Helsel v. West Coast Mennonite Central Committee, Inc.

(34) Tentative Ruling

Re: Helsel v. West Coast Mennonite Central Committee, Inc. Superior Court Case No. 25CECG03228

Hearing Date: July 23, 2026 (Dept. 503)

Motion: Cross-Defendant’s Motion to Strike Request for Punitive Damages

Tentative Ruling:

To grant cross-defendants’ motion to strike the allegations and prayer for punitive damages from the complaint, without leave to amend. In particular, the court strikes paragraph 29 and the prayer for punitive damages from the First Amended Cross- Complaint.

Explanation:

Cross-defendants Jason Helsel and Melissa Helsel, as Trustees of the Helsel Family Trust, Mark Vogt, and John Fowler (collectively “cross-defendants”) move for an order striking allegations seeking punitive damages in connection with cross-complainant West Coast Mennonite Central Committee, Inc.’s cross-complaint alleging trespass on their property.

Civil Code section 3294 states that, “In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) “‘Malice’ means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1), emphasis added.)

“In order to survive a motion to strike an allegation of punitive damages, the ultimate facts showing an entitlement to such relief must be pled by a plaintiff. In passing on the correctness of a ruling on a motion to strike, judges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth. In ruling on a motion to strike, courts do not read allegations in isolation.” (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255, internal citations omitted.) However, conclusory allegations of malice, fraud, or oppression will not suffice to support a claim for punitive damages. (Brousseau v. Jarrett (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 864, 872.)

“The adjective ‘despicable’ connotes conduct that is ‘“... so vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people.”’ ‘“[A] breach of a fiduciary duty alone without malice, fraud or oppression does not permit an award of punitive damages. The wrongdoer ‘“must act with the intent to vex, injure, or annoy, or with a conscious 3

disregard of the plaintiff's rights. [Citations.]”’ Punitive damages are appropriate if the defendant's acts are reprehensible, fraudulent or in blatant violation of law or policy. The mere carelessness or ignorance of the defendant does not justify the imposition of punitive damages. ... Punitive damages are proper only when the tortious conduct rises to levels of extreme indifference to the plaintiff's rights, a level which decent citizens should not have to tolerate.”’” (Lackner v. North (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1188, 1210, internal citations omitted.)

Here, cross-complainant alleges cross-defendants, their guests, invitees and clients have continued to access the WCMCC property despite a demand that crossdefendants cease and desist and that a sign was removed from the property by crossdefendant(s) and damaged. Cross-complainant has added further allegations as to cross-defendant’s knowledge of cross-complainant’s intent to use the sign to enforce its rights to have unauthorized vehicles towed from the property. (FACC, ¶¶ 17-22.) Crosscomplainant further alleges the removal of the sign was intended to violate its statutory rights under Vehicle Code section 22658 for the removal of unauthorized vehicles from the property. (Id., ¶ 23.) Cross-complainant argues these allegations plead crossdefendant’s conscious disregard for its rights to support the prayer for punitive damages.

That the removal of the sign was intentional or done knowing it would interfere with cross-complainant’s ability to tow vehicles from the property is not sufficient to plead malice. The acts alleged do not rise to a level of conduct that could fit a definition of despicable conduct necessary to support a prayer for punitive damages. (Code Civ. Proc. § 3294, subd. (c)(1).)

“Used in its ordinary sense, the adjective ‘despicable’ is a powerful term that refers to circumstances that are ‘base,’ ‘vile,’ or ‘contemptible.’ (4 Oxford English Dict. (2d ed. 1989) p. 529.) As amended to include this word, the statute plainly indicates that absent an intent to injure the plaintiff, ‘malice’ requires more than a ‘willful and conscious’ disregard of the plaintiffs' interests. The additional component of ‘despicable conduct’ must be found. [Citations]” (College Hospital, Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 725.)

Accordingly, the court intends to grant the motion to strike the allegations and prayer regarding punitive damages from the cross-complaint, without leave to amend.

Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), and Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5, subdivision (a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will serve as the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Tentative Ruling

Issued By: JS on 7/21/2026. (Judge’s initials) (Date)

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