MCDONALD, et al. vs COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, et al.

A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will be forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

TENTATIVE RULING

***NOTICE: EFFECTIVE APRIL 13, 2026, THIS DEPARTMENT HAS MOVED TO THE TANI G. CANTIL-SAKAUYE COURTHOUSE LOCATED AT 500 G STREET SACRAMENTO, CA. ALL MOTIONS NOTICED FOR DEPARTMENT 28 WILL BE HEARD IN DEPARTMENT 8C OF THE NEW COURTHOUSE. ALL PAPERS FOR THIS DEPARTMENT MUST BE FILED AT THIS NEW LOCATION AND WILL NOT BE ACCEPTED AT THE HALL OF JUSTICE. ALL HEARINGS WILL TAKE PLACE AT THIS NEW LOCATION***

Defendants California Department of Developmental Services (“CDDS”) and Nancy Bargmann, in her official capacity as CDDS Director (“Director Bargmann”) (collectively, “CDDS Defendants”) demur to the Complaint filed by Plaintiffs Haley M. McDonald (“Haley”), Timothy Green II (“Timothy”), and Haydyn McDonald (“Haydyn”), individually and as successors in interest to the estate of Joseph Lee Wood (Deceased) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”). The Court rules on the demurrer as follows.

The notice of motion does not provide notice of the Court’s tentative ruling system, as required

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by Local Rule 1.06. Moving counsel is directed to contact opposing counsel and advise of Local Rule 1.06 and the Court’s tentative ruling procedure and the manner to request a hearing. If moving counsel is unable to contact opposing counsel prior to the hearing, moving counsel is ordered to appear at the hearing by Zoom or in person.

CDDS Defendants’ request for judicial notice is unopposed and granted.

Background

Allegations in the Complaint

Plaintiff filed this action on February 16, 2024. The Complaint includes six causes of action: (1) wrongful death; (2) dependent adult abuse; (3) survival action; (4) negligence; (5) violations of the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act; and (6) violations of the Ralph Act. In addition to CDDS Defendants, the Complaint names Defendants County of Sacramento (“County”) and Alta California Regional Center, Inc. (“Alta Regional”). All causes of action are brought against all defendants.

Plaintiff’s claims arise from the alleged death of their sibling, Decedent Joseph Lee Wood (“Decedent”), on January 23, 2023 at the Sacramento County Jail (the “Jail). Plaintiffs allege that Decedent suffered from physical and mental limitations and “was a conservatee of or ward of the state of Defendant DDS and/or Defendant Alta Regional and/or one of its contractual agents.” (Complaint, ¶ 3.) Plaintiffs thus allege that CDDS was a care custodian of Decedent. Plaintiffs further allege that on September 23, 2022, Decedent was released from a psychiatric care hospital into the custody of a social worker employed by Alta Regional named Maria, who then drove Decedent “to a DDS/Alta Regional contracted care home for the mentally and intellectually disabled somewhere in Sacramento County.” (Complaint, ¶ 21.)

While at the care home that evening, Decedent allegedly experienced a mental health episode that resulted in him brandishing a knife at the dinner table, which led to law enforcement being contacted and Decedent being arrested for assault with a deadly weapon. Plaintiffs allege that Decedent should not have been taken to the Jail because it lacked required facilities and personnel to hold him. Despite the efforts of Decedent’s relatives over the next several months, Decedent remained at the Jail until his death.

On January 23, 2023, Decedent was found unresponsive at the Jail and later pronounced dead at a hospital. The cause of death was determined to be “choking on a sandwich.” (Complaint, ¶ 40.)

The Complaint describes the alleged investigation into Decedent’s death conducted by two medical professionals assigned by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California to monitor the Jail pursuant to a consent decree. According to the report filed on August 15, 2023 following the investigation as alleged in the Complaint, the Jail and its

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personnel repeatedly failed to provide Decedent with appropriate medical care, despite knowing of his disabilities and his needs for daily medication, and despite Decedent presenting with physical ailments that should have resulted in medical intervention. Plaintiffs allege that the report found that the personnel and conditions at the Jail were “directly responsible” for Decedent’s death. (Complaint, ¶ 37.)

