Bustos Garcia vs Nissan North America, Inc., a Delaware Corporation, et al.

If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 25CV004945: BUSTOS GARCIA vs NISSAN NORTH AMERICA, INC., A DELAWARE CORPORATION, et al. 06/03/2026 Hearing on Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Lemon Law) in Department 8D

****NOTICE: EFFECTIVE APRIL 13, 2026, THIS DEPARTMENT HAS MOVED TO THE TANI G. CANTIL-SAKAUYE COURTHOUSE LOCATED AT 500 G. ST. SACRAMENTO, CA. MOTIONS NOTICED FOR DEPARTMENT 25 WILL BE HEARD IN DEPARTMENT 8D OF THE NEW COURTHOUSE. ALL HEARINGS WILL TAKE PLACE AT THIS NEW LOCATION***** TENTATIVE RULING Defendant Nissan North America, Inc.’s (’Defendant’) Demurrer to Plaintiff Jose Bustos Garcia’s (’Plaintiff’) Complaint is ruled upon as follows. The request for judicial notice is granted. In taking judicial notice, however, the court accepts the existence of the documents, not the truth of their contents. (Herrera v.

Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1366, 1375.) BACKGROUND This is a lemon law/Song-Beverly Act action. Plaintiff alleges that on November 3, 2017, he purchased a used 2017 Nissan Pathfinder (’Subject Vehicle’). (Compl., ¶¶ 7, 10.) Plaintiff alleges that he received an express written warranty in which Defendant undertook to preserve or maintain the utility or performance of Subject Vehicle or to provide compensation if there is a failure in utility or performance for a specified period of time. (Compl., ¶ 12.)

The warranty provided, in relevant part, that in the event a nonconformity developed within Subject Vehicle during the applicable warranty period, Plaintiff could deliver Subject Vehicle for repair to Defendant’s authorized service and repair facilities and Subject Vehicle would be repaired. (Id.) Following the purchase of the Subject Vehicle, Plaintiff alleges the Vehicle manifested defects covered by Defendant’s express written warranties. (Compl., ¶ 13.) These defects include, but are not limited to: exhaust and battery defects (Subject Vehicle’s “defects”), which substantially impair the use, value, and/or safety of Subject Vehicle to Plaintiff. (Id.)

Plaintiff further alleges that he delivered the Subject Vehicle to Defendant and/or its authorized service and repair facilities for diagnosis and repair of the defects, but Defendant has failed to properly repair or replace the Subject Vehicle or make restitution. (Compl. ¶¶ 15, 16.) The Complaint was filed in this matter on February 28, 2025. The Complaint alleges four causes of action based upon California’s Lemon Law statute, the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, and for violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312.)

Defendant now moves for judgment on the pleadings as to each cause of action under the Song- Beverly Act on the grounds barred by the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 871.21 and its statute of repose. The Court also notes that Defendant’s notice of motion also seeks judgment on the pleadings on the grounds that “Plaintiff’s fraud claim is independently barred by

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 25CV004945: BUSTOS GARCIA vs NISSAN NORTH AMERICA, INC., A DELAWARE CORPORATION, et al. 06/03/2026 Hearing on Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Lemon Law) in Department 8D

CCP § 338(d)’s three-year statute of limitations, and the Complaint pleads no facts … adequate to invoke delayed discovery or fraudulent concealment tolling.” (Ntc. Mtn. at 2:3-5.) The Court will not address the latter argument because (1) there is no fraud cause of action in the Complaint; and (2) Defendant does not include this argument in its Memorandum of Points and Authorities.

Legal Standard

A defense motion for judgment on the pleadings ’is akin to a demurrer and is properly granted only if complaint does not state facts sufficient to state a cause of action against that defendant.’ (Shea Homes Limited Partnership v. County of Alameda (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1246, 1254; see Code Civ. Proc. § 438(c)(1) (motion for judgment on the pleadings for failure to state a cause of action).) In adjudicating a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court treats the pleadings as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions, or conclusions of law. (Schonfeldt v.

State of California (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1462, 1465.) In ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court will take judicial notice of records and may extend consideration to all matters that are subject to judicial notice. (Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 593, 604-605.) In doing so, the Court performs essentially the same task as ruling on a general demurrer. (Smiley v. Citibank (1995) 11 Cal.4th 138, 146.). DISCUSSION Defendant moves for judgment as to the first, second, third, and fourth causes of action, arguing (albeit without significant analysis) that the new rule set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 871.21 applies.

