Motion to Dismiss
24CV095244: LI, et al. vs CHEN 07/30/2026 Hearing on Motion to Dismiss filed by YANLING CHEN (Defendant) CRS# 937105287674 in Department 517
Tentative Ruling - 07/27/2026 Keith Fong
The Motion to Dismiss filed by YANLING CHEN on 05/06/2026 is Denied.
Defendants Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.
BACKGROUND
Yongyi Li filed this action through his daughter, Qunhua Li, as his conservator. Defendant litigated for more than a year without challenging that conservatorship, and the Letters of Conservatorship authorized Qunhua Li to maintain litigation on the conservatees behalf. (Li Dec. ¶¶ 3-4; McDonnell Reply Dec. ¶ 5 & Ex. C.)
Yongyi Li died on May 5, 2025. On June 2, 2025, counsel moved under Code of Civil Procedure section 377.31 to substitute Qunhua Li as plaintiff, representing that she has been appointed as executor of the decedents estate. (Wu Dec., Ex. A at pp. 1-2.) Relying on that representation, the Court granted the unopposed motion on August 7, 2025. However, no probate was ever opened, and no court appointed an executor. (McDonnell Dec. ¶ 5; Wu Dec. ¶ 5.)
The decedent had been married to Wenying Ge since the 1960s. (Li Dec. ¶ 6; McDonnell Dec. ¶ 7 & Ex. A.) The 2016 will submitted with the substitution motion states, at Section 1.1, I am currently not married. (Motion to Dismiss, Ex. A.) On February 19, 2024, the decedent signed and notarized a First Amendment to the Yongyi Li Revocable Trust stating that he was married when my Trust was created and I am currently still married. (Li Dec. ¶ 7 & Ex. A.) Schedule A to the trust lists the decedents bank accounts and his fifty-percent interest in Lancaster as trust assets, and his three other children assigned their interests in the claims to Qunhua Li. (Li Dec. ¶¶ 9-10 & Exs. B, C.) At her March 20, 2026 deposition, Qunhua Li testified that her father had been married to Ge since the 1960s. (McDonnell Dec. ¶ 7 & Ex. A; Li Dec. ¶ 8.)
By order of May 19, 2026, the Court held Defendants motion to dismiss in abeyance pending resolution of Plaintiffs amended motion for leave to amend currently set for hearing on 6/30/2026. However, upon further review of the matter, the Court determined that the proposed joinder of Wenying Ge is intertwined with the standing and fraud questions the motion raises. (6/29/2026 Order.) As such, the Court subsequently vacated the stay and set the motion for hearing with Plaintiffs motion for leave to amend.
Defendant moves to dismiss on two grounds: that Qunhua Li is not the real party in interest and lacks standing to prosecute the action, and that the action should be dismissed as a sanction for fraud on the court. The motion is decided on its merits.
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DISCUSSION 24CV095244: LI, et al. vs CHEN 07/30/2026 Hearing on Motion to Dismiss filed by YANLING CHEN (Defendant) CRS# 937105287674 in Department 517
A. Standing and Real Party in Interest
Defendant contends that Qunhua Li lacks standing on two related grounds. As a threshold matter, no probate was opened, and as a result, Qunhua Li was never appointed the executor of Yongyi Lis estate. Relatedly, Defendant contends that, in any event, every claim alleged in this action is community property that vested in the surviving spouse, Wenying Ge. As a result, Yongyi Lis death means that Qunhua Li never had any interest to prosecute. In reply, Defendant adds that the decedents transfers of community assets into his revocable trust were ineffective for want of spousal consent, so that the entire estate passed to Ge.
Every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. (Code Civ. Proc., § 367.) When a plaintiff who commenced an action dies, the action may be continued by the decedents personal representative or, if none, by the decedents successor in interest. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 377.30, 377.31.) A successor in interest is the beneficiary of the decedents estate or the person who succeeds to the cause of action, and must file a declaration satisfying Code of Civil Procedure section 377.32. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 377.11.) Where a complaint shows on its face that the plaintiff lacks the right or standing to sue, it is subject to a general demurrer for failure to state a cause of action. (Carsten v. Psychology Examining Com. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 793, 796.) A plaintiff who lacks standing to prosecute an action on the real partys behalf may have the action dismissed. (Tepper v. Wilkins (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1198, 1203-1204.)
While Defendants community property argument is partially correct, it does not support dismissal. On a spouses death, one-half of the community property belongs to the surviving spouse and one-half to the decedent, who may dispose of his own half. (Prob. Code, § 100; Fam. Code, §§ 751, 760.) The surviving spouses half vests in her by operation of law, and if there is no valid will the decedents half also passes to her. (Prob. Code, §§ 100, 6401, subd. (a).)
In the instant case, decedents portion of the estate passed under his trust and, through the childrens assignments, to Qunhua Li, who is a successor in interest as to that half under section 377.11. (Li Dec. ¶¶ 9-10 & Exs. B, C.) At most, then, Defendant has shown that Qunhua Li may not pursue Wenying Ges one-half interest. Defendant has not shown that no proper plaintiff exists, which is what dismissal would require.
In reply, Defendant argues that spousal consent and transmutation (Fam. Code, §§ 1100, subd. (b), 852) go to the character and ultimate ownership of the disputed assets, not to who may appear. Whether transferring community assets into a revocable trust changed their character, and whether those statutes defeat the childrens succession to the decedents half, are merits questions that cannot be resolved on this motion.
