KOURY, ANITA vs FORD MOTOR COMPANY

"The requirement of specificity in a fraud action against a corporation requires the plaintiff to allege the names of the persons who made the allegedly fraudulent representations, their authority to speak, to whom they spoke, what they said or wrote, and when it was said or written." (Tarmann v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 153, 157.)

Pleading fraud with specificity

Defendant argues that the fraudulent concealment cause of action does not satisfy the requisite specificity required to plead fraud.

"There are certain exceptions to the particularity requirement." (Citizens of Humanity, LLC v. Costco Wholesale Corp. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1, 20 disapproved on another ground by Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court (2011) 51 Cal.4th 310.)

" 'Less specificity is required when 'it appears from the nature of the allegations that the defendant must necessarily possess full information concerning the facts of the controversy.' ' " (Ibid.)

Here, the FAC satisfies the requirement of specificity to state a fraudulent concealment action. Courts have explained that the requirement of specificity in fraud actions "is intended to apply to affirmative misrepresentations" rather than concealment or nondisclosure. (Alfaro v. Community Housing Improvement System & Planning Assn., Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1356, 1384, as modified on denial of reh'g (Mar. 18, 2009) .)

The FAC alleges that Ford--through at least its marketing materials, salespersons, and repair representatives--concealed and/or failed to disclose material information regarding known defects with the ten-speed transmission model that was installed in the 2024 Lincoln Navigator that Plaintiffs' leased. The Court finds the allegations in the FAC sufficiently satisfy the specificity requirement in this instance.

Duty to disclose

Defendant next argues that the FAC fails to demonstrate that it had a duty to disclose alleged defects with the ten-speed transmission.

"A duty to disclose a material fact can arise if (1) it is imposed by statute; (2) the defendant is acting as plaintiff's fiduciary or is in some other confidential relationship with plaintiff that imposes a disclosure duty under the circumstances; (3) the material facts are known or accessible only to defendant, and defendant knows those facts are not known or reasonably discoverable by plaintiff (i.e., exclusive knowledge); (4) the defendant makes representations but fails to disclose other facts that materially qualify the facts disclosed or render the disclosure misleading (i.e., partial concealment); or (5) defendant actively conceals discovery of material fact from plaintiff (i.e., active concealment). [Citations.]" (Rattagan v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2024) 17 Cal.5th 1, 40.)

"Circumstances (3), (4), and (5) presuppose a preexisting relationship between the parties, such as 'between seller and buyer, employer and prospective employee, doctor and patient, or parties entering into any kind of contractual agreement.' " (Ibid.)

Here, the FAC adequately alleges there is a buyer-seller relationship between Defendant and Plaintiffs because Plaintiffs leased a 2024 Lincoln Navigator from Big Valley Ford in Stockon, California. The FAC alleges that Big Valley Ford is an authorized dealer and agent of Defendant, and that Defendant backed the leased vehicle with warranties. Therefore, the FAC alleges a seller and buyer relationship forming the basis of a duty to disclose. (See, e.g., Dhital v. Nissan North America, Inc. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 828, 844 ["Nissan argues plaintiffs did not adequately plead the existence of a buyer-seller relationship between the parties, because plaintiffs bought the car from a Nissan dealership (not from Nissan itself) . . . we decline to hold plaintiffs' claim is barred on the ground there was no relationship requiring Nissan to disclose known defects."].)

The CLRA cases Defendant relies on are distinguishable, because those cases did not contain allegations that the defect could cause physical injury or safety concerns. (E.g., Daugherty v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 824, 836, as modified (Nov. 8, 2006) ["The complaint is devoid of factual allegations showing any instance of physical injury or any safety concerns posed by the defect."].)

The FAC also pleads exclusive knowledge and active concealment. For example, the FAC pleads that Defendant possessed exclusive knowledge of the alleged defective transmission through internal channels and that Defendant concealed the information by intentionally omitting it from marketing materials and failing to disclose such information to customers. Accordingly, the Court finds that the FAC adequately pleads a duty to disclose. (See, e.g., Dhital, supra 84 Cal.App.5th at 844-45 ["revers[ing] the trial court's order sustaining Nissan's demurrer to the SAC's fourth cause of action (the claim for fraudulent inducement by concealment)" where plaintiffs pleaded, inter alia, that certain transmission models installed in Nissan vehicles were defective and that "Nissan had exclusive knowledge of the defects but intentionally concealed and failed to disclose that information"].)

Fraud damages

The FAC alleges that if Plaintiffs would not have leased the vehicle or would have paid substantially less for it but for Defendant's concealment regarding alleged defects with the ten-speed transmission. The allegations are sufficient to state causation at this stage.

