K&L Supply Co., Inc. v. Yeo Lee

Defendant is now in a dispute with Christy Ryoo, his adopted daughter and current owner of K&L Supply. In 2025, during negotiations over the sale of properties jointly owned by Christy Ryoo and Defendant, his attorneys proposed that Ryoo’s proceeds should be held in escrow pending resolution of the appeal. In response, Ryoo’s attorneys agreed to consider this proposal if Defendant would also place his share of the proceeds in escrow to cover his debts to Plaintiff, which by then had grown to $3,658,630.76. Defendant’s attorneys first refused to recognize and then repudiated Defendant’s debt to Plaintiff. (Complaint ¶¶ 11-13.)

Plaintiff’s October 2025 complaint alleges causes of action for: (1) breach of contract – February 2019 loan, (2) breach of contract – August 2019 loan, (3) breach of contract – 2021 loan for settlement of Hee Ja Lee’s claims, (4) repayment of advanced money for personal expenses, and (5) open book account.

Legal Standard

“A defendant, on or before the day of his or her time to plead . . . may serve and file a notice of motion . . . [t]o quash service of summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over him or her.” (§ 418.10, subd. (a)(1).) By filing such motion, “a defendant makes a special appearance for the narrow purpose of contesting personal jurisdiction where the summons is defective. (Stancil v. Superior Court (2021) 11 Cal.5th 381, 393.)

“In the absence of a voluntary submission to the authority of the court, compliance with the statutes governing service of process is essential to establish that court's personal jurisdiction over a defendant.” (Floveyer International, Ltd. v. Superior Court (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 789, 793; see also Calvert v. Al Binali (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 954, 961 [“To establish personal jurisdiction, it is essential to comply with the statutory procedures for service of process.”].) “When a defendant challenges that jurisdiction by bringing a motion to quash, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove the existence of jurisdiction by proving, inter alia, the facts requisite to an effective service.” (Lebel v. Mai (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1160, internal quotations omitted.) 17

California Rules of Court, Rule 3.110(b) provides that a summons and complaint must be served on each defendant and a proof of service on each defendant must be filed with the court within 60 days after the complaint is filed. Proof of such service must be made by affidavit of the person making the service “showing the time, place, and manner of service,” and including facts showing service was made in accordance with California law. (§§ 417.10, subd. (a), 417.30.) Proof of personal service must be made on a form adopted by the Judicial Counsel. (§ 417.10, subd. (f).)

Analysis

The motion challenges the validity of substituted service effectuated on October 30, 2025, at MorningStar Assisted Living & Memory Care facility in San Jose, California.

Reasonable Diligence

For an individual defendant, a summons may be served on the defendant or a person authorized by the defendant to receive service of process. (§ 416.90.) If a copy of the summons and complaint cannot with reasonable diligence be personally delivered to the person to be served, substitute or constructive service may be made by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint at the person’s dwelling house in the presence of “a competent member of the household or a person apparently in charge of their office, place of business, or usual mailing address.” (§ 415.20, subd. (b).) “ ‘ “Ordinarily, ... two or three attempts at personal service at a proper place should fully satisfy the requirement of reasonable diligence and allow substituted service to be made.” ’ ” (Bein v. Brechtel-Jochim Group, Inc. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1387, 1391- 1392 (Bein).)

Plaintiff’s process servers made three attempts to personally serve Defendant at his residence – the MorningStar facility - on three consecutive days: October 28, 2025, at 5:01 p.m.; October 29, 2025, at 1:07 p.m.; and October 30, 2025, at 12:17 p.m. The process servers were told on the first visit that Defendant was on visitor restriction and could see only immediate family or people his family approves. On the second and third visits, Defendant was not present at the facility. Plaintiff exercised reasonable diligence. (§ 415.20, subd. (b); American Express Centurion Bank v. Zara, (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 383, 389.) Nothing more is required by the Code of Civil Procedure.

Evartt v. Superior Court (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 795, is distinguishable. There, plaintiff waited until three days before the limitations period expired to serve the defendant even though the evidence showed defendant had been available for service during all but a short period of that time. No such evidence is present here.

Competent Member of the Household or Person Apparently In Charge

Section 415.20, subdivision (b) requires that substituted service be made by leaving the summons and complaint “in the presence of a competent member of the household or a person apparently in charge” who is at least 18 years of age. (§ 415.20, subd. (b).) The person must be one whose relationship with the person to be served makes it more likely than not that they will deliver process to the named party. (Chinese Theater, LLC v. Starline Tours USA, Inc., (2025) 115 Cal. App. 5th 1048, 1058.) 18

Plaintiff argues that the front desk attendant at MorningStar qualifies as a competent member of the household or person apparently in charge because Defendant or his attorneys authorized the attendant to control access to him and his apartment. Defendant counters that the attendant explicitly disclaimed authority to accept documents on his behalf and cannot be considered a competent member of the household.