CDDS Defendants’ Demurrer

CDDS Defendants demurrer on the following grounds:

1. All tort causes of action against demurring CDDS defendants brought on behalf of Timothy Green II and Haydyn McDonald, including all survivor claims, fail to state a claim and fail as a matter of law against CDDS Defendants because Timothy Green II and Hayden McDonald failed to comply with the Tort Claims Act which requires the presentation of a government claim as a precondition to suit. No claim was presented by Timothy Green II or Hayden McDonald.

2. All tort causes of action against demurring defendant CDDS Director Nancy Burgmann fail to state a claim and fail as a matter of law because plaintiffs failed to name Director Bargmann in the government claim, depriving her requisite notice under the Tort Claims Act.

3. The First Cause of Action fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for Wrongful Death by operation of Government Code sections 815, 815.2 and 820.8. The factual allegations supporting this cause of action also fail to establish that CDDS defendants owed a duty to protect the decedent from third-party conduct.

4. The Second Cause of Action fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act. The factual allegations supporting this cause of action fail to establish that CDDS defendants had a caretaking or custodial relationship with the decedent at the time of his death.

5. The Third Cause of Action fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for Survival because the underlying wrongful death and negligence causes of action fail to state a claim and fail as a matter of law[.]

6. The Fourth Cause of Action for negligence fails to allege sufficient facts to state a claim against demurring CDDS defendants. The cause of action fails to identify the existence of a duty or a breach of that duty by the demurring CDDS defendants and fails to allege damages resulting from a breach of duty by demurring CDDS defendants.

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7. The Fifth Cause of Action for violations of the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act fails to allege sufficient facts to state a claim against demurring CDDS defendants because no allegation of threats, intimidation, or coercion by any of the demurring CDDS defendants is alleged.

8. The Sixth Cause of Action fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for violations of the Ralph Act against demurring CDDS defendants because no allegation of any violent or intimidating act motivated by decedent’s alleged disabilities by the demurring CDDS defendants is alleged.

(Demurrer, pp. 3:3-4:4.)

Additionally, in their memorandum, CDDS Defendants contend that the Complaint is uncertain because it repeatedly refers to “all defendants,” insufficiently alleges involvement by CDDS Defendants, and fails to clearly identify whether liability against CDDS Defendants is based on direct or vicarious liability. CDDS Defendants also attack Plaintiffs’ claims for damages for Decedent’s pre-death pain and suffering, punitive damages, and attorney’s fees.

Legal Standard

The function of a demurrer is to test the sufficiency of the pleading it challenges by raising questions of law. (Salimi v. State Comp. Ins. Fund (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 216, 219; Nordlinger v. Lynch (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1259, 1271.) A demurrer “tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters.” (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) The purpose of a demurrer is to test the legal sufficiency of a claim. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.)

For the purpose of determining the effect of a complaint, its allegations are liberally construed, with a view toward substantial justice. (Code Civ. Proc. § 452; Amarel v. Connell (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 137, 140-141; Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 43, fn. 7.) In this respect, the Court treats the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law, and considers matters which may be judicially noticed. (Blank v.

Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Poseidon Development, Inc. v. Woodland Lane Estates, LLC (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1111-1112.) A general demurrer does not admit contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law alleged in the complaint; facts impossible in law; or allegations contrary to facts of which a court may take judicial notice. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318, William S. Hart Union High School Dist. v. Regional Planning Com. (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1612, 1616, fn. 2.)

Extrinsic evidence may not properly be considered on demurrer. (Ion Equipment Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881; Hibernia Savings & Loan Soc. v. Thornton (1897) 117 Cal. 481, 482.)

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Discussion

Uncertainty

“Demurrers for uncertainty under Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (e) are disfavored.” (Chen v. Berenjian (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 811, 822.) “A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly’s of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) A demurrer for uncertainty should be overruled when the complaint contains sufficient factual allegations to apprise the defendant of the issues it is being asked to meet. (Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139, fn. 2.)