Defendant's arguments regarding the economic loss rule were presented for the first time in Defendant's reply, thus the Court does not consider them.

Fourth Cause of Action for Violation of Civil Code Section 1750 et seq. (Consumer Legal Remedies Act)

Defendant argues that the Consumer Legal Remedies Act ("CLRA") claim fails for the same reasons as the fraud claim. For the same reasons discussed above, the Court finds the CLRA claim is adequately stated.

b) On June 5, 2026, Defendant filed a motion to compel depositions of Plaintiffs Anita Koury and John Koury and request for sanctions. On July 22, 2026, Plaintiffs filed an opposition. On July 24, 2026, Defendant filed a reply.

Defendant served the notices of deposition on February 19, 2026, but had to reschedule the noticed date due to a trial conflict. Despite numerous follow-ups from Defendant, Plaintiffs failed to provide alternate dates for the deposition.

Defendant filed the instant motion, asking the Court to order Plaintiffs to appear for their depositions and produce documents on a date falling within 15 days of the Court's order. Subsequently, Plaintiffs contacted Defendant and the depositions were scheduled for July 31, 2026.

Defendant requests that the instant motion remain on calendar and requests that the Court grant the motion in the event the depositions do not occur on July 31, 2026, as scheduled.

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 2025.450, the motion to compel is GRANTED. Plaintiffs shall appear for deposition within 15 days of service of the signed order.

The Court finds the circumstances here make the imposition of sanctions unjust and declines to issue them. The request for sanctions is DENIED.

Moving party to submit a proposed order within five court days that conforms with this ruling.

CV-26-003882 - PADILLA, JOHN PAUL vs DOCTORS MEDICAL CENTER OF MODESTO INC - Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction - GRANTED.

For the reasons set forth below, the motion for preliminary injunction is GRANTED.

Defendant Doctors Medical Center of Modesto, Inc. is enjoined from participating in the American Arbitration Association ("AAA") arbitration between the parties (i.e., AAA Case No. 012600037344). Defendant shall notify AAA within one court day that, pursuant to this Court's order, Defendant seeks a stay of the arbitration.

Plaintiff shall post an undertaking in the amount of $500 and submit a proposed order within one day that conforms with this ruling. (CRC 3.1150(f).)

On July 17, 2026, Plaintiff filed a motion for preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin Defendant from participating in the AAA arbitration that Defendant initiated on June 9, 2026. On July 24, 2026, Defendant opposed. The Court does not consider Plaintiff's reply, as it is unauthorized.

California Code of Civil Procedure section 526 allows a preliminary injunction to issue in the following cases: "(1) When it appears by the complaint that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded, and the relief, or any part thereof, consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act complained of, either for a limited period or perpetually. (2) When it appears by the complaint or affidavits that the commission or continuance of some act during the litigation would produce waste, or great or irreparable injury, to a party to the action. (3) When it appears, during the litigation, that a party to the action is doing, or threatens, or is about to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act in violation of the rights of another party to the action respecting the subject of the action, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual. (4) When pecuniary compensation would not afford adequate relief. (5) Where it would be extremely difficult to ascertain the amount of compensation which would afford adequate relief. (6) Where the restraint is necessary to prevent a multiplicity of judicial proceedings. (7) Where the obligation arises from a trust." (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 526.)

Trial courts consider two factors when determining whether to issue a preliminary injunction. The first factor "is the likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits[.]" (Salazar v. Majestic Realty Co. (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 813, 825, reh'g denied (Dec. 23, 2025), review denied (Feb. 25, 2026)).

The second factor "is the interim harm that the plaintiff is likely to sustain if the injunction were denied as compared to the harm that the defendant is likely to suffer if the preliminary injunction were issued." (Ibid.)

The greater the plaintiff's showing on one factor, the less must be shown on the other factor. (Butt v. State of California (1992) 4 Cal.4th 668, 678.)

"A preliminary injunction is an interim remedy designed to maintain the status quo pending a decision on the merits." (MaJor v. Miraverde Homeowners Assn. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 618, 623.)

First, plaintiff has shown a possibility that it will prevail on the merits of the motion to compel arbitration. Plaintiff argues that the arbitration agreement is unenforceable because it is both procedurally and substantially unconscionable because it was essentially a contract of adhesion, because it requires the arbitration to be confidential, and because it requires employees to waive their right to bring a representative PAGA action.

After considering Defendant's arguments in opposition, the Court finds "there is some possibility that the plaintiff will ultimately prevail on the merits of the claim." (Butt, supra, 4 Cal.4th at 678.)