Notably, at no point in its moving papers does Defendant ever argue or even mention the duration of the applicable statute of limitations or statute of repose under section 871.21. Instead, it appears that Defendant simply identifies itself as an “opt-in manufacturer” (Mtn. MPA at 3:8) and seemingly expects that should be the end of the discussion and application of the statute is automatic. The Court disagrees with any such approach. Code of Civil Procedure section 871.20[1] provides: (a) Notwithstanding any other law, this chapter applies to an action, brought against a manufacturer who has elected under Section 871.29 to proceed under this chapter, seeking restitution or replacement of a motor vehicle pursuant to subdivision (b) or (d) of Section 1793.2, Section 1793.22, or Section 1794 of the Civil Code, or for civil penalties pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 1794 of the Civil Code, where the request for restitution or replacement is based on noncompliance with the applicable express warranty. (b) This chapter does not apply to service contract claims under Section 1794 of

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 25CV004945: BUSTOS GARCIA vs NISSAN NORTH AMERICA, INC., A DELAWARE CORPORATION, et al. 06/03/2026 Hearing on Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Lemon Law) in Department 8D

the Civil Code or any action seeking remedies that are not restitution or replacement of a motor vehicle. Section 871.21[2] states: (a) An action covered by Section 871.20 shall be commenced within one year after the expiration of the applicable express warranty. (b) Notwithstanding subdivision (a), an action covered by Section 871.20 shall not be brought later than six years after the date of original delivery of the motor vehicle. (c) The time periods prescribed in subdivisions (a) and (b) shall be tolled as follows: (1) As provided by tolling requirements prescribed in subdivision (c) of Section 1793.22 of the Civil Code, as applicable. (2) For the time the motor vehicle is out of service by reason of repair for any nonconformity. (3) For the time period after a pre-suit notice is provided to the manufacturer in accordance with Section 871.24, which time period shall not exceed 60 days.

Pointing to the Legislative Counsel’s Digest for SB 26, Plaintiff claims that Sections 871.20 and 871.21 do not apply here because Defendant’s ability to invoke section 871.21’s statutes of limitations is contingent on whether it opted into the new procedures under section 871.29. The laws applicable to the opt-in process were amended under Senate Bill 26, and those amendments did not become fully effective until July 1, 2025. Because the amended opt-in procedures did not become fully effective until July 1, 2025, actions commenced prior to July 1, 2025, are not affected by section 871.21’s statutes of limitations.

This case was filed on February 28, 2025 – prior to the fully effective date of the opt-in requirements of 871.20 and 871.21. Thus, the only way that these sections apply to this action is for the Legislature to have intended them to be retroactive. The Court rejects any retroactive application of Sections 871.20 and 871.21. A fundamental principle of statutory interpretation is that statutes generally operate prospectively only, and will not be given a retrospective operation that interferes with antecedent rights unless such is the unequivocal and inflexible import of the terms of the statute and the manifest intent of the Legislature. (See Myers v.

Philip Morris Companies, Inc. (2002) 28 Cal. 4th 828, 840.) Thus, a statute that interferes with antecedent rights may be applied retroactively only if it contains express language of retroactivity, or if other sources provide a clear and unavoidable implication that the Legislature intended retroactive application. (See, Thurman v. Bayshore Transit Management, Inc. (2012) 203 Cal. App. 4th 1112, 1140; Quarry v. Doe I (2012) 53 Cal. 4th 945, 955.) A law has a retroactive effect when it changes the legal consequences of past conduct by

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 25CV004945: BUSTOS GARCIA vs NISSAN NORTH AMERICA, INC., A DELAWARE CORPORATION, et al. 06/03/2026 Hearing on Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Lemon Law) in Department 8D

imposing new or different liabilities upon such conduct – in other words, when it substantially affects existing rights and obligations. (Quarry v. Doe I, supra, 53 Cal. 4th at p.956.) ’’In general, application of a law is retroactive only if it attaches new legal consequences to, or increases a party’s liability for, an event, transaction, or conduct that was completed before the law’s effective date.’’ (Ibid.) ’Ordinarily, considerations of basic fairness militate against such retroactive changes. [Citations.]’ (Ibid.)

There is a strong presumption against retroactivity. (See, McClung v. Employment Development Dept. (2004) 34 Cal. 4th 467, 475.) Moreover, in Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. Cole (1965) 235 Cal.App.2d 40, 43, the Court held: [A] statute shortening the period of limitations cannot be applied retroactively to wipe out an accrued cause of action that is not barred by the then applicable statute of limitations. ... To avoid the unconstitutional effect of retroactive application, a statute must be applied prospectively to such causes of action.

In this case, Plaintiff alleges that he entered into a warranty contract with Nissan on November 3, 2017, concerning the Subject Vehicle. If Section 871.21 applied here, it would require Plaintiff to have filed suit either within one year after the expiration of the warranty, prior to there being any such time requirements. It is neither reasonable nor feasible to conclude that Plaintiff was required to comply with a deadline that was not yet in effect. Moreover, the Court finds no clear or express indication that the Legislature intended section 871.21 to apply retroactively, nor does Defendant identify any such language in the statute. (See Landgraf v.

USI Film Prods. (1994) 511 U.S. 244, 270 [recognizing the presumption against retroactivity based on the unfairness of imposing new burdens after the fact].) Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is denied. Defendant shall file and serve an answer no later than June 17, 2026. The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312 or further notice is required. [1] Section 871.20 became effective January 1, 2025.

Section 871.20 was later amended, effective April 2, 2025, to include the phrase ’brought against a manufacturer who has elected under Section 871.29 to proceed under this chapter.’ [2] Section 871.21 became effective January 1, 2025.