CDDS Defendants contend that based on the allegations of the Complaint, “[i]t is uncertain as to what (if any) involvement there was by CDDS former director Nancy Bargmann or CDDS [in Decedent’s death].” (Demurrer MPA, p. 11:14-16.) The Court disagrees. Plaintiffs allege that Decedent’s “legal and physical custody and care was exercised and under the control of [CDDS Defendants], its contractual agents ALTA REGIONAL, and/or its/their subagents.” (Complaint, ¶ 18.) Plaintiffs also allege that CDDS Defendants “failed to adopt adequate policies and issue directives” in administering programs for services for persons with intellectual and developmental disabilities. (Complaint, ¶ 19.) Whether these allegations actually support a basis for liability is not the relevant inquiry on a demurrer for uncertainty. The Court also concludes that any ambiguities can be resolved through discovery.

Thus, CDDS Defendants’ demurrer for uncertainty is OVERRULED.

Plaintiffs Timothy and Haydyn’s Compliance with Government Claims Act

CDDS Defendants first contend that Timothy and Haydyn failed to comply with the Government Claims Act because they failed to file a claim with CDDS before filing this action. This argument is not directed towards Haley, who CDDS Defendants concede filed a claim on behalf of Decedent’s estate on July 21, 2023. The Court also notes that although CDDS Defendants’ statement of demurrer refers to “[a]ll tort causes of action against demurring CDDS defendants brought on behalf of Timothy Green II and Haydyn McDonald, including all survivor claims” (Demurrer, p. 3:3-4), CDDS Defendants’ memorandum states that this ground for demurrer is directed only towards the first four causes of action (Demurrer MPA, p. 11:27).

Plaintiffs’ opposition does not seem to address the individual causes of action at issue or raise any contention that CDDS Defendants’ demurrer on this ground should not include Plaintiffs’ fifth and sixth causes of action. Since Plaintiffs’ fifth and sixth causes of action seek compensatory damages (Complaint, ¶¶ 97, 107), and since the Government Claims Act applies to “all claims

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for money or damages” (Gov. Code § 905), the Court finds that CDDS Defendants’ demurrer on this ground applies to all causes of action alleged in the Complaint, notwithstanding the assertion in the memorandum that it only applies to the first four causes of action.

“A claim relating to a cause of action for death or for injury to person” against a public entity must be presented to the public entity “not later than six months after the accrual of the cause of action.” (Gov. Code § 911.2(a).) “A claim shall be presented by the claimant or by a person acting on his or her behalf.” (Gov. Code § 910.)

Plaintiffs concede that Timothy and Haydyn were not part of Haley’s claim and that they did not present separate claims. Plaintiffs thus state that they “will amend to remove their individual claims against the CDDS Defendants.” (Opp. MPA, p. 9:4-5.) However, Plaintiffs contend that Haley’s claim “preserves all claims belonging to the Estate,” and “supports the representative Wrongful Death action brought on behalf of the heirs,” because Timothy and Haydyn’s “status as heirs is independent of whether they each filed a separate claim.” (Opp. MPA, p. 9:9-15.)

Generally, each claimant must file his or her own tort claim. When people suffer separate and distinct injuries from the same act or omission, they must each submit a claim. One claimant cannot rely on a claim presented by another. (California Restaurant Management Systems v. City of San Diego (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1581, 1592 [126 Cal. Rptr. 3d 160].) This rule applies where different claimants are alleging survivor theories and wrongful death theories of liability arising from the same transaction. (Nelson v.

County of Los Angeles, supra, 113 Cal.App.4th at pp. 796–797 [separate tort claims required for survival cause of action by injured decedent and wrongful death claim by mother]; Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. County of Riverside (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 183, 190– 192 [165 Cal. Rptr. 29][separate tort claims required for decedent’s employer for workers’ compensation and widow’s wrongful death claim]; Roberts v. State of California (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 844, 847–848 [114 Cal. Rptr. 518] [same].)