The controlling authority is Bein v. Brechtel-Jochim Group, Inc., which determined that a residential gate guard who controls access to a defendant’s residence satisfies the competent member of household or person apparently in charge requirement. The Bein court reasoned that because defendants authorized the guard to control access to them and their residence, the relationship between the defendants and the guard ensured delivery of process. The court emphasized that litigants do not have the right to control who may sue or serve them by denying physical access. (Bein, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at p. 1393.)

Bein is applicable to the facts here. The MorningStar facility has a staffed front desk that controls access to the building. Defendant resides in the memory care unit, and the facility staff enforce visitor restrictions. The front desk attendant confirmed to the first process server that Defendant was on visitor restriction and could see only immediate family and people his family approves. (Ex. F, Declaration of Due Diligence ¶ 2.) Julia Lee, acting as Defendant’s attorney-infact, has authority over Defendant’s affairs and receives most of his mail.

The visitor restriction policy requiring family approval for access to Defendant was necessarily implemented with Julia Lee’s authorization or acquiescence, as she exercises control over Defendant’s care and communications. (Julia Lee Decl. ¶¶ 5, 6.) By establishing a visitor restriction that required family approval for anyone to see Defendant, Defendant (through his attorney-in-fact) effectively designated the front desk staff as gatekeepers who control access. This relationship makes it more likely than not that documents left with the attendant would reach Defendant or his representatives, satisfying the Bein standard.

Defendant argues that the attendant’s explicit disclaimer of authority to accept documents distinguishes this case from Bein. However, in Bein itself, the gate guard threw the summons and complaint on the ground after being handed them. The court nevertheless found service valid because the guard’s relationship with the defendants—controlling access to their residence— made delivery of process likely. (Bein, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1393-1394.)

Defendant argues service is defective because the facility was not his place of business. Though the process server may have checked the wrong box for “business” instead of “home,” defendant does not dispute that the address listed matches the address of the MorningStar facility. That de minimis error is not adequate to find service defective.

Informing Person Served of the Contents of the Document

Section 415.20, subdivision (b) requires that the person with whom the summons and complaint are left “shall be informed of the contents thereof.” (§ 415.20, subd. (b).)

The proof of service of summons box 5.b.(1) is checked, indicating service at Defendant’s business, which includes pre-printed language stating, “I informed him or her of the general nature of the papers.” The proof of service of summons also suggests that the same individual made all three service attempts. 19

Evidence Code section 647 provides that the return of a registered process server establishes a presumption affecting the burden of producing evidence of the facts stated in the return. Here, registered California process server Celeste Perez signed the proof of service of summons. To rebut this presumption, Defendant must present credible evidence that the facts stated in the proof of service are false. Defendant relies on a declaration by Katreena Borlaza, who was apparently covering the front desk at the facility on October 30. But that declaration is unsigned. The signature line states “signature to follow.” An unsigned declaration is not competent evidence.

In the reply, defendant argues service was faulty because declarations supporting the opposition indicate the first two service attempts were made by someone other than Celeste Perez (the person who signed the proof of service of summons). But that discrepancy does not mean the proof of service of summons is inaccurate as to what occurred on October 30. And defendant provides no competent evidence to rebut the proof of service of summons as to that date.

The service statutes must be “liberally construed to effectuate service and uphold jurisdiction if actual notice has been received by the defendant, ‘ “ ‘and in the last analysis the question of service should be resolved by considering each situation from a practical standpoint.’ ” ’ ” (Bein, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at p. 1392.) Reviewing the circumstances of Defendant’s service, the court concludes Defendant’s evidence does not conclusively rebut the statement in the proof of service of summons that the person served was informed of the general nature of the papers. And it is undisputed that defendant received actual notice of this lawsuit.

Proof of Mailing

Section 415.20, subdivision (b) requires that after leaving the summons and complaint with an appropriate person, the server must mail copies to the person to be served at the place where the documents were left. Service is deemed complete on the 10th day after mailing. (§ 415.20, subd. (b).)

The proof of mailing indicates that copies of the summons and complaint were mailed on October 31, 2025, to Defendant at 1380 S. De Anza Blvd., San Jose, CA 95129, which is the MorningStar facility address. That satisfies the mailing requirement.

Conclusion

Defendant’s motion to quash service of summons is DENIED. Defendant must file and serve a responsive pleading no later than August 28, 2026.

The court will prepare the order. - oo0oo -

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