Demurrer
LINE CASE NO. CASE TITLE TENTATIVE RULING 9:00 23CV424190 AI Technology vs. Plaintiff moves petitions this court to compel Defendant to respond to Request for 1 Renesas Electronics Production of Documents Set Five No. 62-82 and moves for sanctions. Plaintiff America argues that Defendant fails to identify the documents withheld based on the stated objections and fails to provide the document code numbers that it claims to be responsive to Plaintiff’s request. CCP 2031.20 mandates responses to have such particularity as Plaintiff argues.
This court notes that Defendant failed to provide the specific privilege or identify the specific documents as required under CCP 2031.20. Defendant submitted no objections to Plaintiff’s petition. Plaintiff’s petition is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s motion for monetary sanctions of $2,000 is GRANTED. 9:00 24CV438439 Diane Volgenau vs. Defendant moves this court to enforce the settlement agreement approved by an 2 Blake Volgenau, et.al. attorney appointed by this court to serve as a pro tem judge for purposes of the settlement agreement.
Plaintiff argues that the settlement agreement is not enforceable because the agreement was not signed nor was it agreed to in front of this court; therefore, CCP section 664.6 was not complied with. This court finds that because the court appointed an attorney to serve as pro tem judge for purposes of the settlement agreement, section 664.6 has been complied with. Defendant’s motion to enforce the settlement agreement is GRANTED. 9:00 24CV451322 Isauro Juarez- Plaintiff petitions this court to further compel Intervenor Avis Budget Group Inc. to 3 Mendoza, et.al. vs answer Plaintiff’s request for admissions without conditioning its response to Luis Ramirez Fuentes, “assuming You refers solely to responding party.”
Defendant/Intervenor argues et.al. that Plaintiff’s petition should be denied based on timeliness. Defendant/Intervenor also argues that it complied with Plaintiff’s request for admission. This court deems Plaintiff’s motion as timely as it was filed within the 45 calendar days plus an additional 2 court days for electronic filing. This ourt finds that plaintiff did electronically file within the proscribed time frame. This court also finds that Plaintiff is correct that you refers to any party that represents the Defendant including the Intervenor and should not be answered with the qualifying phrase “assuming you refers solely to responding party.
Petition for Defendant/Intervenor Avis Budget Group to respond to Plaintiff’s request for admission is GRANTED. This court orders Avis Budget Group to answer Plaintiff’s request for admissions without the phrase “assuming You refers solely to responding party. 9:00 25CV461594 Monica Alcantar vs. Defendant petitions this court to compel Plaintiff to appear for a deposition. 4 General Motors, LLC Plaintiff’s argument that she notified defendant of failure to appear for deposition does not constitute good cause for Plaintiff’s failure to produce attendance at a deposition especially when the deadline was in November of 2025.
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Under CCP 871.26(j)(2), sanctions of $1500 are mandatory. Defendants petition is GRANTED. Defendant’s motion for sanctions of $1500 is GRANTED. 9:00 25CV466156 Parastou Mafi vs. See below 5 Lynn Jozani 9:00 25CV466156 Isella Cantu vs. Nam Continued to 10/29/26 6 Tran, et.al. 9:00 25CV481653 Wells Fargo Bank, Plaintiff moves this court to deem the truth of the matters specified in Plaintiff’s 7 N.A. vs Rachael Dicen Request for Admissions as admitted. Plaintiff served Defendant on January 5, 2026 with a request for admissions.
Defendant’s responses were due February 10, 2026 but she never responded. Defendant did not file a response to Plaintiff’s motion. Plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED.
9:00 25CV477954 SIU Holdings, et.al. Defendants move this court for Plaintiffs to comply with statutory undertaking 8 vs. Pouya Taaghol requirement of CCP section 1030. Plaintiffs admit that they are out of state entities. The court is not persuaded that the business contacts they have made render them to be entities that are within the state. Defendant also need only show that they have a reasonable possibility of prevailing at trial. Defendant has met its burden showing that a factfinder could find that defendant’s statements are protected by the common interest privilege or that the statement is not an accusation of a crime. Defendant’s motion is GRANTED. This court will seek oral argument regarding the amount of bond appropriate in this matter.
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Case Name: Mafi v. Jozani Case No.: 25CV466156
According to the allegations of the first amended complaint (“FAC”), Plaintiff Parastou Mafi (“Plaintiff”) is married to but legally separated from Vahid Assadi (“Assadi”). (See FAC, ¶ 1.) Defendant Lynn Diane Assadi Jozani (“Defendant”) is Assadi’s sister and thus, Plaintiff’s sister-in-law. (Id.) During the marital dissolution proceeding, Assadi made certain false representations to Plaintiff and the court, thereby breaching his fiduciary duties owed to Plaintiff. (See FAC, ¶¶ 9-15.) Defendant knowingly aided and abetted Assadi in the breach of his fiduciary duties and benefitted from these breaches. (See FAC, ¶ 16.)