(Castaneda v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1051, 1062- 1063.)

Plaintiffs are correct that Haley’s claim preserved the causes of action belonging to the Estate with Haley as the successor in interest. Whether Timothy and Haydyn may also serve as successors in interest is unclear, but it also does not seem to matter ultimately. The survivor claims belong to the Estate and are based on the harm to Decedent, not any of Decedent’s heirs. Thus, the Court sees no issue with Timothy and Haydyn also being identified as Decedent’s successors in interest.

However, the failure of Timothy and Haydyn to file their own claims bars their wrongful death

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claims. Initially, the Court notes that Plaintiffs cite no authority to support their argument that Haley’s claim preserves Timothy and Haydyn’s wrongful death causes of action simply because it included a wrongful death claim. Each heir has his or her own individual wrongful death cause of action. (Cross v. Pacific Fas & Elec. Co. (1964) 60 Cal.3d 690, 692-693.) “Any recovery is in the form of a lump sum verdict determined according to each heir’s separate interest in the decedent’s life, with each heir required to prove his or her own individual loss in order to share in the verdict.” (San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v.

Superior Court (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1545, 1551, citations omitted.) Additionally, “in a wrongful death action the ‘injury’ is not the general loss of the decedent, but the particular loss of the decedent to each individual claimant.” (Ibid., emphasis added.) Since Timothy and Haydyn have separate wrongful death causes of action, they were required to file their own claims or join Haley’s claim.

Accordingly, CDDS Defendants’ demurrer to Plaintiffs Timothy and Haydyn’s individual causes of action on grounds of failure to comply with the Government Claims Act is SUSTAINED. This ruling is directed towards the following causes of action on behalf of Timothy and Haydyn: (1) the first cause of action for wrongful death; (2) the fourth cause of action for negligence; and (3) the sixth cause of action for violations of the Ralph Act. Under each of these causes of action, Plaintiffs allege that they “bring this cause of action as heirs to the Decedent that died and suffered as a result of the unlawful conduct of the Defendants, and for themselves [or on their own behalf].” (Complaint, ¶ 42, 82, and 99, emphasis added.)

Notice to Director Bargmann

CDDS Defendants next argue that although Plaintiff Haley McDonald filed a timely claim against CDDS, the claim does not name or allege any wrongdoing by CDDS employees, including Director Bargmann. Thus, CDDS Defendants contend that Haley’s claims against Director Bargmann are barred.

A claim shall include, among other information, “[t]he name or names of the public employees causing the injury, damage, or loss, if known.” (Gov. Code § 910(e).) CDDS Defendants contend that since the identity of Director Bargmann as Director of CDDS was readily available from public sources, Plaintiffs knew Director Bargmann’s name at the time the claim was filed. In opposition, Plaintiffs concede that Director Bargmann is not named in the claim, but they argue that this is not necessary since Director Bargmann is sued in her official capacity, which Plaintiffs contend is the equivalent of suing the agency. In reply, CDDS Defendants contend that Plaintiffs’ admission that Director Bargmann is sued only in her official capacity further supports dismissing her as a defendant on the basis that her presence in this suit is redundant.

The Court finds that this issue is not appropriately addressed on the pleadings. For one, CDDS Defendants’ initial argument in their demurrer is that Plaintiffs should have named Director

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Bargmann in Haley’s claim because she is the agency director so her identity was public and easily obtainable. In other words, CDDS argues that Plaintiffs should have known Director Bargmann’s name. However, Government Code section 910(e) requires the claimant to name the public employee only “if known,” not if the claimant should have known. Moreover, since Plaintiffs name Director Bargmann only in her official capacity, they are effectively suing CDDS. “[A] suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s office.” (Will v.

Michigan Dept. of State Police (1989) 491 U.S. 58, 71.) Thus, Plaintiffs do not allege that Director Bargmann individually caused their injury, so Government Code section 910(e) does not apply. Finally, CDDS Defendants’ argument in reply that Director Bargmann’s presence is redundant implicitly acknowledges the inapplicability of section 910(e). However, redundancy of a defendant is not a proper ground for demurrer.

