LINDBLOOM vs PEACH TREE HEALTHCARE, et al.

25CV006421: LINDBLOOM vs PEACH TREE HEALTHCARE, et al. 08/01/2025 Hearing on Motion for Change of Venue in Department 47

The motion to transfer venue pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 396b is denied as untimely. A motion to transfer venue under that section must be filed and served before or at the same time the moving defendant files an answer, demurrer, or motion to strike. Here, Defendant filed a demurrer on May 5, 2025, before filing this motion. Defendant therefore waived any right to transfer venue pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 396b.

However, the time limit set forth in Code of Civil Procedure § 396b is in applicable to a motion to transfer venue pursuant to section 397(a). (Walt Disney Parks & Resorts U.S., Inc. v. Superior Court (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 872, 879.) Thus, the Court retains discretion to transfer venue and will consider the merits of the motion pursuant to section 397(a).

“Venue is determined based on the complaint on file at the time the motion to change venue is made.” (Brown v. Superior Court (1984) 37 Cal.3d 477, 482.) 'The plaintiff's choice of venue is presumptively correct.' (Easton v. Superior Court (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 243, 274.) Thus, the moving party has the burden of showing the action was not commenced in a proper county and that the action is proper in the proposed county for transfer. (Sequoia Pine Mills, Inc. v. Superior Court of Tuolumne County (1968) 258 Cal.App.2d 65, 68.)

In an action brought by an aggrieved employee involving claims for violation of FEHA, venue is proper “in any county in the state in which the unlawful practice is alleged to have been committed, in the county in which the records relevant to the practice are maintained and administered, or in the county in which the aggrieved person would have worked or would have had access to the public accommodation but for the alleged unlawful practice, but if the defendant is not found within any of these counties, an action may be brought within the county of the defendant’s residence or principal office.” (Gov.

Code § 12965(c)(3).) The termination of an employee allegedly motivated by unlawful discrimination or retaliation occurs where the decision to terminate the employment is made, not where the employee receives the communication. (See Malloy v. Superior Court (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 543, 554.)

The complaint alleges that the discriminatory and retaliatory decision-making took place in Sacramento County. (Complaint, ¶ 4.) In particular, Plaintiff contends Defendant’s CEO, Greg Stone and Chief Administrative Officer/Human Resources, Michelle Woodard, committed unlawful practices while working in Sacramento County, including the allegation that Stone decided to unlawfully terminate Plaintiff on a day he was working in Sacramento. These allegations are sufficient to make Sacramento County a proper place for trial as a county where the unlawful practice is alleged to have occurred. (Gov. Code § 12965(c)(3).)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV006421: LINDBLOOM vs PEACH TREE HEALTHCARE, et al. 08/01/2025 Hearing on Motion for Change of Venue in Department 47

Defendant argues venue that he alleged unlawful acts did not actually occur in Sacramento. As evidence that the unlawful acts occurred in Yuba County, Defendant offers the declaration of Human Resources Manager Michelle Cowdery. (Cowdery Decl., ¶ 7.) Notably, however, Cowdery’s declaration does not indicate she was involved in the decision-making process for Plaintiff’s termination and does not explain how she has personal knowledge that the decision was made in Yuba County rather than Sacramento County.

Rather, Cowdery declares that the lay-off “would have been decided and carried out in Marysville, Yuba County,” suggesting that Cowdery’s declaration is based on information and belief as to the normal decision-making process rather than personal knowledge of the particular decision. (See Cowdery Decl., ¶ 7.) Further, Cowdery concedes that Stone worked in both Sacramento and Yuba County. (Cowdery Decl., ¶ 4.) As noted above, Cowdery does not offer any details explaining how she knows Stone made the decision to terminate Plaintiff while in Yuba County rather than Sacramento County.

In addition, Cowdery acknowledges that Plaintiff contends a volunteer board member is partially responsible and that her knowledge of the board member’s work place is based solely on information and belief.

In reply, Cowdery provides a supplemental declaration stating she has reviewed badge reports and that the reports show Stone worked 64% of the time at the facility in Sacramento and spent the remaining 36% of the time split between Yuba County and working remotely. (Cowdery Supp. Decl., ¶ 7(b).) Notably, Defendant does not dispute that when Stone worked remotely, he did so from his home in Sacramento County. Notably, Cowdery does not indicate whether the badge reports show Stone was working in Sacramento County on the day Plaintiff was terminated. However, based on Cowdery’s supplemental declaration, it appears Stone spent the majority of his time working in Sacramento County. Thus, Defendant’s own evidence supports a finding that venue is proper in Sacramento County.

In reply, Defendant’s also offer a declaration from Woodard, who disputes evidence offered by Plaintiff as to Woodard’s work location. Notably, however, Woodard does not provide testimony as to how often she worked in Sacramento County and does not state whether any of the alleged unlawful acts attributed to her were done in Sacramento County.

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds Defendant has failed to submit sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption that Plaintiff’s choice of venue is correct. Venue is proper in Sacramento County on grounds unlawful acts are alleged to have been conducted in Sacramento County.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV006421: LINDBLOOM vs PEACH TREE HEALTHCARE, et al. 08/01/2025 Hearing on Motion for Change of Venue in Department 47

The motion is denied. However, the Court finds Defendant had a good faith basis for bringing this motion. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request for an award of reasonable expenses and attorney’s fees is denied. (See Code Civ. Proc. § 396b(b).)

This case has been assigned to Department 47 for hearing. In the event that either party requests a hearing the matter will be heard at 9:30 a.m. in Department 47. Any party requesting an oral argument must contact the clerk at (916) 874-5487 and opposing counsel or parties in pro per by 12:00 p.m. on the court day before the hearing. If a proper request for hearing is not made, this shall become the order of the Court.

Parties requesting services of a court reporter will need to arrange for private court reporter services at their own expense, pursuant to Government Code section 68086 and California Rules of Court, rule 2.956. Requirements for requesting a court reporter are listed in the Policy for Official Reporter Pro Tempore available on the Sacramento Superior Court website at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp-6a.pdf. Parties may contact Court- Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore by utilizing the list of Court Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore available at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp- 13.Pdf A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list, Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk.

If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.