On January 5, 2026, Plaintiff filed the FAC against Defendant asserting causes of action for:
1) Aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty; 2) Aiding and abetting fraud—intentional misrepresentations—Dougherty Property; 3) Aiding and abetting fraud—intentional misrepresentations—Stevens Creek Property; 4) Aiding and abetting fraud—concealment of material facts—Dougherty Property; 5) Aiding and abetting fraud—concealment of material facts—Stevens Creek Property;
6) Aiding and abetting fraud—false promise—Dougherty Property; 7) Aiding and abetting fraud—false promise—Stevens Creek Property; 8) Interference with prospective economic advantage—Dougherty Property; 9) Interference with prospective economic advantage—Stevens Creek Property; 10) Violations of Uniform Voidable Transactions Act—Dougherty Property; and, 11) Violations of Uniform Voidable Transactions Act—Stevens Creek Property.
Defendant’s request for judicial notice of the May 18, 2023 order regarding the sale of real properties and distribution of net proceeds, the June 20, 2023 order appointing real estate agent, the July 5, 2023 order appointing real estate agent Brian Costello, and the October 11, 2023 stipulation and order is GRANTED. (Evid. Code § 452, subds. (c), (d), (h); see also Day v. Sharp (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 904, 914 (stating that “[a] court...can only take judicial notice of the truth of facts asserted in documents such as orders”).) Defendant’s request for judicial notice of the Ruby Naranjo declaration is GRANTED as to its existence. (See Evid. Code § 452, subd. (d).) Defendant’s request for judicial notice of the August 24, 2023 email from Judge Edward Mills to Christopher Hirz and Thomas Bloom regarding the Stevens Creek listing is DENIED as it is not a proper subject of judicial notice.
First cause of action for aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty
As Defendant argues, the alleged nondisclosures or misrepresentations during a judicial proceeding, or statements made in court documents filed in a proceeding are protected by the litigation privilege. (See Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1065 (stating that “if the gravamen of the action is communicative, the litigation privilege extends to noncommunicative acts that are necessarily related to the communicative conduct”).) Further, a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty based on fraud is generally required to be pled with particularity. (See Knox v.
Dean (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 417, 434 (stating that “[a] breach of a fiduciary duty usually constitutes constructive fraud... [and] like actual fraud, must be pleaded with specificity”).) Moreover, Defendant is correct that Plaintiff may not attempt to relitigate matters concerning Assadi in a separate action. Here, to the extent that the first cause of action is based
on conduct that is neither protected by the litigation privilege, nor the subject of an order in the family law case, it fails to allege facts with sufficient specificity regarding the Defendant’s conduct constituting the substantial assistance or encouragement and how such conduct was a substantial factor in causing harm. (See Nasrawi v. Buck Consultants LLC (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 328, 343 (stating that “[t]he elements of a claim for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty are: (1) a third party’s breach of fiduciary duties owed to plaintiff; (2) defendant’s actual knowledge of that breach of fiduciary duties; (3) substantial assistance or encouragement by defendant to the third party’s breach; and (4) defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in causing harm to plaintiff”).)
Defendant’s demurrer to the first cause of action for aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty is SUSTAINED with 10 days leave to amend.
Second through seventh causes of action
The second through seventh causes of action allege fraud by intentional misrepresentations, concealment and promise without intention to perform. As indicated above, fraud must be pled with particularity. (See Wald v. TruSpeed Motorcars, LLC (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 378, 393 (stating that “[i]n California, fraud must be pled specifically; general and conclusory allegations do not suffice... plaintiff must plead facts which show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were made”); see also West v.
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 780, 793 (stating same).) As stated above, these causes of action may not be based on alleged representations made “in various court documents filed in the marital dissolution proceeding” as those representations are protected by the litigation privilege. As to other statements or omissions not protected by the litigation privilege, the causes of action fail to allege the fraud or Defendant’s substantial assistance with sufficient particularity. Defendant’s demurrer to the second through seventh causes of action is SUSTAINED with 10 days leave to amend.
Eighth and ninth causes of action for interference with prospective economic advantage
Here, both the eighth and ninth causes of action are based on Defendant’s “engaging in her wrongful acts of aiding and abetting Assadi in his breaches of fiduciary duties to Plaintiff and his fraudulent conduct perpetrated against Plaintiff.” (FAC, ¶¶ 66-68, 73-75.) As the FAC fails to adequately allege causes of action for aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty and fraud, these dependent causes of action likewise fail to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Defendant’s demurrer to the eighth and ninth causes of action is SUSTAINED with 10 days leave to amend.
Tenth and eleventh causes of action for violations of the Uniform Voidable Transactions Act
Defendant demurs to the tenth and eleventh causes of action for violation of the Uniform Voidable Transactions Act, arguing that judicially noticeable facts demonstrate that Defendant was a good faith transferee. Plaintiff argues that the Court should not take judicial notice of the facts contained within the orders. However, as stated above, the Court may “take judicial notice of the truth of facts asserted in documents such as orders.” (Day, supra, 50 Cal.App.3d at p.914.) The orders indicate that the parties anticipated the amount of $1,515,000 for the sale of the Dougherty property and $1,200,000 for the Stevens Creek property. (See Def.’s request for judicial notice, exhs.
C (“Narajo decl.”), ¶ 3; D (“October 11, 2023 order, ¶¶ 4-5 (stating the amount anticipated for Stevens Creek property is that which was received from the seller).) Judicially noticeable facts indicate that Defendant was not a good faith transferee and the tenth and eleventh causes of action fail to state facts supporting violations of the UVTA. Defendant’s demurrer to the tenth and eleventh causes of action is SUSTAINED with 10 days leave to amend.
Defendant shall prepare and submit a proposed final order consistent with this tentative ruling.
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