Accordingly, CDDS Defendants’ demurrer to Haley’s claims against Director Bargmann is OVERRULED.

Failure to State a Cause of Action[1]

Wrongful Death

“‘The elements of the cause of action for wrongful death are the tort (negligence or other wrongful act), the resulting death, and the damages, consisting of the pecuniary loss by the heirs.’” (Quiroz v. Seventh Ave. Center (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1256, 1263, italics removed.) CDDS Defendants contend that Plaintiffs fail to allege the underlying tort because they fail to allege facts establishing the existence of a duty owed by CDDS Defendants to Decedent. CDDS Defendants argue that “Plaintiffs plead no plausible basis to attribute responsibility to CDDS or its Director for the decedent’s incarceration, the conditions of the county jail, or the choking incident that caused his death.” (Demurrer MPA, p. 14:15-17.)

CDDS Defendants further argue that because Plaintiffs allege that Decedent died while in the custody of the Jail, and since he was in the custody of Alta before he was arrested, Plaintiffs must allege facts to establish a duty on CDDS Defendants to protect Decedent from third-party conduct, which requires a special relationship between CDDS Defendants and Decedent. Additionally, CDDS Defendants argue that even if a special relationship could be shown, policy factors do not support imposing a duty.

Finally, CDDS Defendants contend that, as a matter of law, they have no control over regional care centers like Alta, and thus cannot be liable for Alta’s acts.

In opposition, Plaintiffs contend that they have alleged “a duty arising from the special, custodial, and fiduciary relationship between he CDDS Defendants and [Decedent].” (Opp. MPA, p. 11:13-14.) Plaintiffs contend that this duty arises from the Lanterman Act. Plaintiffs also attempt to distinguish CDDS Defendants’ argument that no special relationship exists in

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arguing that “CDDS Defendants were no innocent bystanders: through funding, provider selection, monitoring, training requirements, and policy-setting, they exercised control over the environment in which [Decedent] was placed,” and that Decedent depended on CDDS Defendants for protection. (Opp. MPA, p. 12:7-9.)

“Generally, the ‘person who has not created a peril is not liable in tort merely for failure to take affirmative action to assist or protect another’ from that peril.” (Brown v. USA Taekwondo (2011) 11 Cal.5th 204, 214.) However, this rule is not absolute, and “a person may have an affirmative duty to protect the victim of another's harm if that person is in what the law calls a ‘special relationship’ with either the victim or the person who created the harm.” (Id. at p. 215.) “A special relationship between the defendant and the victim is one that ‘gives the victim a right to expect’ protection from the defendant, while a special relationship between the defendant and the dangerous third party is one that ‘entails an ability to control [the third party’s] conduct.’” (Id. at p. 216.)

Even where a special relationship exists, the duty arising from that relationship may be excused or limited through application of the Rowland factors. (Id. at p. 218.)

“Relationships that have been recognized as ‘special’ share a few common features. Generally, the relationship has an aspect of dependency in which one party relies to some degree on the other for protection.” (Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 607, 620.) “The corollary of dependence in a special relationship is control. Whereas one party is dependent, the other has superior control over the means of protection.” (Id. at p. 621.) “Special relationships also have defined boundaries. They create a duty of care owed to a limited community, not the public at large.” (Ibid.)

Plaintiffs cite Welfare and Institutions Code section 4501, which is part of the Lanterman Developmental Disabilities Services Act (the “Lanterman Act”), and which states, in part, “The State of California accepts a responsibility for persons with developmental disabilities and an obligation to them which it must discharge.” (Welf. & Inst. Code § 4501.) “Pursuant to the Lanterman Act, our state has undertaken the duty to provide ‘[a]n array of services and supports’ to ‘person[s] with developmental disabilities.’” (Shalghoun v.

