Motion to Set Aside/Vacate Default (CCP 473.5)
25CV161704: HENDRICKS vs WFG NATIONAL TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, et al. 05/27/2026 Hearing on Motion to Set Aside/Vacate Default (CCP 473.5) filed by WFG NATIONAL TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY (Defendant) CRS# 456525833204 in Department 20
Tentative Ruling - 05/21/2026 Karin Schwartz
The Motion to Set Aside/Vacate Default filed by WFG NATIONAL TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY on 04/16/2026 is Granted.
Defendant WFG National Title Insurance Companys Motion to Set Aside/Vacate Default is GRANTED.
Plaintiff Dana Hendricks initiated this action on December 26, 2025 against Defendant WFG National Title Insurance Company (WFG or Defendant) for (1) Breach of Contract; (2) Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; (3) Negligence; (4) Negligent Misrepresentation; and (5) Unfair Business Practices.
On February 3, 2026, Plaintiff filed a proof of service stating that service was effectuated on January 2, 2026 on Nancy Sals, on behalf of WFG. On February 10, 2026, Plaintiff requested entry of default, which was entered by the clerk on the same date.
WFG moves to set aside/vacate default pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473(b), on the ground that WFGs in-house counsel failed to timely retain outside counsel to represent it in the instant litigation. WFG submits the sworn declaration of Jeffrey Leung, WFGs Senior Vice President, Chief Claims Counsel. Leung acknowledges service effectuated by Plaintiff on January 2, 2026, and states that he failed to ensure that WFG timely retained outside counsel to timely respond to the complaint. (Leung Decl. ¶¶ 5-7.)
Plaintiff submits an untimely opposition. Plaintiff contends that Leung was not acting as litigation counsel or counsel of record, and was not representing WFG when default was entered. Plaintiff contends that section 473 requires that the attorneys conduct actually be the proximate cause of default.
Plaintiff relies on Cisneros v. Vueve (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 906, in which the court found that the defendant permitted default to be entered, then retained counsel who was equally neglectful in allowing default judgment to be entered. (Id. at pp. 911-912.) The Cisneros court found that because the attorney was not representing the defendants at the time default was entered, as a matter of law, he was not the proximate cause of the entry of default.
Cisneros is distinguishable from the facts here because in that case, the court considered whether the negligence of the later-retained counsel in permitting entry of default judgment was adequate to grant the mandatory relief under section 473(b). Because the client, not the attorney, was the cause of entry of default, defendants in Cisneros were not entitled to relief under section 473(b). 25CV161704: HENDRICKS vs WFG NATIONAL TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, et al. 05/27/2026 Hearing on Motion to Set Aside/Vacate Default (CCP 473.5) filed by WFG NATIONAL TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY (Defendant) CRS# 456525833204 in Department 20
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Here, Leung is in-house counsel. While he is not the attorney of record for the instant litigation, he is nevertheless an attorney of WFG. Based on his sworn declaration, he failed to timely retain outside counsel, which resulted in entry of default.
The general underlying purpose of C.C.P. § 473 is to promote determination of actions on their merits. (Austin v. Los Angeles Unified School District (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 918, 928.) Any doubts in applying section 473 must be resolved in favor of the party seeking relief from default. (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal. 4th 975, 980.0 Section 473 is often applied liberally where the party in default moves promptly to seek relief, and the party opposing the motion will not suffer prejudice if relief is granted. (Elston v. City of Turlock (1985) 38 Cal. 3d 227, 233 [internal citations omitted].) In such situations very slight evidence will be required to justify a court in setting aside the default. (Id.)
Defendant timely moved to set aside entry of default. Defendant presents sufficient evidence to establish attorney mistake to provide for mandatory relief under C.C.P. § 473(b).
Defendants motion is GRANTED. Default entered on February 10, 2026 is hereby VACATED.
Defendant shall file a response to the Complaint by June 12, 2026. PLEASE NOTE that the proposed Answer attached as Exhibit 2 to the Declaration of Kelly Andrew Beall is NOT deemed filed or served.
If a party does not timely contest the foregoing Tentative Ruling and appear at the hearing, the Tentative Ruling will become the order of the court.
HOW DO I CONTEST A TENTATIVE RULING?
THROUGH ECOURT Notify the Court and all the other parties no later than 4:00 PM one court day before the scheduled hearing, and briefly identify the issues you wish to argue through the following steps: 1. Log into eCourt Public Portal 2. Case Search 3. Enter the Case Number and select "Search" 4. Select the Case Name 5. Select the Tentative Rulings Tab 6. Select "Click to Contest this Ruling" 7. Enter your Name and Reason for Contesting 8. Select "Proceed" BY EMAIL
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA
25CV161704: HENDRICKS vs WFG NATIONAL TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, et al. 05/27/2026 Hearing on Motion to Set Aside/Vacate Default (CCP 473.5) filed by WFG NATIONAL TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY (Defendant) CRS# 456525833204 in Department 20 Send an email to the DEPARTMENT CLERK and all the other parties no later than 4:00 PM one court day before the scheduled hearing. This will permit the department clerk to send invitations to counsel to appear remotely.
BOTH ECOURT AND EMAIL notices are required.