Turner v. GM

In reaching the lodestar, a court begins by deciding “the reasonable hours spent” on the case and

multiplying that number by “the hourly prevailing rate for private attorneys in the community conducting

noncontingent litigation of the same type.” (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1133.) “[T]he

unadorned lodestar reflects the general local hourly rate for a fee-bearing case; it does not include any

compensation for contingent risk, extraordinary skill, or any other factors a trial court may consider under

Serrano III.” (Id. at p. 1138 [discussing Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25).

Requested rates are reasonable if they are “within the range of reasonable rates charged by and

judicially awarded comparable attorneys for comparable work.” (Children’s Hosp. & Med. Ctr. v. Bontá

(2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 740, 783.)

Plaintiff claims rates of $525 per hour for attorney Christopher Urner; $450 per hour for attorney

Jorge L. Acosta; and $250 per hour for paralegal Mary M. Zazueta. (Acosta Decl., ¶27.) The case was

taken on a contingency basis. (Acosta Decl., ¶11.) Attorney Acosta’s declaration provides background and

experience for each of the three billers. (Acosta Decl., ¶¶6-10.) Acosta also provides or cites to other

materials supporting the rates claimed including the United States Consumer Law Attorney Fee Survey

Report from 2017-2018 (noting those rates should be adjusted for inflation) and the Lafey Matrix. (Acosta

Decl., ¶¶19-21; Exh. C.)

In opposition, Defendant generally argues the rates claimed are unreasonably high. Included in

this portion of Defendant’s brief are contentions that tasks performed by higher billers should have been

performed by lower billers, but those arguments do not go to the propriety of the rates themselves in the

first instance and are more appropriately addressed when addressing the proper number of hours for which

reimbursement is properly awarded.

The rates claimed are reasonable for lemon law cases prosecuted in this legal community. Note,

however, these rates already adequately reward counsel for the contingency nature of the representation

thus negating the need to apply a multiplier as discussed more fully below.

Reasonable Hours. The starting point for every fee award is calculating an attorney’s services in

terms of time expanded on the case. (Levy v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 807,

815.)

Counsel’s invoices are attached as Exhibit A to attorney Acosta’s declaration. Attorney Urner

claims 7.5 hours; attorney Acosta claims 18.8 hours; and paralegal Zazueta claims 15 hours, for a

collective total of 41.3 hours including estimated time to complete prosecution of this fee motion.

As indicated above, Defendant argues the 7.5 hours attorney Christopher Urner billed at $525 per

hour could have been properly performed by attorney Acosta at only $450 per hour. There is nothing to

indicate the time claimed was duplicative, and it is reasonable that two attorneys would both work on this

motion.

Similarly, Defendant argues time entries claimed by attorney Acosta on 8/20/25 and 8/26/25 for

scheduling matters could have been handled by paralegal Zazueta at a lower rate. These involved emails

between counsel, and it was reasonable that counsel would handle these rather than a paralegal.

Defendant next argues counsel spent excessive time on certain tasks given their self-proclaimed

skill and experience. Defendant points out examples where both attorneys reviewed Plaintiff’s auto service

record; paralegal Zazueta billed 1.9 hours to draft initial disclosures and prepare document production,

Acosta then billed 0.6 hours to review the compilation, and Zazueta then billed 0.2 hours to finalize the

production and create a Dropbox link; Acosta billed 3.1 hours researching applicable technical bulletins

and research and drafting a memorandum on the same; and Zazueta and Acosta billed a collective 4 hours

to analyze Defendant’s initial disclosures. These entries each appear reasonable standing alone, and there

is no indication of general overbilling in the invoices. Although lemon law cases are repetitive, counsel is

still required to carefully review documents prepared and received.

Defendant also challenges 5.5 hours of anticipated time claimed for the remainder of this fee

motion, contending it is entirely precluded under Karapetian v. Kia Motors Am., Inc. (C.D. Cal. 2013) 970

F.Supp.2d 1032. However, the District Court did not find such anticipated time categorically

unrecoverable. Instead, it criticized the amount of anticipated time claimed and the fact that estimated time

was claimed for work done years prior. (Id. at pp. 1036-1037.) The anticipated time claimed is reasonable.

In sum, the Court sets the lodestar, inclusive of all attorney, paralegal, and anticipated time, at

$16,147.50—the full amount requested.

Multiplier. Plaintiff seeks a 0.3 multiplier to the lodestar recovery due to the delay in payment,

expertise resulting in an excellent recovery, and the contingent risk involved.

The purpose of a multiplier is “to fix a fee at the fair market value for the particular action. In

effect, the court determines, retrospectively, whether the litigation involved a contingent risk or required

extraordinary legal skill justifying augmentation of the unadorned lodestar in order to approximate the fair

market rate for such services.” (Thayer v. Wells Fargo Bank (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 819, 833.) However,

the multiplier cannot apply to the work related to the attorney fee motion. (Pellegrino v. Robert Half

Intern., Inc. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 278, 296.)

“A lawyer who both bears the risk of not being paid and provides legal services is not receiving

the fair market value of his work if he is paid only for the second of these functions. If he is paid no more,

competent counsel will be reluctant to accept fee award cases.” (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th

1122, 1133, quoting Leubsdorf, The Contingency Factor in Attorney Fee Awards (1981) 90 Yale L.J. 473,

480.) “The purpose of a fee enhancement, or so-called multiplier, for contingent risk is to bring the

financial incentives for attorneys enforcing important constitutional rights, such as those protected under

the anti-SLAPP provision, into line with incentives they have to undertake claims for which they are paid

on a fee-for-services basis.” (Id. at 1132.)

As explained in Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132

Cal.App.4th 359:

“It has long been recognized, however, that the contingent and deferred nature of the fee award in a civil rights or other case with statutory attorney fees requires that the fee be adjusted in some manner to reflect the fact that the fair market value of legal services provided on that basis is greater than the equivalent noncontingent hourly rate. (Ketchum v. Moses, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 1132–1133.) “ ‘A lawyer who both bears the risk of not being paid and provides legal services is not receiving the fair market value of his work if he is paid only for the second of these functions.

If he is paid no more, competent counsel will be reluctant to accept fee award cases.’ ” (Id. at p. 1133, quoting with approval from Leubsdorf, The Contingency Factor in Attorney Fee Awards (1981) 90 Yale L.J. 473, 480.) The contingency adjustment may be made at the lodestar phase of the court's calculation or by applying a multiplier to the noncontingency lodestar calculation (but not both). (Ketchum v. Moses, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 1133–1134.)”

(Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University, supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at 394-395,

emphasis added.)

As explained above, the rates already claimed adequately compensate counsel for the contingent

nature of the litigation and delay in payment. Although Plaintiff prevailed, the results are not so impressive

as to justify an increased award given the routine nature of lemon law cases. Thus, the Court denies

Plaintiff’s request for a multiplier.

Costs. Typically, costs are challenged via a motion to tax costs served and filed within 15 days

after service of the cost memorandum. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1700(b).) Here, however, Plaintiff filed

her memorandum of costs concurrently with the motion. Defendant has not affirmatively challenged the

$705.03 in costs claimed, and has not moved to tax. Therefore, the Court grants the request for costs in

full.

RULING

Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court rules as follows:

1. Grants Plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees exclusive of costs in the amount of $16,147.50;

2. Denies Plaintiff’s request for a multiplier; and

3. Allows costs in the amount of $705.03.