North Los Angeles County Regional Center, Inc. (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 929, 941.) CDDS “oversees the provision of services and support” to persons with developmental disabilities. (Ibid.) “However, because those services and support ‘cannot be satisfactorily provided by state agencies,’ the Act requires [CDDS] to do so by contracting with ‘regional centers,’ which are ‘private nonprofit community agencies’ that operate as ‘fixed points of contact in the community’ to diagnose, counsel and coordinate the acquisition of the necessary services and support.” (Ibid.)

The respective obligations of the State and regional care centers under the Lanterman Act were discussed in Association for Retarded Citizens v. Department of Developmental Services (1985) 38 Cal.3d 384 (ARS), a case cited by CDDS Defendants. In ARS, the Supreme Court stated that

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“it is the regional centers, not DDS, that provide services to developmentally disabled persons and determine the manner in which those services are to be rendered. [Citations.] DDS has the authority to promote uniformity and cost-effectiveness in the operations of the regional centers.” (ARS, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 389.) The Supreme Court further stated:

From our review of the provisions of the Act, we reach the following two conclusions. First, the regional centers and DDS have distinct responsibilities in the statutory scheme: that of the regional centers is to provide each developmentally disabled person with the services to which he is entitled under the Act; that of DDS is to promote the cost- effectiveness of the operations of the regional centers, but not to control the manner in which they provide services. Second, the Act defines a basic right and a corresponding basic obligation: the right which it grants to the developmentally disabled person is to be provided with services that enable him to live a more independent and productive life in the community; the obligation which it imposes on the state is to provide such services.

(ARS, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 391.)

While the issue in ARS was whether CDDS exceeded its statutory authority in issuing certain regulations, and not the existence of CDDS’s duty to developmentally disabled persons in a tort context, the Court finds the ARS court’s discussion of the scope of the Lanterman Act helpful here. Based on the conclusions reached in ARS, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not alleged a duty of care. Based on ARS, as well as Shalghoun, supra, CDDS’s duty to developmentally disabled persons like Decedent is to provide services to support such persons and their ability to maintain an independent life by contracting with regional care centers, and to promote the costeffectiveness of the operations of the regional centers.

Plaintiffs’ allegations that provide the basis for liability against CDDS Defendants do not invoke these duties. Plaintiffs allege that after being released from a psychiatric hospital, Decedent was placed into the custody of Alta Regional, and that a person or persons in charge of Alta Regional called law enforcement, resulting in Decedent’s arrest, which ultimately led to his death. Thus, Plaintiffs appear to allege that Alta Regional should not have called law enforcement. (See Complaint, ¶¶ 20-25.)

From this, it appears that Plaintiffs allege that CDDS Defendants are liable for failing to adequately oversee Alta Regional. But this is not within the scope of CDDS Defendants’ duty to Decedent. Plaintiffs also allege that CDDS “failed to adopt adequate policies and issue directives to ensure that the I/DD services it funds and oversees are reasonably administered and safe to its clients.” (Complaint, ¶ 19.) This is also not within the scope of CDDS Defendants’ duty to Decedent. CDDS Defendants are obligated to provide services to persons like Decedent by contracting with regional care centers and by overseeing the cost-effectiveness of these contractual arrangements.

CDDS lacks the authority to control the actions of the regional care centers with which it has contracted. Importantly, Plaintiffs do not allege that CDDS Defendants failed to actually provide services by failing to contract with regional care centers or to ensure that the regional care

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centers were operating cost-effectively. “DDS is without authority under the Lanterman Act to control the manner in which the regional centers provide services or to control their operations.” (ARS, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 392.) It follows that CDDS does not have a duty to ensure that the services “are reasonably administered and safe to [persons with developmental disabilities].” (Complaint, ¶ 19.)

Accordingly, CDDS Defendants’ demurrer to Plaintiffs’ first cause of action for wrongful death on the grounds of lack of duty is SUSTAINED.

Negligence

As an initial matter, the Court’s conclusion that no duty has been alleged with regards to Plaintiffs’ wrongful death cause of action applies to this cause of action.

