, would, if granted, result in the “court order” purportedly required under Vehicle Code section 9951(c)(2). Nothing in the text of the statute suggests a two-step procedure. Thus, Plaintiff’s procedural/jurisdictional argument is rejected.

Plaintiff’s opposition essentially concedes that, if the procedural argument is rejected, then Defendants are entitled to conduct an inspection. Plaintiff simply disagrees on the scope of the inspection. The primary dispute appears to be over the scope of the download. Defendants’ counsel declares that it is her understanding that EDR data downloads cannot be limited to a

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV012802: JOHNSON vs BRIDGEWAY CIVIL CONSTRUCTORS, INC., et al. 04/29/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses and Production an Inspection of Vehicle in Department 8C

specific date and can only be done by downloading the entirety of the data. (Carter Decl., ¶ 7.) Plaintiff does not dispute or object to this assertion, so the Court accepts it as true. This is also consistent with the Court’s understanding of the process. Even if the download could be limited to certain dates or incidents, Plaintiff has not shown a valid privacy concern over the data beyond the date of the collision. Defendants indicate that Plaintiff has disclosed that he was involved in a more severe collision two days before the collision that is the subject of this lawsuit.

The data from this prior crash is clearly relevant to a multitude of issues in this case, including causation and damages. Moreover, it has been held that a criminal defendant has no reasonable expectation of privacy in EDR data such as the vehicle’s speed and braking immediately before a collision, since such information is observable to the public. (People v. Diaz (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 743, 757-758.) Thus, EDR data does not invoke Fourth Amendment concerns, and it follows that it is not subjected to privacy protections in civil discovery.

This applies equally to EDR data of other events in addition to the subject collision in this case. Plaintiff’s braking and vehicle speed is projected to the public every time he drives, both at the time of the collision and during other collisions. Finally, although not clearly discussed by the parties, it is the Court’s understanding that EDR data consists only of data of events, i.e., collisions. EDRs do not record and store all of the vehicle’s movements. Any prior or subsequent collisions the vehicle has been involved in are relevant and discoverable.

The Court turns next to the issue of whether Defendants must provide the notes, reports, photographs, and other data obtained by Defendants’ expert at the inspection. The Court notes that Plaintiff has not formally requested this information, and Plaintiff cites no authority obligating Defendants to provide this information at this procedural posture. Indeed, Defendants are correct to point out in reply that Plaintiff’s demand for this information is technically beyond the scope of this motion. Even so, for the sake of efficiency, the Court addresses the issue here, and, as stated further below, will order Defendants to provide Plaintiff with the EDR data obtained during the inspection, but not the other information requested.

“It has long been recognized that the work of an expert-consultant is protected by the attorney’s work product privilege.” (County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 647, 654.) An expert’s work becomes discoverable once it is reasonably certain that the expert will provide opinion testimony in the case. (Id. at pp. 654-655.) Discovery of expert materials occurs with the simultaneous exchange of expert witness information, which occurs either 50 days before trial or 20 days after service of an expert disclosure demand, whichever is later. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2034.230(b).)

“In California, an attorney’s work product is protected by statute. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2018.010 et seq.)” (Coito v. Superior Court (2012) 54 Cal.4th 480, 485.) Any writing “that reflects an attorney’s impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal research” is subject to absolute work

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV012802: JOHNSON vs BRIDGEWAY CIVIL CONSTRUCTORS, INC., et al. 04/29/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses and Production an Inspection of Vehicle in Department 8C

product protection and is not discoverable. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2018.030(a).) Other forms of attorney work product are subject to qualified protection and becomes discoverable if “the court determines that denial of discovery will unfairly prejudice the party seeking discovery in preparing that party’s claim or defense or will result in an injustice.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2018.030(b).)

Purely factual material is not work product. (Mack v. Superior Court (1968) 259 Cal.App.2d 7, 10.) Here, the EDR data is purely factual. There is nothing within the data itself or in its retrieval that could reveal impressions, conclusions, or opinions. As Defendants note in their papers, the data can only be retrieved in its totality, and there is no ability of the person downloading the data to limit what is downloaded. Thus, the EDR data is not protected work product.

However, the Court finds that any reports, notes, measurements, photographs, and other similar documents generated and obtained by Defendants’ expert from the inspection are subject to work product protection, as they could reveal strategic considerations. Plaintiff’s reliance on DeLuca v. State Fish Co., Inc. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 671 is inapposite. The attorney-client privilege and work product protection apply to statements to and reports from an expert witness until it becomes reasonably certain that the expert will testify. (Deluca, supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at pp. 689-690.)

Additionally, “an expert’s opinion regarding the subject matter about which the expert is a prospective testifying expert is discoverable, but the expert’s advice rendered to the attorney in an advisory capacity is still subject to conditional work product protection.” (Id. at p. 690.) Plaintiff indicates that Defendants “agreed to disclose their expert who will be conducting this inspection” (Opp. MPA, p. 6:10-11), but there is no indication that Defendants have disclosed that this person will be testifying.

Thus, the work product protection of this category of documents has not been waived at this time.

Finally, regarding Plaintiff’s requested condition that Defendants be expressly permitted only one inspection, the Court to declines to include such a requirement as it would be premature. Defendants have not requested a second inspection, and if they do, Plaintiff is free to respond to the request accordingly, and the issue can be resolved at that time.

Disposition

Based on the above discussion, Defendants’ motion is GRANTED. Plaintiff shall make his vehicle available for inspection and EDR data download on a mutually agreeable date that is no later than May 29, 2026. Defendants shall provide Plaintiff with a copy of the EDR data report within 24 hours after the inspection.

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV012802: JOHNSON vs BRIDGEWAY CIVIL CONSTRUCTORS, INC., et al. 04/29/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses and Production an Inspection of Vehicle in Department 8C

Civ. Proc. § 1019.5; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1312.)