JACKSON vs HARBOR FREIGHT

A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will be forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

TENTATIVE RULING

***NOTICE: EFFECTIVE APRIL 13, 2026, THIS DEPARTMENT HAS MOVED TO THE TANI G. CANTIL-SAKAUYE COURTHOUSE LOCATED AT 500 G STREET SACRAMENTO, CA. ALL MOTIONS NOTICED FOR DEPARTMENT 28 WILL BE HEARD IN DEPARTMENT 8C OF THE NEW COURTHOUSE. ALL PAPERS FOR THIS DEPARTMENT MUST BE FILED AT THIS NEW LOCATION AND WILL NOT BE ACCEPTED AT THE HALL OF JUSTICE. ALL HEARINGS WILL TAKE PLACE AT THIS NEW LOCATION***

Defendant Harbor Freight Tools USA, Inc.’s (“Defendant”) motion to compel arbitration against Plaintiff in pro per Stephen Jackson (“Plaintiff”) is ruled upon as follows.

Defendant’s request for judicial notice is unopposed and granted.

This matter was originally heard on May 20, 2026 after the Court issued a tentative ruling granting the motion and deeming it unopposed. Plaintiff appeared at the hearing, and the Court learned that Plaintiff had filed a document on April 28, 2026 that he intended to be a response to

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV019531: JACKSON vs HARBOR FREIGHT 08/03/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Action in Department 8C

the motion. The Court thus continued the hearing and granted Defendant leave to file a supplemental reply. However, Defendant did not file a supplemental reply. Having considered Plaintiff’s April 28 opposition, the Court now rules as follows.

Plaintiff filed this action on August 18, 2025. The Complaint contains three unlabeled causes of action. Although the Complaint lists the defendant as “Harbor Freight Legal Dept. 26541 Agoura Rd Calabasas, CA 91302,” the allegations indicate that Plaintiff’s claims arise from events that occurred during and in relation to his employment with Defendant. Defendant’s counsel declares that Plaintiff was employed by Defendant from May 2013 through February 2016. The Complaint includes allegations that a cashier employed by Defendant and/or a customer of Defendant’s named Lacey Soltero called Plaintiff racial slurs (first cause of action); that an individual named Brandon Brizze, whose affiliation with Defendant, if any, is not clear, accused Plaintiff of various deviant sexual conduct and also called Plaintiff racial slurs, and that Ms.

Soltero was present during this time (second cause of action); and Defendant’s associates, including Ms. Soltero and Mr. Brizze, attempted to kill Plaintiff (third cause of action). The dates that these events occurred are not clear, but Plaintiff does allege that Mr. Brizze and Ms. Soltero circulated a letter containing false accusations against Plaintiff on or around December 13, 2013, and that the letter was used as a basis to terminate Plaintiff’s employment on or around December 21, 2016.

On February 9, 2017, Plaintiff filed a separate lawsuit against Defendant related to his employment. That action was compelled to arbitration before ultimately settling in May of 2018. As part of the settlement, Plaintiff agreed to release all claims he had or may have had against Defendant arising prior to the execution of the settlement. The settlement agreement included an arbitration provision that stated:

Any dispute over the validity, enforcement, scope, breach or interpretation of this Agreement and any dispute of any kind whatsoever between Jackson and Harbor Freight and/or the Harbor Freight Releasees, if any, shall be submitted and resolved in final and binding arbitration pursuant through the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) pursuant to the provisions of the AAA employment arbitration rules or successor rules then in effect, applicable to individually negotiated agreements; except, no arbitrator shall have jurisdiction to grant any remedy or relief that would have been unavailable to the parties had the matter been heard in court in accordance with applicable law, including but not limited to, awards of attorney’s fees and costs. Any and all issues regarding this agreement to arbitrate shall be governed by applicable state law, both procedural and substantive, except that the standards for vacation of any award will be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act.

(Freidman Decl., Exh. 1, ¶ 20.)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV019531: JACKSON vs HARBOR FREIGHT 08/03/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Action in Department 8C

Plaintiff’s opposition consists of a two-page handwritten letter addressed to the Court. Plaintiff acknowledges that he entered into the arbitration agreement with Defendant but asserts that the agreement “doesn’t include[] sexual assault during a hate crime attack and attempted murder by Lacey Soltero and Harbor Freight associates and customers.” (Opp., p. 1:3-5.) Plaintiff contends that he was racially attacked by Ms. Soltero’s friend on December 12, 2016 “after Harbor Freight wrongfully terminated me.” (Opp., p. 1:6.)

“Under both federal and state law, the threshold question presented by a petition to compel arbitration is whether there is an agreement to arbitrate.” (Sparks v. Del Mar Child and Family Svcs. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1511, 1517.) If the Court determines that an agreement to arbitrate exists, then it must order the case to arbitration unless grounds exist for revocation of the agreement. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2; 9 U.S.C. § 2.)

Plaintiff’s argument is essentially that his claims are not within the scope of the arbitration agreement.

“In determining contractual arbitrability, the threshold issue is whether the parties agreed to arbitrate their dispute—i.e., whether the contract included or excluded the dispute from its arbitration clause.” (Elijahjuan v. Superior Court (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 15, 20.) “The scope of arbitration is a matter of agreement between the parties. A party can be compelled to arbitrate only those issues it has agreed to arbitrate. However, doubts as to the scope of an agreement to arbitrate are to be resolved in favor of arbitration.” (Larkin v. Williams, Woolley, Cogswell, Nakazawa & Russell (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 227, 230, citations omitted.) In assessing whether the parties agreed to arbitrate particular disputes, the arbitration clause must be read in the context of the entire agreement. (Lawrence v. Walzer & Gabrielson (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1501, 1506; see Civ. Code §§ 1647, 1648.)

Whether an arbitration clause applies to a particular claim “rests substantially on whether the clause in question is ‘broad’ or ‘narrow.’” (Bono v. David (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1055, 1067.) An arbitration clause that applies to “any claim arising from or related to” the agreement, or the breach thereof, is generally considered a broad clause. (Rice v. Downs (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 175, 186; Larkin, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at p. 229.) Such clauses are typically interpreted “to encompass tort, statutory, and contractual disputes that ‘“‘have their roots in the relationship between the parties which was created by the contract.’”’” (Ramos v. Superior Court (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 1042, 1052.)

Here, as noted above, Plaintiff’s causes of action are not labeled, and thus the nature of the claims is not clear. Even so, the Court finds that the claims fall within the scope of the arbitration agreement. Plaintiff’s claims arise out of his relationship with Defendant, even to the extent they

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV019531: JACKSON vs HARBOR FREIGHT 08/03/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Action in Department 8C

pertain to events that occurred after Plaintiff’s employment was terminated. The arbitration agreement applies to “any dispute of any kind whatsoever” between Plaintiff and Defendant. (Freidman Decl., Exh. 1, ¶ 20.) This type of language has been found to broadly apply to claims between and employer and former employees, including for claims that arose after the employee’s termination. (See Vianna v. Doctors’ Mgmt. Co. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1186, 1189; see also Buckhorn v. St. Jude Heritage Med. Group (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1406-1407.)

Accordingly, since Defendant has established the existence of an agreement to arbitrate between the parties that encompasses Plaintiff’s claims in this lawsuit, and since Plaintiff has not shown that the agreement is unenforceable, Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration is GRANTED.

This case is STAYED pending completion of the arbitration.

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1019.5; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1312.)