“[T]here is no common law tort liability for public entities in California. Sovereign immunity is the rule and a public entity may be held liable only if there is a statute subjecting it to civil liability.” (Torres v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 844, 850, citations omitted.) The Complaint does not identify a statute subjecting CDDS Defendants to civil liability. Plaintiffs purport to identify several statutes in their opposition. However, a plaintiff is generally required to identify the statute or enactment imposing liability against the public entity. (Sullivan v. City of Sacramento (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 1070, 1080.) The Court expresses no opinion as to whether the statutes cited in Plaintiffs’ opposition actually impose liability.

Accordingly, CDDS Defendants’ demurrer to Plaintiffs’ fourth cause of action for negligence on the grounds of lack of duty and lack of statutory basis for liability is SUSTAINED.

Dependent Adult Abuse CDDS Defendants contend that they did not have a caretaking or custodial relationship with Decedent at the time of his death, as any such relationship was terminated upon Decedent’s arrest and transfer to the custody of the Jail.

To state a claim under the Elder Abuse Act, the plaintiff must allege “the existence of a robust caretaking or custodial relationship—that is, a relationship where a certain party has assumed a significant measure of responsibility for attending to one or more of an elder’s basic needs that an able-bodied and fully competent adult would ordinarily be capable of managing without assistance.” (Winn v. Pioneer Medical Group, Inc. (2016) 63 Cal.4th 148, 158.) The Court notes that its conclusion that CDDS Defendants did not have a special relationship with Decedent supports the conclusion that CDDS Defendants did not have the more direct caretaking or custodial relationship with Decedent, either before or after his arrest. Further, the Court agrees

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with CDDS Defendants that even assuming a caretaking or custodial relationship existed before the arrest, the allegations in the Complaint show that it was terminated upon the arrest, at which time the Jail became responsible for Decedent’s basic needs. Plaintiffs do not explain, either legally or factually, how CDDS Defendants could fulfill a duty to attend to Decedent’s basic needs once he entered the custody of County at the Jail.

Accordingly, CDDS Defendants’ demurrer to Plaintiffs’ second cause of action for dependent adult abuse is SUSTAINED.

Bane Act

“There are two distinct elements for a [Bane Act] cause of action. A plaintiff must show (1) intentional interference or attempted interference with a state or federal constitutional or legal right, and (2) the interference or attempted interference was by threats, intimidation or coercion.” (Allen v. City of Sacramento (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 41, 67.) CDDS Defendants contend that Plaintiffs fail to allege facts showing that they engaged in threats, intimidation, or coercion, or that they identify any constitutional or legal right of Decedent’s.

The Complaint alleges that “Defendants” in general engaged in “wrongful conduct” that included “reckless failure to verify information as to [D]ecedent’s mental state; reckless failure to properly investigate facts or investigate at all; reckless failure to provide proper and adequate medical care thereby subjecting the Decedent to almost five months of severe physical and mental pain and suffering.” (Complaint, ¶ 94.) These allegations do not establish threats, intimidation, or coercion. Plaintiffs essentially concede that the Complaint as alleged is insufficient and thus request leave to amend. (See Opp.

MPA, pp. 15:17-16:6.)

Accordingly, CDDS Defendants’ demurrer to Plaintiffs’ fifth cause of action for violation of the Bane Act is SUSTAINED.

Ralph Act

The elements of a claim under the Ralph Act are: “‘1. That [the defendant] threatened or committed violent acts against [the plaintiff or his or her property]; [¶] 2. That a motivating reason for [the defendant’s] conduct was [his/her] perception of [the plaintiff’s age or disability]]; [¶] 3. That [the plaintiff] was harmed; and [¶] 4. That [the defendant’s] conduct was a substantial factor in causing [the plaintiff] harm.’” (Austin B. v. Escondido Union School Dist. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 860, 880-881, citing CACI No. 3023.) The “motivating reason” element is not limited to a plaintiff’s age or disability but applies to any prohibited discriminatory motive. (See Doe v. Kachru (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 175, 208, fn. 12.)