What remains then is a defect of form. The August 7, 2025 substitution rested on the incorrect representation that Qunhua Li was the executor, and no declaration under section 377.32 appears to have been filed. The remedy for a substitution that reached the right party under the
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA
24CV095244: LI, et al. vs CHEN 07/30/2026 Hearing on Motion to Dismiss filed by YANLING CHEN (Defendant) CRS# 937105287674 in Department 517 wrong label, and for a missing section 377.32 declaration, is correction, not dismissal. The motion also does not address the presence of Lancaster. Defendants notice of motion does not name Lancaster and advances no ground against its separate claims. (Wu Dec. ¶ 10.) Defendants argument that Qunhua Li lacked authority to sue on Lancasters behalf, and that any such claim must proceed derivatively, appears for the first time in reply, and the Court does not consider it. Lancasters claims will not be dismissed.
B. Fraud on the Court
Defendant contends that the action should be dismissed as a sanction because Qunhua Li obtained the substitution by falsely representing that she was the appointed executor and by presenting a will that stated the decedent was unmarried.
Dismissal as a sanction for litigation misconduct is a drastic remedy. A court has inherent power to impose a terminating sanction only when a partys deliberate and egregious misconduct makes any sanction short of dismissal inadequate to ensure a fair trial. (Stephen Slesinger, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co. (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 736, 740, disapproved on another ground in City of Los Angeles v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP (2024) 17 Cal.5th 46; see id. at pp. 71-72 [noting courts undisputed inherent authority to impose nonmonetary sanctions, including terminating sanctions, for discovery misconduct].)
Where the ground is fraud, the fraud must be extrinsic; it must deprive the opposing party of a fair adversary hearing, ordinarily by keeping that party in ignorance of the proceeding or preventing the presentation of a claim or defense. (In re Marriage of Modnick (1983) 33 Cal.3d 897, 905.) By contrast, fraud in the conduct of the litigation itself is intrinsic and will not support that relief. (Estate of Sanders (1985) 40 Cal.3d 607, 613-614.)
Here, Defendants showing falls short of the applicable standard. Plaintiffs counsel declares that the executor usage was a mistake in terminology and not an attempt to deceive. Counsel claims that his client conveyed the true underlying facts to him, including that no probate had been opened and that she held a written assignment from her siblings, and he chose the wrong legal label for that status. (Wu Dec. ¶¶ 5-7.) Qunhua Li declares that the wills marital-status clause was a template error the decedent himself corrected in a notarized 2024 trust amendment, and she volunteered the fact of the marriage at her deposition. (Li Dec. ¶¶ 6-8 & Ex. A.) Those facts are inconsistent with the deliberate and egregious intent a terminating sanction requires. (Stephen Slesinger, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 740.)
Materiality is absent as well. Defendant has litigated this case for over a year, took Qunhua Lis deposition, and has fully briefed the standing question. No party was kept in ignorance and no defense was suppressed. (In re Marriage of Modnick, supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 905.) Estate of Sanders does not compel a different result. There, the court found extrinsic fraud and reversed where an executors concealment and misrepresentations, in breach of a fiduciary relationship, kept the aggrieved parties from timely contesting a will. (Estate of Sanders, supra, 40 Cal.3d at pp. 614-615, 618-619.) No comparable concealment occurred here: Qunhua Li disclosed the marriage at her deposition, and Defendant has been aware of the pertinent facts and has litigated
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA
24CV095244: LI, et al. vs CHEN 07/30/2026 Hearing on Motion to Dismiss filed by YANLING CHEN (Defendant) CRS# 937105287674 in Department 517 them fully. And even if some irregularity had been shown, the lesser remedy of correcting the substitution would foreclose dismissal.
Although the Court is denying Defendants motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs counsel conduct in this matter is a cause for serious concern. The standing disputeincluding the additional litigation and motion practice that it has engenderedwas avoidable. Counsel told the Court, as a ground for relief, that his client had been appointed as executor of an estate that was never in probate (Wu Dec., Ex. A at pp. 1-2). Notably, Counsel was alerted by opposing counsel in early 2026 that no such appointment existed and that the case was exposed, and then did nothing to fix it (McDonnell Dec. ¶ 6).
That inattention, consistent with the tendency to overlitigate the Court has noted before in this case, generated a motion, a stay, and a round of concurrent briefing that a timely corrected declaration would have avoided. The Court expects the defect to be cured now, promptly and without further motion practice.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1. Defendants Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.
2. Within (7) seven days after service of notice of this order, Plaintiffs counsel shall (a) file and serve a declaration complying with Code of Civil Procedure section 377.32 establishing Qunhua Lis status as successor in interest to Yongyi Li, and (b) file and serve either a corrected motion to substitute or a proposed order amending the August 7, 2025 order nunc pro tunc to identify Qunhua Lis status as successor in interest under Code of Civil Procedure sections 377.11 and 377.31 rather than as executor.
3. If Plaintiffs counsel fails to comply within the time allowed, the Court may impose monetary sanctions or dismiss the claims prosecuted in the name of the individual plaintiff. This order does not affect the separate claims of Plaintiff Lancaster.
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