Espinoza Bail Bonds, Inc. v. Ludloff

1. Judgment On January 5, 2023, a default judgment was entered in Plaintiff’s favor against Defendant Heather Ludloff aka Heather Ann Ludloff in the amount of $10,551.46.

2. Jose Espinoza dba Espinoza Bail Bonds The Plaintiff in this action was Espinoza Bail Bonds, Inc. Plaintiff’s counsel states that subsequent to entry of the default judgment, he learned that Plaintiff is not a corporation. Rather, Jose Espinoza does business as Espinoza Bail Bonds. Plaintiff argues the use of the “Inc.” in the name was a clerical error which can be corrected.

a. CCP section 473 5

Plaintiff moves pursuant to CCP section 473. Subsection (d) of section 473 provides: “The court may, upon motion of the injured party, or its own motion, correct clerical mistakes in its judgment or orders as entered, so as to conform to the judgment or order directed, and may, on motion of either party after notice to the other party, set aside any void judgment or order.” It is not clear that this subsection is applicable. Plaintiff sued under the name Espinoza Bail Bonds, Inc. Therefore, judgment was entered as intended using the name provided by the Plaintiff. The error was in filing the complaint using the wrong name.

Subsection (b) of 472 provides, in applicable part: “The court may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a party or the party's legal representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against the party through the party's mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. Application for this relief shall be accompanied by a copy of the answer or other pleading proposed to be filed therein, otherwise the application shall not be granted, and shall be made within a reasonable time, in no case exceeding six months, after the judgment, dismissal, order, or proceeding was taken.” Subsection (b) is not applicable because the judgment was not “taken against” Plaintiff. In addition, this motion was filed more than six months since entry of the judgment in this case.

b. Inherent Power to Correct Plaintiff argues that a court has the inherent power to vacate and correct its judgments due to a clerical error or upon learning of the true identity of a party. Plaintiff cites Bastajian v. Brown (1941) 19 Cal.2d 209 and Pettigrew v. Grand Rent-A-Car (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 204. Independently of statute a trial court has power to correct mistakes and to annul orders and judgments inadvertently or improvidently made. (Bastajian v. Brown (1941) 19 Cal.2d 209, 214.) While a court has power to set aside judgments and orders inadvertently made which are not actually the result of the exercise of judgment, it has no power, having once made its decision after regular submission, to set aside or amend judicial error except under appropriate statutory procedure. (Ibid.)

In Bastajian, the Supreme Court found that the error that was the subject of that case was not a judicial one—it did not conform to and set forth the true judgment rendered by the court. (Ibid.) In Pettigrew v. Grand Rent-A-Car (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 204, the appellate court held that the inadvertent making and entry of a money judgment in excess of the amount limited by law was a clerical error which could be corrected by the trial court. (Id., at p.210-211.) A clerical error in a judgment, ‘'as regards correction, includes one made by the court which cannot reasonably be attributed to exercise of judicial consideration or discretion.” (Id., at p. 209–210.)

A judgment in the amount of $150,000, instead of the limit of recovery allowed by the applicable statute, $15,000, was therefore not attributable to the exercise of judicial consideration or discretion. (Id., at p. 211.) “It cannot be presumed that the court intended deliberately to render and enter a judgment which was contrary to law. Thus, there was an error in the judgment which was made inadvertently; it was a clerical error and could be corrected by the court under its statutory and inherent power [].” (Ibid.)

“‘Clerical error, ... is to be distinguished from judicial error which cannot be corrected by amendment. The distinction between clerical error and judicial error is ‘whether the error was made in rendering the judgment, or in recording the judgment rendered.’ [Citation.] Any attempt by a court, under the guise of correcting clerical error, to ‘revise its deliberately exercised judicial discretion’ is not permitted.’ [Citation.]” (Id., at p. 210.) “Witkin has said that the test as to whether an error in a judgment is a clerical or a judicial error ‘is simply whether the challenged judgment was made or entered inadvertently (clerical error) or advertently (judicial error).” (Ibid.)

“‘The general rule with respect to the power of the court to modify a judgment does not preclude the court from correcting clerical errors and misprisions either in the entry of the judgment 6

or due to inadvertence of the court. The term ‘clerical error’ covers all errors, mistakes, or omissions which are not the result of the exercise of the judicial function. If an error, mistake, or omission is the result of inadvertence, but for which a different judgment would have been rendered, the error is clerical and the judgment may be corrected to correspond with what it would have been but for the inadvertence. [Citations.] The court has inherent power to correct such errors. This power extends to striking out findings of fact and conclusions of law and a judgment and substituting wholly different findings of fact and conclusions of law and judgment.

In correcting a clerical error or mistake the trial judge may give effect to facts within his personal knowledge and to his recollection. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) Plaintiff has not provided authority that this court has the power to change the name of the Plaintiff after entry of judgment.

3. Vacate Judgment Alternatively, Plaintiff requests that if this court finds it does not have the power to make the requested correction, the default judgment entered against Defendant be vacated and set aside so that Plaintiff can amend the complaint to state Plaintiff’s correct name. This request is GRANTED.

4.

Conclusion

The default judgment entered against Defendant on January 5, 2023, against Defendant Heather Ludloff aka Heather Ann Ludloff in the amount of $10,551.46 is hereby VACATED and SET ASIDE. Plaintiff’s counsel is directed to submit a written order to the court consistent with this ruling.

5. SCV-267521, The Design Build Company, LLC v. De Arkos

(TENTATIVE ISSUED BY HON. JANE GASKELL)

IF ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED, MATTER WILL BE HEARD IN DEPT.

17. PLEASE USE DEPT. 17’S ZOOM LOGIN INFORMATION (SEE BOTTOM OF PAGE).

Defendant Eduardo De Arkos (“De Arkos”) moves for reconsideration of the order granting Cross-Defendant Robert Auger’s Memorandum of Costs. The motion is DENIED.

The trial in this action commenced on November 15, 2024, and concluded on January 31, 2025. Plaintiff Design Build Company, LLC, did not appear. Therefore, on March 18, 2025, this court entered judgment in favor of De Arkos against the Design Build Company, LLC, on its complaint. Trial proceeded on De Arkos’s Cross-Complaint. The jury determined that Cross- Defendants Design Build Company, LLC, Robert Brian Auger, and John William Currier were entitled to judgment against De Arkos on his Cross-Complaint. Accordingly, judgment was entered that Cross-Defendants were not liable to De Arkos and that they could recover costs of suit. On July 24, 2025, Auger filed a Memorandum of Costs seeking $32,690.00 which was awarded in the Judgment After Jury Trial entered on January 20, 2026.

A motion for reconsideration is brought pursuant to CCP section 1008, which provides at subsection (a): “When an application for an order has been made to a judge, or to a court, and refused in whole or in part, or granted, or granted conditionally, or on terms, any party affected by the order may, within 10 days after service upon the party of written notice of entry of the order and based upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law, make application to the same judge or court that made the order, to reconsider the matter and modify, amend, or revoke the prior order. The party making the application shall state by affidavit what application was made before, when 7