Plaintiffs fail to allege that CDDS Defendants engaged in threatened or actual violent acts

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV002941: MCDONALD, et al. vs COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, et al. 08/03/2026 Hearing on Demurrer in Department 8C

against Decedent or that any such conduct was motivated by Decedent’s protected characteristic. The allegations purporting to show violence do not actually show violence, and the allegations of discriminatory motive are conclusory. (See Complaint, ¶¶ 101-102.)

Accordingly, CDDS Defendants’ demurrer to Plaintiffs’ sixth cause of action for violation of the Ralph Act is SUSTAINED.

Survival Claim

“Unlike a cause of action for wrongful death, a survivor cause of action is not a new cause of action that vests in the heirs on the death of the decedent. It is instead a separate and distinct cause of action which belonged to the decedent before death but, by statute, survives that event. The survival statutes do not create a cause of action. Rather, ‘[t]hey merely prevent the abatement of the cause of action of the injured person, and provide for its enforcement by or against the personal representative of the deceased.’” (Quiroz v. Seventh Ave. Center (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1256, 1264, citations omitted.)

CDDS Defendants contend that Plaintiffs’ survivor cause of action fails because their underlying claims for negligence and wrongful death fail. While this is somewhat correct with respect to the negligence cause of action, the wrongful death cause of action has no bearing on a survivor claim. Additionally, this argument fails to address the fact that Plaintiffs’ other claims are also brought on behalf of Decedent and are thus “survivor claims.” Even so, there is no separate cause of action for “survival” or “survivor.” The statutes authorizing such claims simply provide that certain claims survive the death of a decedent and that those claims can be pursued by the decedent’s successor in interest or personal representative. (Quiroz, supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at p. 1264.)

Accordingly, CDDS Defendants’ demurrer to Plaintiffs’ third cause of action for survival is SUSTAINED on the basis that there is no separate cause of action for survival.

To the extent CDDS Defendants seek to adjudicate Plaintiffs’ right to recover damages for Decedent’s predeath pain and suffering through the claims brought on behalf of the estate, the demurrer is OVERRULED since a demurrer cannot be directed to a claim for damages. (Venice Town Council, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1547, 1561-1562.)

Punitive Damages/Attorney’s Fees

CDDS Defendants also contend that Plaintiffs are not entitled to recover punitive damages or attorney’s fees on the basis of a wrongful death claim. Again, a demurrer may not be brought against a claim for damages or a remedy such as attorney’s fees. Thus, the demurrer on this

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV002941: MCDONALD, et al. vs COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, et al. 08/03/2026 Hearing on Demurrer in Department 8C

ground is OVERRULED. The Court declines to treat the demurrer as a motion to strike allegations related to punitive damages or attorney’s fees.

Disposition

CDDS Defendants’ demurrer is OVERRULED on the grounds of uncertainty, notice to Director Bargmann, and to the extent it is directed towards Plaintiffs’ claims for damages.

CDDS Defendants’ demurrer is SUSTAINED on the grounds of failure to state a cause of action as to all causes of action in the Complaint. With respect to these grounds, leave to amend is GRANTED, except as to the third cause of action for survival action, as to which leave to amend is DENIED.

CDDS Defendants’ demurrer is SUSTAINED on the grounds of failure to comply with the Government Claims Act as to Plaintiffs Timothy and Haydyn’s first, fourth, and sixth causes of action. With respect to these grounds, leave to amend is DENIED.

Plaintiffs may file and serve a First Amended Complaint by no later than September 2, 2026.

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1019.5; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1312.)

[1] CDDS Defendants’ brief contains a subsection discussing derivative immunity under Government Code sections

820.8 and 815.2 on the basis that the Complaint only alleges wrongful acts by other defendants, not CDDS Defendants. The Court views this argument as being related to CDDS Defendants’ failure to state a cause of action arguments, and thus discusses the immunities to the extent they are relevant in this section.